

THE
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A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RĀMĀNUJA

By
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DEDICATION

THIS BOOK
IS DEDICATED WITH GREAT RESPECT
TO
DR. S. RADHAKRISHNAN
PRESIDENT OF INDIA
AND
ONE OF THE GREATEST PHILOSOPHERS
OF THE PRESENT CENTURY
WHO HAS ALWAYS ENCOURAGED ME
IN MY EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THE
CAUSE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

THE AUTHOR

'A VALUABLE PIECE OF WORK'—

says Dr. S. Radhakrishnan

* * An advance copy of this book was sent to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, President of India, for his kind perusal and permission to dedicate the book to him.

Having read the book, Dr. Radhakrishnan in a letter addressed to the author—Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, writes—

"I have looked through the pages. You have done a valuable piece of work. It is a systematic exposition of the philosophy of Ramanuja done with care and discrimination.....You may dedicate the book to me. With best wishes."

The Publishers

CONTENTS

	Pages
An Appreciation	ix
Preface	xi
Foreword	xvii
Author's note	xix
Chapter I—INTRODUCTION	3
Biography of Ramanuja—Historical Background— Sources of Ramanuja's Philosophy.	
Chapter II—EPISTEMOLOGY	25
Nature of Knowledge—Relation between knowledge and the object of knowledge—Meaning of self-revelation— Sources of knowledge—Perception—Sense-object con- tact—kinds of perception—Determinate and Indeterminate perceptions—Nature of illusion—Dream-hallucinations— Consideration of some important objections raised against Ramanuja's theory of illusion—Objections met— Memory—Pratyabhijna as a form of perception—Infe- rence—Kinds of Inference—Fallacies Upamana—Artha- patti—Scriptural testimony.	
Chapter III—METAPHYSICS	
Section A— <i>Theory of Causation</i>	62
Different views of causation as expounded in the Tattvakaumudi of Vacaspati Misra—Ramanuja's view— Relation between God & the world—substance—attribute relation between God and the world—Soul-body rela- tion—Motive behind Creation—Objections considered— Objections Met.	
Section B— <i>The Nature of Acit in the Philosophy of Ramanuja</i>	77
Meaning of Acit—Ajadattva of Suddhasattva—The Na- ture of Prakṛti—Prakṛti and Maya—Reality of the world—Evolution of the world—Causation according to Ramanuja—Samkhya Causality and Causality according to Ramanuja—Objections—Objections Met.	

Section C—*Soul in the Philosophy of Ramanuja* 99

Atman is different from body—Jiva and the external sense organs—Soul and Antahkarana—Jiva and vital airs—Positive characteristics of the soul—Peculiar characteristics of Jiva—Objections considered—conclusion.

Section D—*Avidya in the Philosophy of Ramanuja* 115

Metaphysical meaning of avidya in Ramanuja's Philosophy—Saptavidhanupapatti—Further elucidation of the unjustifiability of Samkara's avidya—Ethical meaning of avidya—Objections against Ramanuja's refutation of avidya—Objections Met—Conclusion.

Chapter IV—ETHICS

Section A—*Liberation as expounded by Ramanuja in his Philosophy* 127

Meaning of liberation—means of liberation according to Ramanuja—Jivanmukti and Videhamukti—The stage of Sthitaprajna—The nature of a liberated soul—Objections—Objections Met.

Section B—*Meaning of Bhakti in the Philosophy of Ramanuja* 141

Bhakti as described in the Sribhasya and the Vedarth-samgraha—Relation between Bhakti, Jnana and Karma—Sevenfold limbs of Bhakti—Different forms of Bhakti—Meaning of Prapatti—Prapatti and Paramabhakti—Conclusion.

Chapter V—THEOLOGY 155

God in the Philosophy of Ramanuja—Nature of God as viewed by Ramanuja—Staticism and Dynamism of God—God as the upadana karana and nimitta karana—Super personality of God and His aprakrita form—Vyuhaa of God—Avataras—Arcavataras—Proofs for the existence of God—Objections considered—Objections Met.

Conclusion 171

Appendix 202

Acknowledgment 244

Index 249

AN APPRECIATION

A few good modern studies on Rāmānuja have been for some years available. But whereas Śaṅkara's doctrine very legitimately attracted the earnest attention of Eastern and even Western philosophers during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries and raised an abundant exegetical literature : the Viśiṣṭādvaita school seems to have failed in stirring an interest equal to its merits. I do not wish to exasperate the age-long opposition between these two great Vedāntic āchāryas, nor to lessen the grandeur of the Prince of Advaita. But one should be prepared to welcome any new endeavour to do full justice to the metaphysical and religious genius of Śrī-bhāṣyakāra, provided the work is carried on with an objective and rigorous method.

Dr. Anīma Sen Gupta offers "A critical study of the philosophy of Ramanuja" that answers such a design and such requirements : and it is my pleasant duty to recommend her book to all who are concerned with the admirable development of Indian philosophy as well as with its culminating points.

The author is a thorough thinker and her work does not read so easily. But her lucid mind knows how to express difficult matters in a clear and attractive way. With searching insight, she gets to the root of things and grasps the essentials of the vast Viśiṣṭādvaita synthesis.

She emphasises very aptly the organic, nay organicist character of Rāmānuja's thought and shows that the keystone of the system is to be found in the body-to-soul relation : the whole world of sentient beings is assumed in the unity of the God-head in the same way as the individual body is assumed in the unity of the individual soul.

Dr. Sen Gupta hits the right path when she enables us to see how Rāmānuja understands his duty as a Vedāntic āchārya and how he endeavours to remain true to all the pronouncements of the upaniṣads, however contrasting they may be or appear, without

favouring these that advocate unity or those that vindicate plurality. She describes quite correctly Rāmānuja's procedure as an improvement on the synthetic method previously worked out by the Bhagavad Gita.

The author often refers to other darśanas and even to Buddhism not merely to illustrate the controversies held by Rāmānuja himself, but also and mainly to make Rāmānuja's meaning more intelligible and his originality more manifest. In dealing with such comparisons, she displays not only her scholarship but acumen and soundness of judgment. Her treatment of the Rāmānujiya epistemology as compared with other realistic schools in India is specially praiseworthy.

The essence of bhakti, according to Rāmānuja, is analysed with no less clarity and accuracy : it is interpreted not as a mere emotional outflowing of the soul, but as an exalted form of jñāna. The association of karma and jñāna in Rāmānujiya ethics is carefully scrutinized.

To sum up : Dr. Sen Gupta gives us a thorough, systematic and critical exposition of viśiṣṭādvaita vedānta. No important philosophical problem or issue of the doctrine is omitted. Her contribution is "critical and constructive". The work is original being based on the original Sanskrit texts of Rāmānuja, and also on account of the critical sympathy with which the author has explored the depths of her subject. We must be thankful indeed to Dr. Sen Gupta for this valuable and promising achievement.

University of Paris
Sorbonne.

Olivier Lacombe
Professor of Comparative
Philosophy

PREFACE

Dr. Anima Sen Gupta's book; "A Critical Study of the Philosophy of Rāmānuja," is a lucid and authentic presentation of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta as expounded by Bhagavān Rāmānuja.

Viśiṣṭādvaita Darśana advocates on the philosophical side a type of Absolutism, a kind of organic conception of Reality, and inculcates on the religious side, belief in a single supreme God who from His boundless mercy saves those who are His ardent devotees. Rāmānuja did not initiate a new school of Vedānta, but reaffirmed faith in an old doctrine treasured and elucidated by ancient masters (pūrvācāryas) like Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kaparḍi and Bharuci. He acknowledges his indebtedness to them, and more particularly to Bodhāyana from whose *Vṛtti* on the *Brahma Sūtras* he frequently quotes, and to his own paramaguru Yāmunācārya, whose *Siddhitraya* and *Gītārthasaṁgraha* furnished the basis for his own *Śrī Bhāṣya* and *Gītā-Bhāṣya*. The system, however, owes not a little to Rāmānuja. To appreciate the full extent of his contribution to Vedāntic thought and religion one should view his teachings in the context of the social milieu in which he lived and taught.

In the heyday of Buddhism and Jainism, the Hindu faiths suffered a serious set back. Among those who helped to stem the rising tide of the heretical schools and enable the Hindu faiths to build up their inner resources, casting away the overgrowth of ritualism and an attitude of exclusiveness, the Vaiṣṇavite Saints, known as *Ālvārs* (Persons immersed in the rapture of God-love) and the Śaivite saints, known as *Nāyanmārs*, who flourished in the early centuries of the Christian era, played a leading role. They revealed in exquisite strains their characteristic religious experiences. To save mankind from atheism and religious indifference and to throw open the doors of wisdom to all, without any distinction of caste, creed or sex, these stalwarts of the spirit, in whom we find

Indian Bhakti at its best, tried the novel but effective expedient of expounding divine mysteries in Tamil, the speech of the common folk, the language which they knew best and which spoke to their hearts.

While these Tamil saints sought to awaken the religious sentiments of the common people and to redeem them from rank atheism and the morass of asceticism, eminent Mimāṃsakas like Kumarila Bhaṭṭa and great exponents of Vedānta like Śaṅkara dealt deadly blows at the philosophical teaching of the Buddhist schools. Unable to withstand this onslaught, Buddhism gradually declined.

But Hinduism procured this victory over heretical schools at great cost. For, in course of time the Mimāṃsakas who had helped to overthrow the enemy came to attach more importance to sacrificial rites than to the gods themselves, whom they were intended to worship. This meant the spread of the evils of ritualism, blind formalism and the drying up of the springs of spiritual life. The ritualistic Mimāṃsaka relegated the really philosophical portions of the Vedas, namely the Upanisads, to a position of unimportance. The excessive emphasis which he laid on the Vedic ritual as a means of obtaining supreme blessedness promoted an illiberal spirit which kept out large sections of the people from either reading the Vedas or performing the ritual enjoined therein.

Master minds like Śaṅkara, who with their vast learning and matchless dialectical skill, were largely responsible for defeating the enemy were followed by lesser men who could not fully understand the lofty thoughts of their great master and seemed to incorporate into their system many of the doctrines of their opponents. Thus victory seemed in a sense pyrrhic. Belief in a God who is but a phenomenal entity, and in a *Jīva* who is, merely an appearance of the truly Real, and in a world that is illusory (*Mithyā*) might, it was feared, tend to atheism and scepticism and to a reduction of ethics and religion to useful fictions. The Mimāṃsakas laid undue stress on rituals; and the later *Advaitins* went to the opposite extreme and insisted upon the need for renunciation of all actions

(*karmasaṁnyāsa*). The outlook for Hindu thought was not at all pleasant. It was at this juncture that a succession of brilliant thinkers, Nāthamuni, (9th century), Yāmunācārya and Bhagavān Rāmānuja came upon the scene. Theirs was indeed a difficult task. They had to defend Hinduism against two classes of opponents,—those who repudiated the Vedic authority and those who accepted the Vedas but took considerable liberties in interpreting them. The atheism and scepticism of the Buddhists, the relativism of the Jains and illusionism of the Vedāntins had to be refuted. The upaniṣadic view of Reality and the intensely religious conception of life characteristic of the *bhakti* cult set forth in the *Ekāyana Śākha* of the White Yajur Veda had to be synthesised. While it was necessary to discard sacrificial ritualism which had outgrown its original purpose and begun to deny God, it was equally necessary to insist upon the importance of moral endeavour. If devotion to God, service to humanity and selflessness should be permanent values in human life and not wither away like the abstract moralism of the Buddhists, the firm theoretical foundation on which they are based must be made known.

The social order that prevailed excluded women and the lower castes from the privileges of religious thought and practice and naturally the axe had to be laid at this exclusiveness. The reconstruction of Vedāntic thought and religion effected by these Ācāryas was as timely as it was sublime. Their place in the history of Viśiṣṭādvaita Siddhānta and its own special features are described by Vedānta Deśika in the following words :—

“Our system of philosophy was started (on a new phase of its career) by Nāthamuni; it was considerably developed by the works of Yāmunācārya and was greatly strengthened (rendered proof against attack) by Rāmānuja. It is competent to dispel all kinds of ignorance (*tamas*), for it does not contradict perception; in its inferences, it has the great merit of economy of thought. It is in no way antagonistic to the spirit of the scriptures”. Speaking specifically of Rāmānuja's great services to the cause of philosophy, the same author says in

his *Yatirājasaptatī* that Rāmānuja saved from extinction the soul which was caught in the wild-fire of illusionism. As Maxmuller puts it, Rāmānuja attempted to give Hindus their souls back.

A notable feature of Rāmānuja's philosophy is the spirit of synthesis that pervades it. His is indeed a truly synoptic vision. The scriptural authority for this system is described as being two-fold *Ubhaya-Vedānta*, the Vedas including the upa-*niṣads*, *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and *Smṛtis* on the one side and the Hymns of the Ālvārs on the other. Not only does Rāmānuja show that the Sanskrit and the Tamil scriptures teach an identical doctrine but he also points out that the teachings of the *Pāncarātra Āgamas* are quite consistent with the Vedas. Of the Vedas themselves, the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* and the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* thereof, are exhibited as constituting complementary parts of one unified *śāstra*, the former elaborating the means of worshipping Brahman and the latter expounding the nature of the adorable Lord and of the worshipping souls, and of the world wherein they play their part. The *Jñāna-kāṇḍa*, the vast body of upa-*niṣads* is clearly explained as setting forth one integral body of doctrines. The seemingly contradictory statements, the *bhedaśrutis* which speak of the *Jiva* and the world as being distinct from Brahman, and the *abheda-śrutis*, which declare the absolute identity of man and material nature with Brahman and the absence of plurality, are reconciled without having to raise the *abheda śrutis* to the rank of *mahāvākyas* (great utterances) and belittling the value of the more numerous *bheda śrutis* as dealing with lower knowledge. Rāmānuja shows that each set of texts could be understood in its primary significance and assigned equal validity with the help of the *ghaṭaka-śrutis*. He could not bring himself to accepting the view that the Upa-*niṣads* speak in two voices.

The doctrine peculiar to Viśiṣṭādvaita (*pradhāna prati tantra*) which marks it off from all other schools of Vedāntic thought, the concept of animate and inanimate nature as forming the body (*śarīra*) of Brahman and Brahman as the soul (*Śaririn*) of all the universe is a key concept in Viśiṣṭādvaita. All the aspects

of the system, metaphysical, ethical, religious and mystical, centre round this. As Vedānta Deśika puts it : "Only he who understands the world to be the Lord's body could be said to have grasped the true significance of the unfathomable Vedas and reduce to order the tangled skein of scriptural texts."

In his treatment of the *hita* (the way), the same spirit of synthesis is noticeable. The *sādhana* is the spiritual ascent of the aspirant. There is a synthesis of divine grace and human endeavour. There can be no (*sādhya*) achievement without (endeavour) *sādhana*. *Karma*, *Jñāna* and *Bhakti* are presented as aspects of a progressively developing process culminating in *paramabhakti* (intellectual love of God).

The supremely Real is not only the metaphysical Absolute but also the God of religion. He is no other than Śrīman Nārāyaṇa, the all-pervading reality, in whom all things abide, and through whom individual souls progress to perfection and in whom they reach everlasting and limitless bliss. The Divine is conceived as the home of inexhaustible perfection. Of special interest to the souls caught up in *samsāra* are His attributes of *vātsalya*, *saubhāgya* and *saṁśīlya*. The Lord of mercy is ever ready to extend His helping hand to all aspiring souls. As *Rakṣaka* He is *siddhopāya*. He is thus the *prāpya* and the *prāpaka*; and the *tattva*, the *hita* and the *puruṣārtha*.

The Lord of mercy incarnates time out of number to save the wayward soul. The descent of Brahman (*avatāra*) with His soul-hunger into the abodes of men and the ascent of the *Jīva* with its God-hunger meet in the unitive stage of *Brahmānubhava*. To the Viśiṣṭādvaitic *Ācāryas* belongs the glory of democratizing the traditional religion of love by popularising the *nyāsa vidyā* of the upaniṣads as *prapattimārga* (the path of absolute self-surrender). All *Jīvas* with God as their indwelling Love are equally entitled to redemptive grace.

They resolutely set themselves against conservative tendencies. The system boldly invite all to share in its spiritual hospitality. Salvation is not the monopoly of any section or of any individual. Even the lowliest of the low and the worst

among the sinners may be sure of God's abounding mercy if only he places his trust in Him. The Gītā says. "Whosoever worships any deity with true devotion, in him I deepen that devotion, and he ultimately reaches me; and even those who worship other divinities worship me".

As stated by Rāmānuja in the concluding verse of the *Vedārthasaṃgraha* the marks of the truly philosophical attitude are as follows :

Openness of mind, width of vision, depth of insight, freedom from rancour, keen eye for the essential and anxiety to keep close to authority. Without a doubt, he exemplified in himself this philosophic attitude.

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In this excellent book Dr. Anima Sen Gupta writes with sympathy, understanding, clarity and critical acumen. The distinctive features of Rāmānuja's philosophy have been faithfully presented. Her work is fully documented and is a very valuable addition to the books on Viśiṣṭādvaita Siddhānta.

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May 12, 1964.

R. RAMANUJACHARI

Dean, Faculty of Philosophy
& Education

FOREWORD

Dr. Anima Sen Gupta's work "A critical study of the philosophy of Rāmānuja" is a welcome publication. It is indeed a work of extraordinary merit.

In this valuable work, the author has not only stated and explained the various doctrines of the great Commentator and thinker Rāmānujāchārya, but she has also tried to study them systematically and critically. The author's knowledge of the philosophy of Rāmānuja is deep, exact and free from sectarian prejudice. Her approach to treatment of the subject is not merely that of an expositor or commentator, but also that of a critical and comparative thinker. This volume is indeed a valuable addition to the literature on the philosophy of Rāmānuja.

The author Dr. Anima Sen Gupta is a young lady scholar, working as Reader in philosophy, Patna University, and also as Head of the Department of Philosophy, Magadh Mahila College, Patna. She has devoted herself to the study of philosophy and has already published two pioneering works, namely "The Evolution of Sankhya School of Thought" and "Chandogya Upanishad : samkhya point of view." Her another work entitled "Essays on samkhya and other systems of Indian philosophy" has recently been published.

Dr. Anima Sen Gupta is a very promising writer : she is bound to shine in the firmament of Indian thought. I congratulate her on this work which I consider as her first magnum opus to be followed by others.

May she live a long and healthy life to serve the cause of Indian philosophy !

*Atreya Niwas
P. O. Hindu University
Varanasi.
May 29, 1964*

B. L. Atreya

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The present work is a critical exposition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy of Rāmānuja. The philosophy of Rāmānuja is a form of religio-philosophy based on the bhakti-cult of Vaiṣṇava religion. Bhakti-cult is as old as the Vedas, although it has been shaped and moulded in different ways by various religious sects. Śaivas, Śāktas and Vaiṣṇavas representing different sectarian religions are all followers of the cult of devotion.

Śaivas, for example, regard Śiva as the Supreme Reality and He is supposed to perform five divine acts of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe together with obscuration and liberation of souls. Śakti represents divine energy or power of Lord Śiva, and Lord Śiva acts through Śakti. Individual souls are infinite, eternal and omniscient like God, but being in *pāśas*, they falsely imagine themselves to be ignorant, non-eternal and finite. Our past karmas, done under the spell of ignorance, are the *pāśas* or the bonds and these can be removed by Śaiva-sādhana which is to be practised under the direct supervision of a *guru* or preceptor and primarily by the grace of God. Religious discipline and grace of God constitute the means of liberation. Śaivism again has different offshoots with mild variations among them.

The religion of Vaiṣṇavism or bhāgavata-dharma accepts Viṣṇu as the Highest Reality. Worship of Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa and devotion to Him constitute the principal means of liberation. Lord Viṣṇu is the lover and protector of all human souls. He is the first and the final cause of the universe. He is endowed with six auspicious qualities of jñāna, śakti, aiśvarya, bala, viryya and teja. So, He is saguṇa; as He is devoid of all natural and impure qualities, He is also called nirguṇa. He lives in the hearts of all bhūtas and so He is called Vāsudeva. Knowledge of Vāsudeva is the supreme form of knowledge and God-realisation is possible through devotion and self-surrendering love.

Like Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism, Śāktaism too is a form of bhakti-cult and it has developed elaborately through Śakti-tantra. Śrīvidyā is an outstanding achievement in Śāktaism and it is supposed to have developed under the influence of the advaita-vedānta. Śrīvidyā is a pure form of worship of Devī as the primary cause of the world. Both bhakti-cult and advaita-vāda meet together in the worship of this Supreme Female Deity. In the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy, too, Rāmānuja has tried to effect a harmonious compromise between intellectual attainment of the advaita-vedānta and emotional outpourings of the Ālvārs (or the Vaiṣṇava-poets). Ālvārs of South India constituted a school of vaiṣṇava mystics and saints who used to compose devotional songs of Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa worship and adoration in Tamiḷ language. The word Ālvār means one who is well versed in the knowledge of God and is also mad with love for Him. In his "Hymns of the Ālvārs", J. S. M. Hooper has said that this group of vaiṣṇava mystics "fill the place between the Bhagavad-Gītā and Rāmānuja". In "Hinduism through the Ages," Dr. D. S. Sharma has remarked: "The fountain of vaiṣṇava-bhakti rises in the Gītā, passes through the songs of the Ālvārs, gathers its waters in the system of Rāmānuja and flows out later..... in varied streams all over India".¹ The Gītā has advocated a kind of reciprocity in the relation of love between the devotee and God. One who seeks refuge in God, becomes dear to Him and is also liberated finally through His grace. Bhakti is a pure and blissful dharma of the human heart. He who worships God with firm devotion is lodged in Him and remains in close communion with Him. The love relations of different forms existing between God and His devotees are replicas of the different varieties of the worldly sentiment of love which is also mutual, seeking constant nourishment from both sides.

The love of God and the spirit of self-surrender to Him which were thus the noble and prominent features of the bhakti-yoga of the Bhagavad-Gītā developed gradually into intense

1. D. S. Sharma : "Hinduism through the Ages"—published by Vidya-Bhawan Press, p. 38.

and passionate love of the Ālvārs. According to Prof. S. N. Das Gupta, "The Ālvārs were probably the pioneers in showing how love for God may be on terms of tender equality softening down to the rapturous emotions of conjugal love."¹

Ālvār Movement

The Ālvār movement was essentially an extra-ordinary overflowing of the heart which found a very deep root in the soil of South India during seventh or eighth century A. D. The eighth century A. D. saw the rise of Śaṅkarāchārya. He overpowered the minds of the Hindus of the age with his advaita philosophy which was a remarkable achievement of human intellect. His teachings that the absolute of the Upaniṣads should be regarded as impersonal and indeterminate and that the world should be viewed as a metaphysically illusory modification of that one indeterminate Brahman, seemed to throw a new light on the minds of the Hindus. The supremacy of knowledge to action and devotion advocated by Śaṅkara also satisfied the rational hankerings of his countrymen.

The Buddhist Śūnyavāda had already created enough confusion for ordinary people by its doctrine of the total unreality of the empirical world. In this philosophy, the world of experience appeared as unreal, non-substantial and consequently devoid of all values and meaning. Śaṅkara advocated the empirical reality of the world having value from the practical and ethical points of view, and for this reason his philosophy was highly admired. His rational approach, dialectical arguments and splendid metaphysical conclusions pleased the Hindus of the age so much that a large number of them became his followers.

Although Śaṅkara succeeded in producing a brilliant philosophy of the Absolute, he failed hopelessly in composing a satisfactory theory of religion. His way of approach to religion was detrimental to religion itself. Indeed, in his philosophy

1. Prof. S. N. Das Gupta—"A History of Indian Philosophy", vol. III, p. 84.

he had introduced a God to satisfy a religious mind : but this lacked the stamp of fullness and finality. His qualified Brahman was no doubt all-knowing and omnipotent, still being a product of māyā, it proved false and phenomenal like other things of the world. A false object can please a man so long as its falsity is not detected and the moment the falsity of the object is detected, his loving heart loses its support and sustenance for ever. The religion which Śaṅkara offered could not fully satisfy the emotional cravings of a religious soul.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy of Rāmānuja, however, strikes a balance between Absolutism and Theism, i. e. between Philosophy and Religion. Rāmānuja's philosophy of the Absolute is derived from the philosophy of advaita-vāda whereas his theistic view is an offspring of the theistic philosophy of the Ālvārs. His system is indeed unique particularly the manner in which Rāmānuja conceives the relation between cit, acit and Īśvara. According to him, God, soul and matter are ultimate realities but the last two are absolutely dependent on Him. Their relation to God is like the relation of body to the soul. Both soul and matter, therefore, are as inseparable from God as attributes are from the substance. The three form an organic unity. The highest reality is a qualified Brahman endowed with innumerable auspicious qualities.

Thus the philosophy of Rāmānuja is different from that of the advaita-vedānta according to which there is only one differenceless ultimate reality, Brahman. Īśvara is a phenomenal category which becomes as false as the jīva when considered from the transcendental point of view. So devotion to God will not lead a man to his final goal. According to Śaṅkara, Jñānayoga is the only means to realisation of the highest truth whereas in the theistic philosophy of Rāmānuja Bhakti occupies the supreme place. Bhakti, accompanied by love or *prapatti* involving self-surrender to God, constitutes the principal means of God-realisation. Mokṣa comes only after death and it is the stage of the enjoyment of supreme bliss with an *aprākṛta* form in the constant presence of God.

While advocating the supremacy of bhakti over knowledge

and action, he has also tried to bring about a reconciliation with jñāna and karma. Unless an individual acquires a true knowledge of his self as a mode of God on whom he depends fully for his very being, he will not be able to have that intense love and affection which are the essential ingredients of Devotion. For this reason, Rāmānuja had admitted that knowledge, being the cause of bhakti, is very intimately connected with it. Further, when devotion arises in the mind of a devotee, it can remain steady and unperturbed only through constant meditation, thinking and reflection on the nature of the Supreme Being.

Disinterested performance of action should not be given up at any stage of life. In this connection, Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya has quoted the following śloka of the Bhagavadgītā :

Yajñadānatapaḥ karma na tyājyaṁ kāryameva tat
Yajño dānaṁ tapascaiva pāvanāni manīṣiṇām —18/5
Yataḥ pravṛttirbhūtānāṁ yena sarvamidam tatam
Svakarmaṇā tamabhyarcya siddhiṁ vindati mānavaḥ—18/46

Even a sannyāsi should perform all actions relating to his particular āśrama. (Kevalasvāśramavihita—Karmāpekṣetyarthaḥ)—Śrībhāṣya —3/4/25.

Both knowledge and action are necessary forerunners of devotion and as such they should be regarded as doors to bhakti. It would therefore appear that there is perfect harmony between Devotion, Knowledge and Action. The true knowledge of the soul helps a man to give up the sense of agency of all worldly actions thereby making it possible for him to dedicate all his actions completely to God. Such a dedication results in ripening of his faith in God whom he now accepts as his sole refuge. This is the attitude of a devotee and thus devotion is not antagonistic to knowledge and action. In fact, Rāmānuja's philosophy has the merit of bridging the gulf between different systems of ancient Indian Philosophy in the spheres of ontology, epistemology, ethics and religion as a result of which his philosophical approach to different problems of life and the universe has become primarily synthetic.

In the concluding chapter of this book, I have interpreted in detail the synthetic character of the philosophy of Rāmānuja. I have also tried to show that the philosophy of Rāmānuja is the only system that reconciles all forms of worship and also all paths (leading to final goal) advocated by different religious schools of India. Even the theories of different religious schools of India, such as Materialism and Spiritualism, Realism and Idealism, Atheism and Theism, Dualism and Nondualism are not to be totally disregarded. All these Philosophies contain elements of truths and as such they are capable of satisfying human souls of different temperaments.

Those who wish to enjoy the diverse experiences of life admit a diversified world as real and true. The result is the formulation of a pluralistic philosophy such as the pluralism of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system. Again, those who, for temperamental reasons, wish to see only unity will see unity everywhere nullifying diversities of the visible world. This view is advocated in the philosophy of Śaṅkara which is essentially monistic. In his overzealous attempt to establish one Impersonal Brahman as the Ultimate Reality, he has falsified even the creator God who is so dear to the heart of a loving soul. In all his philosophical writings, Rāmānuja has laid emphasis on the truth which stands between these two extreme views. He has emphatically declared the reality of multiplicity and at the same time showing wisely that God or the Supreme Principle of unity is the ultimate source of the multiplicity of the world and as such Nature is wholly governed by this Principle of unity. He has glorified the spirit of unity by subordinating (and not abolishing) the principle of Multiplicity to it. He agrees with the materialists in giving an important status to the material world; but he differs from them when he accepts the existence of consciousness as another important constitutive principle of the world in addition to it. Neither matter nor spirit is a figment of imagination. They are the two real modes of a Supreme Being which alone is independently real. Materialism, therefore, suffers from the defect of omission as it has omitted an important ingredient of human experience.

Although the duality of thought and thing is a fact of experience, still it is not ultimate as both of them are the modes of One Supreme Being. The dualistic thinker has rightly discerned the dual principles inherent in all forms of worldly experience but he has not been wise enough to realise the existence of a still higher principle behind thought and things. If thought and things, which are supposed to be distinct in forms and characters, are not brought into a meaningful relation by a higher uniting principle which is also their guiding master, then a purposive interaction between the two which is all the time visible in this world, will never be possible. Matter provides spirits with an environment which offers them an opportunity for attaining perfection and it is the spirit that sustains matter after deriving power and potency from the Highest Being. Acit or matter is controlled by spirit and spirit is controlled by God who is its indwelling ruler. The spirit as the subject of experience and matter as the object of experience are distinguishable but not separable, as both of them are held together in an inseparable relation with God who is their final support. While matter is real, the materialistic outlook, which identifies the self with material series, is false; again while both spirit and matter are real and distinguishable, the dualism that keeps them apart by denying the reality of the final uniting principle is logically unsound.

Man is essentially a unity of intellect, emotion and conation and it is only by the satisfaction of these three aspects of his nature that he can be fully satisfied. Intellect awakens in him an intense desire for knowledge whereas emotion inspires him to cling to some such being from whom he will be able to receive love, solace and support. Conation, again, seeks its expression in activism and energism and incessantly drives a man to different ways of living, and forms of enterprise. A true philosophy, therefore, should be competent to inform the intellect of a man with true knowledge, to nourish his emotions by awakening in his heart an intense yearning for the object of the Supreme value and also to discipline his will into a strong and virtuous character.

If we reflect on the philosophical position of the dualistic Sāṃkhya, we find that its strict rationalistic character is capable of satisfying the rational mind of a man but is incapable of giving any satisfaction to his emotional life as it does not offer any scope for the outpouring of human heart in the forms of love and devotion. The classical Sāṃkhya is more a metaphysics than a religion. The conative aspect of man, too, does not find full satisfaction in the philosophy of the Sāṃkhya school as in the opinion of this school, the doer of action is the unconscious intellect and not the inherently conscious self. If the individual soul is not the real agent at least in his empirical life he will never feel inspired to lead a good and active life. The problem of free will which is the basic problem of morality does not arise at all in the philosophy of Sāṃkhya.

When we discuss the philosophy of Śaṃkara, we find an unhappy separation of Metaphysics from Religion. The highest of metaphysics is not the highest of religion and religion itself has been included in the realm of falsity and appearance. Here too, the subtle metaphysical analysis and powerful dialectical arguments of Śaṃkara will give immense satisfaction to the intellectual aspect of human mind; but the philosophy of Śaṃkara (as we have already seen) will undoubtedly fail to satisfy the emotional and conative cravings of man as both the spheres of morality and religion have been admitted by Śaṃkara as false and illusory.

In the philosophy of Rāmānuja, however, we find a very apt blending of the rationalistic attitude of the Sāṃkhya and the advaita-vedānta with the ethico-religious tendencies of the upaniṣads, the Bhāgavata, the Vaiṣṇava literatures, the Purāṇas and the Gītā. The ultimate reality is one only without a second of its kind and the multiplicity of the universe is wholly supported by it. According to Śaṃkara arguments should be used to make scriptural meaning certain for ourselves. It is only when *tarka* is coupled with scriptural testimony, that the Oneness of Brahman and Ātman can be fully realised. Though unlike Sāṃkhya and like Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja

has sought to establish the existence of the highest reality on the basis of the Śāstras, still he has also accepted the value of the arguments which are put forth to support the scriptural findings. Of course, scriptures alone are capable of telling us the truth, but reason can be employed to understand the real purport of the scriptures. In his opinion, Truth is always in harmony with both reason and revelation. So, the metaphysics of Rāmānuja gives importance to both *yukti and śāstra* although śāstras are to be given the superior place. His metaphysics is therefore truly a metaphysics and is not a dogmatic theism. When we succeed in realising the existence of God with the help of the scriptures, reason should come to our help to strengthen our theistic belief. The metaphysics of Rāmānuja is claimed to be more rational than that of Śaṅkara in respect of the fact that awareness of the truth of one's own self always implies the awareness of other selves, of the world of experience and also of the Supreme Being that shines for ever as the permanent support of both spirit and matter. Revelation is always a revelation of *cidacidviśiṣṭa* Brahman and never of pure Brahman devoid of all modes and qualities. (According to modern psychology also, self-awareness involves the awareness of other selves as well as of a common world). In knowing our own selves, we also know God. When an individual acquires a true knowledge of his pure *Aham* he also realises simultaneously that this pure *Aham* is only a mode of God on whom he fully depends. In other words, in knowing and realising one's own true self one also realises God as the Supreme Person. When God is, thus, known as our only support, we naturally develop a loving trust and devotion towards Him. Rāmānuja has said that the knowledge of God must be of the nature of devotion (*bhaktirūpā-pannam jñānam*) and by doing so he has proved that the highest reality which the devotee worships is not different from the highest reality which a metaphysician seeks to know.

Rāmānuja has not only provided the worshipper with God but he has also shown that this Supreme Being is the possessor of infinite auspicious qualities. He is good, wise, and is very lovingly disposed towards all creatures of the world. He is

so affectionate that He sometimes regards the demerits of his devotees as merits. (Vātsalyaṁ doṣepi guṇatva buddhirdoṣā darsitvamvā-YatIndramatadīpikā, chap. 7). ' Since He is the eternal friend of all individual souls, He is highly adorable by all irrespective of differences of caste and creed. The eternal union with such a loving God is therefore the highest goal of one's religious life. By admitting the supremacy of jñānamūlaka bhakti¹ in the form of *dhruvāsmṛti* involving a complete self-surrender to God, Rāmānuja has been able to satisfy the eternal cravings of human heart. Not only this : he has also formulated a living rationalistic religion which is, indeed, the pressing demand of the present-day civilization.

Lastly, Rāmānuja has emphasised the importance of the disinterested performance of actions in all stages of life; this has offered us a philosophy of activism which recognizes fully the dignity of an active life. In his *Gītābhāṣya*, Rāmānuja has shown clearly that there is no practical impossibility in the maxim "Duty for duty's sake". It is not that in doing duty for the sake of duty alone, one cannot have any motive or intention. Here Love for God is the principal moving power and all actions thus get transformed into worship of God. Action in the form of Divine Service develops into steady and continuous loving devotion of the Supreme and as such in all stages of life, action is of great ethical value. It is only by means of a sevenfold ethical and spiritual discipline that devotion can be built up firmly.

It is true that the philosophy of Rāmānuja favours a complete resignation of human will to the will of God; but this does not mean that he has made an individual soul a mere puppet in the hands of God. In order to keep up the dignity of human efforts, Rāmānuja has made provision for freedom of will and has thus based his ethical teachings on a solid foundation. In his opinion, the individual soul is both free and dependent on the Divine will. He is dependent on Divinity in the sense that for the performance of every action,

1. For Rāmānuja, bhakti consists of knowledge, intense affection and respect resulting in self-surrender to God.

the will of God is needed as the common cause; but he is also free in the sense that it is his desire that acts as the *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* of his action. The individual soul is no doubt a *kartā* but he is a "parādhīna kartā." (dependent doer).

From what is stated above it is clear that the religiophilosophy of Rāmānuja can be regarded as a system that affords satisfaction to the total self of man. Indeed his philosophy offers a synthetic view, and it has not omitted any important content of experience, and as ultimate reality, the philosophy of Rāmānuja has given us a triune unity without sacrificing any one of the three *tattvas*. In his opinion, the whole of the Śruti seeks to establish logically the truth of *cit* and *acit* as *prakāras* of God and the upaniṣadic texts cannot therefore be distinguished into primary and secondary.

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In my attempt to give a critical and constructive interpretation of the philosophy of Rāmānuja, I have tried to consider the various topics of Rāmānuja's philosophy on comparative basis as far as possible. The criticism is fairly 'exhaustive' in relation to other systems of ancient Indian philosophy, but I have made no attempt to compare and contrast the teachings of this great philosopher with the theories of Western thinkers. This is because the main purpose of this book is to bring to light the essentially synthetic character of the philosophy of Rāmānuja which has enabled this system to effect a happy reconciliation of *śāstra* and *yukti*, *tattva*, *hita* and *puruṣārtha*, *dvaita* and *advaita*, etc. on the basis of Indian scriptures.

It is a critical study of the philosophical teachings of Rāmānuja and as such I have tried to collect material mainly from the original writings of Śrī Rāmānujāchārya. I have taken the help of the commentaries only where it has become absolutely necessary, and I take full responsibility for all the interpretations given. I have also tried to answer a number of charges that are generally brought against Rāmānuja on the basis of my own interpretation of the philosophical position of this great thinker.

The materials for the work have been collected from the following books of Ramanuja (in Sanskrit) :—

(1) Śrībhāṣya—Chatussutri portion, with the commentary Śrutaprakāśikā—Edited and published by T. Srinivasa Sarma, Bombay, 1916.

(2) Śrībhāṣya—Vols. I & II.—printed at Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1940.

(3) Commentary on the Gītā, published by the Gita Press.

(4) Vedānta Sāra—Pancanadiya Pandita—Sri Sudarsanacarya Sastri likhitadhi-karanasara-vatisahitah—Published by Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1954.

(5) Vedāntadīpa—Vedārtha Samgraha with the gloss called Tatparya Tika by Sundarsana Suri—Publisher : Dr. Jagannath Prasad, M. B. B. S., Second Edition—1924.

(6) Saranāgati-gadya contained in Strotra-ratnāvalī, Bombay, 1982 vikrama.

Incidental references to YatIndramatadīpikā by Srinivasdasa (published by V. G. Apte; second edition, 1934, Poona) and Tattvatraya of Srīlokacarya Swami (published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1938) have been made on relevant occasions. In transliteration the common method of Putting the diacritical marks has been adopted.

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The title of the book calls for a little explanation. When I say a "critical study", it does not mean merely "fault-finding." I have made an attempt to analyse carefully and also in a subtle philosophical manner the qualities of the philosophy of Rāmānuja. I have also tried to evaluate the comparative worth of this system.

Again this is not a popular work. The book is mainly intended for scholars and for all readers who have comprehensive knowledge of Sanskrit. I have used Sanskrit words extensively for clarity and to avoid ambiguity. The book is written in English because English is the recognised medium

for all post-graduate examinations. The work is naturally to be read and made use of by those persons who will be doing research work on Rāmānuja.

My grateful thanks are particularly due to Prof. R. Ramanujachari of Annamalai University, for writing the preface to this book despite his ill-health. Prof. Ramanujachari is a wellknown scholar who has made standard contribution to the philosophy of Vishishtadvaita : his appreciation of this work, therefore, carries immense value.

Padmabhusan Knight Commander Darshanacharya Dr. B. L. Atreya, D. Litt., an all-India figure in the philosophic world, has done me a great favour by writing the Foreword most willingly.

Lastly, I am specially grateful to Prof. O. Lacombe, Professor of Comparative Philosophy, University of Paris, who took the trouble of reading the entire typescript. His appreciation of the book is a source of great encouragement to me. Not only this, his opinion is valuable because he is an authority on Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

In writing this book, I have received encouragement from Prof. Kedar Nath Ojha, Darshansagar, Senior Professor of Philosophy, Government Sanskrit College, Patna. I am really grateful to him.

Unfortunately, despite all efforts, some printing mistakes have crept in for which I may be forgiven by my generous readers.

On page 171, the title "Conclusion" continues upto page 201. The word "Chapter V" appearing on pages 173, 175 and the word "Chapter IV" appearing on pages 177, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 199 and 201 are misprints and have no significance.

*Patna University
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Anima Sen Gupta

**À CRITICAL STUDY OF
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RĀMĀNUJA**

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Biography of Ramanujacharyya

Śrīperumbudus is a prosperous village in Chingleput district which is about thirtysix miles to the south of the city of Madras. This village which is also called *Śrīmahābhūta-purī* in *Sanskrit* is inhabited mainly by the *Brahmins*.

About a thousand years ago, Āsurikeśavāchāryya—an honest *Brahmin*—used to live in this village. He belonged to *Hārītāgotra* and was a follower of *Āpastambha* school of the *Yajurveda*. Āsurikeśava married Kāntimati—a sister of Śrī Śailapūrṇa who was a disciple of Yamunāchāryya. On the occasion of a lunar eclipse, Keśava, along with his wife Kāntimati, went to Vṛndāranya and there on the bank of the 'Kumudsarovara' he performed a sacrifice with a desire to beget a son. At night Śrīkeśava saw *Pārtha-sārathī* in a dream and he got assurance from Lord *Viṣṇu* that He Himself would be born to him as a son, so as to save human beings from falling into the dark pit of irreligion and impiety. Actually by divine grace Keśava and Kāntimati were blessed with a son in 1017 A. D. The astrologers predicted that their son would one day become a great person. Śailapūrṇa, the brother of Kāntimati, gave the child the name of Rāmānuja.

The thread-giving ceremony of Rāmānuja was performed when he was eight years old. He studied the scriptures from his father till the age of sixteen when he was married to a very beautiful girl. Within a very short time after his marriage, Rāmānuja lost his father who was so dear to him. He then left his native village with his family and went to Kānci with a view to acquiring more knowledge. Yādava Prakāśa was then famous for his learning and as he was in Kānci, Rāmānuja went there to receive lessons from him.

As Rāmānuja was born and brought up in a family which followed the cult of *Bhakti*, he developed from his childhood an intense love and admiration for Lord *Viṣṇu* as a Personal God endowed with all auspicious qualities. It was because of this living faith in theism that he began to incur his preceptor's disfavour and hatred. The displeasure of Yādava Prakāśa reached its limit when one day after having heard of his preceptor's interpretation of the proposition "*Brahman* is truth, knowledge and infinity", Rāmānuja offered his own interpretation of the proposition from the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* point of view. His novel interpretation was rejected by Yādava Prakāśa and torrents of reproaches were showered on him. Rāmānuja bore all these humiliations quietly but he stuck to his point firmly and with a great zeal.

When Yādava Prakāśa failed to defeat Rāmānuja by arguments, he made a plot with his pupils to drown Rāmānuja at the sacred confluence of the Ganges and the Yamunā at Prayāg. His plot could not be carried out as Govinda, a pupil and a cousin of Rāmānuja divulged the secret to him and asked him to run away. Rāmānuja at once slipped away quietly without being noticed by anybody but he lost his way in the forest. Through God's grace, Rāmānuja met a fowler couple in that dense forest who escorted Rāmānuja safely to Kānci.

Rāmānuja was so mild and amiable by nature that Yādava Prakāśa was able to win his confidence again and Rāmānuja once more became his disciple.

At that time Yamunāchāryya, the great *Vaiṣṇava* scholar was living at Śrīrangam and he was in search of a brilliant young man who would be able to propagate the cult of devotion in the proper manner and spirit. Kāncipūrṇa was a student of Yamunāchāryya and he was also known to Rāmānuja's family. Yamunāchāryya heard about Rāmānuja from Kāncipūrṇa when he paid a visit to Kānci but he did not make any attempt to talk to Rāmānuja personally at that time as Rāmānuja was then receiving lessons from Yādava Prakāśa.

Yādava Prakāśa could not remain on good terms with Rāmānuja for a long time. Soon he fell out with Rāmānuja on the interpretation of the *Śruti* text "*Kāpyasam Puṇḍarikam*". Yādava Prakāśa compared God's eyes to the red buttocks of a monkey whereas Rāmānuja explained the text by saying that "the eyes of God seemed like petals of a lotus blooming forth under the rays of the sun". This difference in the interpretation of the text made Yādava Prakāśa so angry that Rāmānuja was at once driven out by him. Rāmānuja came out and started worshipping Nārāyaṇa regularly on Hostiśaila in Kānci.

As Yamunāchāryya wanted Rāmānuja to work for the propagation of the Devotional Cult, he sent Mahāpūrṇa at this time to bring Rāmānuja to Śrīrangam. But before Rāmānuja could reach Śrīrangam, Yamunā died. The body of Yamunā was still lying on bed and the three fingers of his right hand were closed. Rāmānuja was told that Yamunā had three unfulfilled desires which he wanted Rāmānuja to fulfil in his lifetime. These three desires were: (1) propagation of the cult of devotion, (2) composition of a commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* from the devotional point of view and (3) giving the names of *parāśara* and *Sathkopa* to two suitable persons. Rāmānuja promised that he would try his best to complete these tasks with the result that the three closed fingers of Yamunā became straight one by one. Rāmānuja, then, returned to Kānci and became attached to Kāncipūrṇa as his teacher.

After some time, Rāmānuja went to Śrīrangam where he was initiated into the cult of Vaiṣṇavism. Rāmānuja got his initiation from Pūrṇāchāryya at Śrīrangam and then both of them returned to Kānci where they began to live together. For some time, they lived in peace but afterwards a clash took place between the ladies of the house as a result of which Rāmānuja left home and embraced asceticism.

His first disciples were Dāsarathi and Kuresh—his sister's sons. Yādava Prakāśa too, being impressed by his deep learning and purity of heart, became his disciple and was renamed as Govindadāsa.

Rāmānuja was aware of Bodhāyanavṛtti which was available only in Kashmir. So, he went to Kashmir with Kuresh who had a wonderful memory. Kuresh memorised the whole of *Bodhāyanavṛtti* and then both of them came away from Kashmir. With the help of Kuresh's memory, Rāmānuja was able to compose his monumental work "*Śrībhāṣya*" on the line of the *Bodhāyanavṛtti*. He also wrote *Vedāntadīpa*, *Vedāntasāra*, *Vedārthasaṅgraha* etc. He also wrote a commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* and composed another important devotional literature, the *Gadya-traya*.

Rāmānuja was put to trouble by Kulottunga of the Chola dynasty. He had to undergo much hardships in Śrīrangam and ultimately he had to leave that place. During the reign of Vikrama Chola who had a sympathetic attitude towards *Vaiṣṇavas*, Rāmānuja again returned to Śrīrangam where he installed the images of *Ālvārs*. Rāmānuja lived more than one hundred years and all through his life, he struggled hard to establish *Vaiṣṇava* faith in India on a firm philosophical ground.

Historical Background

To understand the philosophy of Rāmānuja it is necessary to know the historical atmosphere of the country when he was born. In South India, the Cholas became powerful under Rajaraja early in the eleventh century. Rajaraja's conquests came to an end in 1005 A. D.; and he fixed the boundary of the Chola empire on the northern and north-western side.

Hieun-Tsang's travel stories give us enough clues that in Southern India Buddhism began to decline about the middle of the seventh century. The *Vaiṣṇavite* and *Śaivite* saints of South India began to fight it on the ground of *bhakti* with the result that *bhakti* movement started gaining ground in South India from the seventh century onward. Through the joint efforts of *Ālvārs* and *Nāyanmārs*, the religions of Buddhism and Jainism suffered serious reverses in South India. The *Ālvārs* flourished considerably in the South till the 9th century A. D. These *Ālvārs* while emphasizing the need for recitation of God's name, meditation on His different forms, worship of

God in different temples, had also expressed reverence and deep piety for the *Vedas*. They were also familiar with the *Purāṇas* and used to hold them in high esteem. This attitude of the *Ālvārs* might have inspired Rāmānuja to include *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas* among *Prāmāṇya* (authoritative) books and also to formulate a religio-philosophy which would be based on the *Brahmasūtras* as well as on the *Tantras*, the *Saṁhitās* and the *Purāṇas*.

The several branches of the Chalukyas reigned over different portions of South India for a fairly long time (i. e. from the sixth century A. D. to almost the middle of the eighth century A. D.). It was during this period that Vaiṣṇavism flourished in South India. The family emblem of the early Chalukyas was the boar form of *Śriviṣṇu* and the traditional belief was that this emblem was obtained by the Chalukya family through the grace of *Nārāyaṇa*.

During the whole history of the Pallava rule, extending from 200 A. D. to 900 A. D., religion, art and Sanskrit literature flourished peacefully in the peninsular India thereby bringing into being a healthy union between the cultures of the North and the South. Both Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism—the two branches of the *Bhakti* cult—were shaped and formed during the reign of the Pallava kings. Śaiva literature and *Vaiṣṇava* literature were composed in Tamil during the age of the Pallavas. Truly speaking, the age of the Pallavas was the age when people became dissatisfied with the godless religions of early Buddhism and Jainism and were eager to bring themselves into close touch with God through the religion of the *Bhakti*-cult. This eagerness of the people found expression through Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism which on many occasions formed a common front against Jainism and Buddhism. Prof. Nilkaṇṭha Śāstri has said : “In stemming the strong current of anti-*vedic* heresy, the *Ālvārs* and *Nāyanmārs* had laboured together in the past.....”¹

Thus Vaiṣṇavism in the traditional form of Bhāgavatism flourished in South India from a very early time. Rāmānuja gave the existing *Vaiṣṇava* religion a new philosophical form

1. The Cholas—vol. II, part I, p. 474.

and presented the system as a religio-philosophy of a very high order.

Rāmānuja, however, had to work in an age when Kulottunga I of Chola dynasty was the ruler of the place. The Cholas were in favour of Śaivism but there was no evidence of the *Vaiṣṇavas* being persecuted as such before the age of Kulottunga who was a jealous patron of Śaiva religion. Thus, although the cultural atmosphere of his country was favourable for Rāmānuja, the political atmosphere was very much against him. The eyes of Mahāpūrṇa and Kuresh were taken out by Kulottunga and the *Vaiṣṇava* saints were mercilessly persecuted. Rāmānuja too was forced to leave Śrīrangam in the garb of an ordinary householder to save his life. Kulottunga was succeeded by his son Vikrama Chola who was perhaps a *Vaiṣṇava* and so most probably in his reign, Rāmānuja was able to return to Śrīrangam.

Sources of Rāmanuja's Philosophy

The Vedas :

The cult of *Bhakti* upholding *Viṣṇu* as the Lord of the universe, had its origin in the *Ṛgveda*.¹ *Viṣṇu* was regarded as a Great Deity pervading the whole universe. He was supposed to be the creator and the protector of the whole universe. Lord *Viṣṇu* has been characterised in the *Ṛgveda* as beneficent, pure and undeceivable, preserver of the world, generous, merciful, wish-fulfiller, brave, all-encompassing and creator. The idea of *ātmanivedana* as a golden means to the attainment of God² is also present in the *Ṛgveda*. The *Ṛgveda* also says that the path of devotion is the easiest and the best, as it offers immeasurable bliss at every stage of spiritual progress³. According to *Vaṣiṣṭa*, *Viṣṇu* knows everything

1. (a) *Ṛgveda*—1. 22. 17 :

Idam viṣṇurvicakrame tredha nidadhe padam.

(b) *Ibid* : 1. 154. 4 :

Ta tu tridhātu prthivīmūta dyāmeke adhōra bhuvanāni viśva.

2. *Ṛgveda*—11. 27. 5, 11. 27. 11, 11. 27. 13.

3. *Ibid*—11. 27. 16.

about creation and nobody has ever reached the end of His greatness (na te viṣṇo jāyamāno na jāto deva mahimnāḥ paramantamūpa R̥gveda 7. 66. 2). In the *Taittiriya Saṁhitā* (1. 6, 4, 3 (r)), it has been stated that by the sacrifice to *Viṣṇu*, one may attain health and wealth and security. Benevolence and eagerness to help man are two important traits of His character and He is also regarded as the redeemer and expiator. *Viṣṇu* maintains the Cosmic order and natural laws and hence he has been described as the protector of the cosmic order.

Thus, we can say that the stream of *bhakti* that flooded the philosophy of Rāmānuja, had started flowing quite markedly through the literature of the *Vedas*.

Upaniṣads :

Rāmānuja has based his philosophy on the teachings of the *upaniṣads*. He has given ample justification for his *viśiṣṭādvaitic* interpretation of the passages of the various *upaniṣads*. The fundamental conception of Rāmānuja's philosophy is the conception of the Absolute as a *Triune Unity* and this he has formed in accordance with the *upaniṣadic* teachings. The *Śveta. upaniṣad* tells us that there are three eternal and ultimate entities which constitute the Absolute and these are powerless and ignorant soul, the powerful and all-knowing God, and eternal *Prakṛiti* that exists for the enjoyment of the individual soul.¹ Again, in the same *upaniṣad*, it has been stated that man has got to know the three entities which constitute the Absolute, namely, the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the enjoyer. By knowing these three, a man knows all.²

Regarding the view that God is the soul of Nature, we find a passage in the *Bṛhad. upaniṣad* which tells us that God is

1. Śveta upa.—1. 9.

Jñāñau dvāvayāvīśānīśāvīśahyeka bhoktṛ bhogārthayuktā. Ananta-
cātmaśīvarūpohyakartā trayamyadāvindate Brahmanetat.

2. Śveta upa. 1. 12.

Etajjñeyam nityamevātmasamsthām nātaḥparam veditavyaṁ hi kiñcit.
Bhoktā bhogyaṁ, preritāraṁca matvā sarvaṁ proktaṁ trividhaṁ brah-
manetat.

the *antaryāmi* of the universe. He exists inside the universe and governs it from within. The inner controller is "He who dwells in earth but is within it, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth and who controls earth from within, is the inner controller—your own self and immortal."¹ This inner controller is immanent in fire, in air, in space, in the sun, in the moon, in darkness, in light and in all things and beings of the universe. Thus, the *Bṛhad. upaniṣad* declares that one all-pervading God is the supervisor of the whole universe. In the *Taittirīya upaniṣad* too, it has been stated that God is the immanent principle of all things including even the contradictories: "Having brought it forth verily, He entered into it, having entered it, He became both the Being and the Beyond. He became the defined and the undefined; the founded and the foundationless, the conscious and the unconscious, the real and the unreal; whatever else there is—He became the entire reality. For that reason, sages declare that all this is Real."² There is also another passage in the *Bṛhad. upaniṣad* which declares that "God is the All. He is both the formed and the formless, the mortal and the immortal, the static and the dynamic. He is the Truth of truths, for all these are true and He is the Supreme Truth."³ On the basis of all these upaniṣadic truths, Rāmānuja has framed his theory of God as the soul of everything, as the Real of the Reals and also as the Truth of all truths.

1. *Bṛhad. upa.* 3. 7. 3.

*Yah pṛthivyāṁ tiṣṭhan pṛthivyā antarah yam pṛthivī naveda, yasya pṛthivī śarīraṁ, yah pṛthivimantarayamayati Eṣa te ātmāntaryāmya-
mītaḥ*

2. *Taittirīya*—11. 6.

*Tatsṛṣṭoḥ tadevāṁspraviśat, tadanuṣraviṣya sasea tyaceḍbhavat. Nīruktāṁ cānīruktāṁ ca. Nīlayanaṁ cānīlayanaṁ ca. Vijñānaṁ cāvijñānaṁ ca. Sa'yam cānyāṁ ca. Sa'yamabhavat. Tadidaṁ kīṇa tat satyamityā-
cākṣate.*

3. *Bṛhad. upa.* 2. 3. 1. & 2. 3-6.

Deo evāva Brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtāṁ caimūrtāṁ ca, martyāṁ cāmṛtyāṁ ca yasea, sasea tyacea, Atha nāmādhyaṁ satyasya satyamāti.

Rāmānuja's conception of *saguṇa Brahma* is also formed on the basis of the *upaniṣads*. In the *Taittiriya upaniṣad*, *Brahman* has been described as the possessor of existence, knowledge and infinitude (*Taittiriya* 2. 1. 1. *satyaṁ, jñānaṁ, anantaṁ Brahma*). The *Muṇḍaka upaniṣad* says "yah sarva-jñāḥ sarvavid" (2/2/7). The *Chānd. upaniṣad* says that *Brahman* is devoid of death, sin, sorrow and mortality. He is the possessor of *satya-kūmatra*, *satya-saṁkalpatva* which are his auspicious qualities.¹ All these *upaniṣadic* texts and many others have been quoted by Rāmānuja with a view to defending his theory of *saguṇa Brahma*.

Rāmānuja has also found justification for upholding his doctrine of the separateness of the universal and the individual souls. The *Kaṭha upaniṣad* tells us that *Jivātmā* and *parātmā* reside in the innermost core of the human heart and *Jivātmā* tastes the fruits of action. These two are different from each other like light and shade. (*Ītam pivantau sukṛtasya loke guhām praviṣṭau parame parārdhe. chāyatatapau brahmavidau vadanti. Kaṭha up. 3. 55. 1*). The *Muṇḍaka upaniṣad* further says "two birds sit on the same tree : they are friends and companions to each other. Of these, one eats the sweet fruits, while the other simply looks on."² According to Rāmānuja, these passages have made this point clear that the individual soul is different from the universal soul. The universal soul is God who is the creator, preserver and the destroyer of the world. He is a Personal Being and all other souls are His servants. This single God resides in the hearts of all as He Himself is the soul of all souls.³ Rāmānuja's view that God is sovereign ruler over all things and beings of the universe, has also found ample justification from the

1. *Chānd. upa.* 8-7-1.
Eṣa ātmāpahatahāṁśmā vijaro vimṛtyu viśeko vijīghātso 'pipasaḥ satyakāmaḥ, satyasamkalpaḥ.
2. *Muṇḍaka upaniṣad* III. 1. 1.
Dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhayā samānam vṛkṣam parisarajāte. Tayoranyah pippalamsvādvātyanas' mannanyo abhicakāśīti.
3. *Śvetā. upa.* VI. 1. 1.
Eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gṛdhra sarvadyatnī sarvabhūtantarātmā.

teachings of the *upaniṣads*. The *Śrēta upaniṣad* says "nothing exists beyond God and there is nothing subtler or greater than God. He stands motionless like a tree and every part of the universe bears the mark of the presence of this Supreme Divinity.¹ In the same *upaniṣad*, it has been stated again that God is the creator of all including heaven and the earth :

(*Viśvataścakṣuruta viśvatomukhoḥ
Viśvatovāhuruta viśvataspāt,
Sainvāhubhyām dhamati sainpatatrair-
dyāvābhūmī janayan deva ekaḥ.*)

The *Taittiriya upaniṣad* says, "all things and beings of the universe have sprung forth from Him, they live and move and have their being in Him; and they are ultimately revealed in Him."²

Regarding the atomic nature of soul, the *Bṛhad. upaniṣad* says that the soul makes its departure from the body either through the eyes or through *bhrahma-randhra* etc. indicating the very small size of the soul. (*Eṣo ātmā niṣkramaticakṣusovā mūrdhnovā* etc.). The *Śrēta. upaniṣad* holds that the soul is the one hundredth part of the one hundredth part of a hair.³

Rāmānuja's theory of the Personal immortality of souls is also based on the *upaniṣads*. A passage in the *Muṇḍaka upaniṣad* says "when the devotee sees the golden coloured Person who is the all-doer, all-governor and the source of the universe, he shakes off both sin and merit and free from these, attains divine likeness."⁴ (English translation by Ranade).

1. *Śrēta. upa.* III. 9.

*Tasmāt param nāparamasti kincit Tasmānnānītyo na jyayo'sti kas'cit
vṛkṣa Iva stabdho diti tiṣṭhatyekasteṇedaṁ Purnam puruṣeṇa sarvaṁ.*

2. *Taittiriya upaniṣad.* III. 1.

*Tatovāimānibhūtāni jñyante, yena jātāni jīvanti, Tatprayanatyabhisamviśanti
tadvijijñāsva tadbrahmeti.*

3. *Śrēta. upa.* 5-9.

*Vālūgra śatabhāgasya śatadha
Kālpitasya ca bhāgo jīvaḥ sa vijñeyah.*

4. *Muṇḍaka upa.* III. 1. 3.

*Tadāpāśya pātyate rukmarānakartāramīṣaṁ . puruṣaṁ Brahmayonīm.
Tada vidvān puṣyapūpe vidhūya niraijanaḥ paramaṁ sāmāyupaiti.*

The Bhagavadgītā

Like the *upaniṣads*, Rāmānuja has also found *Viśiṣṭādvaita* thoughts and ideas in the teachings of the *Bhagavadgītā*. Rāmānuja has written a commentary on the *Gītā* from his own point of view. In the *Śrībhāṣya* too, he has quoted profusely from the *Gītā* with a view to justifying his own interpretation of the *Brahmasūtra*.

In the opinion of Rāmānuja, the *Gītā* is a splendid exposition of Personal Theism, *Bhakti* and *Śaraṇāgati* which are the essential ingredients of his philosophy of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. The *Gītā* holds that the Highest Reality is a Personal God endowed with innumerable auspicious qualities.¹ *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are two aspects of God² and both of them are eternal. God is the supporter of all the *jivas*, the *jivas* are in Him and He is their upholder.³ He is the soul of all living beings.⁴ All beings constitute the body of God. He is the *ādhāra* (substratum) *niyantā* (controller) and *śeṣī* (principal) of all. Nothing can exist without being supported by Him (*na tadasti vinū yat syūnmayā bhūtān carācaram. Gītā 10/39*). He is the originator and also the destroyer of the whole universe. (*Aham kṛtsnasya jagataḥ prabhavaḥ pralayasthātū—Gītā 6/7*).

The *Gītā* too holds that a liberated soul becomes similar to God (*Mamasūdharmīyamāgata*). It has made a distinction between *kṣara* and *akṣara*. *Kṣara* stands for the embodied soul whereas a liberated soul is called *akṣara*.

The *Gītā* has also spoken of a *triguṇātmikā Prakṛti* as the changeable matrix of the world. It conceals the nature of God from the individual souls and vitiates their knowledge in such a manner that the souls begin to think that *Prakṛti* is an object

1. Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Gītā* 15/19.—

Kṣarākṣarāpuruṣābhyām anyayasvabhāvatayā īyāpanabharanaiśvarya-diyegana ca viśajāṭīyam jānāti.....

2. *Prakṛtām puruṣām caiva vidhyanādi ubhāvopī—Gītā 13/19.*

3. *Bhūtābhyanna ca bhūtastho mamatmābhūtābhāvānāḥ...Rāmānuja's Commentary on the Gītā 9/6.*

4. *Ahamātmā guḍākeśa sarvabhūtāśasthitaḥ.....Gītā 10/20.*

“*cetasā sarvakarmāṇi
mayi samnasyamatparāḥ
buddhiyogamupaśritya
maccittaḥ satatambhava.*”

God in the *Gītā* is both metaphysically and ethically necessary. In Rāmānuja's philosophy too, the metaphysical necessity of God has been held as important as His ethical necessity. According to the *Gītā*, there will be no creation and dissolution of the world without God. God is logically needed for both creation and deluge. He is also the sole redeemer of the individual souls. So, the Lord of the *Gītā* says “Give up all *dharma*s and come to me alone for solace and refuge. I shall deliver you from all sins and sorrows.”

Besides these things, the *avatāra* doctrine of Rāmānuja, his conception of liberation etc. too have received constant nourishment from the teachings of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Purāṇas

In the *vedārtha saṁgraha*, Rāmānuja has quoted a few lines from the *Matsya-purāṇa*. It is however the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* that has been abundantly quoted by Rāmānuja in this *Śrībhāṣya*.

The Highest Reality is called *Vāsudeva* in the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*. He is the possessor of innumerable auspicious qualities. He is also free from all impurities (*sa sarva bhūta prakṛtim vikārāṇ guṇādīṁśca mune vyatitaḥ.....akhilātmā.....samasta kalyāṇa guṇātmako saṁ, svaśaktileśād dhṛtabhūta sargaḥ.....sarveśvaraḥ sarvadyk sarvavettā samastaśaktiḥ paramēśvarākhyāḥ.....Viṣṇu-purāṇa.....6. 5, 83-87.*

Thus the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* too speaks of *Viṣṇu* as a *saguna* *Īśvara*¹ and He is both self-caused and self-supported. *Puruṣa*, *Prakṛti* and *Kūla* etc. are different forms of God and are

1. *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*—6. 5. 72-74.

*Maitreya. bhagavacchabdāḥ sarva karaṇa karaṇe
Sambharteti tathā bhartā bhakāro'rthadvayanvitāḥ
Kṛta gamayita sraṣṭā bhakārarthastathā mune
Aivavyasya samagasya vīryasya yaśasak sṛyaḥ
Jñāna-vairāgyayoścaiva sannām bhagaitirayā.*

different from His essential nature although He is the real container of these different forms. The world, however, does not depend finally on *Puruṣa*, *Prakṛti* and *Kāla* which are not the ultimate principles of the world. The ultimate ground of the world is God. Creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe belong to God only and not to any other principle. The world of spirit and matter resides in Lord *Viṣṇu*¹. Like a spider, God projects the world from within Himself at the time of creation and at the time of dissolution He again withdraws the world within Himself which then remains hidden in His Causal body.

Time also is a form of *Viṣṇu* and its function consists in joining together the two apparently diverse aspects of *Vāsudeva* in the forms of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The world that is created by God is real and eternal. Its creation means its manifestation as an effect and its destruction means its disappearance into the causal state². The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* too has described the creation and destruction of the world as playful activities of God. Since the whole world constitutes the body of God, everything of this world can rightly be called *Viṣṇu*³. The final teaching of *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* is *advaita* as it has admitted as ultimate *one* Spiritual Reality. God is the Supreme Truth. He spontaneously manifests Himself in all sights and sounds. All that we see, hear, feel, touch and taste are the glories of God and are playfully created out of Himself. The Supreme Lord is the existent eye in each human being, but under ordinary circumstances the living creatures cannot conceive Him by means of their senses, minds and words. He is the Lord of all, He is the Lord of Himself and He is the Lord of

1. *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*—1/1/31.

Viṣṇoḥ sakāśād udbhūtam jagat.

2. *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*—1. 22. 58.

Tad etad aḥ śayam mṛtyam jagann munibarāḥkṛtam

ācīrbhava itrebhāvajanmanāśavakalparat.

3. *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* 2. 2. 39.

Jagat sarvam śarīram tasthairyam jyelimsi Viṣṇu bhuvanāni viṣṇu

raṇtri vimuṣiravedijāśa...

Puruṣa, *Prakṛti* and Time. All these ideas are developed in the philosophy of Rāmānuja with greater thoroughness and more logical accuracy.

Pañcarātra literatures

Pañcarātra literatures form the most important source of the *Vaiṣṇava* religion and philosophy as these literatures seek to establish the exclusive supremacy of Lord *Viṣṇu* or *Nārāyaṇa* and also put the greatest emphasis on devotion to Him alone. Rāmānuja has accepted the *Pañcarātra* as authoritative and in his Commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* 2. 2. 41, 2. 2. 42, he has quoted from the *Sāttvata-samhitā*, *Paṇḍikā-samhitā* and *Parama-samhitā*.

The *Pañcarātra* literatures, being the literatures of the *Vaiṣṇava* religion, accept Lord *Viṣṇu* or *Vāsudeva* as the Highest Reality. Lord *Viṣṇu*, being the ultimate reality, is self-existent and self-caused. He is omniscient, all-perceiving and the sole support of the whole universe. All things are included in Him and He is not limited by space and time.

According to *Viṣṇu-samhitā*, the three *guṇas* are the qualities of *Prakṛti*. *Triguṇātmikā Prakṛti* with all the evolutes is called *kṣetra* and God is called *kṣetrajña*. *Prakṛti* exists in union with God (*Kṣetrākhyā Prakṛtir jñeya tadvid kṣetrajña.....Īśvara. Ubhayam cedam atyantam abhinnamiva tiṣṭhati.....Viṣṇu-samhitā—4*. Quoted in the "History of Indian Philosophy"—Das Gupta—Vol. III). *Prakṛti* is eternal, unconscious and essentially dynamic. *Puruṣa* is 'anādi' and 'ananta', i. e. without birth and without death (*acetanā parārthā ca nityā satatavikriyā, trigunā karmīṇām kṣetraṁ prakṛter rūpamucyate. Vyūptirūpeṇa samvandhasyaśca puruṣasya ca. Sa hi anādiranantaśca paramārthena niścitaḥ—Parama-samhitā*, quoted in the *Śrībhāṣya*, *Sūtra* 2. 2. 42).

The *vyūhas* and *vibhavas* of God mentioned in the *Śrībhāṣya* by Rāmānuja, have been worked out in detail in the *Pañcarātra* literatures. In the *Sāttvata-samhitā*, even the colour, dress, weapons, etc. of the *vyūha* forms of God have been mentioned in an elaborate manner. The fact that Rāmānuja has not interpreted *bhakti* merely as emotion of love and respect

devoid of knowledge, shows a very deep influence of the *Pañcarātra* thoughts on him. In the *Pañcarātra* literatures, *bhakti* has been united with *yoga*-wisdom and it has been held in the *Parama-samhitā* that devotion can help a man to attain salvation only when it is accompanied by knowledge acquired through *Yoga*.

Regarding the relation between God and the individual souls the general view of the *Pañcarātra* literatures is that the *jīvas* remain in a subtle form in God at the time of dissolution and at the time of creation they separate out of Him and become manifested in the forms of the worldly beings. At the time of emancipation they enter into God and remain there through eternity. The *Pañcarātra* also maintains that the liberated souls have an independent existence in the abode of *Viṣṇu*. They do not get merged in Him :

(*Vaikunṭhe tu para loke nityatvena vyavasthitāḥ
paśyanti ca sadā devam netrairjñānena cāmarāḥ...*

Viśvakasena-samhitā).

The individual souls are also regarded as Lord's servants. All *jīvas* whether bound or liberated are the *klīṅkaras* of God :

(*Dāsabhūtāḥ svataḥ sarve hyātmānaḥ paramātmānaḥ
Nānyathā lakṣaṇam teṣāṃ vandhe mokṣe ca vidyate.....*

Iśvara-samhitā).

According to *Vaiṣṇava* saints, *Pañcarātra* doctrines were pronounced by God for the benefit of the devotees and the authoritative nature of these doctrines could not therefore be doubted. *Pañcarātra* is called *ekāyana-veda* by the followers of the *Vaiṣṇava* religion, because in these literatures God is said to be the only shelter for His devotees. It is the belief among the *Vaiṣṇavas* that at the end of *dvāpara-yuga* and in the beginning of *kali-yuga*, Sage *Sūndilya* learnt these *Pañcarātra* doctrines from *Samkarṣaṇa*. He then taught these to *Sumantu*, *Bhṛṅgu*, *Jaimini* etc.

The Hymns of the Ālvars

Rāmānuja was also indebted to *Āhārs* to a very great extent for the formulation of his devotional philosophy of *vīśiṣṭādvaita-veda*. The *Āhārs* were the lovers of God whom

they used to regard as the greatest of all beings. They used to look upon *Viṣṇu* or *Kṛṣṇa* as their lover and master and were eager to depend on Him in the manner of a woman depending exclusively on her lover. They used to regard self-surrender as the most suitable means to the Divine communion. This devotion to God involving complete self-surrender of the individual soul proceeds through a blissful enjoyment of the nature of the noble qualities of God. The devotee feels that there is nothing greater in anything else than this holy Communion with his beloved God. When one is overcome by self-surrendering devotion to God, he easily attains truth. God's grace can be won by self-surrendering attitude alone. No other effort is necessary for this purpose. The idea that the liberated soul can assume any form he likes is also present in the hymns of the *Ālvārs*. The devotees nourish in their hearts intense desires to be transformed into different '*upakaraṇas*' which are used in the service of God. *Sathkopa ālvār*, for instance, has said :

"*Sopāni bhūtvā tava pravādharam paśyāmi.*"

The soul is described in the hymns of the *Ālvārs* as a pure spiritual essence devoid of all relations with impurities of various kind. We cannot, however, know the soul in a manner in which ordinary things of the world are known to us. The soul has also been described by them as a mode of God or as a predicate of God who is the Eternal subject. The eligibility of the persons of all castes to the cult of devotion was also admitted by them and persons of different castes and creeds were allowed to enter into their religious fold. Mr. J. S. M. Hooper has translated some hymns of Namm' *Ālvārs* in English in his well-known book "*The Hymns of the Ālvārs*". A few lines of these love songs are quoted below for the benefit of the readers :

"Thou, fair as Kannan's heaven, when he is away
What ages long it is ! He here, a span !
Whether friends stay for many days or go
We grieve. Yet be this spreading darkness blest
In spite of many a cunning trick it has
What will befall my girl with bracelets fair,

With tearful eyes like gleaming kayal big,
 Who wonders with a secret pain at heart
 For blooms of tulasi fresh from the Bird's Lord
 Who with that hill protected flocks in storm."

The *Ālvār* has found delight in darkness as darkness resembles the colour of his beloved Kṛṣṇa, who is away from him. He is eager to send message to the Lord, of his heart and with this end in view, he is requesting swans and herons to be his messengers :

The flying swans and herons I did beg
 Cringing "Forget not, ye, who first arrive,
 If ye behold my heart with kannan there
 Oh, speak of me and ask it 'Sir not yet—
 Hast thou returned to her? And is it right? "

The blue water-lily reminds the *ālvār* of the colour of his Lord and he sees the divine form everywhere :

All places, shining like great lotus pools
 On a blue mountain broad, to me are but
 The beauties of his eye—the Lord of earth
 Girt by the roaring sea, heaven's lord, the lord
 Of other good souls, black-hued lord—and mine.

The Lord—his master—is the greatest of all things and beings that are existent or can possibly exist :

Sages with wisdom won by virtuous toil
 Assert "His colour, glorious beauty, name
 His form—are such and such." But all their toil
 Has measured not the greatness of my Lord :
 Their wisdom's light is but a wretched lamp.

In the love poems of Namm-*ālvār*, there is a feeling of loneliness caused by his separation from his beloved Lord and there is also an eager expectation of meeting again his beloved Lord who is his only solace and refuge.

Hooper has also given us English versions of the hymns of many other *Āhārs* like Andāl, Tirumangai, Kulasekhar, etc. Andāl has conceived herself as a *gopī* and has looked upon Kṛṣṇa as her beloved lord. Tirumangai *Āhār*, on the other hand, expressed the most intense and rapturous form of love for Lord in and through his love-songs.

A study of the hymns of *Ālvārs* reveals to us the fact that they were well acquainted with the stories of *Śrī Kṛṣṇa* narrated in *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and *Bhāgavata purāṇa*. To approach Lord through '*madhurā-bhāva*' '*vātsalya-bhāva*' or '*sakhyā-bhāva*' was very common among the *Ālvārs*. Some of them played the role of *Yosodā*, some of *Kṛṣṇa*'s friends and some of the *gopis*. As devotees, the *ālvārs* thus used to identify themselves with the legendary personalities depicted in the *Purāṇas*. In imagination they used to identify themselves with the mother, friends and beloved women of *Śrī Kṛṣṇa* with a view to living through their various emotional experiences in a very lively and intense manner. This spirit of the *Ālvārs* has found a magnificent expression in the *Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism* of Bengal. The *Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas* also identify themselves with *Gopis*, *Rādhā* and her female attendants with a view to developing similar emotional attitudes to *Kṛṣṇa* into their own hearts. In the words of Prof. S. N. Das Gupta, we can say "It seems fairly certain that the *Ālvārs* were the earliest devotees who moved forward in the direction of such emotional transformation. Thus King Kula-śekhara, who was an *ālvār* and devotee of *Rāma*, used to listen rapturously to the *Rāmāyana* being recited to him. As he listened, he became so excited that when he heard of *Rāma*'s venturing forth against *Rāvana*, his demon opponent, he used to give orders to mobilise his whole army to march forward towards *Lankā* as an ally of *Rāma*."¹ These devotional writings of *Ālvārs* provided much food and inspiration for the *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy of Rāmānuja.

The utterances of the *ālvārs* were compiled together in Tamil language in the form of essays under the name of *Dīvyā-sūkti*. These divine essays are known as *Drāviḍa-veda*. Rāmānuja has taken help of these divine utterances of the *Ālvārs* with a view to explaining more clearly the meaning of the *Śruti*-texts.

Among the *Pūrvāchāryyas* of Rāmānuja the names of

1. Prof. S. N. Das Gupta : History of Indian Philosophy—vol. III, p. 80.

Bodhāyana, *Tamka*, *Drūmiḍa Guhadēva*, *Bhāruci*, etc. have been mentioned in the *Śrībhāṣya*. *Bodhāyana* was the *vṛttikara* of the *Brahma-sūtra* from the devotional point of view. *Drāmiḍāchāryya* wrote a commentary on that and Sage *Tamka* composed a brief exposition of the same. *Rāmānuja* has sought help from their books to clarify the meaning of his own interpretations. Quotations from the *Siddhitraya* of *Yamunāchāryya* and the *Kārikā* of *Nāthamuni* have also been made use of by *Rāmānuja* in his commentary to *Brahma-sūtra*.

The special merit of *Rāmānuja* lies in the fact that he has tried to make a logical blend of the traditional *brāhmanic* literatures of his age with the literatures of the *vaiṣṇava*-religion. The religio-philosophy of *Rāmānuja* is based on both reason and *śāstra* and the function of reason is to justify the truths expounded in the *śāstras*. *Śāstras* however cannot be replaced by reason. A pure philosophy is a free rational enquiry into the nature of truth and reality and is, as such, opposed to everything that contradicts reason. Reason reigns supreme in the sphere of pure philosophy and faith or revelation can never find any place in its domain. Traditional religion on the other hand rests simply on faith in the scriptural truths. It believes in the existence of a Personal God who is all good and all merciful and also accepts *bhakti* or love of God as the sole means to salvation. The *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy has brought about a synthesis of reason and revelation or *yukti* and *śāstra* and has taught that reason should be used only to strengthen the *śāstras* and not to refute them. When reason is brought to justify the scriptural truths, religion does not degenerate into blind faith and superstitious ritualism. So, *viśiṣṭādvaitadarśana* has admitted God as the ultimate source of the whole universe and has also described Him as the supreme goal of religion.

In other words, while as a philosophy, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* holds that *Brahman* or the Absolute is the Supreme Reality, the Highest Truth and the Primary Source of the world, as a religion, it describes this Supreme Reality as the inner controller of the universe of spirit and matter and also as the beloved God of mercy and bliss. A sublime unity of *tattva*, *hita* and *puruṣārtha*

has thus been brought about by the miraculous genius of Sri Rāmānujāchāryya. As the absolute of thought *Brahman* is *tattva* and as divine expiation and final refuge of the world, *Brahman* is both *hita* and *puruṣārtha*.

Works of Śrī Rāmānujāchāryya.

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| 1. <i>Vedānta-sāra</i> | } | Two short commentaries on the |
| 2. <i>Vedānta-dīpa</i> | | <i>Brahma-Sūtra</i> . |
| 3. <i>Śrībhāṣya</i> | | a voluminous commentary on the <i>Brahma-sūtra</i> of <i>Būdrāyaṇa</i> (Śrī Rāmānuja's monumental work). |
| 4. <i>Vedārtha-saṁgraha</i> | | an independent exposition of the <i>Vaiṣṇava</i> philosophy and religion on the basis of the chief scriptures of the system. |

In addition to these a commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, *Gadya-traya*, *Bhagavad-ārādhana-karma*, were also written by him.

CHAPTER II EPISTEMOLOGY

Nature of Knowledge

Rāmānuja has classified substances into two categories—*jada* (inert) and *ajada* (non-inert). Knowledge for him falls into the group of *ajada-dravya* (non-inert substances). It is always of a qualified character and is also invariably related to a knower or the self. The subject or the self is the substrate of knowledge. He agrees with *Śaṅkara* in holding that knowledge or consciousness constitutes the essence of the soul, but he differs from him when he asserts that knowledge is also a property of the soul. To make his point clear, he has given us the example of the light of the lamp. The light constitutes the essence of the lamp and light is also a quality inhering in the lamp. - Like light, knowledge is also both a substance and a quality. It is a substance as it constitutes the essence of selves and God and is also an attribute as knowledge exists as a property of both God and *ātman* (soul). When it so exists, it is called "*Dharmabhūtajñāna*" (attributive knowledge). Though '*acetana*'¹ it is of the nature of *viśayi* (subject) and is both all-pervading and eternal. In the case of God or ever free souls, *dharmabhūtajñāna* remains in its pure form; but in the case of bound souls, it remains enveloped by *avidyā* and as such it seems to us as if it is non-existent. When we say that knowledge arises or is destroyed, we refer simply to the expansion and contraction of *dharmabhūtajñāna* due to ignorance and *karma*.

1. *Taṭīndramatadīpikā* Chap. 7. (second edition—printed at Ananda-srama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934).
Svayamprakāśacetanadravyatve sati viśayitvam. Acetana—because it cannot know itself.

This *dharmabhūtajñāna* is further compared with the "*maṇi-prabhā*"¹ (rays of a precious stone) as, like rays, this knowledge also streams out towards an object and reveals it.

Rāmānuja has not described knowledge as '*cetana*'. For him, the ordinary division of objects into *jaḍa* (matter) and '*cetana*' (spirit) is not *dichotomus*. There is a third category like *ajāḍa* (immaterial) which lies midway between them. Knowledge is of the nature of this third category. It is not material as unlike material objects it is self-revealing and also the revealer of other material objects. Again, it is not '*cetana*', as it cannot know itself. Knowledge can show itself as well as other material objects but cannot know itself, whereas a soul can know itself and can show itself but cannot show other material objects.

According to Rāmānuja, the function of knowledge is solely to manifest the objects which are already in existence. The objects are, in no sense, dependent on knowledge which simply brings them into relation with the knower and manifests them. The things that we see, feel and touch are not the creations of knowledge. They exist even when there is no knowledge to reveal them. Manifestation and not creation, therefore, is the function of knowledge. In this act of revealing the objects, knowledge receives help from the sense-organs which are its instruments. The process of knowing, according to Rāmānuja, starts from the soul, reaches the mind and then emerging through the sense-organs, reaches the external objects².

The physical basis of knowledge consists of all the organs of cognition through which knowledge manifests itself in richness and details.

1. (a) *Prakāśavattāta*—*Tegedraṇyameva Śrībhāṣya*—1, 1. 1. (published by T. Srinivasa Sarma, Bombay 1916, p. 95)

(b) *Tatīndramatāḍīpikā*—p. 58. chap. 7. (second edition—printed at Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934).
Prabhāvadēkasyaiva draṇyatvagunātayorvirodhābhāvāt.

2. *Tatīndramatāḍīpikā*—chap. I, p. 5 (second edition, printed at Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934).

Ātmā manasā saṃnyuyate mana indriyenendriyamarthena.

Relation between Knowledge and the Object of Knowledge.

Regarding the relation between knowledge and its object, Rāmānuja is in favour of admitting it as a form of *saṁyoga* (contact) since both knowledge and its object are substances¹. This relation is not of the nature of '*vimbapratiyimba*' as is held by the *Sūm̐khya* and the *Advaitavedānta*. Here the object and not its image becomes directly manifested in knowledge. This theory is, therefore, a form of direct realism. According to *Nyāya*, which is also a form of realism, the relation between knowledge and its object is not *saṁyoga* (contact) as knowledge is not a substance according to this school.

Meaning of Self-revelation.

According to *Advaitavedānta*, self-revelation of knowledge implies non-objectification of knowledge. It can never be expressed in the form "*Ayam iti*". It has no substrate other than its own nature. No objectification of knowledge in any form is ever possible.

For Rāmānuja, however, self-revelation of knowledge implies that knowledge reveals itself as well as the object to its substrate (i. e. the soul or the knower). It is not true to say that knowledge always reveals an object and is never revealed as an object. Past knowledge and the knowledge or experiences of another's mind do become objects of our knowledge on suitable occasions. If we do not believe in the possibility of knowing the thoughts and experiences of other persons as objects of our knowledge, then our practical life will come to a standstill. We shall not be able to profit even by the teachings of our preceptors whose thoughts or experiences will then be wholly inaccessible to us. If we hold that non-objectification is the true characteristic of knowledge, then we shall not be able to differentiate it from a hare's horn which also can never become an object of knowledge.

1. *Śrībhāṣya*—2. 2. 27 (vol. II, printed at Anandasrama Mudra-nalaya, Poona, 1940).

Samvandhaś ca Saṁyogalakṣaṇaḥ Jñānamapi hi draṣṭavyaḥ.

This view of Rāmānuja school that knowledge always shows itself and an object to its substrate or the soul resembles to a very great extent the "triputt-pratyakṣa-vāda"¹ of the Prabhākara school. But according to Prabhākara a particular piece of knowledge sometimes becomes its own object whereas according to Rāmānuja one knowledge becomes the object of another knowledge. Further there is also similarity between Prabhākara school and Rāmānuja regarding the conclusions, namely, that knowledge is self-revealing and that all knowledge is true, but regarding the processes of illusory perception etc. there is marked difference between the two schools.

Sources of Knowledge.

There are three sources of knowledge according to Rāmānuja school—*Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* (perception, inference and scriptural testimony).

Perception.

Perceptual knowledge is gained immediately through sense-object contact and this characteristic differentiates perception from inference and scriptural testimony. In the case of perception therefore, the sense-organs are the means that enable a soul to know an object directly. The sense-organs which are the instruments of perception are six in number—five external sense-organs and mind which is internal. *Buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *citta* etc. refer to different *vṛttis* (*adhyavasāya*, *abhimāna*, *cintā* etc.)² of the one and the same internal organ.³ The five external sense-organs are primarily needed to receive knowledge of the external world, whereas mind is an instrument for memory etc. Heart is the seat of the mind and it is the cause of bondage

1. Theory of triple perception or triple consciousness. In every cognition, three factors are revealed, the knower, (*Pramātā*) the known (*Prameya*) and the cognition itself (*Pramiti*),
2. Determination, act of referring all objects to Self, thinking etc.
3. *Śrībhāṣya*—2/4/5 (Vol. II, printed at Anandarama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1940).
Adhyavasāyābhimānacintāvṛttibhedānumana eva budhyahamkāra-cittāśabdairvyapadīyata.

and liberation.¹ The sense-organs which are perceptible on the surface of the body are external. The real auditory organ lies in the cavities of the ears, the tactual is spread over the skin, the visual is in the eye, the taste organ is in the tongue and the olfactory one is in the nose. These sense-organs are only the instruments through which the *ātman* (soul)—the real knower—acquires knowledge.

The sense-organs manifest objects only when they are in contact with them. In the case of our perception of taste, smell, sound and touch, the objects reach them. In the case of visual perception, however, the visual organ comes in contact with the object through *vyñāna*. *Vyñāna* is a peculiar modification of the sense-organ which connects it with the objects. Such a modification can stream out of a sense-organ and can connect the latter with distant objects for the purpose of apprehension.² All sense-organs are described as *prāpya-prakāśakāri*³, perhaps on the basis of the fact that all of them function in regard to those objects only which are within reach.

The sense-organs are primarily *ahamkārika* (Psychical) in nature. They are *bhautika* (physical) only in a secondary sense, i. e. in the sense that their powers are nursed and fed by the *bhautika* objects.⁴ (objects formed of elements).

All sense-organs are atomic in nature. If they were not atomic they would not have been able to move along with souls from birth to birth. Since they are *prākṛta*, (natural) they are incapable of accompanying the soul to '*vaikuṇṭha*'

1. *Yatīndramatadīpikā*—chap. 4 (Second edition; Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934).
Smṛtyādīkaraṇamindriyaṃ manaḥ, tacceca hṛdayadeśavyññāna buddhya-
hamkāracittādisabdavācyaṃ vandhamokṣasambhūtaṃ ca.
2. *Śrīyodāye sakaladikvyāpīṇyaḥ prabhayā iendriyavyūteratīṇāḍṛṣṭa vegatī-
śayāṅgikareṇa doṣāt* (*Yatīndramatadīpikāprakāśatikā*).
3. They function by coming in contact with their respective objects.
4. *Śrōtrādīndriyāṇāṃ bhautikatva pratipādanam bhautīyāṇāṃ itena upacāritam* (*Yatīndramatadīpikā*—chap. 4).

which is a supernatural place. So, the organs exist till dissolution.¹

Regarding the organs of action, it has been stated in the *vedāntadīpa* that they do not accompany an individual soul in its journey from birth to birth. The organs of action are five in number—the organs of speech, hands, feet, the organ of excretion and the organ of generation.

Sense-object Contact.

According to Rāmānuja school, the sense-object contact is of two kinds : *Samyoga* (union) and *Samyuktāśraya*. (Contact of the sense-organs with substances in which qualities subsist). The perception of substance is due to *samyoga*. The sense-organ comes in contact with the substance when one perceives a jar. The perception of qualities, however, is due to *samyuktāśraya* relation as in this case the sense-organs come in contact with substances in which qualities inhere.²

According to Naiyayikas, sense-object contact is of six kinds : *samyoga*, *samyukta-samavāya*, *samyukta samaveta samavāya*, *samavāya*, *samaveta samavāya* and *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*.³

Samyoga (union) is a contact between the sense-organ and a substance. Here, the sense and the object can be separated and *samyoga* is a separable union.

Samyukta-samavāya (united inherence) is used in perceiving the qualities of objects. The object in which quality is

1. *Etānīndriyāṇyāṇāni parakāyaprabeṣe lokāntaragamanādīṣu eā jīvena saha gamanamīndriyāṇāṃ Muktidāśāyāmaprākṛtadeśagamanāsamābhāvaādī-haiva yāvatpralayaṃ sthitiḥ* (*Tatīndramatādīpikā*—chapt. 4).

.....*Tatīndramatādīpikā* Second edition; Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Ponna, 1934.

2. *Dravyagrahaṇe samyogaḥsamvādhah, d'anyagatarūpādigrhaṇe samavāyānamīkārāt samyuktāśrayaṇaṃ samvādhah*—*Tatīndramatādīpikā*—chapter I—Second edition, Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Ponna, 1934.

3. *Pratyakṣa jñānabheturīndriyārthā sannīkarsaḥ sadvidhaḥ samyogaḥ samyukta samavāyaḥ samyukta samaveta samavāyaḥ.....*

Tarkasamgraha with Indumatī. Chowkhamba, Page, 19.

perceived is in *saṁyoga-sannikarṣa* with the sense-organ and the quality is in *samavāya* relation with the object. For example, in perceiving the colour of a jar, there is the *saṁyukta-samavāya sannikarṣa* according to *Nyāya* system.

Saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya (united-inherent-inherence) is involved in the perception of those things which are inseparably related to the things perceived by the *saṁyukta-samavāya*. When a coloured jar is before us, there is *saṁyoga-sannikarṣa* between the sense-organ and the object, *samavāya* between the colour and the jar which is in contact with the eyes and *samavāya* between the universal of colour and the particular colour of the jar. The jar is *saṁyukta* with the eyes, the colour of the jar is *samaveta* with the jar and the universal of the colour is in *samavāya* with the colour.

Samavāya (Inherence) :—According to *Naiyāyikas*, the organ of hearing has *akāśa* as its essential constituent which fills the cavities of the ears. Sound, therefore, is a quality of the organ of hearing. So, the contact between it and its substance in the form of the organ of hearing is *samavāya*.

Samaveta-samavāya (Inherent inherence) :—The *sāmānya* of sound is in *samavāya* relation with a particular sound and the particular sound heard by the ears is again in *samavāya* relation with the organ of hearing. This is called *samaveta-samavāya sannikarṣa*.

Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva (The relation of qualification and the qualified) :—This form of *sannikarṣa* is involved in the perception of *abhāva* or non-existence of an object. The non-existence of an object is an adjective that qualifies the place where the object is non-existent. Our perception on such an occasion is the perception of the place qualified by the *abhāva* of the object not perceived there.

The *Rāmānuja-school* has made its position much simpler by recognizing only two forms of *sannikarṣa* : (Sense-object relation) and if we take into consideration the philosophical position of *Rāmānuja* we find that this simplicity (of *Rāmānuja-school*) is justified from the logical point of view.

Saṁyuktāśraya relation is capable of being used in all those cases where the *Naiyāyikas* have used *saṁyukta-samavāya*,

samyukta-samaveta sāmavāya, *samaveta-samavāya* and *samavāya sannikarṣa*. In other words, four forms of *sannikarṣa* of the Nyāya school can be replaced by one form of *sannikarṣa* of the *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy, i. e. *samyuktāśraya-sannikarṣa*. According to Rāmānuja, nobody can have an isolated indeterminate knowledge of the universal (*jāti*). Perception of quality and action means perception of *jātivīṣiṣṭaguṇa* and *jātivīṣiṣṭakriyā*. So, *samyuktāśraya sannikarṣa*, necessary for perceiving colour of an object or action is competent to give perceptual knowledge of the universal of quality and also of the universal of action since quality and action are always perceived as being qualified by their respective universals. Hence a separate *sannikarṣa* (sense-object relation) like *samyukta-samaveta-samavāya* is not necessary from the point of view of the *viśiṣṭādvaita* school.

For *viśiṣṭādvaita*, *samyuktāśraya sannikarṣa* can replace *samavāya sannikarṣa* which according to Nyāya, is necessary for perceiving sound, since it is a quality of the organ of hearing. According to qualified monism, *ākāśa* possesses form and is therefore an object of perception. *Ākāśa* is perceived through *samyoga sannikarṣa* between itself and the eyes and the organs of hearing perceive sound which is a quality of *ākāśa* through *samyuktāśraya sannikarṣa*. *Samaveta samavāya* also is not necessary from the *viśiṣṭādvaita* standpoint because according to this school whenever sound is perceived by *samyuktāśraya sannikarṣa* it is perceived as qualified by its universal.

Lastly, *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya sannikarṣa* is not necessary in the *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy as this school has not recognized any independent existence of *abhāva* (Negation) as a category. *Abhāva* (Negation) is of the form of *adhikaraṇa* (locus). If that *adhikaraṇa* is a substance then it can be perceived by *samyoga-sannikarṣa* and if it is a quality, it can be perceived by *samyuktāśraya sannikarṣa*.

Thus, according to the philosophy of *viśiṣṭādvaita* school, only two forms of sense-object contact are sufficient for explaining the perceptual knowledge of all things.

Kinds of Perception.

Perception is of three kinds : God's perception, perception of the *yogis* and perception of ordinary persons. Ordinary perception is again of two kinds—Determinate and Indeterminate.

Determinate and Indeterminate Perceptions.

Division of perception into determinate and indeterminate forms is a favourite topic for discussion in Indian systems of philosophy. Such a discussion satisfies the curiosity of the Indian mind, which is always anxious to find out what and how much one can actually grasp while becoming acquainted directly with a new object. Inference, verbal testimony, and memory cannot give us knowledge of things which are entirely new. So no division of inference or of verbal testimony or of memory into determinate and indeterminate form has been recognized by the Indian thinkers. Although almost all the systems of Indian thought recognize the existence of indeterminate perception and determinate perception, they hold slightly different views about the nature of these two types of perceptual cognition.

Knowledge gained immediately and not through the mediation of some other knowledge is called perception. This direct and immediate experience is effected through the use of the external and internal sense-organs. A contact between the object and the sense-organ is the pre-condition of perceptual knowledge under ordinary conditions. The sense-object contact necessary for perceptual knowledge is of two kinds, viz., *samyoga* and *samyuktāśraya*. The perception of substance is due to *samyoga*. The sense-organ comes into contact with the substance when one perceives a jar. The perception of qualities, however, is due to *samyuktāśraya* relation, as in this case the sense-organs come in contact with substances in which the qualities inhere.

Perception can be classified into determinate and indeterminate forms from the point of view of fullness and clearness of knowledge. In indeterminate perception, we do not perceive

a pure and simple object, shorn of all its characteristics, as such an absolutely unqualified object, according to Rāmānuja, can never become the content of knowledge. Knowledge always reveals an object as qualified by some of its characteristics.¹ Discrimination is the most fundamental condition of knowledge, and so consciousness always involves some sort of differentiation and distinction. Whenever we perceive an object, we perceive the special arrangement of parts. We cannot perceive a cow without perceiving its dewlap and the like. So, indeterminate perception, according to Rāmānuja, is the perception of an individual as a specific instance in the absence of any revival in memory of the past impressions of like instances, observed on previous occasions. As recollection of other similar instances is not present, the perceiver perceives the object as the first instance,² and no knowledge of its common qualities arises in his mind. Here *prathamapiṇḍa*³ has been specially mentioned in order to lay stress on the fact that, in the absence of the revival of the past traces of similar instances of that class, the perceiver is unable to detect its common characteristics or to know the class to which that individual belongs. It seems to him as if he is seeing the object for the first time (*Prathama grahaṇam*).

Savikalpaka pratyakṣa or determinate perception is therefore the perception of the object together with the recollection of the other instances of the same kind, perceived in the past in different places and resulting in a thorough understanding of

1. *Śrībhāṣya*, 1. 1. 1.—published by Śrī T. Srinivasa Sarma, Bombay, 1916.

Nirvikalpakaṁ nāma kenacid viśeṣena vijuktasya grahaṇam ; na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya ; tathābhūtasya kadācidapi grahaṇādarśanāt.

2. *Tatīndramatadīpikā*, P. 6. (Second edition, Anandesrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934).

Nirvikalpakaṁ nāma guṇasamsthānīdī viśiṣṭa prathama piṇḍa grahaṇam.

3. *Prathamapiṇḍa* :—*Piṇḍasya prathamagrahaṇam*. In the absence of the revival of past impressions, the Perceiver feels that he is perceiving the object for the first time.

Prathama is an adjective of *grahaṇam* & not of *Piṇḍa*.

the distinction between common and specific characteristics of the object at the time of perception. Thus, when we see a 'table', we remember the other instances of the 'table' perceived on other occasions, with the result that we are able to know that it is a Particular 'table' belonging to the class 'table' and possessing class characteristics along with its specific characteristics. It is because this Perception is fuller, richer, and more definite, and is also accompanied by the past impressions roused up in memory, that it is called *savikalpaka* (accompanied by revived impressions) as against *nirvikalpaka*, where revival of such impressions does not take place. In both the forms, the object perceived is a qualified one. The difference between these two forms therefore lies mainly in their psychological processes, and it is this difference that causes difference in the knowledge of the perceiver as well; because in the case of indeterminate perception, even common qualities of the object appear to the perceiver as specific in the absence of *anuvṛtti-jñāna*. The object is perceived as unique; whereas in the determinate perception, due to *anuvṛtti-jñāna*, the object appears as a member of a particular class and also as possessing both generic and specific characteristics.

According to Rāmānuja, the generic quality is grasped as a quality of the object even in indeterminate perception; the only thing is that here the quality is perceived only as a quality and not as a generic feature of the object perceived. The generic feature, however, is not anything different from *saṁsthāna* (arrangement of parts) so when *saṁsthāna* is perceived in indeterminate form, the generic quality is also grasped. It is only because, in indeterminate perception, all qualities (both generic and specific) are perceived that, in the subsequent determinate perception, the perceiver, on seeing the common qualities and on remembering that these qualities were perceived by him in similar instances on the other occasions, accepts these qualities as class qualities or *jāti-guṇa*. Thus for Rāmānuja, *nirvikalpaka* perception is not *nisprakāra-kam jñānam*, but *prakāraśya anuvṛttirahitam jñānam*.

The Naiyāyikas, however, have stated that indeterminate

stage is the first stage of the non-relational apprehension of an object, and that this stage can be known by people under ordinary circumstances through inference only. In the opinion of the Nyāya-school, we cannot have determinate knowledge or *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* without a prior perception of the simpler elements of *jāti*, (universal) *guṇa* (quality) *ākāra* (form) *sambandha* (relation) etc. in a state of *dvandva* (separation). We are therefore led to infer the existence of *nirvikalpaka* stage as preceding every stage of determinate perception. A prior perception of *viśeṣaṇa* (adjectives) is absolutely necessary for determinate knowledge.

A perusal of the trend of discussion which Rāmānuja held on the topic of perception reveals that, in his opinion, a prior perception of *viśeṣaṇa* is not the cause of the subsequent *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* (qualified knowledge) which the Naiyāyikas seem to have only in the stage of determinate perception. The real cause for *saṁkalpaka pratyākṣa*, according to Rāmānuja, seems to be a *saṁskāra* (impression) of *viśeṣaṇa*, and so an impression of the attribute, if properly revived, can give a new determinate knowledge of a previously experienced object even in the absence of a prior indeterminate stage.

Indeterminate perception, thus, does not seem to be, an absolutely necessary prior stage in every case of determinate perception, according to Rāmānuja. When we perceive an object and remember immediately the attribute, we can have the required *anuvṛtti-jñāna* of the attribute even without passing through a stage of indeterminate perception. Where, such revival of *saṁskāra* (impression) is not possible, we shall have, first of all, the apprehension of a qualified object unaccompanied by revival of impressions. The apprehension of pervasiveness of some properties in the second and third instances can never be possible unless those properties as properties of the individual are perceived in the very first instance.

Here, we must be very careful in interpreting the meaning of the expression 'dvitīyādīpiṇḍa-grahṇam'. The word 'dvitīyādī' does not merely mean beginning from the second

instance or the third instance, but it also implies the recognition of the second instance etc. as such (i. e. as second, third, and so on) on the part of the perceiver (*dvitīyādityena pinḍagrahaṇam* etc.).

If, on the basis of Rāmānuja's definition of indeterminate perception and determinate perception, we now proceed to analyse further the steps involved in a perceptual process, we shall get the following result :

First moment : *Nirvikalpaka* stage, that is, the perception of the qualified object without the revival of any previous impressions and therefore without *anuvṛtti-jñāna*.

Second moment : The perception of the second instance together with the revival of past impressions.

Third moment : Recognition of common qualities (as *anuvṛtta-dharma* or *jāti-guṇa*) with the help of the past impressions.

Fourth moment : Reflection on similarities and dissimilarities.

Determinate perception starts at the second moment, and it becomes full and complete at the fourth moment. Perception of the second instance, being the cause of *anuvṛtti-jñāna*, cannot take place at one and the same moment. Cause is always an event that is prior to the effect. Since perception of the second instance and *anuvṛtti-jñāna* (being cause and effect) cannot occur simultaneously, we must place them separately at two different moments. Moreover, in the original sources, everywhere the expression used is *dvitīyādi*. From this, we can infer legitimately that, in the second moment, the second instance is perceived, and that the common qualities are recognised as *anuvṛtta-dharma* only in the third moment.

If we compare this process of perception of Rāmānuja with that of the Naiyāyikas, the following differences will at once be detected by us. Firstly, according to Rāmānuja, in order to have determinate perception, we ordinarily need a knowledge of quality in quality (*viśeṣaṇa* in *viśeṣaṇa*). Mere perception of cowness in a cow is not enough for the purpose of determinate knowledge. We are also to possess a knowledge of

the existence of 'cowness' in many cows (*anekavṛttitva*). For the *Nyāya* system, however, the perception of cowness in a cow is sufficient for the purpose of the determinate perception of the cow.

Secondly, according to the *Nyāya* theory, the whole perceptual process will be complete at the fifth moment and not at the fourth moment.

First moment : *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* or non-relational apprehension of *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa* etc.

Second moment : Determinate perception or relational apprehension.

Third moment : Perception of the second instance.

Fourth moment : Recognition of the *jāti-guṇa* or generic quality. (*Anuvṛtti-jñāna*).

Fifth moment : Reflection on similarities and dissimilarities.

Thus, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, determinate perception does not need observation of the second instance; but for Rāmānuja, the perceiver cannot have determinate knowledge unless he perceives the second instance and understands it as such. Further, according to Rāmānuja, the difference between the two kinds of perception arises only when perception is viewed from the side of the subject. When viewed from the side of the object and its manifestation, such distinction disappears immediately. Both *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* bring the same type of qualified object into relation with the perceiver. In the former, the perceiver is not equipped with a memory (*'pūrvā saṃskāra'*) whereas in the latter, revival of past impressions by the perceiver is the most essential and necessary condition. According to the *Nyāya*, however, there is difference between these two forms of perception from the point of view of the object as well. In the *nirvikalpaka* perception, the perceiver does not cognize a qualified object, whereas in the *savikalpaka* perception, the object perceived is a qualified one.

Regarding the duration of time needed for full and complete knowledge of an object, Rāmānuja is able to save one

moment, thereby making his perceptual process a bit simpler than that of the Naiyāyikas. According to the *Nyāya* school, relation between different presented facts takes place after one moment, whereas Rāmānuja has emphatically stated that there is no moment in the perceptual process when facts remain unrelated. Presentation always implies presentation of a qualified object. So, if we follow Rāmānuja, we gain one moment. In the case of the perception of *daṇḍin* (a man with a stick), for instance, a *Naiyāyika* will say that first we perceive *daṇḍa* (stick) and *puruṣa* (man) and then we perceive the *daṇḍin*, whereas a Rāmānujist will assert that, if we had seen *danda* on some previous occasions, then in this case, by simply remembering the impression of *daṇḍa*, we shall be able to perceive the *daṇḍin* at the very first moment.

Although, in the texts, Rāmānuja has not definitely mentioned about such remembering of *samskāras*, (impressions) still it seems reasonable to hold that this was his view, as otherwise, it would be very difficult for a Rāmānujist to explain how perception of a qualified object could take place at the very first moment.

In conclusion, we can say that a close study of the perceptual processes of these two schools will, however, reveal that actually the difference between the *Nyāya* view of perception and Rāmānuja's view of perception is slight. Rāmānuja differs from the *Nyāya* school only in holding that the object perceived in indeterminate form is a qualified one. Otherwise, like the Naiyāyikas, he also holds that the stage in which an analysis of generic and specific features based on our knowledge of subject-predicate relation takes place is the *savikalpaka* one.

Nature of Illusion

The subject of illusion as studied in western Philosophy differs to a considerable extent from that of ancient Indian Philosophy. In the West Illusions obtain interpretations which are mostly Psycho-physiological and logical; in the ancient Indian Philosophy, however, emphasis is laid on

metaphysical consideration and also on epistemological analysis. According to Indian Philosophy, Psychology is an appendage of metaphysics and that man being essentially a spirit, his body and mind are only artificial and invariable additions to his spiritual being due to 'Avidyā' (ignorance) and 'Karma' (actions). He will, however, have to remain under the influences of body and mind in the ordinary conditions of worldly existence. The Westerners in their study of the subject have tried to find out the nature of knowledge of our waking life and also of the nature of dream-knowledge. The ancient Indian thinkers, however, have gone further to an analysis of dreamless sleep as well where the soul remains entirely free from the influences of the body and the sense-organs. Their main concern was to find out whether in dreamless sleep, they could discover anything that might be regarded as the generator of knowledge. Naturally, therefore, they had recourse to a psychological analysis of illusion only so far as it is helpful to anybody for understanding its ontological status. Physiological explanation of illusion also does not figure prominently in ancient Indian Philosophy. In Rāmānuja's account of illusion, however, we find treatment from the points of view of ontology, logic, psychology and physiology. He has also made an attempt to distinguish between illusion and dream-hallucination in his theory of error.

According to Rāmānuja, illusion means perceiving one thing as another: for example perceiving a conchshell as silver. The speciality of his theory, however, consists in the fact that for him not only the conchshell but also the silver perceived in it are real¹. His theory is thus a combination of *Satkhyāti* and *anyathākhyāti*. The object of illusory perception must be held as real, otherwise we shall have to admit that there can be perceptual consciousness of an unreal object which is absurd. The sky-flower, for example, is unreal and

1. Ramanuja holds that an illusory perception has a real object (sat) for its objective substrate. "Yathārtham sarvavijñānam iti Vedavidān matam." (Quoted in Śrībhāṣya) 1. 1. 1

it can never become an object even of illusory perception. When perception is illusory it is not because of the fact that its object is a product of imagination; it is illusory because the element perceived in illusion is a subdued one and is not, therefore, the determinant character of that Particular object. Due to this, the object perceived in illusion also fails to satisfy the practical needs of human beings. When silver is perceived in a conch-shell, the silver perceived does exist in the conch-shell; but as it exists there in very small quantity,¹ the object is not called silver by anybody. Otherwise "*Sarvam Jñānam Satyam Saviśeṣaviśayam.*"

The basis for this theory is the doctrine of *Trivrit Karaṇa* as a result of which all elements get mixed up in different proportions in different objects. It, therefore, follows that since all elements in different proportions are present in all objects the diverse objects of the world are not rigidly distinct and different from one another. On the contrary, each object in some respect or other, resembles every other object of the Universe. The elements present in a piece of rope are the same as those present in a snake. Only, quantity is different in these two cases. Therefore, when a man perceives a snake in a piece of rope, he is actually perceiving the snake-portions of the rope, which are small in quantity. The rope-portions, which are greater in quantity and more prominent in the object are not revealed to him due to some unavoidable causes. When those causes are removed, the rope-portion becomes more prominent and we say that the man is perceiving the object correctly. The 'snake' which is the object of illusory perception is not, therefore, imaginary. It is real, it is in the object, though in a subdued condition.

This illusory experience may also be described as '*anyathākhyāti*',² since in this case, everyone has got to admit that one thing is always experienced as another.

1. *Yatindramatadīpikā*—Second edition, Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934. Page-12

Rajātāmāsasya Svalpatvāttatra na Vyavahāra itī tajjñānam bhramah.

2. *Anyathātva* : Conchshell perceived as silver (otherwiseness).

The supporters of 'ātma-khyāti' say that all objects are the products of *buddhi* and that they are really the ideas of our minds. From the minds they are projected into the external world and viewed as external objects. Their externality is purely imaginary. So, all our phenomenal experiences are ultimately illusory. To say that the internal idea is appearing as the external object, is equivalent to holding the theory of 'anyathā-khyāti'. In the same way when an upholder of the 'asat-khyāti' says that what is Asat, is appearing as Sat or an upholder of the 'Akhyāti-vāda' says that in the case of illusion, we do not perceive the difference existing between the perceptual knowledge of the 'idam' and the memory image of silver, they are also doing nothing but advocating the theory of "anyathā-khyāti". Even *Anirvacanīyakhyāti* is nothing but a form of 'anyathā-khyāti', as here also 'anirvacanīya' silver is mistaken for a real silver.

If this be the position, then it is wise and economical to recognise only 'anyathā-khyāti' as it includes within its fold all other theories of error and illusion. Here of course, we must remember that in illusion the object perceived is as real as the thing which is the substrate of illusion

Logical Consideration of Illusion

According to Rāmānuja, there seems to be no difference between true knowledge and error, when considered logically. Truth means agreement of our thoughts with facts accompanied by a belief in their agreement. In Rāmānuja's theory of illusion, the object of illusory thinking is in agreement with fact and the subject in illusion also believes that there is an agreement between his idea and the actual fact. Difference arises only when one proceeds to apply pragmatic test. Pragmatically, the object of true knowledge is useful but the object of false knowledge fails to be of any service to human beings.

Psychological Consideration of Illusion

When considered psychologically, illusory experience is for

of course silver-pearls and pearls of conchshell are both present in the object but silver is present in the object in a small quantity (i. e. not in the usual quantity of silver).

Rāmānuja as factual as the so-called true experience. Both the forms of experience are directly received from the real stimuli in the same process, only with this difference that while the content of one is practically useful, the content of the other is not. In illusory experience, the subject does not introduce anything from his imagination which is objectively false. The thing perceived by him is there. The external stimulus, operative in illusion, is not falsely understood. The object is in the external world in the same form in which it is perceived. The silver-portion which is the object of the illusory experience is in the object and is stimulating the sense-organs of the 'subject'. The result is that the subject is perceiving 'silver' on the occasion and not the 'conch-shell'. The question, therefore, arises; is illusion psychologically on a par with the so-called true experience?

The very fact that in illusion the mind of the perceiver fails to select the dominant and determinant character of the object and selects only a subdued one, proves that psychologically, there is some difference between illusion and true experience. The cause for the inability of the perceiver to perceive the prominent character of the object lies in the psychological make-up of the perceiver only and not in the percept itself. It is due to the presence of a particular type of *vāsanā* in the mind of the perceiver that he perceives a character which is only a subdued one in the object. A person, who is greedy for silver will have such a bent of mind that as soon as he will come across any object, in which though silver is not the major element, yet in relation to other existing elements is more prominent, his eyes will immediately catch the silver portion, and he will perceive it as silver. Falsity (*doṣa*) here is due to his inability to receive the impression of 'conch-shell', and this inability is due to *adriṣṭa* or *vāsanā* or the mental inclinations he has developed due to his past impressions.¹ So, although illusion is factual, yet there

1. Śrūta prakāśikā Tīkā (1-1-1)

doṣaḥ śuktyānāṁgrahabettu :

Adriṣṭavaśācca Rajatagrahaṇam (Vāsanā-Doṣaḥ)

is difference between illusion and true experience, so far as selection of parts of the real object is concerned. While in true experience, the selection has universal approval, it is not so in illusion.

Ontological Consideration of Illusion

Rāmānuja believes in the ontological existence of the object of illusion. Illusions, for him, are primarily on the same level as other physical appearances which are considered as true. The silver we see in a conch-shell, is as much non-mental and objective as the conch-shell. Illusion consists simply in the selection of the silver-portion of the conch-shell which is very small in quantity and is not, therefore, of any practical use. Rāmānuja, being a staunch believer in the reality of both 'cit' and 'acit', was eager to prove that whatever object the individual soul contemplates, exists independently of it. Even an object of illusion does not depend for its being on the mind of the subject. The illusory character is as much a part of the stimulus as the true one; and only experience shows that the former is not practically useful and has not obtained the necessary approval of everybody's experience. Since all objects are composed of the same elements, every thing possesses the character of every other thing; the perceiver only selects one or the other under a particular set of conditions. An illusion is as much a part of the world as a real fact. Ontological status of the two (as facts of the world) is not, therefore, different. What we perceive in true experience is not more real than what we perceive in illusion. Rāmānuja has not recognized any difference in the degrees of reality belonging to the objects of true and false knowledge.

Physiological Consideration of Illusion

Rāmānuja has also mentioned some forms of illusions with physiological origin. When a white 'conch-shell' is perceived as yellow by a person suffering from jaundice, the illusion is purely physiological.¹ In the case of the perception of double

1. Here also, he has maintained his realistic attitude by asserting that the conch-shell becomes actually yellow with the yellowness

moon, the cause is however psychophysiological. The perceiver desires to see two moons instead of one and accordingly he presses the retina of the one eye a little downward with his finger and it does not therefore correspond to the retina of the other eye.¹ As visual light in such a case comes out of the two eyes in two parts, two moons are perceived. The physiological change here is produced by the desire of the agent

Dream-hallucinations

Rāmānuja has given a queer explanation about hallucinatory experience of our dream-life. Objects seen in a dream are as independent of the perceiver's mind as the objects of our waking experience. They are also real, although they have no existence outside of the dream-world. These objects are, however, created by God at the time of dream, in accordance with accumulated merits and demerits of the dreamer. During waking-hours, the *jñātman* enjoys the so-called external objects which are also ultimately rooted in God; and in the dream-state, a new world and new objects are created by God and these objects can be enjoyed by the dreamer alone. The difference between the two worlds lies only in this, that the longevity of the dream-world is very short as compared with the relatively permanent character of the world² of our waking life. While illusions are facts of the external world¹ of our waking life, dream-hallucinations are facts of the dream-world only.

Consideration of some important objections raised against Ramanuja's theory of illusion

Śaṅkara Caitanyabhārati, who represents the *advaita* position of Śaṅkarācāryya,¹ has pointed out some defects inherent in Rāmānuja's theory of error in his book called '*Khyātvāda*'.

of the diseased eyeball which has been actually transmitted from the eyeball to the conch shell

- 1 Here the *doṣa* which is causing illusion is a known one as it is the desire of the perceiver. This defect in perception occurs only when there is a desire for perceiving the double moon

Although he believes in the doctrine of 'trivritkaraṇa', yet he is unwilling to accept the interpretation of 'trivritkaraṇa', given by Rāmānuja in his theory of error. If we say that milk contains wine due to 'trivrit-karaṇa' then a man should be supposed to acquire demerit by drinking milk which is 'Surātmaka' (of the nature of wine). A Rāmānujist may, however, answer that in milk 'wine' exists in a very small quantity and therefore by drinking milk, one will not commit any sin. This also cannot be accepted as it has not been stated in the 'Śruti' that a man will commit sin only if he drinks wine in a large quantity.¹ If therefore we accept Rāmānuja's interpretation, we shall have to give up completely all our drinking and eating. Such a state of affairs cannot even be conceived.

Again in the 'Śribhāṣya', it has been stated that the 'Śruti' has prescribed the use of 'putikā' in the absence of 'soma-creeper', simply because the parts of a 'soma-creeper' are present in the 'putikā'. The fact that resemblances are often found between two objects proves that the constituent elements of the one are also the constituent elements of the other. The author of the "Khyātiyāda", therefore, raises the question : can 'putikā' and soma give us the same amount of merit and demerit or the amount differs in the two cases ? As they are not identical, he continues, the quantity of merit and demerit in two cases cannot be exactly the same.

Now, if a Rāmānujist says that they can give us the same quantity of merit and demerit on the strength of 'Codanā' (injunction), then 'adriṣṭa' (desert) will result from the 'Codanā-Vākya' and not from the facts that the constituent parts of 'soma' are present in the 'putikā'. Further, if 'Codanā-Vākya' is competent enough to generate potency in a thing for creating 'adriṣṭa' then anything can be a substitute for the 'soma-creeper'. Why has 'putikā' been mentioned as the substitute

1. Khyātiyāda by Śaṅkara-caitanya-bhāratī, p. 73. The Prince of Wales Saraswati Bhawan Texts no. 58.....

.....Surānapātanya iti śrutau, bhūyasyāḥ surāyāḥ pānenaiṣa pratyavāya
iti na śrutam.

and not anything else ? If it is argued that '*putikā*' has been prescribed specially as it contains 'soma parts' in the largest quantity and is therefore very efficacious for producing maximum merit, then also the difficulty cannot be totally eliminated. According to Śaṅkara Caitanyabhāratī, a question will again be raised; if this be so, then a man, who is by nature eager to get maximum merit, will normally and naturally seek that substitute in which parts of '*soma*' exist in the largest quantity. Why should then be any mention of the '*putikā*' in the *Śruti* as the only substitute for the 'soma-creeper' ? So the author of the '*khyātivāda*' is not ready to accept the example of '*putikā*' in a manner in which Rāmānuja has used it to justify his interpretation of the doctrine of "*trivritkaraṇa*".

Further, Rāmānuja has combined his '*saikhyāti*' with the '*anyathākhyāti*' of the *Nyūya* school. In the "*Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha*", the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*' has been refuted by Vidyāraṇya Muni. In his opinion, '*anyathātva*' (otherwiseness) cannot belong to knowledge. If it is in knowledge, then we shall have to admit that knowledge is of the form of silver and that the conch-shell is only its "*ālambana*" (support), either in the sense that the conch-shell bestows its form on knowledge or in the sense that it becomes the causal basis of our knowledge of silver. Nobody can have knowledge of silver unless his eyes get related to the conch-shell.

First sense is inadmissible because knowledge is already of the form of silver and the conch-shell therefore cannot impart its own form to the cognition that apprehends silver (*rājatākāragrastam jñānam*). Second sense is equally unsound, because if it is admitted that the conch-shell, though unrevealed, is still an object of our knowledge of silver (being the cause of '*rajata-jñāna*'), then in the case of our knowledge of tiger, bows and arrows which are made to kill the tiger, may equally be regarded as the objects of our knowledge of tiger. Again *anyathātva* (otherwiseness) cannot belong to the result (i. e. manifestation),—the nature of manifestation in illusion and truth being exactly the same. *Anyathātva* cannot belong to the object. If it belongs to the

object, then illusion must mean either an identity between silver and conch-shell or the transformation of the conch-shell in the form of the silver. If identity, then again the question arises : does identity here exist between two entirely different things or between two things which are partly similar and partly different ? If they are entirely different, there cannot be any identity between them. If they are partly similar and partly different, then like the knowledge of 'śaṇḍagau' the knowledge of 'idam rajatam' will not be false. Further, if silver is a real transformation of the conch-shell, then also it will not be illusory like the transformation of milk into curd. Moreover, when milk is changed into curd, the curd becomes an object of everybody's perception. Silver, however, will be perceived only by him who is in illusion. Vidyāraṇya Muni's contention, therefore, is that *anyathākhyāti* cannot be supported.

Again, it has been pointed out by some critics of '*satkhyāti*' that in the case of illusion, different persons may perceive different objects in one and the same substrate. Thus, a piece of rope may appear as a snake or as a garland or as a stick or as a water line to different persons at the same time. A *satkhyātvādi* will have to admit that the constituent parts of all these objects exist in that piece of rope. So the doctrine of "*satkhyāti*" cannot be logically upheld.

Now, the question raised by Śaṅkara 'Caitanyabhārati' is : if milk is really 'śūrātmaka' (of the nature of wine) why is it not also prohibited in the scriptures—like wine? To this, the writer would like to reply that in milk, wine-portion and milk-portion are *avyāpavṛtta* (mixed) and that milk-portion is more prominent. As such, one does not commit sin by drinking milk. In the "*dharmaśāstra*", for example, selling of beef is prohibited but not the selling of a cow or a bull, although the body of an animal is composed of flesh. Again, selling of oil is a prohibited action for a person of the *Brāhmin*-class but he is allowed to sell linseeds which contain oil.

Further, it is true that Rāmānuja has accepted "*anyathākhyāti*" but, in his opinion, "*anyathātva*" does not belong to knowledge. It belongs to the object and that too, in a very special sense. Indeed in the ordinary sense, knowledge of

'*idam rajatam*' is as true as the knowledge of '*saṇḍagan*' (so far as the object is concerned). The former is false only in the sense that it is not universally recognized as such and that it is not also practically useful. Perception, here, is of the '*yathāvasthita*' object, (object as it actually exists) but the object is not suitable for use. (Here '*anyathātva*' lies in the fact that the silver that is perceived in illusion is different from the customary silver that is an object of everybody's experience and use).

Objections Met

The above criticisms, nevertheless, provide good materials for thought to all serious thinkers. The doctrine of "*trivrit-karaṇa*" holds that the elements of three types form the stuff of every object. So, when we perceive silver, we actually see the fiery part of the object and not actual silver. If this fiery part is called silver, then there will be different silvers corresponding to the different elements of which the total silver is composed. One type of silver will be composed of the fiery part, one of the earth and a third of water and so on, This is an unhappy position. If we say that the whole alone is called silver (and not a mere part), then in the conch-shell only the fiery part is present and that also in a small quantity. How can we, then, say that 'silver' is present in the conch-shell? The confusion, here, is perhaps due to the fact that the so-called '*bhūtas*' (elements) exist in the subtle forms as well as in the forms of the gross objects. Fire is subtle as well as gross; so also are earth and water. The word 'fire', therefore, can be used to mean the subtle element called fire as well as the gross object of the same name. We are justified in saying that in 'fire' (in the sense of gross fire), 'earth' is present as the subtle form of the latter also bears the same name; but we cannot on that account say that in the conch-shell silver is present, as 'silver' is not the name of the *taijasa*-element, present in the object.

Moreover, when the conch-shell is known as such, we at once feel that the silver that we perceived a few minutes back was never present in the object (*trikāla-bādhita*): but if one is

a follower of *satkhyāti*, then he will have to say that the silver that he had perceived in the conch-shell sometime ago, was not non-existent in the past.

Hence, '*abhāva*' (non-existence) of 'silver' in three '*kālas*' (past, present and future) which is the common belief of the man in the case of illusions cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of *satkhyāti*. The position, therefore, becomes extremely anomalous and miserably inconsistent with the customary beliefs of our ordinary life. Again, all the factors which are generally needed for the production of silver are not in the conch-shell; then how can silver be expected to exist in conch-shell even for a short while ?

Further, it is also very difficult for me to understand why 'silver' in the conch-shell, which is believed to be real, should fail to render to the perceiver that service which is generally obtained from the silver in the silver shop ? Difference in function results from difference in natures only, and differences in natures cannot here be logically maintained, since both of them are called by the same name and are given the same ontological status. It is no good saying that difference here is only quantitative and not qualitative as quantitative differences always lead to qualitative differences in objects.

To defend Rāmānuja, it can, however, be said that since he has admitted that the world is in no sense dependent on the individual self, he is eager to prove that not a single object of knowledge is a creation of anybody's imagination. The world is real, is objective and is rooted only in God. To eliminate subjective element totally from the object of knowledge is a very difficult task, and the defects in Rāmānuja's theory of illusion are mainly due to the fact that he is out to prove something that goes against the common beliefs of ordinary human beings. We are persuaded to believe by the evidence of our day-to-day experience that our perceptions are sometimes indicative of the presence of physical objects and sometimes they are not. So, to assert that illusion is not illusory and that it is as good a fact as a true experience, needs boldness and courage of conviction. Indeed, in ancient Indian philo-

sophy it is Rāmānuja who alone has given a real place to the illusory objects in the objective world. Even *anyathākhyāti*, advocated by the realistic *Nyāya* school, does not recognise the object of illusion as fully factual and objective. According to this theory, when a man perceives silver in a conch-shell, only the common qualities of silver and conch-shell are perceived by him, while the peculiar qualities of the conch-shell remain completely unnoticed. The perception of similar attributes revives the idea of the peculiar qualities of silver in memory and the memory-image of silver produces the perception of silver. So, the object of illusory perception is the memory-image which has been projected in the external world from the mind of the perceiver at the time of illusion. An object is apprehended in that in which it does not exist. The realistic dualism of *Sāṃkhya* also says that in the illusory perception of silver the knowledge of "idam" is real and the knowledge of '*rajatam*' is unreal. The knowledge of 'this', has for its object, an object present to the eyes of the perceiver. It is, therefore, real; but the knowledge of silver has for its object 'silver' which is not present to the sense-organs of the person concerned and so it is unreal.

In the present century, much time and energy have already been spent on the problem of error and illusion in the West. Realists and Neo-realists are trying hard to deny the subjectivity of error. Like Rāmānuja, the western realists too have declared that a fictitious thing can never be an object of perception. From the arguments and counter-arguments that crop up in this connection, one can easily understand the difficulties involved in this problem. It is really a great pioneer work on the part of Rāmānuja to declare that error could not be called subjective. His method of establishing this proposition may invite criticisms from his successors but the weaknesses of his arguments cannot lessen the credit which Rāmānuja rightly deserves for his extraordinary genius and free thinking, displayed in his theory of error even in that far off age of the eleventh century A. D. His important contribution to the theory of knowledge is, thus twofold (1)

his statement that even illusory perception is true¹, (2) his assertion about the utility of true knowledge. According to Rāmānuja, knowledge is not only of cognitive value: it has also a practical aspect which should not be overlooked. True knowledge reveals reality and also serves the practical purpose of life. When both the purposes are not fully served in the usual manner, knowledge becomes an illusion. Thus, we find that both pragmatic and logical values of knowledge have found equal prominence in Rāmānuja's theory of error and truth.

Memory

According to Rāmānuja, valid knowledge is that knowledge which reveals the true character of the object and is at the same time practically useful. This differentiating characteristic of valid knowledge is true of memory. But if memory is regarded as a form of valid knowledge, then it must have a suitable *karana* or instrument through which *smṛti-jñāna* can be acquired. In order to overcome this difficulty, *Pūriamimāṃsā* has held that valid knowledge must be entirely new (*anadhigata*). Since memory does not give us new knowledge but is only a reproduction of the past knowledge, it cannot be called *pramāṇjñāna*. According to *Nyāya*, however, a knowledge does not become invalid only because it is not entirely new. Memory also, in some cases, corresponds to real objects. So memory-knowledge is also true and is definitely believed as true. But *pramāṇa* according to *Nyāya* is an instrument for giving us valid '*anubhava*' of objects which are felt to be given to us. '*Anubhava*' refers to that cognition only, the object of which is felt to be given to us. Memory being representative in character is not '*anubhava*' and so no *pramāṇa* or instrument is necessary for memory knowledge.

The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy has accepted the validity of memory-knowledge, but this type of valid knowledge is held to be slightly different from the valid knowledge obtained through perception, inference or scriptural testimony. In the case of

1 "Yathartham sarvavignānam ti Vedavidām matam"
Śrībhāṣya—111

valid knowledge obtained through perception, inference and verbal testimony, validity does not depend on any condition ; but the validity of the memory-knowledge depends on the validity of that presentative knowledge which is its cause and basis. This is the reason why a separate *pramāṇa* is not needed to establish the validity of memory. The validity of memory arises from the validity of the *anubhava* which is its cause. In *Yatindramatadīpikā*, memory has however been defined as a form of perception¹ in the sense that the *samskāras* (impressions) which really cause memory are nothing but traces of objects and events which were presented as given facts on previous occasions. Although *smṛti* (memory) has been described as a form of perception yet it should not be supposed on that ground that memory-knowledge results from perception only and not from inference and scriptural testimony. The *prakāśatikā* suggests that memory is valid when it results from valid knowledge ; it becomes doubtful if it results from doubt and if it results from an illusion, it becomes illusory.² This interpretation seems to have been made here with a view to making provision for the formation of memory-knowledge on the basis of inferential knowledge as well as knowledge from scriptural testimony.

In conclusion, it can be said that according to *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, memory can be both valid and invalid. If memory is based on valid *anubhava*, it is valid ; if it is based on *anubhava* which is invalid, it also becomes invalid. Memory-knowledge may be roused up by similarity, by association and also by thought (*Sadr̥śādr̥śtacintādyāḥ smṛti-vijasya vadhakāḥ...ādīśabdena sūhacaryasyūpi grahaṇāntenūpibhavati-Yatindramatadīpikā—Chap. I.*).

1. *Yatindramatadīpikā*—Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, Second edition, 1934.

Samskārasūpekṣatvāttasyāḥ pratyakṣamūlabhūtatacānūlabhīte pratyakṣe 'n-tarbhāvaiti....p. 7.

2. *Yatindramatadīpikā—Prakāśatikā—Chap. I, p. 7.* Anandasrama, Mudranalaya, Poona, Second edition, 1934.

Sā ca svakāraṇabhūtabramūhibhāntisamsayānredhena svayamapi tadgr-rūpā satī...

Pratyabhijñā as a form of Perception.

Pratyabhijñā (recognition) has been brought under perception due to the fact that it is a combination of direct perception and *smṛti*. For example if I see Devadatta after six months and recognize him immediately, I have that kind of knowledge which is called *pratyabhijñā*. On analysis, we shall see that it involves nothing but a direct perception of Devadatta in combination with the memory of him.

Inference.

The second source of knowledge is inference. As inference is based on memory and memory is based on perception, inference is also based on perception. The object of inference is always qualified like the object of perception. Inference is the process of knowing some new truth on the basis of some truths already known to us. As soon as a person perceives smoke in a hill, he at once remembers the invariable relation between smoke and fire. This helps him to arrive at a new knowledge, that is, there is fire in the hill. According to *Nyāya* philosophy, *linga parāmarśa* or subsumptive reflection in three forms must be present in every form of inference as an indispensable antecedent; as such *linga parāmarśa* should be regarded as the cause of *anumiti* (inferential knowledge). The knowledge of the presence of the middle term in the minor term may be called first *lingaparāmarśa* (subsumptive reflection), the knowledge of the invariable relation between the middle term and the major term is the second *lingaparāmarśa* (subsumptive reflection) and the complex cognition like '*van-hiṣṭyāpyadhūmayān ayam parvataḥ*' which arises from the two previous cognitions is the third *lingaparāmarśa* (subsumptive reflection). The first *lingaparāmarśa* is known as *pakṣadharma* (relation between middle term and the minor term) and the second as *vyūpti* (universal relation between the middle term and the major term). In the opinion of Rāmānuja-philosophy, these two (*Pakṣadharma* and *vyūpti*) constitute the cause of *anumiti*. The third *lingaparāmarśa* of the *Nyāya* has not been recognized by a Rāmānujist. The process of inference in *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy is, therefore, simpler than

the *Nyāya* process. Here, *anumiti jñāna* arises one moment earlier than what is required according to *Nyāya*-system. The third *lingaparīkṣa* has not been recognized by the school of *Pūrvaśāstrī* as well.

Regarding *vyāpti*, the *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy holds that it is an unconditional (*nirupādṛhika*) and universal (*nijata*) relation between the middle term and the major term. This universal relation is arrived at by repeated observations of *sahacāra* and *vyabhicāra* between the middle term and the major term.

Regarding the methods of arriving at *vyāpti* the *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy has accepted only *anvayavajireki* method and *kevalanvay* method. The *anvayavajireki* method seeks to establish *vyāpti* on the basis of the observations of two sets of instances—one in which both the middle term and the major term are invariably found together such as "*Parīkṣāmandhūmavattāt, Yo Yo dhūmavānsa so'gnimāyathā mahānasaṃ*" and the other in which the absence of the major term is constantly associated with the absence of the middle term, "*Yo'nagnih sa nirdhūmayathā mahāhradaṃ iti*". By *kevalanvay* method, *vyāpti* is discovered on the basis of the observation of mere copresence of the middle term and the major term. Such as "*Brahmaśabdarāciṃ vastutīrthahataṃ*".

According to *Nyāya* philosophy, *Kevalavajireki* too has been recognized as a method for discovering *vyāpti* or the universal relation between the middle term and the major term. *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, of course, recognises the existence of *kevalavajireka sahacāra* but does not admit that this can be used as a method for arriving at *vyāpti*. This is because, according to *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, the object inferred must not be entirely new. It ought to have been known previously in some other place. But the *vajirekiśāstra* remains entirely unknown and so it cannot be an object of inference. When '*pṛthivī*' is *pakṣa*, '*pṛthivītarorī*' is '*sādhya*' and '*gaṇitā*' is '*hetu*', then it is evident that this *sādhya* exists in *pakṣa* only and not anywhere else. Fire that is inferred on seeing smoke in the hill is definitely known to exist in some other

places such as *mahānasa*. In the present case (i.e. hill) the existence of fire is doubtful and so it is to be established by inference. But *Pṛthveta-bheda* is *aprasiddha* and so it cannot be an object of inference.

Kinds of Inference

Inference is of two kinds: *svārtha* and *parārtha* or inference for one's own sake and inference for the sake of others. Having knowledge of an invariable relation between smoke and fire, one goes to a hill and finds a cloud of smoke rising from the hill. He then infers that the hill contains fire. This is an instance of *svārthanumāna*. *Parārthanumāna*, generally consists of five propositions such as *pralīḥa*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*. But sometimes a syllogism may contain three propositions or two propositions. In other words, *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy does not attach much importance to the number of propositions in a syllogism.¹

The number of propositions is relative to the intelligence of the persons who are concerned with inferential knowledge. The *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy has also recognized a distinction between deductive and inductive forms of reasoning. In the *śrībhāṣya* it has been stated that one form of inference proceeds from the observation of particular cases whereas another form rests on general truths.²

Fallacies

Fallacy in syllogistic argument occurs when false reason appears in the guise of a true reason. It is of five kinds such as *asiddha*, *viruddha*, *anaikantika*, *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*, *prakaraṇasama*³ :—

1. *Asmākaṁ tvaniyamah, kvacit pañcāvayavah, kvacitryāvayavah, kvacidvya-vayavah—Yatindramatadīpika*—Chap. II, p. 21.

Second edition—Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934.

2. *Nāḥyanumānaṁ viśeṣatodṛṣṭam, sāmānyatodṛṣṭam vā.* (*Śrībhāṣya*—1-1-3—Edited and published by T. Srinivasa Sarma, p. 239. Bombay, 1916).

(*Śrutoprakāśika-Dvividhanumānāgocaravamāhanāpīṭyādīnā.*)

3. *Nyāyaparīsuddhiḥ—Prathama āhika* (chapter on Anumāna).

(1) *Asiddha*—It is also of three kinds—*svarūpāsiddha*, *āśrayāsiddha* and *vyāpyatvāsiddha*. *Svarūpāsiddha* form refers to a fallacy which is committed when one argues that soul is non-eternal like the jar since it is perceptible. Here, the minor term (soul) by nature rejects the middle term (perceptibility). The existence of the middle term in the minor term being unreal, the minor premise which relates it to the minor term becomes false. *Āśrayāsiddha* fallacy is committed when one falsely argues that the sky-lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus like the lotus of a lake. Here the minor term sky-lotus which is the substratum (*āśraya*) of the middle term lotusness is unreal. In *vyāpyatvāsiddha* fallacy, the connection between the middle term and the major term cannot be proved. "That which is real is momentary". Here, the universal relation between the real and the momentary cannot be proved.

(2) *Viruddha*—This happens when the middle term is opposed to the major term such as "Matter is eternal because it is fashioned like time." (*Nitya prakṛtiḥ kṛtakatvāt kālavat*). Here, the middle term *kṛtakatva* exists only where eternity is absent.

(3) *Anaikāntika*—Here, the middle term is related to both the existence and the non-existence of the major term "Sound is eternal because it is knowable like time" (*śabdonityaḥ prameyatvāt kālavat*). Here, the middle term knowability belongs to both eternal and non-eternal things.

(4) *Prakaraṇasama*—When both the major term and its absence are not definitely known, the necessity for definite determination arises. If in such a case, one desires to prove the existence of the major term on the basis of the non-perception of its absence or vice versa, he commits the fallacy of *Prakaraṇasama*. This, therefore, is a case where a stronger argument on the other side is also possible. "God is non-eternal because he is devoid of eternal qualities."

(5) *Kalātayāpadiṣṭa*—Here, the middle term is related to the minor term in which the major term cannot exist. "Fire is cold, because it is a substance like water."

Upamāna

According to *Nyāya*, *upamāna* is an independent source of knowledge. Since through this source, one gains knowledge of a new thing from its similarity to another thing previously well known. As for example, a man who does not know what a 'gavaya' (wild ox) is, may be told by a person, familiar with the animal, that it is like a cow. When next he perceives such an animal in the forest, he knows that it is the 'gavaya'. The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophers hold that if we admit that 'gavaya' is clearly understood when it is heard that *gavaya* is similar to a cow and if such an understanding of the meaning of *gavaya* is believed to help a man to utter "this is a *gavaya* as soon as he perceives that cow-like animal and remembers the *anubhava* aroused by previously heard sentence "a *gavaya* is similar to a cow," then *upamāna* becomes nothing but a combination of memory and direct perception. Therefore, in such a case, like *pratyabhijñā*, *upamāna* also becomes a form of perception. Further, from the previously heard sentence, one may arrive at a universal relation of the form "All cow-like animals are *gavayas*." He may then go to a forest and on seeing a cow-like animal may argue like this : "Since it is cow-like, it is the *gavaya*." Such *upamāna* comes under inference. If knowledge of "this is *gavaya*" is obtained from the previously heard sentence, then it comes under *śabda*. Hence, in the opinion of this school of philosophers *upamāna* is not an independent source of knowledge.¹

Arthapatti

According to *Mīmāṃsā* and *advaitavedānta*, *arthāpatti* is a separate source of knowledge. But *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, like *Nyāya* and *Sāṃkhya*, has included *arthāpatti* in inference.

Arthāpatti is really a kind of deductive reasoning since it

1. *Jaiṇdrama'adīpikā*—Anandasarma Mudranalaya—Poona, chap. II, Second edition, 1934.

Smaranārthapattivārtikāya pratyakṣe'ntarbhāvah

Vṛtyāptigrahanāpekṣatvādanumāne'ntarbhāvah.

Vākyaajanyato'ecchabāde'ntarbhāvah.

consists in the deduction of one truth from another. It is true that Devadatta is fat despite the fact that he does not eat during day-time. We therefore infer that he eats at night because it is true that all fat persons eat either at day-time or at night.

Devadatta has not been seen to take meal at day-time but fatness (which can result from eating only) is perceptible in the case of Devadatta. So, one comes to the conclusion that he eats at night. Eating at night is not established here by perception. Universal relation too exists between eating and fatness and not between eating at night and fatness. Hence fatness can prove eating only and not eating at night. So, in order to establish the fact of eating at night, some schools have accepted *arthāpatti* as an independent source of knowledge.

In *Yatindramatadīpikā*, however, *arthāpatti* has been brought under inference. Here a universal relation has been established between fatness and eating. Just as smoke cannot exist without fire, similarly fatness cannot exist without eating. Inference will help us to prove eating and since eating at day-time is contradicted by perception, eating at night is established by the residual process.

Scriptural testimony

The third means of knowledge according to *viśiṣṭādvaita* is scriptural testimony. According to *Nyāya* philosophy, *Śabda* refers to utterances of the *āptas*. God is an *āptapurūṣa* and the *vedas* are composed by God. Therefore the *vedas* constitute an independent source of knowledge which is called scriptural testimony. According to Rāmānuja, however, the *vedas* are not the utterances of any *āptapurūṣa*. These are beginningless. So far as the beginninglessness and *apauruṣeyatva* of the *vedas* are concerned we find similarity between Rāmānuja's *śāstra* and the philosophy of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. But while the school of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* does not believe in the dissolution and fresh creation of the world, Rāmānuja believes in *Sṛṣṭi* and *pralaya*. He holds that God teaches Brahma the *vedas* at the very beginning of each *kalpa*. The *vedas* are never composed by any being, human or divine.

being to be obtained through *upāsana*, *Brahman* becomes a content of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* of the *vedas*. Śaṅkara is of opinion that *upāsana* is, also a form of action and if *Brahmaprāpti* (Brahma-realisation) is regarded as an effect of *upāsana*, then it will also be non-eternal. But Rāmānuja does not believe that the result of an action is always non-eternal. In his opinion, eternality or non-eternality depends on the nature of that which one obtains by following a particular line of action. *Upāsana* is of such a type that it brings about total destruction of all ego-centric actions. It also helps the worshipper to win the grace of God. Now destruction of actions cannot be destroyed. Further, God, being merciful and perfect will always maintain an affectionate attitude towards his devotee. Love of an ordinary ego-centric person vanishes as soon as something happens contrary to his own self-interest. This can never happen in the case of God.

Lastly, according to *vītiṣṭādvaita*, *vedas* are divided into two sections—one is called *karmā-kāṇḍa* or *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* which deals with the sacrificial rites and the rituals; the other is called *jñāna-kāṇḍa* or *uttara-mīmāṃsā* which deals with the nature of *Brahman*. Thus *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and *Uttaramīmāṃsā* are simply the two divisions of the *vedas*.

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CHAPTER III

METAPHYSICS

Section A

Theory of Causation

Different Views of Causation as Expounded in the Tattvakaumudi of Vacaspati Miśra.

In India, philosophical inquiry relates mainly to the nature of the ultimate cause of the world which has always been viewed as an effect. As cause and effect are relative terms, one necessarily refers to the other. In the worldly-life, an individual experiences the iron-chain of the causal necessity dominating the external and the internal phenomena. There is not a single event which does not point to some other event as its necessary pre-condition. This experience of causal necessity felt by us at every moment of our life, naturally arouses in our mind a desire to know the cause of the world. The world as a fact is present before us ; no sane man can deny its empirical reality. It is, therefore, both logical and natural for us to ask what is the cause of the world which also is factual like all other factual happenings which we perceive in this universe. "What is the source of this world" and "Where do we come from" have therefore become the major philosophical problems in all systems of Indian philosophy. Moreover, the purpose of philosophical enquiry in India, is to find out the means of liberation from the sorrowful worldly life. The world is a condition of misery. Absolute cessation of world-feeling, therefore, is necessary for liberation. Now, world-feeling can be stopped for ever only by destroying its root cause. From this point of view also, the problem of causation occupies a very important place in Indian philosophy.

Vacaspati Miśra's classification of Causal Relation.

Vācaspati Miśra has given us a summary of the principal forms of the causal theory in his "*Tattva Kaumudi*", a Commentary on *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*.

Firstly, we get the theory of the non-existent cause (*Asatkāraṇavāda*) which holds that the existent comes into being from the non-existent. This view can be attributed to the Buddhistic philosophy, according to which all things of the world last for one moment only. When the effect is produced, its cause, being momentary, is no longer in existence. The succeeding moment always comes into being when the preceding moment is destroyed.

Secondly, there is the theory of the prior non-existence of the effect in its material cause (*Asatkāryavāda*). This is generally held by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy. For them, cause and effect are two different substances and the effect-substance does not exist in the causal substance before its production. When the effect is produced, something new comes into existence. The effect is not called "non-existent" (*asat*) because of its falsity or unreality: it is called "non-existent" as it is not existent in the cause prior to its production. Otherwise, an effect is as real as its cause.

The third theory holds that the effect exists in the cause prior to its production, and for that reason this theory is called *Satkāryavāda* (the theory that proclaims the prior existence of the effect in its material cause). This view is held by *Sāṃkhya* and *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. According to *Sāṃkhya*, the effect is existent in the sense that it remains in the form of potency in its material cause even before its actual production. One causal substance can assume different states and features at different times, under different conditions. Since the potentialities of all these states are inherent in the substance, the effects are called "existent" (*sat*) even before they are actually produced in the effect forms.

Pūrva Mīmāṃsā too, holds that the effect in the form of potential energy exists in its cause prior to its production. A seed possessed in it an invisible potency with the help of which it can produce the seed-ling.

Lastly, we get the theory of illusory causation (*vicrtavāda*) of *Śaṅkarācārya*, according to which "the effect is only an illusory appearance of the cause."

The theory of illusory causation is a form of *Satkāryavāda*, though it differs essentially from the *Satkāryavāda* of *Sāṅkhya* and *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. According to *Śaṅkara*, the cause of the world is illusion or *Māyā*, just as according to *Sāṅkhya*, the cause is Nature (*Prakṛti*). *Prakṛti*, however, is regarded as real whereas illusion or *Māyā* is regarded as false. Still the theory of illusory causation is *Satkāryavāda* in the sense that the substrate of all effects is absolutely real. It is Brahman and nothing else.

The list of Vācaspati Miśra, however, is not exhaustive as it leaves out many subtle differentiations of causality made by different orthodox and unorthodox systems of Indian philosophy.

Rāmānuja's View

Now, of all these forms of causation, Rāmānuja has accepted the theory that believes in the prior existence of the effect in its material cause. According to him, if we sincerely make an attempt to deduce the real implication of the upaniṣadic statement such as "by knowing one" all will be known,¹ we cannot deny the identity between the cause and its effect so far as 'material' is concerned. If cause and effect are two different and distinct substances, then by knowing the cause, we could not have known the effect. The pot is regarded as the effect of the earth, because in the production of the pot, the substance of the earth is not changed, but different states, characteristics and features only have arisen in the pot, thereby differentiating it from the earth in general. It is because the earthen pot, the earthen jar and the earthen plates are nothing but different states and features of the same substance that by knowing the earth, one can know all earthen modifications².

1. *Chānd Upaniṣad—Ekaviñśanena Sarva Vijñānam...*

Vedārth Saṁgraha—p. 59.

(By Dr. J. Prasad, Second edition. 1924.)

Ekameva Kāraṇabhūtaṁ Dravyamaṣṭhāntarāyogenakūṛyamityueyate.

2. *Vedārtha Saṁgraha*—p. 60.

(By Dr. J. Prasad, Second edition. 1924)

Dravyāntarādarśanādeetīkāraṇamevāvasthāntarāpannam Kāryamityueyate...

Cause, according to Rāmānuja philosophy is of three kinds : material cause, efficient cause and assisting cause (*Sahakāri Kāraṇa*).

The substance that undergoes changes of states in the form of effects, is called the material cause, that which causes the material to undergo changes is the efficient cause and that which acts as an assisting factor is called the assisting cause.¹ The assisting cause may be included in the efficient cause and so cause can also be regarded as of two forms. When the material cause, through the functioning of the efficient and assisting causes, produces an effect, we actually feel and observe that the material cause remains essentially the same. What happens is this : the particles of material cause are only knitted together in a new fashion, so as to produce a new "arrangement" (*saṁsthāna*) which is called the effect. If the identity between 'cause' and 'effect' is not admitted, then anything can be legitimately regarded as the material cause of anything else.

The causal relation generally presents certain characteristics. First of all, we find that the causal relation is irreversible. Milk will produce curd but curd will not be able to produce milk. Secondly, the order of succession between the cause and its effect is regular. The effect always succeeds the cause. Lastly, there is the absence of fortuitousness. An effect can be produced only from its appropriate material cause and not from anything else. These characteristics of causal relation will be impaired if we do not believe in the doctrine that speaks of the existence of the effect in the cause prior to its production.

It is of course true that we use different words to denote 'cause' and 'effect.' Knowledge of the cause is always different from the knowledge of the effect but all these differences simply indicate a change in the forms and states of the cause and the effect. So far as the actual substance is concerned,

1. *Tatīndramatātīpikā*—second edition, Anandasrama Modranalaya, Poona, 1934—p. 81, chap. IX.
Kūryarūpeṇa Vikṛayegṇam Vastu Upādāraṁ Kūryatayā Parīṇāyini.
Nirmitam, Kūryotpatyupakaraṇam Vastu, Saṁsthāni.

ned there is no difference between the cause and the effect. The different words and names, used for cause and effect, are useful for practical purposes. The real meaning of causation is change in the states and features of a substance and causal operation is necessary to effect such changes.

Whenever we observe golden ear-rings, necklace, etc., we always feel that gold is present in all of them as their one identical cause. We recognize the inherent gold of an ear-ring by saying "this ear-ring is made of gold." We never experience the existence of another substance like clay in a golden ornament. One and the same universal (*Jati*), (i.e. gold), possesses both causal form and effect form under different conditions.¹

The critic may raise an objection against such identity between cause and effect by citing the example of smoke and fire. We generally believe that smoke is the effect of fire ; yet in smoke we do not feel the existence of fire. How can we then say that the substance of the effect is always identical with its causal substance ?

This objection cannot stand as 'fire' is only the efficient cause of smoke and not its material cause. Smoke actually arises when fire is set to wet fuel.²

Those who maintain that cause and effect are two different substances and that the effect substance is non-existent in the cause prior to its production, cite in favour of their theory, the scriptural statements like "In the very beginning there was only Negation" (*Asat*).³ "In the beginning the world was in the form of non-existence,"⁴ etc.

1. Śrī Bhāṣya-Vol. II, Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1940. 2-1-16.

Ekameva Hemaṇḍīyam Dravyam Kāryakāraṇabhayāvastham dṛiṣyate.

2. Ibid.

Agner-nimittakāraṇamātraṭvāt

Agnisamyuktādrendhanāt hi Dhūmajñyate

3. Chānd Upaniṣad : 3-19-1.

Asadevedamagra Āsit

4. Tattirīya Āraṇyaka, chap. 3-1.

Asade, a Idamagra Āsit

According to Rāmānuja, however, all these statements simply express the truth that before production the effect does not exist in the cause in the form in which it appears afterward as the effect.¹ Its existence in the cause in a form other than the one it assumes, when it comes into being as an effect and becomes practically useful in this world, is what is asserted by these scriptural statements quoted by the upholders of "Asatkāryavāda."

All effects of a particular cause should, therefore, be regarded as the possible states which the cause can assume although they are not actually existent in the forms in which they are to be produced as effects. Since the causal substance remains identical through all changes of its states and features, it is not wrong to hold that the effect exists in the causal substance even before the operation of the causal instruments. The forms and arrangements are no doubt new; still as they have no independent being of their own and as they are the possible forms which can be produced from a particular causal substance, their new emergence does not invalidate the theory of *Satkāryavāda* according to which the effect exists in the cause prior to its production. Production, is really nothing but assuming such a state or arrangement of parts by the cause as is practically useful.² Destruction, on the other hand, means destruction of the previous state of a substance when it produces a new one. ³The designation of the effect as *asat*

1. Śrī Bhāṣya—Vol. III. Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1940, 2-1-18.

Sa Khalu asadyapadeśastasyaiva Kāryadravyasya Pīrva Kāle Dharmāntareṇa—Samsthāntareṇa : Na bhavadabhipretenatucchatoena... Mridādravyasya Prithubudhnodarakāryayogo Ghaṭo'stīti vyavahāra hetuḥ. Tasyaiva Tadvirodhyavasthāntarayogo Ghaṭo Nāstīti Vyavahārahetuḥ.

2. *Vedārtha Samgraha*—p. 59. published by Dr. J. Prasad, Second edition, 1924.

Yathā Mridā Utpannam Ghaṭādikam Mridātmakeṇ Sata Utpattināma Vyavahāraśiṣaḥetu Bhūtoavasthāśiṣayogāt.

3. *Vedānta Sāra* : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1954, 2-1-18.

Sikhlatavavireddhi Śikṣamātecarupadharmāntara Yogādarsatrayapadeśāt.

(in Tait. Br. II. 2. 8.) is due to the fact that the thing was with a different affribute, namely "with a subtle state which is opposed to a gross state." For Rāmānuja, causation means production (*utpatti*) of a new state and not the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of the latent energy in the form of an effect.

The supporters of the *Vihartavāda* (theory of illusory causation) say that the cause and the effect are identical because the cause alone is real and the effect is nothing but a false appearance of the cause. This theory is not justifiable according to Rāmānuja. If the cause is real and the effect is false then there cannot be any identity between cause and its effects. No identity between truth and falsity is logically justifiable.¹

Relation between God and the World.

Thus defining the nature of the relation between cause and effect in general, Rāmānuja proceeds to analyse the relation between God and the world : because in his opinion omniscient and omnipotent *nārāyaṇa* or God is the sole cause of the universe. Spirit and matter are the states or modes of *brahman*.²

Substance-attribute relation between God and the world—
(*Viseṣya-viśeṣaṇa sambandha*)

In the first place Rāmānuja has described the relation between God and the world as similar to the relation between

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya*—Vol. II, 2-1-15. English translation by Thibaut.

"Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause & effect on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality are unable to prove what they wish to prove; for the true & the false cannot be one."

2 (a) *Brahman* is cause or effect as His modes of matter and soul are either in their subtle or in their gross phases. *pradhānapuṁso-rajyoh kāraṇam kāryabhūṭayoh*. (He is the cause of unborn prakṛti and puruṣa which are effects) *Viṣṇu purāṇa* 1. 9, 37.

(b) *Brahmana* has the mode of being of cause when his body is constituted by prakṛti and puruṣa in their subtle phase and *Brahman* has the mode of being of effect when his body is constituted by the sum total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities in their gross phase—*Vedārtha Saṁgraha* : translation by J. A. B. Vanbuitenen, page 234.

a substance and its attribute. Conscious beings and unconscious things, which we find in this world may be conceived as attributes of God. In his real nature, God is one, infinite, omniscient and omnipotent super-personality with all the excellent qualities eternally present in Him. Now, conscious and unconscious beings and things which are regarded as His attributes are different from His essential nature, although eternally belong to and qualify Him. Thus, He is eternally the qualified God. These attributes of spirit (*cit*) and matter (*acit*) in a subtle and undivided form remain unified with His true nature in the state of non-manifestation, but become manifest in a variety of forms at the time of creation. In both the states, spirit and matter are inseparable¹ from *Brahman*. As attributes, they are really different from God—the substance. but as they always remain united with *Brahman*, the doctrine of 'Non-dualism' (*Advaita*) is established and the two attributes can in this sense of inseparableness be regarded as non-different from Him²

This type of advaita, Rāmānuja has tried to establish on the evidence of our worldly experience. Inseparably related things are not treated as different, when they are actually used in life. We look upon them or handle them in a manner as if they constitute one object. A jar, for example, consists of substance, quality, universal etc. which though really different are inseparably united to form one object. Theoretically considered, the substance is regarded as totally different from its quality and universal, but practically considered, it is always looked upon as one and is also given a single name (i. e. jar). Similarly, the two attributes of God, being united with Him inseparably are also regarded as non-different from Him, and,

1 *Aprithak Siddhik Vedartha samgraha*, Deccan College Monograph series—16 Introduction critical edition & annotated translation B J A B Van Buiteren Page 114, No 76

2 *Sri Bhāṣya* 3-2-28

*Jīvaṇa prithaksiddhyanarha-Viśeṣanātvenāśvato brahmamsattvam
Viśiṣṭa vastrekāśvatvenābhedaṇyavahāro mukhyaḥ viśeṣanāviśeṣyayoḥ
svatūpasvabhāva bhedenā vedanyavaharo mukhyaḥ.*

thus, we have been induced to believe that the primary cause of the world is only one—i. e. *Brahman*. It has, therefore, been held by Rāmānuja that although in His essential nature God is different from conscious souls and unconscious nature (*Prakṛti*), yet from the practical point of view, we are to recognize both difference and non-difference between God and His attributes. In other words, we can say that from the practical point of view, the relation between God and the world is *bhedabheda*. In character and form God is really different from attributes but as conscious souls and unconscious nature always remain associated with Him as His qualifying attributes, the impression of non-difference which is normally created in connection with the qualified objects of the worldly-life, also holds true with regard to Brahman and His qualities,

Soul-Body Relation (*S'arīrī-S'arīra Sambandha*)

Rāmānuja has also interpreted the relation between God and the world in another way. In his opinion, the relation between God and the world can be conceived on the analogy of the relation between body and soul. God is the soul of the universe and the universe is His body. It is because of the presence of God as soul in all these finite beings and changing things, that in spite of their apparent diversities, they are related together and organically united with one another. All things and beings of the world have evolved out of the nature of God ; they are guided and controlled by Him. They serve the purpose and ideal which are inherent in God and so they are said to constitute the body of God ¹. In practical life the body of a man is regarded as both different and non-different from His Soul. Accordingly, the world of diversities may also be regarded as both different and non-different from God. The feeling of non-difference is always due to inseparable association between God and His qualities. In support of this theory Rāmānuja has given quotations from the scripture,

1. Śrī Bhāṣya—11-1-9.

*Sarvam paramāṣuruseṇa sarvātmanā svārthe nyūṇyāṁ dhāryaṁ tacche-
jātaḥa svarūpamī sarvam cetanūcetanāṁ tasya śarīraṁ.*

such as "the body of whom is composed of soul"....."whose body is this earth," etc. Everywhere conscious souls and unconscious nature have been supposed to constitute the body of God.

Now, in the case of the mind-body relation of an ordinary human being, we find that physical imperfections do not affect the soul; a man may be physically invalid, yet his spirit may remain fresh and lively. In the case of God and the world also, the impurities of the world do not vitiate the ever pure nature of the soul. There is natural distinction between Brahman and the soul. So, Brahman can never be supposed to be tainted by the impurities of the soul in any sense. When non-difference is spoken of, it is meant to refer simply to inseparable relation due to which the world always remains associated with God. Otherwise, there is difference between Brahman and its body composed of conscious souls and nature from the point of view of both form and character.

Motive Behind Creation.

Now, the question arises: why should God create this world? It has been asserted by the critic that God should not be regarded as the creator of the world as He has no need to be fulfilled by such creation. A thing is generally produced to satisfy some needs of the producer. Necessity creates things. Since God is perfect and is without any feeling of want, he cannot be regarded as the creator of this world. No interest of God will be fulfilled by means of this creation. It cannot be maintained that God has created this universe for the benefit of its inhabitants. Had it been so, then He would not have created a world in which living beings always undergo various forms of sufferings. Thus in the absence of any kind of interest (either for Himself or for others) God cannot be regarded as the creator of the world.

Rāmānuja has tried to meet this objection by asserting that the world was created by God out of a sportive motive.¹

1. Śrī Bhāṣya—11-1-33.

Līlāiva kevalaprayojanāt.

Sport is the only motive that can be ascribed to a Perfect Being. Although it is a fact that the world is passing through various types of pains and miseries, yet these sufferings do not display an unkind nature of God. Living beings are made to suffer or to rejoice due to their own past deeds.¹ The objection that there was no individual soul or no action prior to the first cycle of creation cannot stand as both 'Soul' and the flow of action are regarded as beginningless.

So, it can be finally concluded that God who is different from all the things and beings of the world in character and form is the first and the only cause and that He has created this diverse world according to merits and demerits of the individual souls simply from a sportive motive.

Objections Considered.

The first and the most obvious defect which the critic may find relates to the conception of *Brahman* as qualified by the two attributes of soul and Nature. Soul being identical in nature with *Brahman*, may be regarded as His quality : Nature on the other hand is radically different from *Brahman* as it is both material and unconscious. In actual life, we never find that an adjective differs radically in character from its noun. The fact that every adjective cannot be predicated of every noun reveals that there is some sort of affinity between a noun and an adjective that is predicated of it.

Secondly, if adjective is given an independent reality of its own, then in spite of its being externally related to the noun, it will not merge in the noun to become really one. If green colour is given a reality other than that of the tree, then in spite of its inseparable association and apparent presentation as one, we shall always be able to distinguish and separate them intellectually.

Again Rāmānuja has not even recognized soul and nature as essential attributes of God. Had they been so recognized, then it could have been said that these attributes being the

1. Śrī Bhāṣya—11-1-34.

*Devōddinām kṣetrajñanām devōdī śarīra yogam
tattatkarma-sāpekṣaṁ darśayanti hi śrūtismṛtayaḥ.*

constitutive characteristics of Brahman are eternally present in Him : and therefore to think of them as non-separable from God is logically justifiable. Rāmānuja has not accepted this view because it is not in accordance with his theory of real distinction and difference between God and His attributes (i. e. soul and nature).

In order to establish non-dualism (*advaita*), Rāmānuja has introduced the relation of inseparable union with the help of which he has tried to formulate a unity of three different entities. If things are really distinct, then the mere fact that one is always associated with the other, does not establish their real identity which must be both contentual and numerical. Colour and shape of a flower are always seen together, but they are never regarded as one. Rāmānuja himself has admitted that Brahman differs from soul and nature both in form and character. If difference is real, then nothing on earth or in heaven will be able to establish "non-dualism," needless to speak of inseparable relation. In fact, inseparable relation seeks to establish a sort of external connection between two actually different things, having separate existence : as such it establishes distinction and difference and not real identity or non-dualism. It is only the relation of identity in difference (*Tādātmya*) holding between two essentially identical things that can establish non-dualism or true monism.

Lastly, Rāmānuja has accepted two principal forms of cause-material cause and efficient cause. God, however, can only be an efficient cause of the world and not a material cause, although it has been recognized as such by Rāmānuja. The material cause is either the substance that undergoes changes or the substratum in which the effect exists. Brahman cannot be the material cause in the first sense as Rāmānuja has defined it as changeless. It is the unconscious nature (which is an attribute of *Brahman*) that changes in the form of the world. As the substratum of the unconscious Nature also (i. e. the second sense) *Brahman* cannot be regarded as the material cause, because Nature (being conditioned) will become non-eternal. So, in neither sense, we can regard Brahman as the material cause. He can only be the efficient cause of the world.

Objections Met

The possible objections which the critic might raise against Rāmānuja have been stated above. These while providing materials for thought to all serious students of ancient Indian philosophy, reveal that the objections are not irrefutable. As against the first objection, it can be said that an adjective which is not different from the noun it qualifies, is no adjective at all. One jar can never be an adjective of another jar. The *Naiyāyikas* have admitted complete difference between substance and quality. It is the quality that serves as an adjective to a particular substance. The relation that exists between a quality and its substance is called "*samavāya*" or the relation of inherence, Rāmānuja too, has not recognized identity between substance and quality and in the place of the relation of inherence he has recognized the relation of inseparable association or *aprithaksiddhi*. Moreover *acit* (matter) is not wholly different from *Brahman*. Like *Brahman*, *acit* also is metaphysically real and eternal.

With regard to second point, it can be said that according to Rāmānuja *Brahman* is never a differenceless being. He has emphasized in all his writings that soul and matter or *cit* and *acit* are really different from God. These permanent and real attributes (soul and matter) are incapable of existing alone. They find their real existence only in association with God and so they do not interfere with the non-duality of *Brahman*.

Coming to the third objection, we can say that the relation of inseparable association does not hold between essential qualities only. Even non essential qualities may remain inseparably associated with its substance. The date of birth is not an essential characteristic of a particular person: still all through his life he will have to bear this adjective as something inseparable from him. Truly speaking, the relation of inseparable association means that soul and matter can have no other substratum but *Brahman*.

Regarding the fourth point, it can be said that Rāmānuja has never used the word "*advaita*" or non-dualism to stand for a single and differenceless principle of the world as apparently

in his opinion, a single differenceless principle is unable to account for so much diversities of the world. Even in the philosophy of *Śamkarāchāryya* the principle of *Māyā* (the principle of objectivity) has been recognized in addition to pure differenceless *Brahman*. It is true that Śamkara has not admitted the principle of objectivity (*māyā*) as ultimately real like Rāmānuja's nature : but he has not been able to regard it as unreal either, not even as both real and unreal. He has coined a new word, *anirvacanīya*, to describe the nature and status of the constitutive principle of the world. The word "non-dualism," therefore, has been used by Ramanuja in a sense different from that of the *advaita vedānta*. He has never asserted that *Brahman* alone is true and that everything else is false. For, his *advaita* really means that the type of *Brahman*, (*i.e.* *Brahman* in union with soul and nature) he has accepted is only one without a second.

Further, Rāmānuja has not accepted "non dualism" or *advaita* in every sphere. Only in the sphere of causality, *advaita* has been held up by him. *Brahman* united with soul and nature in subtle forms is the cause and *Brahman* united with soul and nature in gross forms is the effect and there is *advaita* between the two. Here a question may be asked : whether a difference in attributes can create difference in the qualified things. If it is proved that difference in attributes always means a difference in the qualified objects, then *Brahman* in union with soul and nature in subtle forms will not be identical with *Brahman* in union with soul and nature in gross forms, and the philosophy of Rāmānuja will have to be characterised as a form of dualism (*Dvaita-vāda*).

According to *Navya-Nyāya*, pure being and being qualified by attributes and action are identical and Śamkara too has regarded pure *Brahman* as being identical with *Brahman* qualified by the principle of illusion (*Māyā*). Identity of one qualified thing with another qualified thing does not seem to have been advocated by any other philosophical system. In such cases, of the two qualities that which is present in the object of the moment under consideration is called an attribute (*vśesana*) and that which was present in the past is called

upalakṣaṇa, i. e. an adjective of the past. For example, if anybody says "here is a professor who was my class-fellow ten years back" then according to the view stated above, professorship of the person will be called an attribute and his previous station of life as the speaker's class-mate will be called an upalakṣaṇa, i. e. an adjective of the past which serves as a mark or characteristic.

Rāmānuja of course has not accepted such a distinction between a present adjective and an upalakṣaṇa or adjective of the past. For him both are adjectives of the same type qualifying one and the same subject under different circumstances. As two attributes, they are different from each other and they are also different from the substance they qualify. Since it is the same substance that acquires two different states due to two different adjectives, the object should be viewed as one in practical life : and in practical life, an individual is believed to retain his identity even though he is qualified by different adjectives either simultaneously or at different periods of time. As for example, in our ordinary conversation, we always maintain that the professor of to-day and the class-mate of the past are identical and one, although one of these two states belonged to him only in the past. When both these adjectives belong to a person or a thing at the same moment, then non-dualism between qualified and qualified is very easily recognized. Fatherhood and sonship can exist in one and the same person at the same time. If in a similar manner we can conceive of *cause-Brahman* (*Brahman* in union with soul and nature in subtle forms) simultaneously with *effect-Brahman* (*Brahman* in union with soul and nature in gross forms) then there will be no difficulty in understanding the two as identical. Lastly as for the recognition of God as the material cause, it can be said that Rāmānuja has followed in the footsteps of the Upaniṣadic thinkers. The Upaniṣads have repeatedly described Brahman as the substratum of everything that constitutes the world. Further dependence or supportedness (*āsritatva*) does not always lead to non-eternality. The soul is eternal and all-pervasive according to many systems. All-pervasiveness, therefore, as an essence of the soul is dependent on it. Though

soul is the substratum of its all-pervasiveness yet the latter is regarded as eternal.

According to Rāmānuja, the Sanskrit word "*Nāsti*"¹ does not mean non-existence. On the other hand, this word is applicable to anything that changes its nature. Since prakṛti undergoes changes of nature, the word "*Nāsti*" can be applied to it; as such although not really non-eternal, it appears to be so due to its constant changes of nature.

In the end, it can be said that Rāmānuja's endeavour here is to effect a synthesis among the different kinds of Upaniṣadic statements in such a manner as to arrive at a conception of the highest Reality which will be satisfying to human mind from the points of view of both philosophy and religion. There are texts in the Upaniṣads which describe Brahman as quality-less; there are also many texts which speak of the different qualities of Brahman. Again, texts teaching non-difference between Brahman and soul are as abundant as the texts speaking of difference Between God and soul. In the opinion of Rāmānuja, all these apparently inconsistent texts can be harmonised, if the philosophical position of "*Viśiṣṭadvaita*" is accepted. The Upaniṣadic statements which seem to deny qualities of God deny only bad qualities of Him. The statements which speak of "non-difference" simply state that soul and matter cannot exist without being unified with God. Lastly, the Upaniṣadic texts which advocate "difference" simply suggest that soul and matter are not unreal and false: they are as eternal as God, although they do not exist outside of Him. Thus in his opinion, rational synthesis of the scattered teachings of the Upaniṣads is sure to produce only the philosophy of qualified monism.

Section B.

The Nature of Acit in the Philosophy of

RĀMĀNUJA

According to Rāmānuja, the ultimate reality can never be an unqualified principle. Absolute unqualifiedness is incon-

1. Śrī Bhāṣya—1-1-1.

ceivable and can never be proved by any means. This is because if anything is conscious, then its being, as qualified at least by consciousness, must be supposed to exist. Consciousness is the property (*dharmā*) and the being itself is the substratum (*dharmī*), and these two necessarily stand in the substance attribute relation. Hence, a conscious being is always a qualified being,—qualified at least by one quality (i. e. consciousness). One Brahman, in fact, has revealed itself into the form of the world and all the souls together with all physical objects, being its attributes, are at once one with Brahman and yet have real existence as parts or modes of that one Ultimate Reality. Since God or the Highest Reality is immanent in all forms of the universe, both soul and matter, or *cit* and *acit* are real and permanent, though subject throughout to the control of God ¹. Both soul and matter find their real existence in and through their inseparable association with God.

Meaning of Acit

According to *Lokachūrya* *acit* refers to that aspect of *Brahman* which is not the substratum of consciousness. It is the objective principle of all changes and modifications which are visible in this world.² Being dynamic it does not remain identical in its form and nature, like the principle of consciousness. *Acit* is of three forms, *Suddhasattva*, *Misrasattva* and *Sattva śūnya*, of these, the second and the third are described

1 Here, we should remember that although *jīva* is a *Vīśeṣaṇa* of God and is also dependent on Him, still the soul is eternal. All attributes of God, though dependent on Him are eternal. This is because the relation that exists between the support (*āśraya*) and the supported (*āśrita*) is *aprthaksiddhi* according to Rāmānuja and not *Samavāya*. Further *cit* and *acit* in gross forms are effects in subtle forms they are not effects. God is the inner controller of spirit and matter in both forms.

2 *Tattvatraja*—published by the Chawkbamba Sanskrit Series Benaras 1938 *acit prakāśanam*, p. 34

as *Jaḍa* (inert)¹ whereas the first one (i. e. *Śuddha-sattva*) is described as *ajāḍa* (non-inert or immaterial). Since *dharma-bhūtajñāna*, soul and God are also reckoned as *ajāḍa*, the difference between *ajāḍatva* (immateriality) of *Śuddha-sattva* and that of *dharmabhūtajñāna* etc. should be made clear and explicit.

Ajāḍatva of Śuddha-sattva.

It has been stated in the commentary on the *Yatīndramatā-dīpikā* that the immateriality of *Śuddha-sattva* is admitted here by following the lines of the *Tāntric* religion.² Philosophical considerations always inspire us to recognize *Śuddha-sattva* as a form of *Jaḍa-vastu* (inert object). *Tantra*, however, has described *Śuddha-sattva* as *ajāḍa* (immaterial); this recognition is due to the fact that according to *Tāntric* religion complete destruction of *aviḍyā* is possible only on the awakening of this pure and unmixed *sattva*. According to *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy also, "*Nirupādhika-jñāna*," which is suitable for liberation, arises only when *Śuddha-sattva* flashes on the mind of the worshipper. Hence, *Śuddha-sattva* is regarded as the substratum of true knowledge. During the state of bondage, the individual soul, though conscious by nature, does not seem to realise this truth and behaves like an unconscious material object due to *aviḍyā*. As soon as *Śuddha-sattva* is roused up, the essentially conscious nature of the individual soul is fully manifested as a result of which it realises completely its essentially self-revealing character. Hence, *Śuddha-sattva*,

1. *Yatīndramatādīpikā-Caturtho'vatāra*.

(a) *Amiśrasattvarahitaṁ jaḍam,*

Taddvividhaṁ-Prakṛti kālōbhedaḥ.

Yatīndramatādīpikā-Pañcama'vatāra.

(b) *Kālonāma guṇatrayarahito*

Jaḍadravyaviśeṣaḥ.

2. *Yatīndramatādīpikā chapter-6 Prakāśatīkā : Nanu Prasiddhaśāstreṣu tavadajāḍatvaṁ suddhasya sattvasya na paśyāmaḥ. Atharahasyāgamavākya viśeṣaistadiṣyeta. Tathā śūṅgunyamaḍatvamapi tasyeṣṭaocyam. Tathā ca cetanavopprasāṅgaḥ.*

being the instrument that helps the individual soul to realise its *ajāḍa-nature*, is itself described as *ajāḍa*. *Ghee*, for instance, is called *Āyu* as it increases the life-span of a man. Further *Śuddha sattva* is not identical with the *guṇa-sattva* of *Prakṛti*.¹

In the *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, *ajāḍatva* (immateriality) has been explained as *Śvayamprakāśatva*; (self-revealing capacity). Soul is *śvayamprakāśa* in the sense that it shows itself and also knows itself. *Śuddha-sattva*, however, does not possess such powers. Still it is also called self-revealing since it is the only means that helps the spirit to know and realise its true nature fully. Its self-revealing power consists in being the medium through which true knowledge emerges and helps the soul to attain liberation from this sorrow-stricken worldly-life. This inclusion of *Śuddha-sattva* among *ajāḍa* (immaterial) substances by the *śrivaishṇava* school evidently proves that the *bhakti*-religion of India has, by that time, accepted many concepts of the tantra-cult. Further, *viśiṣṭādvaita*, being the religion of a personal God like *Viṣṇu*, must give us a soul-enchancing description of the abode of that Supreme Personality where the devotees of *Nārāyaṇa* will be able to serve their beloved God through eternity. The abode of God cannot be made of the three *guṇas* which form the matrix of this imperfect world. The stuff, out of which the abode of God, His body, and the bodies of the liberated souls are made, should, therefore, be different from *Prakṛti*—the mother of this empirical world. Since *Śuddha-sattva* is devoid of *rajas* and *tamas*, the ideal world, which is made of it, is not subject to destruction and imperfection.

Although in the original texts of Rāmānuja, the word *śuddha-sattva* has not been used, still in *Vedārtha Samgraha*, it has been clearly mentioned that the abode of Vishnu is made

1 *Yatīndramatadīpikā*—Second edition, Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934.

Prakaśatikā-pañcama'vatāra :

Svasattābhāsakam sattvam

guṇasattvādailakṣaṇam.

of some such substance which lies beyond the region of *miśra sattva* or *prakṛti*.¹

The term *śuddha-sattva* has been used in *pañchadashi*, an advaita text and some scholars think that *śuddha-sattva* of Rāmānuja school is similar to *śuddha-sattva* mentioned in *pañchadashi*. Even a scholar like Dr. D. M. Datta seems to hold such a view. This view is not acceptable because *śuddha-sattva* of *pañchadashi* is pure *guṇa-sattva*. Pure *guṇa-sattva* means that form of *triṣuṇa* in which *sattva* is predominant and operative and *rajas* and *tamas* are fully subdued and ineffective.² *Śuddha-sattva* of Rāmānuja school is only *sattva* (*kevala sattvaṁ*).³

Śuddha-sattva, however, is not an object of perception or of inference in the empirical state (i.e., in the stage of bondage). It can be known only through the *Śāstras*.⁴ The effects of

1. *Kṣayantamasya rajasah parāk iti rajahśabdena triṣuṇātmikā Prakṛtirucyate Kevalasya rajasō'navasthānt. Imān triṣuṇātmikān Prakṛtīmān Kramya sthite sthāne Kṣayantam-vasantamityarthah. Anena triṣuṇātmakāt Kṣetrājñāya bhogya bhūtvā dvastunah parastādviṣṭero'vasthānam itigamyate.*

(Since the abode of Vishnu has been described as non-natural (*aprākṛta*) its substance ought to be of a nature which is not of *miśra sattva* type). The word *rajas* denotes *Prakṛti* for *rajas* has no existence alone isolated from the other *guṇas*

(*Vedārth samgraha—Sec. 131.*)

Edited by J. A. B. Van Buitenen Page—161

2. According to *Pañcadaśī Prakṛti* is of two forms—*Śuddha sattva pradhānā Mīyā* and *malinasattva pradhānā atidyā*. "*Taccidānandarūpam Brahma tayoparatīcimbena samanvītaṁ sattevarajastamogurānāmsūmyūcashtayā sū Prakṛtirucyate. Sā ca deividhā bhavati.*"
3. *Tatra śuddhasattvaṁ nāma rajastamo' miśra Keralasattvaṁ nityaṁ jñānānandajanakam Karmaṇā Vinā Kevalabhagavadīc' ayaṁ Vīmānagoṣṭraman- dapa prāsādādirūpeṇa parīṇatam- niravadhikatavarūpam nityamuktairīśvareṇa ca paricchestumasaḥkamatyadbhutam Vastu.*

(*Tattvatraya arthopalarāyam*)

4. *Tattvatraya—Tika.—Page—37.*

- (a) *Tathā Śuddhasattvaya svātmoparakāśanaśaktiśca śuddhadaiśjyām prapīḍhā bhavati. Tasmāt śuddhasattvaṁ boddhāntam na prakāśate.*
- (b) *Taiṇdramatadīpikā Chapt. 6 Tika (Prakāśa) Bandhakāle tu Śuddhasattvaṁ na Prakāśate Sūptau dharmatīto'jñānata.*

Prakṛti as well as of Time are perceptible in this world; but not so are the effects of Śuddha-sattva. In the case of Śuddha-sattva, the effects themselves are known through the scriptures. Hence, it is not possible for us to comprehend the nature of Śuddha-sattva by any other worldly means except the means of scriptures. Despite this, Śuddha-sattva has found a place in the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. In the first place, the followers of this school have tried to arouse devotion in the minds of men towards *nitya-vibhūti* etc. described in the *Purāṇas*. Further, in order to make these things intelligible to human beings, this school has introduced the category of Śuddha-sattva perhaps with the hope that this theory will help men understand the nature of *nitya-vibhūtis* etc.,—the important concepts of the Vaiṣṇava religion.

The nature of Prakṛti

The matrix of the phenomenal world is *Miśra-sattva* or Prakṛti. The author of the *Yatindramatadipikā* has defined Prakṛti as the substratum of the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is because this *Miśra-sattva* is constantly undergoing changes of forms that it is called Prakṛti. A bound soul suffers from want of knowledge and bliss because of its association with Prakṛti. Hence, Prakṛti is called *avidyā* or the principle that prevents the soul from realising its essentially conscious nature. Further, as diversities and differences of the world are the results of the activities of Nature, it is also called *Māyā*. Prakṛti is not a stable principle. It is essentially a principle of change and becoming—a perpetually fleeting flux without staticity. Changes (both subtle and gross) are constantly taking place in the vast and expansive bosom of Prakṛti. In *Varavaramuni's* commentary on *Tattva-traya*, three successive stages of Nature are beautifully distinguished. The first stage is called *Tamo'vasthā* of Prakṛti which again is of two forms : *vibhaktatamaḥ* and *avibhaktatamaḥ*. *Avibhaktatamaḥ* is the finest of all the stages. In this stage, Nature being extremely subtle, is not suitable for bearing any definite name or form. It is an absolutely homogeneous state and this does not admit of any kind of distinction or differentiation. This state is so subtle that even as the body of God, it cannot be differentiated from

Him, just as a lump of salt completely dissolved in water, cannot be differentiated from water.

The second form is called *vibhaktatamaḥ* which means that the prior homogeneous state of *Prakṛti* has changed in such a manner that its differentiation into various forms and shapes, now seems to be possible. In other words, the tension of differentiation becomes visible in this stage and *Prakṛti* is now in the stage of passing into a more developed condition which is called *akṣarāvasthā*. The second stage or the stage of *Akṣara*, therefore refers to that condition of Nature in which different *tattvas* are on the way of emergence ; but they still remain in a unified and closely knitted condition. *Guṇas* have been disturbed but this disturbance is not visible. When the disturbance of the *guṇas* becomes explicit, *Prakṛti* becomes ready to create different constitutive principles of this universe. The condition of Nature which is just prior to the emergence of different effects in the graduated series is called the state of *avyakta*. These are simply the different states through which *Prakṛti* passes in order to create the world. As *Tattva*, *Prakṛti* is one.

Prakṛti and Māyā

Like *Māyā* of *Śaṅkara*, *Prakṛti* has been regarded as the material cause of the world and in many respects, one can easily detect similarities between the two. Still, the ontological status of Rāmānuja's *Prakṛti* is wholly different from that of *Māyā*. According to *Śaṅkara*, *Māyā* is *bhāvābhāva-vilakṣaṇa* (different from both positive and negative) and is not metaphysically real. There is no *aprithaksiddhi* relation between *Brahman* and *Māyā*. *Māyā* is destroyed by knowledge of the ultimate reality. It, therefore, exists only so long as the nature of Truth is not realised by an individual soul. *Prakṛti*, on the other hand, is metaphysically real, and as such, it is beginningless and endless. It is also inseparably associated with *Brahman* as one of its attributes. *Prakṛti* is described in the *Śruti* as *asat* because of its inherent dynamic nature. The elements of the world undergo a change of nature at the time of creation and so they are termed either *asat* or *nāsti*. These elements are not illusory and are not subject to absolute

decay or total annihilation. The souls, on the other hand, do not undergo any change of essential nature. They are always the knowers and hence they are called *astī*, *nitya*, etc.¹ All physical objects, being the products of a real *Prakṛti*, are also real under all circumstances. They constitute together the body of God. The sentence '*Jagatcasa*' also implies the reality of *Prakṛti* and its creation. Had the world been illusory then God would not have been described as the Lord of the world. It is non-sensical to describe Brahman as the protector of the universe that does not exist at all. The world, being the body of God, cannot be separated from Him. He is described as the ruler of the world. Thus, according to Rāmānuja, the Śruti and the *Purāṇas* have never described the world as non-existent or illusory. The distinction between knower and the known is not a fabrication of imagination. The knower can never be reduced to a form of knowledge and *Prakṛti*, too, can never be viewed as an adjunct or *upādhi* of Pure differenceless Consciousness. It is as real as Brahman and is not the cause of super-imposition. The world is not projected by *Prakṛti* in the manner of a magic world. It is evolved from Nature through the instrumentality of Divine Will.

Reality of the World

Just as Śamkara has deduced the illusory nature of the world from the illusory nature of *Māyā*—its material cause, in the same manner, Rāmānuja has derived the real character of the world from the reality of its material cause (i.e. *Prakṛti*). In the *Chānd-upaniṣad*, it has been stated that even before creation, the world was real.² The whole world has originated from the real, is grounded on the real and is merged in the real. Before creation, the world was in *Prakṛti* in a very subtle and unmanifested form and that form was not suitable for practical purposes. Hence it is stated that before creation, the world was *asat*. *Asat* here really means unsuitability for bearing names and forms due to extreme subtlety.³ The world,

1. Śrībhāṣya—1-1-1.

2. Chānd Upaniṣad—6.-8.-6. *Sanmulāh*.

3. Śrībhāṣya—2-1-18.

being a real modification of a real cause, is real. It is called non-eternal (*anitya*) because of its essentially mutable nature. What exists cannot be unreal or false. Things enter into different states successively. The previous state of a substance passes away and a subsequent state comes into being without bringing into existence an entirely new substance. Things in space and time change and disappear in quick succession. Prakṛti is not merely what it is but what becomes and this becoming of Prakṛti in diverse directions gives rise to different worldly objects. Matter is eternally unstable. Every physical object of this world is essentially fugitive and flows into different states without pause. It is because of these fugitiveness, instability and perpetually fleeting nature of Prakṛti and also of the world that both are often described in the Śruti as *nāsti*. Nāsti, in no context, means false or *tuccha*. In the causal state, Prakṛti is subtle and undifferentiated; but in the effect state, it evolves itself into numerous varieties of names and forms constituting the empirical world.

Evolution of the World

According to Rāmānuja, the evolution of the world from prakṛti takes place through the instrumentality of thought and will power of God.¹ When a commotion is caused in the three guṇas, the subtle Prakṛti gradually becomes more and more gross so as to become more and more suitable for creating this world. Creation is gradual throughout the whole course (i. e. from the initial stage till its final result). From the account of evolution given in the *Tattvatraya*, it appears that this system believes in the existence of a condition of Prakṛti in between its *avyakta* form and the form of *mahat*. This intermediate form is termed *Prāṇagū Prakṛti* by *Lokāchāryya*.² During bondage, the soul remains in close contact with this *Prāṇagū Prakṛti* in which the fictitious

1. (a) *Śrībhāṣya* 2-1-25.

(b) *Taittirīya upa* 6-2.

(c) *Chānd* 6-2-3.

(d) *Gīta* 9-10.

2. *Tattva-traya- (acit Prakaraṇam)*

notion of self-hood is generated. This *Prāṇagū Prakṛti* then evolves into *mahat* with the three states of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The introduction of the *Prāṇagū Prakṛti* in the evolutionary scheme and the upholding of the view that this *Prāṇagū Prakṛti*, produces gradually 24 principles, seem to offer some justification for the evolution of *mahat* with a preponderance of *sattva-guṇa* in it. Against the Philosophy of classical *Sāṃkhya*, it has been held that *Sāṃkhya* has failed to answer why the first category in the evolutionary process should be one in which *sattva-guṇa* should predominate when Nature in the subtle state does not show any tendency towards the predomination of *sattva* over *rajas* and *tamas*. Here, it has been shown that even before the evolution of *mahat*, *Prakṛti* undergoes a change in such a manner that a subtle state of it with a tendency towards transperance comes into being in the form of *Prāṇagū Prakṛti* in which the false notion of self-hood is produced. In the state of *Prāṇagū-Prakṛti*, *rajas* and *tamas* too exist but the tendency is towards the excess of *sattva* over *rajas* and *tamas*. From *Prāṇagū-Prakṛti*, by a further process of change, *mahat* comes into being. *Mahat* then changes into *ahamkāra* with the three states of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. According to the predominance of a particular *guṇa*, *ahamkāra* is called *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtadi*. From *sāttvika ahamkāra* originate *vaikārika* organs.¹ These are included in the psychical aspect of evolution. Organs are eleven in number and they are again of two kinds: organs of knowledge and the organs of action. Organs of knowledge help the self to know and understand the world and they are classified into mind, ears, eyes, nose, tongue and skin. *Manas* or mind is the inner sense-organ and is the instrument for recollection and coordination of knowledge. Heart is the seat of *manas*. Mind functions as *ahamkāra*, *citta*, *buddhi* etc. It is also the cause

1. *Yatindramatadīpikā-Caturtha 'vatāra'*.

(a) *Sāttvikāhamkāropādānakam dravyamindriyamindriya lakṣaṇam*.

(b) *Taijasaśrāṇasādāhamkāraśrāṇasādāśendriyāni jayanta iti paramatamupanyasya Sāttvikāhamkāraśrāṇasādāśendriyāni jayanta iti samatam ucyate* [*View of Parāśara quoted in the Vedārtha Samgraha*] no. (57)

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of bondage and liberation.¹ In the *Bhagavadgītā* also, mind has been described as the cause of bondage and liberation. In *Sāṃkhya-yoga*, however, bondage and liberation are spoken of as being due to the functioning of *buddhi-tattva*. *Manas* is only an organ derived from *sāttvika ahaṃkāra* which again is a product of *buddhi*. Thus, apparently speaking, there seems to be a difference made between *buddhi* and *manas* by the philosophy of the classical *Sāṃkhya*. But if we go deeper into the philosophical subtleties of this school, we will find that this distinction between *buddhi* and *manas* is not very rigid or absolutely non-flexible. *Samkalpa* is the function of mind and the function of *buddhi* is *adhyavasāya*. Both *Samkalpa* and *adhyavasāya* are needed jointly in every form of human action. So, both *manas* and *buddhi* work together and both of them are very subtle. When manifested, both remain so closely intermingled that it is very difficult for us to detect whether one organ or more than one is functioning at the root. Hence it does not make much difference whether mind and intellect are differentiated as two or recognized as one organ performing different functions on different occasions.² According to Rāmānuja *manas* is called *ahaṃkāra* when due to mind's activity the self is falsely identified with the body. It is called *citta* when it desires a thing. When *manas* discriminates between what is true and what is false, it is regarded as *buddhi*.

In the Nyāya-system also, *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra* as internal organs of knowledge have not been recognized. Co-ordinating function of the *buddhi* has been ascribed to the soul through the instrumentality of the mind. According to the *Naiyāyikas* 'I' consciousness (knowledge of *ahaṃ*) is generated in the soul when it gets associated with the mind-body system. So, egohood or *ahaṃkāra* as a separate *tattva* has not been accepted.

In the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* too, the importance of *buddhi* has been minimised. It has been reduced to a form or aspect of *manas*.

1. *Yatīndramatadīpikā-Caturtha 'vārtā'*.
Smṛtyādikaraṇamindriyaṃ manaḥ. Taccāhṛdayadeśasoytī buddhyaham-
kāraścittādi-Śabdavācyaṃ bandhamotgahetubhūtaṃca.
2. *Adhyavasāyabhīmānasāntarīyottibhedānmarā eva buddhyahamkāraścitta-*
śabdairvāpodiśyata ityekādaśendriyāni. Śrībhāṣya 2-4-5.

According to Rāmānuja philosophy all sense-organs together with the atomic soul are located in the heart. This seems to be fully justified when the soul is atomic in nature. Consciousness belongs to the soul and is manifested in experience only through the actions of the sense-organs. Hence, there must be a very close and intimate-connection between the soul and the sense-organs. Since the soul is atomic in nature, it can maintain an intimate relation with the sense-organs if it exists in a place where sense-organs are located. Moreover, regarding the place of *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra*, the general belief is that they are located in the heart. Now the sense-organs are the modifications of *ahaṁkāra* and according to *Pariṇāmavāda*, cause and effect cannot remain separate in two different places. Hence, the sense-organs also should reside in the heart which is the seat of *ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi*. Thus, we find that *viśiṣṭādvaita* is not dogmatic and uncritical in locating the soul as well as the sense-organs in the heart. It is therefore obvious that the views expressed by Rāmānuja-school in this regard are in harmony with its fundamental position.

Of the different sense-organs, the eye is the organ that perceives colour, the ear is the organ that hears sound, the nose is the organ that smells odour, the tongue is the organ that tastes objects and the skin is the organ that gives a man the sensation of touch. The five organs of action are speech, movement, grasping, excretion and generation. From the *tāmasa ahaṁkāra*, called *Bhūtādi*, arise the five subtle elements (*tanmātras*) from which by successive evolutions, the five gross elements come into being. The five subtle elements are ether, air, fire, water and earth. Now, regarding the evolution of *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas* from the *tāmasa-ahaṁkāra*, two different views are found in the *Tattvatraya*.

According to one interpretation, *Śabdatanmātra*, first of all, arises from *tāmasa-ahaṁkāra*; and from *Śabdatanmātra*, *ākāśa* and *sparsātanmātra* come into being. From *sparsātanmātra* arise air and *rūpatanmātra*; from *rūpatanmātra*, fire and *rasatanmātra* are produced. From *rasatanmātra*, water and *gandhatanmātra* emerge and from *gandhatanmātra* arises the earth.

The other view is as follows :

Śabdatanmātra arises from *bhūtādi*, *ākāśa* arises from *śabdatanmātra*. *Sparśatanmātra* again arises from *ākāśa* and air arises from *sparśatanmātra*. Air further produces *rūpatanmātra* and *rūpatanmātra* brings fire into existence. *Rasatanmātra* then arises from fire and water is produced from *rasatanmātra*. Lastly, *gandhatanmātra* arises from water and the earth comes into being from *gandhatanmātra*.

Of these two interpretations, the first one appears to be better than the second, as in the second theory, *tanmātras* are supposed to be produced from the *bhūtas*. Generally, evolutionary changes proceed from the subtle to the gross and this direction has been reversed to a certain extent in the second interpretation.

Space or *ākāśa* therefore, is a product of *Prakṛti*, being an evolute from *śabdatanmātra*. Since it is a product, it is not eternal ; and as it does not pervade *ahamkāra*, it is not all-pervasive. Space or *ākāśa*, however, is not the absence of covering. On the contrary, it is something positive. Since space-feeling is never contradicted, it has to be regarded as positive like all other positive entities, such as earth, air, etc. Space can never be viewed as the mere negation of positive entities like the earth, air, water, etc. Had space been prior or posterior negation of earth, air, etc. then so long as these objects, constituting the world exist there should not have been any experience of space.¹ This, however, is not the case. Moreover, space cannot be the absolute negation of the earth, etc. because absolute negation of things like the earth, air, etc. is unthinkable. Hence, space should be admitted as a real entity.

Time is also a form of *acit*. Since it is devoid of *sattva*,

1. *Śrībhāṣya*-2-2-23.

Na ca pṛthivyādyabhāvamātramākāśa itī uktam Śakyam.....
Prāgabhāvapradhvamsābhāvayorākāśatve pṛthivyādīṣu varitamāneṣu ākāśa-
pratītyayogāt nirākāśam jagadyāt.

it is called *sattva-śūnya*. *Rajas* and *tamas* are present in *Kāla*.¹ Time is the cause of the modifications of *Prakṛti* and also of all created objects. Time is real ; it is not outside *Brahman* though it does not merge in *Brahman*. It is not independent like the time of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system. It is also not an aspect of *Prakṛti* as is held by the *Sāmkhya-yoga* philosophy. It is independent of *Prakṛti* and everything in this world is subject to it. In reality, Time is eternal, one and all-pervasive ; but in practice, Time is divided into hours, moments, second, etc. and is used in such a manner as to suggest that it is non-eternal. Non-eternity of Time is due to *upādhi* or limiting adjunct. At the time of creation, God too arranges things of the world in accordance with the law of Time. In the case of *nityavibhūti* Time exists but does not exist as an independent principle. As changes are perceived everywhere, the reality of time cannot be denied. The scriptures also speak of the reality of Time.

It has already been stated that Time has been described as *sattva-śūnya*. The question that naturally disturbs our mind is : what does this '*sattva-śūnyatā*' really imply ? Does it mean that *sattva* is wholly absent in Time ? Or does it mean that *sattva* becomes so much over-powered by *rajas* and *tamas* that it becomes totally ineffective ? According to *Sāmkhya*, there cannot be any object in which three *guṇas* are not present. This, in *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy, is true only with regard to those objects which are the products of *Prakṛti* (i. e. *mitra-sattva*). Time is not a product of *Prakṛti* and so it is not absolutely necessary that all the three *guṇas* should exist in it. Just as there is pure *sattva*, in the same manner there is time consisting only of *rajas* and *tamas*. In fact, the presence of *sattva* becomes absolutely necessary in the sphere of knowledge. In the case of time, no knowledge-giving property is needed. So, *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy has spoken of Time as devoid of

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1. It has been admitted in the *Tattvairāya* that time can be modified into hours, moments etc. So, *rajo guṇa* can be supposed to exist in time. Time is devoid of knowledge. So, *tamoguṇa* too may be supposed to exist in time.

sattva. It is a form of *acit* different from *Prakṛti* and *Śuddha-sattva*.

From the acceptance of these two forms of *acit*, namely *Śuddha-sattva* and *sattva-sūnya*, it follows that unlike Sāṃkhya, *viśiṣṭādvaita* believes that *rajas* and *tamas* can exist without *sattva* and *sattva* too can exist without being mixed up with *rajas* and *tamas*. *Acit* is, thus, a term that includes within itself two *jaḍa* (inert) substances and one *ajāḍa* (non-inert) substance. Since both *Prakṛti* and *Kāla* are regarded as the causes of this empirical world, the philosophy of *viśiṣṭādvaita* asserts the existence of more than one cause of the world even if *Brahman* is excluded.

The principle of evolutionary process of Nature mainly implies the inclusion of all qualities in all the *bhūtas*. The empirical world is a world of change and mutations; but all these changes take place in a substratum that is permanent. According to *Buddhism*, however, the world is a ceaseless flow of changes, but these changes simply hang in the air, as there is no permanent principle underlying this process of becoming. Rāmānuja holds that unless we recognize the existence of a permanent substance which continuously undergoes changes of states, we shall not be able to explain the fact of recognition. If the objects to be recognized are newly created at every moment, then recognition becomes an absurdity. *Buddhism*, however, seeks to remove this difficulty by saying that recognition means recognition of an object as similar to the prior one which no longer exists. This, too, is not possible, since the person who experienced the prior object and the person who is experiencing the posterior, are entirely different according to the doctrine of momentariness. Rāmānuja holds that if the knower and the known are supposed to be momentary, then the phenomenon of recognition can never be explained.¹

1. *Śrībhāṣya*-2-2-24.

Na hyanyānubhūtenaikatvamsādrīyam vā svānubhūtyānyo'nusandhate.
Ata bhinnā kālavastāśrayasādrīyānubhavanibandhanamekatvavyāmohāt
īdadadvirjñāturekatvamavāśyaśrayaṇīyam.

This universe, according to Rāmānuja, is not a chance-creation, nor is it a mere superfluous manifestation of Divine energy. It is meaningful as it is the place where bound souls can achieve emancipation which is their due. Rāmānuja seeks to explain the universe in terms of *Śarira-śariri* relation. Under all circumstances, souls and matter constitute the body of God. When they are subtle, *Brahman* is in the causal condition and when they are in the gross state, *Brahman* is in the state of the effect and is called the world. The world as the body of God or as the adjective of God is inseparably associated with Him. It is because as the innermost soul of the entire world of cit and acit, *paramātman* (the supreme soul) pervades, supports, regulates and protects all things and beings, that He is called *Īśvara*. Due to inseparable relationship, both conscious soul and unconscious physical world are regarded as parts, or body or power of God. *Cit* (spirit), *acit* (matters) and God are naturally distinct and different : but as they always remain together due to *aprithaksiddhi* relation, (relation of inseparableness), the triune unity is regarded as one. Adjectives which are inseparably associated with a particular noun do not merely express their own meanings but they also refer to the noun which is their common substratum. In the case of the blue lotus, blueness and lotusness not only convey their own meanings but they also refer to the substance of which they are inseparably related qualities. Separable adjectives, however, in the case of *Sāmūnādhikarānya*, needs the help of '*matuparthiya pratyā*' इत् to refer to their substrates. *Kuṇḍala*, for instance, will be changed into *kuṇḍali* to refer to the person who wears it. *Cit* and *acit*, therefore, being inseparable adjectives of God, naturally refer to God while conveying their own meaning. In fact, inseparably related adjectives become meaningful from the practical point of view in and through the meaning of the noun that they qualify. The practically useful meaning of blue is not intelligible unless it gets associated with the noun lotus or the noun jar or any other noun. In the same manner, *Cit* and *acit* also become meaningful and effective by being associated with *Brahman*. It has been stated in the *Śruti* that God, through His will power, changed the subtle *acit* (matter) into gross *acit*, bearing different forms

and names ; then He made *cit* (spirit) enter into *acit* as their indwelling spirit thereby manifesting Himself in the form of this meaningful world. So, it is clear that *cit*, *acit* and *Brahman* are three different *tattvas* ; but as both soul and matter remain always in union with God, we get only one substance qualified by two adjectives.

The identity propositions of the upaniṣads do not imply identity between God, Soul and matter or between soul and matter. On the other hand, all these propositions express emphatically the identity between *Kāraṇa Brahman* (causal Brahman) and *Kārya Brahman* (effect Brahman).

Causation according to Rāmānuja.

According to Rāmānuja, causation does not mean creation of a new substance ; it simply means '*avasthā-pariṇāma*' or change of states. The same substance assumes different states without losing its substantiality and identity. Before creation and also during dissolution, the manifold of *cit* and *acit* remain in such a subtle form that it can very well be treated as non-existent. At the time of creation, the manifold as the infinity of living beings and non living things is fully evolved and made explicit. The same *Brahman* exists with its modes explicit or implicit in creation or dissolution. Cause and effect are, therefore, not different in substance, and by knowing the cause, the effect can be fully understood. It is this non-difference in substantiality of the cause and the effect that has been explained in the *Chānd-upaniṣad* by the well-known story of *Uddālaka* and *Śvetaketu*. It is because an effect is nothing but a changed state of the cause that even a soul can be regarded as an effect. Although the soul does not undergo a change of its essential nature, yet its consciousness is capable of expansion and contraction. When the soul in its subtle form remains associated with *Brahman*, its consciousness remains fully contracted and it exists there as the cause of the soul in the gross form, the consciousness of which expands in accordance with the law of karma and becomes explicit in and through the course of evolution. The soul in the gross form, thus, becomes the effect as there is a change in the state of its knowledge from implicit to explicit. Thus, both *cit*

(spirit) and *acit* (matter) undergo changes of states, and with them as the modes (*Prakāras*) *Brahman*—the *Prakūrī* also changes from causal state to effect state.¹

Sāṃkhya Causality and Causality according to Rāmānuja

Though Rāmānuja has recognized causation as modification of states (*avasthāpariṇāma*) thereby holding a view similar to a certain extent to that of the Sāṃkhya, still in one important point, Rāmānuja seems to differ fundamentally from the philosophical position of the Sāṃkhya school. The classical Sāṃkhya school holds that the ultimate cause of the world is an unconscious *Prakṛti* wholly independent of *Puruṣa* and is not even guided or controlled in her evolutionary course by God. It is the nature of *Prakṛti* to change in the form of this world and it is doing so quite automatically like the spontaneous flow of milk from the udders of a cow. In fact, *Prakṛti* is so much endowed with inner creativity that it can explain the whole universe even without receiving any influence from *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* alone can carry on the processes of evolution and dissolution as creativity seems to be in its very nature and being. The way in which *Prakṛti* has been equipped with all forces and laws, necessary for creating the universe, logically suggests a materialistic and mechanistic interpretation of the world. The concept of unconscious teleology, introduced to emphasise the fact that the evolutionary process is moving towards a final goal (i. e. the goal of the Spirit) does not make an appreciable improvement in the Sāṃkhya position. Teleological movement inherent in an unconscious but absolutely independent principle is inconceivable. All stock examples, given by Sāṃkhya, to prove unconscious teleology, have been severely criticised by both Śamkara and Rāmānuja. Sometimes in favour of the Sāṃkhya concept of unconscious teleology, it is stated that such a phenomenon we do perceive in our everyday life. Water, for instance, sometimes flows down

1. Śrībhāṣya-2-3-18.

*Ubhayaṅgrahāravisīṣṭe mīyantrūṃśetadavasthatadubhayarīṣiṣṭatūṅga vikāro-
bhavati ; kṛtānavasthāyā avas'hāntarūpāntirūpocikārah prakṛtadoṣe
prakṛtīṇica samānah.*

the ground in a zigzag fashion, thereby creating some letters of the alphabet. A small boy may, by chance, be benefitted by those letters while taking his first lesson in English. Here, water is flowing unconsciously, but by means of its flow, it is benefitting a conscious being. This also is not a very satisfactory example to explain the unconscious teleology inherent in *Prakṛti*. Here too, the flow of water is out and out mechanical. It is an accident that at a particular point of time and in a particular place, water flows in that particular manner thereby serving the purpose of the boy ; but water will not always flow in that particular fashion and boys will not be benefitted all the time by means of the flow of water. *Prakṛti*, on the other hand, will always evolve in that particular manner and selves will always be benefitted by this process of creation. If it is further said, that it is not a wholly unconscious *Prakṛti* but a *cetanāviṣṭā Prakṛti* (Nature, intelligised by Consciousness) that creates the world for the benefit of the selves, then also the teleological movement of *Prakṛti* will have to be explained as the result of the infusion of consciousness in it. Moreover, if the cause is fully unconscious and wholly independent of a spiritual principle, then the effect of such a cause will never be the result of an inner growth of the cause planned and willed by a conscious being to fit into the scheme of this world of living beings. Under such circumstances, the effect will simply be a sequential condition appearing after the appearance of its invariable and unconditional causal-state. We shall therefore be left with the three *guṇas*, moving according to their own laws of motion almost in a mechanical way and making the world a disenchanted world of the modern mechanical science of physics. The hypothesis of consciousness actively influencing the unconscious nature will disappear entirely, no appeal to God's will and act will be possible, it will in truth be a world robbed of all its charms and fascinations.

These difficulties have been fully overcome by Rāmānuja in his theory of evolution. For Rāmānuja, causal relation means inner growth and spiritual development. *Prakṛti* is controlled and made to yield different products by God who is the inner self of all living beings and non-living things.

The universe is rooted in God and pulsates with His life. Changes and diversities of Nature are so created as to adopt themselves to the spiritual progress of the *jnas*. Perfection of individual souls as the *śeṣa* (accessory) of God (principal) is the real purpose of the process of evolution¹. The will of God is the primary cause that produces changes in nature and progress in individual souls. It is by knowing Him as the inner self of both *cit* (spirit) and *acit* (matter) that everything else is known. Causality, therefore, is the Divine urge that creates a universe, the goal and the foundation of which are *Brahman* itself. This is real teleology as it refers to God as the final cause of all things and beings of the world.

Objections.

It has already been stated that for Rāmānuja, *Prakṛti* is wholly controlled by God since it constitutes the body of God. Just as the body, though different from the soul, is under the supervision of the soul, in the same manner, *cit* and *acit*, which constitute the body of God, are under Divine guidance and control. The author of the *Satabhāṣanī*² has raised an objection regarding the nature of difference between God and *Prakṛti*. This difference must be, in his opinion, either *svatantra* or *paratantra*. He has not expounded fully what he has meant by *svatantra-bheda* and *paratantra-bheda*. Nevertheless, he has asserted that if this *bheda* (difference) is *svatantra* then the body-soul relation cannot be held (Here of course he has not given any reason for this assertion). If the difference is *paratantra*, then it amounts to *abheda* or non difference. If

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1. Although *śeṣa śeṣi* relation exists eternally between God and soul, in the stage of bondage, due to veiling of Consciousness by *Tamas* the soul looks like an inert object (Jada-kalpa). When Consciousness is purified through knowledge and devotion, its similarity with Divine Consciousness is fully manifested. Perfection of an individual soul, therefore lies in—manifesting the similarity of soul—Consciousness with Divine Consciousness through Purification.
 2. *Satabhāṣanī*—part III, pp 122–123

Nature is non-different from *Brahman*, then the modification of nature is sure to mean modification of *Brahman* also. So, the theory of causation as the real modification of real Nature lands us into a metaphysically deplorable state.

Further, it has been pointed out by a critic that according to Rāmānuja, God is the underlying substratum of matter and soul which are regarded as His attributes. But if they are attributes, how can they be as real as God ?¹

This critic further says that Rāmānuja has made an attempt to bring about a reconciliation between *advaita* (monism) and *Pluralism* which can never go together. If there are real differences between one attribute and another and also between the adjectives and the noun, then *advaita* can never be introduced. "Absolutism precludes divided loyalties."

Objections Met :

I concede that these are obvious difficulties in the philosophy of Rāmānuja, which appear like apparent riddles. These apparent riddles can, however, be solved by more careful reflection on his real philosophical position.

Earlier, I have referred to the objection raised by the author of the '*Śatabhusanī*.' This objection can be met easily without twisting in any manner the philosophy of Rāmānuja. *Svatantra bheda* (intrinsic), (if I have understood it correctly) means natural and real difference between God and *Prakṛti*, whereas *paratantra* (extrinsic) *bheda* refers to such a difference which is perceptible in the effect-state only and not in the causal-state. In other words, *paratantra-bheda* means a difference created by *kārya* or effect and as such it exists also in the sphere of effects. Now, if we follow carefully the line of thinking adopted by Rāmānuja, we shall find that he has recognized *svatantra-bheda* between God and *Prakṛti* and it is because of this recognition that the relation of *apṛithak-siddhi*, holding between two naturally different *tattvas*, has been introduced. According to *Nyāya*, there is *svatantra-bheda* between substance and quality, *jāti* (universal) and *vyakti* (particular) and still they are related together by the relation of *samavāya*.

1. Indian Philosophy—by Dr. C. D. Sharma, p. 527.

Similarly, in the philosophy of Rāmānuja, God and *Prakṛti* are really and naturally different; yet they are inseparably related by the relation of *aprithaksiddhi*. In fact, all systems, except *Cārvāka* have admitted *svatantra-bheda* between body and soul and have also agreed to accept the *Śarīra-śarīri* relation between them.

Regarding the second objection raised by Dr. C.D. Sharma, it is necessary to understand what he really means by 'as real as God.' If reality means 'beinghood or *sattā*,' then this belongs to God as well as to soul and matter. God is *sat* and so also are *cit* and *acit*. *Sat* or reality does not admit of any kind of qualitative or quantitative discrimination. Further, if knowability (*jñeyatva*) is regarded as the sign of *sat*, then the knowability that belongs to *cit* and *acit* does not differ in any way from knowability that belongs to God. God is knowable like *cit* and *acit*. Only, the sources or the methods of knowledge are different. Again, if we say that *sat* (real) means causal efficiency, then this belongs both to the noun and the adjectives. If we say that only the noun is real and not the adjective, that also is not true. In the case of *Dandīpuruṣaḥ* (man with a stick) both the stick and the man are equally real. Lastly, if by *sat*, we mean that which is never contradicted, then this type of non-contradiction belongs to God, soul and matter in the same way. Hence, how can we say that it is anomalous to hold that *cit* and *acit* are as real as God? Rāmānuja has defined *Brahman* as '*satyasya satyam*' (Real of the reals). This statement seems to imply that the unconscious matter and the conscious soul become meaningful only in and through their inseparable association with God. God is the ultimate substratum and is also the inner principle of the whole creation. It is in this sense of "ultimate" and "fundamental" that the expression 'real of reals' is used. Here, we can also mark an important point of difference between the Sāṃkhya conception of *Prakṛti* and Rāmānuja's conception of *acit*. Sāṃkhya assumes that Nature possesses causal efficiency independently, but Rāmānuja holds that an unconscious substance can act causally only when it is inspired and vitalised by some conscious principle.

Lastly, the word '*advaita*' has nowhere been used in the sense of absolute non-difference. Though body and soul are different, still in empirical life they are spoken of in a manner that suggests '*advaita*' or non-duality between them. "I am fact," "I am fair" etc. are the expressions of the identity-feeling between the body and the soul that generally peeps through all our worldly dealings. In philosophy too, we find that *advaita* is generally supposed to exist between two things which are not wholly identical. In the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, the relation of *Tādātmya* has been supposed to exist between the cause and the effect which are partly like and partly unlike. In the case of *advaita-vedānta*, *advaita* or non-duality has been established between *Brahman* and the world which are two and not one. Had these two been wholly identical, then the distinction between '*adhiṣṭhān*' and '*adhiṣṭheya*' (support and the supported) would not have arisen at all. This division proves that *Brahman* and the world are distinct and different to a certain extent. The only thing is that in the opinion of Śaṅkara, this difference is *mithyā* (false).

In conclusion, it can be said that by introducing the conception of the Absolute as the all-inclusive reality, Rāmānuja has tried to reduce all experience to a unity in terms of such relations as *amśa-amśi*, substance-attribute, cause-effect, etc. *Brahman* is the universal that pervades all and gives them a meaning. All things of the world depend upon and derive their substantiality from *Brahman*. So, *Brahman* is regarded as *advaita* that persists in and through differences. Differences are, no doubt, real; but they are so related to their source of sustenance that the whole of experience has been reduced to a Single Unity which has been described as *advaita*.

Section C.

Soul in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja

The three fundamental categories of the philosophy of Rāmānuja are God, Nature and Soul. Of these, Nature and Soul constitute the body of God who is the supreme indwelling spirit of the whole universe. *Viśiṣṭadvaita* Philosophy of Rāmānuja school has described soul in two ways: namely, positive and

differentiative. In trying to explain the characteristics which "Jīva" (soul) possesses, *Viśiṣṭadvaita* has made a sincere attempt to distinguish soul from all possible things with which it may get identified through confused thinking.

Let us first of all try to follow how *Jīva* or soul has been differentiated from its natural accompaniments which are not identical with it.

Ātman Different from Body :

According to *tattvatraya*, *Jīva* cannot be identified with the body, the sense-organs, the mind or the vital airs which are the constituent parts of a psycho-physical organism. The soul is different from the body, because while making a reference to body, we usually say : "it is my body : it is the body," etc.¹ Body is a whole of many parts. When it is said that the body is identical with soul, the question will arise : does consciousness belong to all parts of the body or to some parts thereof ? If it is said that consciousness belongs to all parts of the body, then at one and the same moment, the consciousness is expected to carry with it a feeling of multiplicity which certainly is not guaranteed by experience. Again if consciousness belongs to one part only, then due to the absence or invalidity of that particular organ, there will be no memory of the past-experience.

Even in the case of the present experience, consciousness being limited to one part only, the feelings of pleasure and pain will not pervade the whole body. As such things do not happen, it is held that consciousness must belong to some entity which is different from the body and its-parts.

Jīva and the External Sense-organs :

Jīva cannot be identified with the sense-organs ; because in that case the commonly-felt identity between the "I" that is

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1. *Tattvatraya*—published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1938, p. 6.

Ātmasvarūpaṁ katham dehādicilakṣaṇamiticed ?

Dehādīnāṁ mama dehādikamityātmaṇaḥ

Pṛthagupalabhyamānatvāt, idamityupalabhyamānatvāt.....

perceiving the object and the "I" that is touching the object will be inexplicable. If the soul is identified with the visual organ, then the blind man will not be able to remember his past experiences as he has lost his soul or consciousness. Similar is the case with every other sense-organ. Truly speaking, the soul is the one identical knower in a particular body and all sense organs are the "*karāṇas*" or the instruments of the knower. The knower is wholly different from the psycho-physical organism.¹

Soul and Antahkarana :

The soul cannot be identified with the *antahkarana*. *Antahkarana* is only the instrument through which the soul is able to perform internal actions like remembering, recognizing, etc. If *antahkarana* is regarded as soul, then performance of internal actions will become impossible.

Jīva and Vital Airs.²

Jīva is also different from vital airs. Vital airs are five in number and, therefore, in each body, we shall have to admit the existence of the five souls which is absurd.

Jīva and the Whole of the Psycho-physical Organism :

Thus, *Jīva* is different from the whole body and also from each one of its parts such as sense-organs, *antahkarana*, vital airs etc. The soul is always referred to as "*aham*," whereas the word "*mama*" is generally used in connection with the body and its organs. Of course, on certain occasions, the '*aham*' is also used in regard to body as "*aham sthūlah*," but such use is occasional and not universal. Moreover, the feeling of body does not exist constantly and uniformly for all times. In deep sleep, the body-feeling of man ceases to

1. *Yatindramataṭīpikā*—Second edition—Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934, p. 67-68, chap. VIII.

Sa ca dehendriya-mānāḥ prajñā-dibhyo vilakṣyaṇāḥ yathā mamajātmanī prātītyā dehadetyvṛttaḥ. cakṣuṣā śaipyāmi. śreṣṭheṣa śṛṇomi cācāśa-tyādyapratyatyāśādeḥendriyebhyo tyavṛttaḥ...etc.

2. Vital Airs—Five *Prāṇa-Vāyu*.

exist, but the feeling of soul persists in all forms of physiological and psychological states. When an individual gets up from deep sleep he says: "I was not able to know my own body during that period." This shows that the body-feeling of an individual does not exist while in deep sleep. Of course the feeling of "*aham*" persists.

Body is subject to birth and death. At the time of birth a new body is formed and one can experience the feeling of this particular body up to the last day of his life. After death there will be no more feeling of that particular body. Since the soul has to reap the fruits of actions of his previous life, it does not die with the death of a particular body. The soul is eternal and indestructible and as such it is wholly different from the body which is destructible and dissolvable. In the case of sense-organs also, we find that they can be felt so long as they are intact. A blind man whose eyes are totally destroyed, will never have such a feeling as "I am a *cakṣusmān* person" (I possess visual organs). The presence of mind also will not be felt in a state of total imbecility (*mūḍāvasthā*). In the case of "*ātman*," however, the feeling of self will always be present. When a man is recovered from a state of fainting fit, he gets the feeling that it was he who remained in a state of fit sometime back and has got back his consciousness just now. Thus by distinguishing the self from the body, sense-organs, vital airs and *antaḥkaraṇa*, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy has been able to keep its theory free from the influences of materialism, vitalism, Buddhism etc.

Positive Characteristics of the Soul :

Of the positive characteristics of the soul described by Rāmānuja and his followers some belong to God as well and these are, therefore, the common characteristics of both God and *Ātman*. Besides these common characteristics, the soul also possesses some other characteristics which are peculiar to itself and which are not, therefore, applicable to God.

The characteristics, commonly shared by God and *Jiva* are *pratyaktva* (inwardliness), *cetanatva* (consciousness), *atmatva* (spirituality) and *kartṛtva* (agency). The peculiar chara-

cteristics are *anutva*, *śeṣatva* (as accessory), *adheyatva* (supportedness), *Vidheyatva* (dependence), *parādhinakartṛtva*, *paratantratva* etc.^{1(a,b)}

Like God soul is also *pratyak* or internal principle in the sense that it dwells in a body. The soul possesses consciousness as its essence. As it is the indwelling and controlling principle of the body, it is called "*Ātmā*."

Jiva is the agent or *kartā* like God as it moves the body and the organs to various types of intellectual and non-intellectual activities. It is also the substratum of knowledge. The soul is also eternal in the sense that it exists in past, present and future. Its birth means association with the body and its death means dissociation from the body.

Peculiar Characteristics of Jiva :

The soul is atomic in nature as otherwise we shall not be able to explain its "*utkramaṇa*"² which has been upheld by the "*śruti*." Here we should remember that the atomic nature of the soul does not prevent it from being the experiencer of pleasures and pains which may occur in any part of the body. The soul feels and knows all that is happening in any part of the body with the help of its "*dharma-bhūtajñāna*" (attributive knowledge) which spreads itself everywhere like the glow of a precious stone.

- 1(a). *Yatīndramatāṭīkā*—published by Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934, p. 67.

Atha jivonirupyaṭe pratyakcetanatātmatva

Kartṛtōdīnīśvarajīva sūdhārāṇī lakṣaṇāni.....

vīṣeṣa lakṣaṇayucyante-anutvesatī cetanatvam.

svataḥ śeṣatve satīcetanatvam. Ecam adheyatva vidheyatva,

parādhinakartṛtva paratantrādīkam, etc.

- b. *Vedārthā samgraha : Ādhyadheyabhave nīyantrīnīyābhyāsāḥ śeṣaleṣi-bhāṣaḥ. Antaḥ Pratyīntaryāmitayā sarveṣāṃ Prāśītitārāṇi nīyan-tūram anīyānā ātmānaḥ, etc.*

2. *Utkramaṇa* or (movement from one place to another) is not possible if the soul is all-pervading. If the soul is atomic, then *utkramaṇa* can be explained without the help of subtle body or *upādhi*.

The soul has also been described as the “*Śeṣa*” (accessory, God being the principle *Tattva*) of God. This is because the soul is fully supported, controlled and employed by God and has no real independence of its own.¹ Since, house, land, wife and children of a man, being wholly under his control, are regarded as his properties, these things, too, can be called “*śeṣas*” of the owner. There is, however, an important point in which *jīva* as the “*śeṣa*” of God differs from land, house, wife and children which are the possessions of a man of the world. Land, house, etc. have separate existence of their own but *jīva* can never exist without being connected with God. The relation between God and soul is inseparable.

“*ādheyatva, vidheyatva, parādhīnakatṛtva and paratantratva* belong to *Jīva* simply because it is controlled and supported (*dhārya*) fully by God.”

The “*Śruti*” also says : “*Ya atmaniṣṭhaṇ : atmānamantaro yamayati sa te ātmā antaryāmi anṛta.*” This implies that God, being the indwelling principle of the soul which is His body, is the true regulator and controller of all knowledge and actions of the *Jīva*. The controlling authority always rests on God and for that reason the *Jīva* is regarded as “*Niyāmya*” (controlled) and God as “*Niyamaka*” (controller). In the case of a living being, although all external activities are done by the body, still the real ruler of all such activities is *buddhi* or the internal intellectual principle. In the same manner although the activities of a *Jīva* are done by it, still God is the real ruler as He is the soul of the *Jīva*. Further, as all things rest on Him, He is the mainstay of all the *Jīvas*.

Though Rāmānuja has described soul as the *Niyāmya* (controlled mode) of God, he has also made provision for the spiritual freedom of the *Jīvas*. The *Jīva* is allowed to have desires in his mind according to His own free-will but those desires will not

1. Varavara Muni's commentary on *Tattva-Traya*—Published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1938, p 22.

*Pṛthaksiddhyanarhādharādheyabhavoniyāntrīyābhāvāḥ,
Śeṣa-śeṣi bhāva itī, yasya cetanasya yaddravyam sarvatmanā
svarthe nīyantum dhārayitum ea śakyaṁ tacehesataika svartṣam.*

find expressions in actual actions unless they are approved of by God. Actual action is possible only through the approval by God of the desires of the *Jivas*.¹ Here also God's interference is not detrimental to the freedom of the souls. If an individual desires to do bad actions, God will allow him to act according to his own desires. He will not prevent the individual from doing the action he likes best by creating any kind of obstacles: the individual is trying to go far off from God because of his vitiated personality and God, too, will help him to have such desires which will lead him farther away from his Lord

On the other hand, those who are specially attached to Him will have through His grace such desires only that will bring them very close to God. The choice of desires will be determined by the character of the individual soul but these desires will be effective only through the grace of God. This is how Rāmānuja has tried to make a happy compromise between the soul's dependence on God and its spiritual freedom.

In the philosophy of Rāmānuja, God appears as the giver of the fruits of actions in accordance with the "*adrīṣṭa*" (desert) of the individual's character, and consequently the desires of the individuals are determined by their *past karmas* or *adrīṣṭa*: but as "*adrīṣṭa*" is unconscious, it cannot do its service without being controlled by a conscious agent. So, God is the controller of "*adrīṣṭa*". An individual has freedom for choosing his own line of action, but when such actions are performed and consequently the "*adrīṣṭa*" of the *Jiva* is formed he has got to reap the fruits of his *karmas*. In this process of reaping the harvests of his past deeds, God will be his controller (being the controller of the individual's *adrīṣṭa*). God is the supporter of all actions because the actions being unconscious, need a conscious and powerful guide. Man is both the master and the slave of his actions. He is the master of the *kriyamāna-karmas* (actions he is doing in the present life) and a slave of the *Prarabdha-karmas* (past actions which have started bearing

1. *Śrībhāṣya*—2, 3, 41.

*Sarvāṁsu kṛtyāṁsu paruseṇa kṛtam prayatnam udyogam epekṣyāntaryāmi
paramātmā tadānumatidānera pravartayati.*

fruits). *Sāncita-karmas* also can be destroyed by the individual's own will and future 'action. Since *Prārabdha-karmas* bear fruits under the supervision and control of God, the kind of pleasures and pains that an individual will go through (due to his *Prārabdha-karmas*) will be determined by *Īśvara*. Prof. S. N. Das Gupta has described this theory of Rāmānuja as a sort of occasionalism. His statement runs thus : "This is a sort of occasionalism which holds that in every action which I am performing, I am dependent on God's will. I can move my limb because He wishes it."¹

Here the statement "I can move my limb because He wishes it" needs clarification as it may also be interpreted in the sense of full determinism which is contrary to the view of Rāmānuja. For the performance of every action, God indeed is necessary as the common cause of the whole universe, but the special cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) is the individual himself who is performing the action. An action is done when both the causes are present. So, in the act of moving a limb the will of God must be present, as the common cause, but together with the will of God, the desire of the *Jīva* too will be needed as the *asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa* of that particular action. God can work only with the help of the *Jīva's* body, mind and sense-organs. If *Jīva's* "*adriṣṭa*" does not determine its present actions, if all actions performed by an individual self are mere actualisations of God's wishes, then *Jīva* will be relieved of its responsibility, and, therefore, there will be no reason why an individual soul should receive punishment for such actions which are really the wishes of God. In the *Sūtra* "*Vaiṣaṃya naighrinnye.....*" it has been clearly stated that the diversities of experiences undergone by different souls are due to their own past deeds. One's desires and wills are the results of one's own past actions. When a particular desire arises in the mind of a particular individual, God who controls *Jīva's* *adriṣṭa* (desert) gives his consent and thereby makes it possible for that particular soul to fulfil the desire which has been chosen by the soul itself. So, a *Jīva* is both

free and dependent on the will of God. That is why the author of the *Yatindramatadīpikā* has used the word “*parādhīna kartṛtva*” to denote this free and also dependent nature of the soul.

Ātman has been described as *ajāda* (immaterial). This is because the soul is self-revealing. That which can reveal itself independently without receiving help from any quarter is called *ajāda*. Just as one lamp does not need the help of another lamp to make itself known to us, in the same manner *ātman* also can show itself and reveal itself and is called “*svayam-jyoti*” or “*svayamprakāśa*” (self revealing).

The soul also is of the nature of bliss.¹ During the state of deep sleep, an individual experiences no object of the external world. Subject-object consciousness remains fully suspended during this stage; but as soon as the individual gets up from deep sleep, he at once remembers that he had a peaceful and blissful experience during the state of “*suṣupti*” (deep sleep). As no object was present at that time, this happiness must be supposed to have sprung forth from the self itself.

When the soul is described as “*avyakta*,” it means simply that it is incapable of being known by any of our sense-organs. It can be known by *mūnasa-jñāna*.²

The soul has been described as “*acīntya*” (unthinkable). This epithet has been applied to the *Jīvas* due to the fact that it cannot be grasped by discursive intellectual thinking. It can be realised only through “*śravaṇa*, *manana*” and “*nididhyāsana*” etc.

The soul is the substrate of knowledge or consciousness. Consciousness is both the essence and the property of the soul.

1. *Tattvāttraya*—published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1938, p. 9.

Ānandarūpa'raṁ sukhavarūpa'raṁ, Prabuddhaḥ sukhamaṇasa'vṛpsam itī pratisandadhāti sukhavarūpaṁ bharaṭi.

2. *Ibid*, p. 12. (Tika)

Ato mūnasa-jñānamātragaṇyam na'raṇdriyālayajñāna gaṇya-iti bhāṣaṭi.

This point has been clarified by Rāmānuja with the help of the example of the light of a lamp. Light constitutes the essence of a lamp and is also a quality inhering in the lamp. Like light, consciousness is also both a substance and a property. It is substance as it constitutes the essence of the *Jivas* (soul) and *Īśvara* (God). In this sense, *Jiva* is of the nature of *jñāna* and is not the *āśraya* (substratum) of knowledge : but knowledge in the shape of "*Dharma-bhūtajñāna*" exists as a property of the *ātman* and since there is the relation of *apri-thaksiddhi* (inseparableness) between substance and its property, the soul is regarded as the substratum of "*caitanya*" (consciousness).¹ Since it is ever qualified by *dharmabhūta-jñāna* (attributive knowledge) the soul is always the knower and is not merely the knowledge. We never have an experience like "I am knowledge" ; on the contrary, every individual has feelings like "I am knowing, I am imagining etc." Souls also are many in number and each body has a separate soul as its inner controller.

Thus while according to Sāṃkhya, the soul is *draṣṭā* (seer), *bhoktā* (enjoyer) in a subtle sense² and *akartā* (non-doer), according to Rāmānuja-philosophy it possesses all the three characteristics of *draṣṭṛtva*, *bhoktṛtva* and *karṭṛtva*, but *bhoktṛtva* (power of enjoyment) and *kaṣṭṛtva* (agency) of various activities of the empirical life belong to it in a special sense. Its natural essence does not permit us to ascribe to it these two adjectives of *karṭṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* which arise in the soul only when it is associated with a body-mind system. *Karṭṛtva* or agency of the soul refers to all its efforts directed towards various types of activities of the worldly life and *bhoktṛtva* refers to diverse forms of its enjoyment of worldly

1. *Tattvatraya*—published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1938, p. 14. Varā Varā's commentary.
2. *Puruṣa* is *bhoktā* in the sense that it is the revealer and receiver of *prativimba*. It cannot be a *bhoktā* of the pleasures and pains arising from an actual contact with external objects as in the state of *mukti*, it is dissociated from *prakṛti*.

pleasures and pains. *Bhoktṛtva*, therefore, follows as a necessary consequence of *kartṛtva* and as agency is due to the soul's association with the body, *bhoktṛtva* too is not a natural characteristic of the *Jīva*. Regarding agency, it has been stated in the *Tattvatraya* : "*sāṃsārika pravṛttiṣu kartritvam na svarūp-prajuktamapi tu guṇasāṃsargakṛitam.*"* Since agency and enjoyment are two characteristics that belong to the *Jīva* only in this worldly life, these properties are, therefore, non-eternal, destructible and changeable. These properties are generated in the soul during waking and dream states and disappear from the soul in deep sleep, fainting fit and also in liberation. So, it is just and proper to hold that the *Jīva* in its real eternal and transcendental form is not an agent or enjoyer of worldly pleasures and pains.

The difference between the *sāṃkhya* view and the view of Rāmānuja school lies in this that according to the former, consciousness of *puruṣa* is reflected through *buddhi* as a result of which *buddhi* appears as conscious : agency belongs to this intelligised *buddhi* only and not to the real self. But according to Rāmānuja school, agency of various worldly actions and for reason of that enjoyment of pleasures and pains are the non-eternal properties¹ of the self which qualify it only when the self becomes associated with the three *guṇas* and appears as a citizen of this world. Qualified Monism also holds that the essence of *Jīva* never gets coloured by such agency and its necessary consequence in the form of enjoyment of pleasures and pains arising from attachment to worldly objects. The *sāṃkhya* conception which ascribes agency to *buddhi* and not to the self in its empirical life is going against the teaching of the scriptures. According to *śāstra*, *bhoktṛtva* of the soul has been admitted because of its agency and action. The soul is the doer of actions and therefore it is just and proper to think that the fruits of its actions should also be enjoyed by the

* The soul by nature is not the doer of worldly action, it becomes an agent due to its association with the *guṇas*.

1. *Jñāna-Kriyā-Karitra* alone is a natural property of the soul.

Jiva. If agency is denied of the soul then *bhoktṛtva* (enjoyment) should also be denied of it.¹

Further, according to Qualified Monism agency and enjoyment of the self are also effected under the supervision of God. No action can be performed by an individual unless it is sanctioned by God. God allows a *Jiva* (soul) to perform actions in accordance with its own "*adriṣṭa*."

The fact that the self is a knower does not imply any kind of change in the individual. "*Jñātṛtva*" really means "*Āśrayatva*" of the attributive knowledge. Although knowledge in essence is eternal and infinite, yet it can undergo contraction and expansion due to "*adriṣṭa*" of the individual self. The contraction of knowledge of an individual self is effected through the use of the sense-organs. So, the appearance and disappearance of "*indriya-vṛtti*" is falsely spoken of as the origin and decay of knowledge. The agency of the soul that is involved in the expansion of knowledge is not natural to it; but is due only to its past actions and is non-eternal. Hence, as the nature of the soul does not change, the soul remains immutable in spite of the expansion and contraction of its "*dharma-bhūtajñāna*."

Rāmānuja refers to three classes of souls. The first category consists of eternal souls who are never bound. They always remain free from *karma* and "*acit*" and live in *Vaiṣṇava* in the constant presence of God. All the time, they are rendering services to God. "*Śeṣa*," "*garuḍa*" etc. are examples of such eternal souls. The second category consists of liberated souls who were once in bondage but who obtained release through their knowledge, action and devotion. The third category consists of "bound soul" who are still steeped in

1. *Tattvatraja*—published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1938, p. 16. (Tika)

Yadiprakṛtereṇa kartṛtvaṃ nātmanastadāśya vidhiniṣedharūpa śāstrādhikāritayā tadvaṁ nānāniṣiddhakarāṇāprayukta sukhaduhkharūpa-phalabhoktṛtvaṃ ea na syādityarthaḥ... "śāstraphalaṃ prayoktari" *karatśāstrārthavattatityuktam. Svargakamayajeta, mumukṣu brahmopasita iti svargamokaḥ* *śāstrādhikāritayā hi kartṛtveṇa śāstreṇa niyujyate.*

ignorance and impure actions, as a result of which they are moving round the cycles of births and deaths.

Objections Considered.

Dr. C. D. Sharma has raised the following objections¹ against Rāmānuja's theory of souls :

1. "Rāmānuja on the one hand identifies the soul with the individual *Jīva*, the "I" consciousness (*aham*) the object of introspection : the substratum of knowledge ; the empirical ego ; the finite object ; the subject of empirical knowledge whose individuality nobody denies and yet, on the other hand, he identifies the soul with the self-luminous and self-conscious subject which preserves its identity through all its births and deaths and is essentially changeless." In the opinion of Dr. Sharma, this is a grave inconsistency.

2. "The souls are essentially alike, but numerically different. There is strict monism regarding the nature of the souls : there is pluralism only in regard to the number of the *Jīva* (souls). But quantitative pluralism is no real pluralism. The difference which makes no difference is no difference."

In regard to the first objection, it is true that like Vedānta and Sāṃkhya, Rāmānuja has not recognised a new phenomenal-category in the form of a *Jīva* or intelligised *buddhi* and that according to him, the soul itself is appearing as *Jīva* due to "*adriṣṭa*" or past actions. In this respect, the theory of Rāmānuja bears similarity with the theory of the Nyāya. While for sāṃkhya and advaita vedānta, the soul is of the nature of consciousness and there is no distinction between "*cetana*" and "*caitanya*," it is not so for Rāmānuja and the Nyāya-system. Both Rāmānuja and the author of the Nyāya-system have described the soul as possessor of knowledge or the substrate of knowledge : but while the Nyāya has accepted the soul simply as the possessor of non-eternal knowledge Rāmānuja has described it both as possessor of eternal knowledge and of the nature of knowledge.

Knowledge that arises in the soul becomes contracted due to bad actions, and the soul is dislocated from the place of its transcendental glory and appears as an empirical self-posses-

1. Indian Philosophy—by Dr. C. D. Sharma, p. 329-330.

sing agency and power of enjoying worldly pleasures and pains. The characteristics of "*kartṛtva*" and "*bhokṛtva*" are real in the sense that these belong to the soul itself during its worldly life. These are not the attributes of a "*māyika-antaḥ-karaṇa*" (false internal organ) or "*prakritika buddhi*" (intellect resulting from Nature) which are falsely ascribed to the *ātman*. Though real, "*kartṛtva*" and "*bhokṛtva*" are not however eternal qualities of the soul. The root cause of agency and power of enjoying worldly objects is soul's association with the psycho-physical organism.¹ Hence, although empirical egohood belongs to the soul itself, yet it is not a natural characteristic of the soul and as such the pure soul is different from the bound soul which is in association with the empirical ego due to "*avidyā*" and "*karma*." Rāmānuja has simply made it clear that the empirical self is not a fictitious category as is held by the *sāṃkhya* and the *vedānta* : it is the soul itself which has been dislodged from its glorious position due to influences of its own bad actions and has appeared on the world-stage, being united with "*aḥamkāra*" or egohood. Soul in its pure form is self-luminous, of the essence of consciousness which is infinite and unlimited : but when the same self gets associated with egohood, it appears as a *Jīva* and becomes the agent of empirical actions and enjoyer of worldly objects due to its contact with the *guṇas*. These two attributes of agency and enjoyment together with attachment and aversion—their necessary accompaniments—do not exist in the state of liberation or in the state of deep sleep. Hence, the soul though becomes "*sasamga*" (attached) due to its mind-body adjunct, is in itself "*asamga*" (non-attached) according to Rāmānuja. Its description as knower simply means that in the real form, the soul is not only of the nature of consciousness but is also the substratum—the holder and the possessor of consciousness. Pure "*aḥam*" is fundamentally different from the "*āhamkārika aḥam*" (a product of Nature) that limits the soul by identifying it with the body and thereby creating its narrow individuality

1. *Tattvatraya*—published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1938, p. 17.

that remains confined to its own mind-body system only. Pure "aham" does not put any kind of limitation on the soul : on the other hand, it simply implies that the soul is not the characterless consciousness but the "*cetana*" (conscious) or the "*jñānavān*" principle which is the eternal subject of all our knowledge. The individuality of pure "aham" is not conditioned and particular but unconditioned and universal in the sense that this uncoloured individuality can be ascribed indifferently to any one of these souls. Self-realisation means realisation of this "*pure aham*" and it is the immutable principle that remains present in the same form in all states of the individual existence.

Further, in the opinion of Dr. C. D. Sharma, quantitative pluralism without qualitative differences is no pluralism at all. This also cannot be upheld as it goes against the evidence of experience. In the ordinary life, numerical pluralism is also admitted as pluralism. If a potter makes one hundred earthen jars, exactly alike in all respects, the jars will be regarded as many in spite of their total agreement in kind. When all the jars will be sold, the potter will remark : "I have sold one hundred jars of the same quality." Qualitative identity in fact can exist only between terms which are numerically different.

Moreover, according to Rāmānuja, one can never become many. So from the very beginning, he has got to admit the existence of many souls ; otherwise multiplicity of real individual souls cannot be explained.

Conclusion

It is because Rāmānuja has accepted "*Dharmabhūta-jñāna*" as an eternal quality of the self that he has to admit "soul" as the eternal possessor of this attributive knowledge. So, the soul is always the knower or "*jñāta*", being the substratum of knowledge. Quality without a substratum is unthinkable and substance without quality is absurd. *Dharmabhūta-jñāna* possesses the power of revelation and this revelation or manifestation becomes meaningful when something is revealed to a subject. Knowledge can reveal itself and can also

reveal other objects but it cannot know itself as an object. Knowledge is different from reality : knowing is not identical with being. The characteristic of knowing cannot belong to knowledge : it must belong to a spiritual substance that knows. Revelation of objects should always be made to a perceiver who must be different from perceptual knowledge which is a quality. *Dharmabhūta-jñāna*, being the quality of the *Jiva* (soul) cannot be identified with it. The quality of knowing, however, is inseparable from the self.

Rāmānuja has throughout maintained a distinction between "*caitanya*" and "*cetana*"—consciousness and the possessor of consciousness, knowledge and the knowing reality. *Ātmā* or soul is the possessor of consciousness because it is the substratum in which "*caitanya*" or knowledge is generated. Knowledge is always the knowledge of an object and that object is always revealed to a "subject" who appears as the cognizer of that cognition. Pure differenceless knowledge, unrelated to any subject and object, cannot be proved by any "*pramāṇa*". It is because knowledge always reveals itself and an object to the knower that it is called "*Samvedanā*".¹ Self-revelation, on the other hand, means that knowledge stands revealed to the soul which is its substrate. The most important function of knowledge, therefore, is to manifest objects to the individual souls. Knowledge, thus, has a referential transcendence. It always refers beyond itself to objects and subjects and is never revealed in the absence of objects. It never exists in the absence of the knower. Even in the state of liberation when the world-feeling will be fully uprooted, the liberated person will constantly experience the real nature of God. In the absence of worldly objects, the real nature of God will then become the object of the liberated person's knowledge.² In the state of "*susupti*" (deep sleep) when external

1. *Śrībhāṣya*—edited and published by T. Srinivasa Sarma, Bombay, 1916,—1-1-1.

2. *Śrībhāṣya*—vol. II — *Anandarama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1940. 4-4-19*
Nirdhṛta nikhilavikāraṁ nikhilahēyaṣratyanīka kalyāṇaikāntānam
niratiśayānandam param brahme sabibhūtikam sakalakalyāṇaguṇam
anubhavatī muktaḥ.

objects are not manifested, the soul becomes the knower of its own "*pure aham*" which is its true character. "*Pure aham*" being the soul's nature is always present. It is not the quality of the soul; and in dreamless sleep in the absence of external objects, it is manifested as its own object.

It is because knowledge constitutes the essential quality of the "*ātman*" and is also the distinguishing characteristic of the soul that the soul is also described as consciousness or *jñāna*. In reality "*ātman*" and "*jñāna*" are logically distinguishable as substance and attribute—though physically inseparable.

It may seem difficult for us to understand why Rāmānuja has not remained satisfied merely by recognizing *dharmabhūta-jñāna* as an attribute of the soul. It may be asked why the soul also has been spoken of to be of the nature of knowledge. This Rāmānuja has done most probably with a view to keeping his philosophy in tune with the *Upaniṣads*.

The *Upaniṣads* have always described the soul as "*jñāna-svarūpa*" and this has been kept unimpaired in Rāmānuja's system. To account for the manifestation of the external objects, however, he has admitted "*dharmabhūta-jñāna*" which is capable of expansion and contraction. It is due to this elastic nature of knowledge that the diverse things can become the objects of our phenomenal consciousness on different occasions. Hence both the forms of knowledge are necessary for a rational explanation of human experience from the point of view of qualified monism.

Section D

Avidyā in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja

The word *avidyā* has been used by Rāmānuja in two different senses: metaphysical and ethical. *Avidyā* appears in almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy, although there is a great divergence of opinions regarding its specific nature. In Sāṃkhya, *avidyā* has been termed *arīṭya* which is intellectual in the sense that it is a failure to discriminate between the self and the not self. The *Nyāya-darśana*, too, gives

an intellectual interpretation of *avidyā* or *ajñāna*. *Śaṅkara-vedānta*, on the other hand, has recognized *māyā* or *avidyā* as the objective matrix of the world and has described it as *bhāvarūpa* (Positive) *anirvācyā* (indescribable) and illusory from the transcendental point of view. This *avidyā* theory of *Śaṅkarācāryya* has been severely criticised by Rāmānuja who does not believe in the existence anywhere of anything bearing resemblance with the *avidyā* of *Śaṅkara*.

Metaphysical Meaning of Avidyā in Rāmānuja's Philosophy

In the metaphysics of *Rāmānuja-darśana*, *Prakṛti* itself has been called *avidyā* since 'act' is the principle that prevents the soul from realising its essentially conscious nature. *Prakṛti*, being unconscious, is naturally opposed to *vidyā* or knowledge (*navidyā*). It is the material cause of the world and is *triguṇātmikā* (Possessor of the three guṇas) like the *avidyā* of *Śaṅkara*, but as a category, *Prakṛti* of Rāmānuja possesses a status wholly different from the status of the *avidyā* of *Śaṅkara*. In the Philosophy of *Advaita* *avidyā* is a terminable principle and is not the ultimate truth. It possesses freedom to put forth appearances only and not to create a real world. The knowledge of *Brahman* not only reveals the falsity of the given world but it also implies the falsity of *Māyā* or *avidyā* as nothing else can remain before the 'advaita-Brahman'. But *Prakṛti* of Rāmānuja, though called *avidyā* in a particular sense, is real and as such it is beginningless and endless. The only speciality about its reality is that it is real as a mode of God from 'whom alone it derives its substantiality and meaning. Like the *avidyā* of *Śaṅkara*, *Prakṛti* is not "*nāmadheyatvamātram*". On the contrary, it is the metaphysically real cause of all modifications of the world.

In the opinion of Rāmānuja, the world that we always see, feel and touch as real must be admitted by us as true; so it is improper to hold that a substantial world like ours has as its primary stuff a wholly illusory principle. Rāmānuja has therefore raised sevenfold objections against the *avidyā*-theory of the *advaita* school which are known as

saptavidhānupapattiḥ. These seven charges against the illusion producing *avidyā* are *āśrayānupapattiḥ*, *tirodhānānupapattiḥ*, *svarūpānupapattiḥ*, *anirvacanīyānupapattiḥ*, *pramāṇānupapattiḥ*, *nivartakānupapattiḥ* and *nivṛtṭyanupapattiḥ*. Let us now explain these *anupapattiḥ* (objections) one by one :

Āśrayānupapattiḥ

The first objection is that there can be no substratum (*āśraya*) for *avidyā*. Neither the individual soul nor *Brahman* can serve as a basis for the principle of illusion. The individual soul or *Jiva*, being itself a creation of *avidyā* (ignorance) cannot be regarded as its substratum. To trace the locus of the individual soul is to commit the fallacy of mutual dependence. *Brahman* also cannot be the locus of *avidyā* as it is supposed to be self-luminous. Self-luminosity cannot be supposed to be enveloped under any condition. If self-luminosity is believed to be covered, there will be the cessation of the true form of *Brahman* since *Brahman* is nothing but this self-luminosity. Thus, as there is no locus for *avidyā*, it is absolutely meaningless.¹

Tirodhānānupapattiḥ

The second objection is that if we believe in *avidyā*, then we have to believe also in the obscuration of Pure Consciousness which is really absurd. *Brahman* has been admitted as self-revealing consciousness. Being *svayam-prakāśa*, it can never be subject to any kind of obscuration. Obscuration means two things : firstly, counteraction of a barrier preventing origination of knowledge and secondly, destruction of knowledge. But pure knowledge is not a product and so it is not also liable to destruction. It is eternal and persisting. How or why self-revealing pure consciousness makes itself obscure by *avidyā* is an insoluble riddle of the *Śaṅkara-vedānta*.

Svarūpānupapattiḥ

The third charge is : *avidyā* itself is obscured by nature. *Avidyā* cannot be admitted as real : because in that case, the Philosophy of *Śaṅkara* will cease to be a philosophy of

non-dualism. Neither can *avidyā* be regarded as the unreal cause of an unreal world, since such an admission will result in committing the fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*). If the false knowledge of the false world is caused by a false *avidyā*, then this knowledge of the false *avidyā* must be due to another principle of falsity and that too, to another and so on.¹ If it is held that *avidyā* is revealed by *Brahman*, even then the situation does not improve. *Brahman* is eternal and so *avidyā* will always be eternal and as such will always be known by the individual souls. Since *avidyā* will never terminate, there will be no liberation for the suffering souls of the world.

Anirvacanīyānupapattih

The fourth charge is brought against the *anirvacanīyā* theory of indefinability. Things of the world are always experienced either as *sat* or as *asat*. A thing which is *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* (different from both real and unreal) can never be an object of experience. It is no use describing any category as *anirvacanīya* when such a category can never be logically established on the ground of any kind of evidence. To assert that an indefinable category can be an object of knowledge is equivalent to courting the absurd position that all things can be the objects of all knowledge.

Pramāṇanupapattih

The fifth objection against *avidyā* theory is that it is not supported by any *pramāṇa*. Since *avidyā* is *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* it cannot be known by perception which is only capable of giving us the knowledge of an entity or of a non-entity and never of any which is *anirvacanīya*. Since there is nothing to serve as the *linga* (sign or reason for conclusion) of this *anirvācyā avidyā*, it cannot be known through inference either. Finally, it cannot be known through scriptural testimony, for the scriptures describe *māyā* as the real world-producing power of God.

1(a). *Vedārtha Samgrah*—printed and published by Lazarus and Co. Benares, p. 76 (Tika—Sudarśana Suri)

(b). *Vedārtha Samgrah*—(English Translation by J. A. B. Van Buitencm.) Page 216 Deccan College Monograph Series-16.

Nivartakānupapattih

According to *advaita* school, nothing short of the knowledge of an undifferentiated attributeless *Brahman* can root up *avidyā* totally and finally. But such knowledge is impossible. Knowledge always involves discrimination and determination. So, *avidyā* can never be removed.

Nivrttīyanupapattih

This is a charge against the *advaita* theory of liberation. *Brahmajñāna* is not (according to *advaita* school) the knowledge of *Brahman*, but it is knowledge that is *Brahman*. This is pure knowledge and it is different from the knowledge of identity, which is called the *Nivartaka-jñāna*. According to Rāmānuja, this *nivartaka-jñāna*, being different from *Brahman*, must be regarded as a form of *avidyā* since anything different from *Brahman* falls in the realm of *avidyā*. In the view of the *advaita*-school, this *nivartaka-jñāna* destroys *avidyā* and then destroys itself like a blazing fire which after destroying a forest destroys itself. This however is not sound and admissible according to Rāmānuja. This is because we find that in the case of fire burning a forest, ashes remain when fire is extinguished. Here too, if we hold that *avidyā* can be burnt, we must also admit necessarily that *avidyā* will continue to exist in the form of its ashes. Absolute liberation, therefore, is wholly unattainable.

Further Elucidation of the Unjustifiability of Śaṅkara's *avidyā*

In fact, the category of *avidyā* as expounded by Śaṅkara, baffles our attempts to understand it. All of us know and firmly believe that a positive entity is that which becomes an object of some form of knowledge. Since *anirvacanīyatva* (indescribability) can never be experienced in any form, it is an absurd hypothesis. If it is held that the knowledge of an entity or of a non-entity can also yield to us the knowledge of something which is neither an entity nor a non-entity, then all things will become the objects of all knowledge. This is, no doubt, a very anomalous philosophical position.

Rāmānuja further holds that it is the pure knowledge that should be regarded as being opposed to *avidyā* and so Brahman as pure knowledge ought to stand as a contradictory to *avidyā*. The positive experience of *avidyā* should therefore be followed by the negation of *Brahman*, for two contradictory principles cannot be felt as positive at the same time. In fact, to hold that Brahman is hidden by *avidyā* is to admit that the nature of *Brahman* as self-revealing consciousness is destroyed. Pure self-revelation is never a product and its concealment means simply that it is destroyed. Further, if concealment means partial covering up of *Brahman*, then *Brahman* will cease to be partless and that will go against the fundamental position of *advaita-vedānta*. Nor can it be maintained that being hidden by *avidyā*, *Brahman* is only indistinctly manifested : because revelation itself cannot be described as distinct or indistinct. The question of distinctness and indistinctness arises with regard to the object of revelation.

Further the use of the negative prefix 'a' in *avidyā* or *ajñāna* undoubtedly implies that it can be understood only by a reference to the cognition of the nature of knowledge or to state briefly, *ajñāna* (Non-knowledge or ignorance) presupposes *jñāna* (knowledge) and is relative to knowledge (*jñāna-sāpekṣa*). If darkness is considered as being opposed to light, then darkness cannot be understood without presupposing the knowledge of light. Cognition of non-existence of a jar presupposes the knowledge of the existence of the jar. One who knows the jar is alone capable of having a cognition of the non-existence of the jar.

Moreover, if the *advaitins* hold that *avidyā* or *ajñāna* can be removed by the knowledge of the falsity of everything other than *Brahman*, then ignorance will simply mean knowledge of the reality of the world ; and in this sense alone *ajñāna* or ignorance can be held as contradictory to knowledge. So, it is not the non-knowledge of the true nature of *Brahman* that will be removed by the knowledge of the falsity of the world, as these two do not have the same object and cannot therefore be treated as contradictory to

each other. If they are non-contradictory, one cannot be the destroyer of the other. So, the assertion that a knowledge of the true nature of *Brahman* invariably leads to the destruction of ignorance is not logically justifiable.

Lastly, it has been held by Śaṅkara school that *avidyā* or *ajñāna* can be perceived directly; and as evidence, this school has referred to such perceptions as "I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or any other". In the opinion of Rāmānuja, however, such perceptions do not prove the immediate and direct experience of *ajñāna*. On the other hand, they simply refer to the *prāgabhāva* (prior non-existence) of the knowledge of an object. To be directly perceptible, *ajñāna* must refer to some specific object of which there is ignorance; and this cannot be, since in that case, *ajñāna* itself will disappear because of the knowledge of the object. If no specific object is referred to by *ajñāna*, then it cannot be perceived, for like pure contentless knowledge, pure contentless ignorance, too, can never be directly apprehended. The experience of "I did not know anything during deep sleep" is an inference grounded on the absence of memory of any knowledge during *suṣupti* (deep sleep). It is not a proof of the direct apprehension of *ajñāna*. Hence, *avidyā* or *ajñāna*, in the sense of a positive but false and illusion producing entity cannot be upheld. For Rāmānuja, therefore, *Prakṛti* is the only real and positive *tattva* that can very well be called *avidyā* and can also be regarded as the real cause of a real world.

Ethical Meaning of *avidyā*

In the ethical realm of his philosophy, Rāmānuja has used the word *avidyā* in the sense of *varṇāśrama karmas*¹ which bring about the expansion and contraction of the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* of the individual soul. *Avidyā*, in this sense too, is a positive entity possessing the power of obscuring *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* (attributive knowledge) and creating thereby the false sense of agency in the *Jīva*. The attitude of the individual

1. *Vedānta-Saṁgraha*-p. 150. (Lazarus & Company)

Ata avidyā bhāvena vidyāyā varṇāśrama-karmasā jñāna-bhūta-jñāna-

soul towards the world, therefore, becomes distorted. The individual thinks himself to be the lord of the world and the main purpose of the world seems to him to be simply to cater to his various needs and comforts. *Avidyā* in the form of *karma*, thus becomes the generating cause only of the *bhoga* (experience) of the individual souls and not of the *bhogyā* which is *Prakṛti*. Due to the inadequate expansion of the *dharmabhūta jñāna*, the individual develops a false attitude towards the universe and instead of admitting God as the ultimate source of everything, he considers himself to be the controller of the world. In the sense of *karma*, therefore, *avidyā* is a principle of obscuraton. In this sense *avidyā* can be treated as a third power besides *kṣetrajña-śakti* and *Prakṛti-śakti*.

Now, all these deliberations on the meaning of *avidyā* lead us to believe that in the *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy, *avidyā* has not been used in any rigid and fixed sense. Anything that stands in the way of self-realisation and God realisation or anything that develops in the soul a strong yearning for the ordinary pleasures of life, may be called *avidyā*¹.

Objections against Ramanuja's refutation of *avidyā*

Mahamahopadhyaya Śrī Anantakṛṣṇa Śastry has raised some objections against Rāmānuja's refutation of *avidyā* in his valuable book "*Śatabhāṣanī*"². We have already noticed that in the opinion of Rāmānuja, knowledge is opposed to ignorance and as such ignorance is never revealed by it. On the contrary, knowledge always destroys ignorance.

The author of *Śatabhāṣanī* has refuted this charge by asserting that pure objectless consciousness is not opposed to

1. Prakṛti may help the bound soul to a certain extent by providing it with the internal organ, but at the time of liberation the soul realises fully the inferior and obstructive character of Prakṛti. In the initial stage, Nature may be of some help but ultimately Nature proves itself an obstacle in the path of liberation. Prakṛti should be realised as *heya* and not as *upādeya* by one who seeks to attain liberation.

2. *Śatabhāṣanī* Page-92-101.

ajñāna. It is only the *Vṛtticaitanya* which is contradictory to *ajñāna* and cannot therefore exist with it. The experience of "I do not know" reveals *sāmānya-jñāna* of the soul and this is not opposed to *ajñāna*. On the other hand, ignorance is revealed by this sort of awareness.

It has been pointed out by the same author that ignorance is not a negative category according to *advaita-vāda*. The prefix 'a' here does not imply non-existence of knowledge prior to the apprehension of an object. This particular prefix is used here to denote that *avidyā* is opposed to phenomenal knowledge obtained through the use of *pramāṇas*.

The third charge brought against Rāmānuja by Shri Shastri is that according to *Rāmānuja-darśana*, it is the *dharmabhūta-jñāna* that is contracted and expanded by the *karmas* of the *Jivas*. *Dharmibhūta-jñāna* is self-revealing and is not revealed by *dharmabhūta-jñāna*. Since contraction of *dharmabhūta-jñāna* cannot bring about a corresponding contraction of the *dharmibhūta-jñāna*, something else besides *karma* has got to be accepted with a view to explaining the obscuration of the *dharmibhūta-jñāna*.

Lastly, it has been stated by the author of *Satabhūṣaṇi* that in the philosophy of Rāmānuja, *karma* has been regarded as the cause of the expansion and contraction of the *dharmabhūta-jñāna* which are simply the effects. Being an effect, expansion of the *dharmabhūta-jñāna* will not be able to destroy *karma*. Unless *avidyā-karma* is destroyed, liberation cannot be attained.

Objections Met

The above objections are no doubt grave, but they are not insoluble,

In the first place, it may be pointed out that Rāmānuja has understood and explained knowledge in a manner which is altogether different from the standpoint of *Saṃkara-vedānta*. According to Rāmānuja, knowledge always refers beyond itself to objects and subjects and is never revealed in the absence of objects. It has a referential transcendence. It always

reveals an object besides its own nature. Śaṅkara has admitted as ultimate and pure that consciousness which is wholly differenceless and contentless; but Rāmānuja denies altogether the existence of such knowledge. Even the knowledge of a liberated soul is not contentless. God himself becomes the content of knowledge of an emancipated spirit. There is, therefore, no such thing as pure *Nirviṣaya-caitanya* serving as the substratum of ignorance. *Ajñāna* of a particular object is always contrary to the knowledge of that particular object. As such, it is also a destroyer of that knowledge. Now, as knowledge and ignorance are incompatible, knowledge can never be the revealer or substratum of ignorance.

Moreover, Rāmānuja has never admitted the existence of a *jñāna-svarupa ātman*, (self as consciousness) totally devoid of the attitude of objective knowing. Whether bound or liberated, awake or asleep, the soul is always revealed as the knower, though the contents of knowledge are relative to different psychological states or stages through which an individual soul passes. Unless the self is admitted as a form of knowledge only and not as a knower, the existence of pure differenceless contentless consciousness cannot be established; and if such a consciousness is not established, there cannot be any locus for *ajñāna*.

In fact, by following the *advaita* line of thinking, we shall not be able to have a glimpse even of any differenceless consciousness at any stage of our life. *Brahman* itself is known through the *ṛitti* of *antaḥkaraṇa* (mode of internal organ) and as such in *Brahman-jñāna*, *Brahman* will become the object of that specific *ṛitti* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. How can we then believe in the existence of a knowledge which does not involve a reference to any object? Secondly, if 'a' in *avidyā* or *ajñāna* implies that it is contrary to knowledge obtained through *pramāṇas*, then it is evident that *ajñāna* cannot be submitted to any proof. As such, *ajñāna*, as expounded by the *advaita* philosophy, is unestablished by any *pramāṇa*.

Thirdly, in the opinion of Rāmānuja, the experience of "I did not know myself" does not imply a perception of

ajñāna during deep sleep. In deep sleep, pure 'aham' becomes the object of knowledge of an individual soul. Since *Antahkaraṇa* remains inoperative during deep sleep, there is no memory, and in the absence of memory of our knowledge of pure aham during *suṣupti*, (deep sleep) each one of us feels as if he did not know even himself in that stage. The knowledge of 'I am' persists uninterruptedly in deep sleep and so *dharmabhūta-jñāna* is never veiled. The presence of the *dharmabhūta-jñāna* (attributive knowledge) only remains unmanifested because of the absence of the specific objects of our phenomenal knowledge, and the question of assuming the existence of a separate principle of obscurator for *dharmabhūta-jñāna* does not arise.

Lastly, Rāmānuja does not seem to have felt the need for assuming the existence of a separate principle to serve as the destroyer of *karmas* (actions). *Karmas* (actions) will be automatically destroyed as soon as their effects will be produced. In brief, it can be said that actions will be destroyed by their results. The performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice results in the attainment of heaven. As soon as heaven is attained, that particular sacrifice comes to an end.

Moreover, when expansion of *dharmabhūta-jñāna* is complete, all attachment to worldly pleasures and pains ceases immediately. The fire of knowledge destroys completely all *sancti karmas* and *kṛtyamāṇa karmas*. *Nityanaimittik karmas* (daily and occasional duties) too, when directed towards God or towards the expansion of *dharmabhūta-jñāna* are automatically destroyed when the effects sought for are produced.

Conclusion

To conclude, we can say that the use of *avidyā* in the sense of *karma* (action) is not an innovation brought about by Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara too, in his commentary on the verse 9 of the *Īśa Upaniṣad*, has interpreted *avidyā*¹ in the sense of *vaidika-karma*.

1. *Īśa-verse 9.*

Vidyāya anya avidyā, tam karmetyarthah.

Truly speaking, *avidyā* in some form or other has been recognized in other systems of Indian philosophy and everywhere we find that *avidyā assisted by karma** has been accepted as the cause of this diversified universe.

In Sāṃkhya, for example, *avidyā* has been called *aviveka* and it has been viewed as a double-edged category. On the one hand *aviveka* has been treated as the operative power of an independent *Prakṛti* which impels it to evolve and dissolve whenever necessary ; and on the other hand, it has been held as the cause of the self's attachment to the world. *Aviveki-prakṛti*, however, needs the help of the law of *karma* to produce diversities of this world of experience.

In the *advaita-vedānta* too, *māyā*, *avidyā* or *ajñāna* has been viewed as the principle of objectivity and creativity ; but it has been made dependent on God who is its master. This changeable matrix of the world in the form of *māyā* or *avidyā* is regulated and shaped by the Lord of *Māyā* (*Īśvara*) in accordance with the law of *karma*.

Rāmānuja perhaps has felt that since creation and dissolution cannot take place unless assisted by *karma*, it is therefore proper and simpler to identify *avidyā* with *karma* and to hold that *karma* is the cause that brings about diversities in the experiences of the individual souls.

* 'Avidyā assisted by Karma' is not the view of Rāmānuja. This is to be found in other systems of Indian Philosophy as has been shown in the subsequent paragraph.

CHAPTER IV

ETHICS

Section A

Liberation as expounded by Rāmānuja in his Philosophy

Meaning of Liberation

In almost all the systems of Indian philosophy, the process of birth and death is called bondage and its absolute cessation is described as liberation. Birth and rebirth after death are certain limitations imposed on the soul on account of the beginningless ignorance. When through *tattva-jñāna* (knowledge of truth) and *tattvābhyāsa* (Practice of truth) the individual soul regains its original divine nature, free from all sorrows and sufferings, it is liberated forever from the whirlpool of the worldly existence. Rāmānuja agrees with all these philosophical schools in holding that worldly pleasures are but transitory and that these are all fraught with pain. A wise man is therefore not charmed by the colourful worldly-life which conceals in its bosom the seeds of rebirth and transmigration. Individual souls are moving round the cycle of births and deaths under the spell of beginningless ignorance and *karma* (action) which in their turn produce automatically the threefold miseries of life. According to Rāmānuja, a man will not be able to attain liberation even by having recourse to vedic rituals only; for these elaborate rites may lead an individual to heavenly pleasures which are more permanent than the pleasures of the world, still these will not be able to liberate him permanently from sorrows and sufferings of the world. When the effects of his *vedic karma* (ritualistic performances) will be exhausted, he will have to return to this world from the much coveted Paradise of gods and angels. Vedic rituals, therefore, like ordinary interested actions of the world are causes of rebirth and pain whereas emancipation in the true sense means complete stoppage of this process.

Means of Liberation according to Ramanuja

The upaniṣads have suggested *vedana* (Knowledge) *dhyāna* (Meditation) and *upāsana* (Divine Service) as means to the attainment of salvation. The various Śruti texts like, "*Brahmavid ūpnoti param*" (*Taittiriya A-1-1*), "*tvameva viditvā-timṛtyumeti*" (*Śveta 3-8*), "*Jñātvā devaṁ sarvapāśūpahāniḥ*" (*Śveta 1-8*), "*Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ mantavyaḥ, nidhidhyāsītavyaḥ*" (*Bṛhad 4-5-6*), "*Tatastu tam paśyate niṣkalam, dhyāyamānaḥ*" (*Muṇḍaka 3-1-8*), "*Saḥ hi āśramaiḥ sadā upāsya samastaiḥ eka evaca, aṇu me etam bhagavo devatām siddhi, yam devatām upāsasva*" (*Chānd 4-2-2*), etc., were quoted by Rāmānuja in support of the view stated above. As the upaniṣadic statements are indubitable, these three, namely *vedana*, *dhyāna* and *upāsana* should be taken to have identical meaning as means of liberation. In other words, a thorough knowledge of the ultimate reality as taught in the upaniṣads followed by an intense and uninterrupted meditation on the nature of God will help one to attain salvation. God being the most beloved object, His thoughts are very sweet and pleasing to the devotee and it is because of this sweetness of the divine thought that the mind of the devotee remains continuously occupied with this. This is what is *bhakti* or devotion. According to Rāmānuja, therefore, *bhakti* or devotion constitutes the principal means and knowledge and action are its two essential and non-separable auxiliaries. If an individual is eager to attain salvation, he should first of all seek to attain a true knowledge of his pure *aham* which consists in his realising the fact that as a mode of God, his pure *aham* is wholly dependent on Him. Naturally, therefore, he feels an intense affection and longing for God in whom he lives and moves. This feeling of dependence on God as his sole support and refuge gradually produces in him an attitude of self-surrender to Divinity. This attitude of self-surrender then succeeds in winning God's compassion and love which actually help him to attain emancipation from all evils.¹

1. *Manmanā bhava madbhakto madyaṅī māṁ namaskuru*

māmevaigyasi yuktavānātmānam matparāyaṇaḥ (*Gītā-9-34*)
(published by the Gita Press, Gorakhpur.)

Rāmānuja differs from *advaita-vedānta* in holding that disinterested performance of action promotes devotion and so actions should be performed in an unselfish manner till salvation is not attained.¹ According to *advaita-vedānta*, true knowledge is the real means of liberation since the veil of ignorance can be removed only by *tattva-jñāna* and not by anything else. Disinterested action as a prior condition purifies the mind and makes it fit for gaining true knowledge. Thus, it is a remote condition and not the immediate antecedent of liberation. In fact, when knowledge is acquired, the wise man loses completely body sense and ego-feeling which are necessary for worldly actions. Hence like a lion and a deer, action and knowledge cannot exist together.² Since action possesses purifying capacity, its performance in a proper spirit leads one to *Pitriloka* and *Satyaloka* respectively, but cannot release him permanently from the sufferings of life and the agnies of worldly existence.³ Devotion too, according to *advaita-vedānta* cannot lead us to the supreme goal. Devotion is directed towards a lower *Brahman* and hence it, too, cannot bring about that eternal bliss which results solely from a feeling of identity with the supreme and unqualified *Brahman*. Action and Devotion cannot therefore be direct means of emancipation which can be brought about by true knowledge alone.

Rāmānuja's ethical position, however, differs fundamentally from that of the *advaita-vedānta*. According to *advaita-vedānta* agency and capacity for enjoyment are not real qualities of the soul. These are only fictitiously supposed to belong to

1. *Jñānanisṭhasya api dhṛyamāṇasarīrasya yāvatsūdhanasamāpti mahā-jyāñādinityanaimittikaṁ karma avāśyam kāryam* (*Gītā* 3-8-*Rāmānuja Bhāṣyam*—published by the Gita Press, Gorakhpur.)
2. *Būdhyaśūdhakabhāṣaṇa pañcāṅga-saṅgahāra*
Ekadeśānavasthūnāma samuccayala tayoh. (Naiṣkarmyasiddhiḥ)—
Chap. I-55)...Udbodhana Karyalaya, Calcutta.
3. *Nityanaimittikayorupāsānānām tvāntaraphalaṁ*
pitriloka-satyaloka-prāptiḥ (vedānta-sūrah—13—by Sadananda)
9 P. R.

the soul due to the operation of *avidyā* (Ignorance). So, the true knowledge of the soul at once removes the false feelings of *kartṛtva* (agency) and *bhokṛtva* (power of enjoyment) which are the products of ignorance. Hence in the eyes of an *advaita-philosopher*, knowledge and action are opposed to each other. But in the opinion of Rāmānuja, *kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva* are real but non-eternal qualities of the soul and so there cannot be any opposition between knowledge and action. Since agency and capacity for enjoyment are not erroneously ascribed to the soul, the negation of these two in the self is not necessary for the attainment of liberation. According to Rāmānuja, salvation means dissociation of the self from all influences of *Prakṛti* and also of selfish actions, because the latter remain operative in the empirical life and prevent the self from having a true knowledge of its free nature. In short, for Rāmānuja, liberation means permanent removal of all these obstacles which cause contraction in the *dharmabhūta-jñāna*. This is the reason why Rāmānuja has attached importance to the performance of the *vedic* rites also, because *vedic* actions too help a man to realise the distinction between the immortal soul and the perishable body. This is also *tattvajñāna*, although this is of a lower order. Higher type of *tattvajñāna* means full knowledge of the true nature of the eternally free self and this is attained through *bhakti* and *upāsana*. So, Rāmānuja holds that devotion in cooperation with knowledge and action constitutes the means to reach the summum bonum of life. *Bhakti* or Devotion consists of knowledge of the object of adoration and intense affection and respect for the same. Complete self-surrender, which is the essence of devotion, becomes possible only when the individual realises his own nature, the nature of God and also the nature of his own relation to God. Not only knowledge, but *karma* (action) performed in a proper spirit is also necessary for the awakening of devotion in the heart of a man. It is the disinterested performance of *nityanamittika karma* (daily and occasional duties) that purifies the mind of an individual and makes him fit for grasping the ultimate truth. Both

knowledge and action are necessary forerunners of *bhakti* and as such they are regarded as doors to *bhakti*.¹

Man's perfection and liberation can come only through devotion involving self-surrender and grace. When the devotee of God realises fully that freedom from ills of life can be achieved only by divine grace, he at once gives up *upāyabudhi* and seeks to have recourse to knowledge, action and devotion only in the sense of services rendered to God. When all scriptural duties are performed in the [spirit of a servant of God or *kainkarya* only, he reaches the supreme goal without any difficulty. Rāmānuja thus holds that duties related to various *varnas* and *āśramas* are to be discharged even by a wise man because *karma* contributes to *vidyā* which means meditation on and selfless devotion to God. In fact, regular discharge of duties in an attitude devoid of egoism, pride and arrogance is itself the worship of God.² Hence Śamkara is wrong in holding that those who follow the path of action or of devotion are living in the darkness of *avidyā*.

Jīvanmukti and Videhamukti

When devout meditation succeeds in winning the grace of God which results in a direct experience of Divinity, the devotee is liberated from the shackles of the body and becomes similar to God (*Brahmaprakāra*). The liberated one is not actually lost in identity with God, but he enjoys perpetually a bliss of communion with God. This goal is reached only after death and so Rāmānuja has not recognised *jīvanmukti* as true liberation. Moreover, according to Rāmānuja, there is no *ādhyāsikatādātmya* (erroneous identity) between body and soul. There is simply the *aprithaksiddhi* relation between the two really distinct objects. Body and soul are really distinct but they are treated as identical in language because of inseparable association. Just as in the case of a white cloth the knowledge of white colour in

1. *Taiśīndramata-tīpikā*—second edition Anandasrama Mudranalaya Poona, 1934. chapter 7 pp. 61-62.

2. *Śrībhāṣya* Vol. II, 4-4-2.

association with a piece of cloth is real, in the same manner in the case of "I am fair", the knowledge of the body in inseparable association with the embodied soul is real. Since this body-soul relation is real and not erroneous, it cannot disappear in the living state. According to Śaṅkara body-sense is false and so it can be removed by knowledge even when one is alive. Hence, he believes in the possibility of *jīvanmukti* after the awakening of true knowledge. But Rāmānuja says that so long as the soul remains embodied, its relation with the body is real and so it can never have the feeling of bodilessness without which release from worldly sufferings is impossible. It is an absurdity to hold that the body-feeling has been negated but still it occurs like the defective perception of the double moon by a man even when he has realised fully that the moon is one. *Avidyā* and *karma* are the causes that produce objects and also the body that encases a particular soul. If *avidyā* and *karma* are annihilated by the *Bādhiakajñāna*¹ then all objects including the body must be simultaneously effaced and so there cannot be any such thing as liberation in life (*jīvanmukti*).

Mukti always means *videhmukti*. Scriptural texts like '*tattvamasi*', when understood fully, give an indirect knowledge of the state of liberation but cannot destroy *avidyā*.² This being so, *vākyaṛthajñāna* can never produce a direct realisation of the bliss of emancipation in this life and in this world. Had scriptural knowledge resulted in real liberation, then wise men would not have tasted the bitterness of worldly-life. The *Chāndogya upaniṣad* says that in order to attain liberation one has to wait till his body is destroyed.³ This statement of the

1. Knowledge that is capable of annulling.

2. *Tato vākyaḍāparokṣyaṇñānāsmbhavadvākyaṛtha jñānena avidyā na nivarate tata eva jīvanmuktirapidurotsūritā.*—

Śrībhāṣya—1-1-4. (Edited and published by T. Srinivasacari Bombay, 1916.

3. *Tasya tīvadeva ciram yāvanna vimokṣye'thasampatsye* (Chānd—6-14-2).

Chāndogya upaniṣad has clearly disfavoured the idea of *jīvan-mukti*.

In fact, it is never possible for a living person to attain that knowledge which is completely free from any feeling of difference. Mind is purified by *dhyāna-niyoga* and it is by such a mind that an individual soul is able to have a direct realisation of a qualified Brahman which leads to his emancipation.

The Stage of Sthitaprajña

A man who has acquired pure wisdom regarding his real nature is not liberated. He, then, becomes possessed of equanimity (*Sthitaprajña*). This stage is the highest one that an individual can attain in this life by following the path of knowledge.¹ Although he is an embodied soul, yet through purification of his intellect and will, he is able to withdraw his senses completely from the worldly objects. His mind is not troubled by sorrows and sufferings of life. He is free from desires and passions, aversion and hatred. His mind always remains fixed on God who then becomes the only object of his love and attachment. This stage is not a stage of real liberation. It is simply a stage in which the individual soul is able to feel confident about his own liberation at the end of his life's journey. *Gītā* too has not described this stage as *Jīvanmukti*.

In fact, if it is held that *avidyā-karma* is the root cause of bondage, and liberation is attained only when *karma* is destroyed, then logically we cannot believe in *jīvanmukti*. This is because in the *jīvanmukti* stage, the soul is not free from the influences of *prārabdha-karma*. Only *sancita karma* and *kriyamāṇa karma* are destroyed through knowledge. Since *prārabdha karma* remains operative even in the *jīvanmukti* stage there cannot be an absolute freedom from all karmic influences which is the real characteristic of the liberated state. The

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1. *Ātmaikāntārambhanena tuṣṭaḥ tena toṣṭaḥ tadavyatirikṣṭaṁ sarvāt rānagaṭān kāmān yadā prakarṣeṇa jahāti tadā ayam sthītaprajñā iti ucyate. Jñānaniṣṭhakaṣṭhā īyam (Gītā—2-55—Rāmānujabhāṣyam).*

feeling of pleasure and pain is present even in the mind of a wise man, although this is negligible from the practical point of view as this feeling will never disturb the stability of his mind. Moreover, Rāmānuja does not believe that a knowledge of the meaning of the *mahāvākyas* possesses the capacity of giving a direct realisation of truth which is as immediate as perception.

The Nature of a Liberated Soul

When an individual soul is liberated through devotion and Divine grace, he loses his natural body¹ and appears in its own divine form. The liberated soul, on the eve of its departure from the world, passes through *agniloka*, *vāyuloka*, *varuṇaloka*, *ādityaloka*, *indraloka*, *prajāpatiloka*, *Brahmaloka*, etc. and then reaches the eternal abode of *Vaikuṇṭha*.² It is in the state of real emancipation that a liberated wise man becomes completely free from the influences of all his virtuous and vicious deeds and becomes similar to *Brahman* in respect of its nature as pure consciousness.³

The word "*sveṇa*" here implies that as soon as liberation is attained, the soul at once regains its true nature and becomes dissociated from the natural body with which it remains identified in the state of bondage. On regaining its true nature in the form of pure consciousness, it also gains back its other qualities like *sarvajnatva*, *satyasamkalpatva* etc. which remain covered by ignorance in worldly-life.⁴ The

1. *Etēbhyo bhūtebhyah samutthāya tānyeva 'vinatyati*—*Bṛhadarāṇyaka upanīṣad*.

2. *Sv etaṁ devayānaṁ pañthānamāpadyāgnilokamāgacchati, sa vayulokaṁ, sa varuṇalokaṁ, sa ādityalokaṁ, sa indralokaṁ, sa prajāpatilokaṁ, sa brahmalokaṁ etc.*—*Kausītaki upanīṣad*; quoted in the *Śrībhāṣya* 4-3-3.

3. *Tadā vidvān puṇyopāpe vidhūya niranjanam paramam sāmyam upaiti*—*Muṇḍaka* 3-1-1—*evamevaiṣa samprasādo 'asamāccharīrāt samutthāya param jyotiṣrūpasampadya sveṇarūpeṇa abhinīṣadyata*—*Chānd.* 8-3-4.

4. *Śrībhāṣya* 4-4-2. Vol. II Anandasram Mudranalaya, Poona 1940.

liberated soul can attain everything he wishes for merely by willing. it.¹ Liberation, therefore, does not mean emergence of any new quality. The soul being free from the defects of ignorance gains back its natural luminosity and shines forth in its own divine glory.²

Again due to the presence of the quality of *satyasamkalpatva* in a liberated soul, it can be embodied and disembodied according to its own sweet will.³ The liberated soul can also assume the forms of diverse *upakaraṇas* which are used in the service of God. Bed, sleepers, umbrella, steps etc are the things generally used in divine service and the *mukta ātmā* assumes the form of any one of these things of daily use.

It has already been stated that a liberated soul, by regaining its nature as form of consciousness becomes similar to God, but this similarity should not be confused with total identity. The soul is not identical with God as it differs from God in a very important quality. God is the creator of the universe but the soul never possesses the potency of creating the world. The liberated soul is similar to God in the sense that in the state of emancipation it becomes endowed with qualities like *sarvajñatva*, *satyasamkalpatva* etc. which are present in God and it also acquires the power of enjoying eternally the bliss that results from a full realization of the nature of *Brahman*.⁴ Thus, the soul, whether eternally free or liberated is always ontologically different from God. This difference has been emphatically declared by the *Śruti* texts also :—

1. Chānd. 8-12-6. *Sasarvāmśealokānāpnotisarovāmśeā kāmān.....*

2. Viṣṇudharmattara 103-55-7.

3. Śrībhāṣya 4-4-12. Vol. II. -

4. *Brahmayāthātmyānubhavarūpabhogamātre muktasya Brahmasāmyaṣpratipāda-
nācca līṅgajagato'yāpāravarjamityavagamyate so 'as' nute sarvān kāmān
saha Brahmanā vipaścitā. Ato muktasya paramapurusaśāmyaṁ satya-
samkalapatvaṁ ca paramapurusaśādhārananikhiljaganniyamana śrutyānu-
gūnyena varnanīyamiti jagato'yāpāravarjameva muktaiśvairyam.*
(Śrībhāṣya—4-4-21)

"Tadāśno paramam pīdam sadāpaśyanti sūrayaḥ"

Here, eternally free souls perceive God as an object —

"Esaḥ ānandayati"

Here, God is the bestower of bliss and the eternally free souls are recipients. The *Brahma sūtras* 1-3-2 (*muktapaśyatyā vyūpadesūcca*), 4-4-21 (*bhogamātrasūm*) *lingūcca*) and 4-4-17 (*jagatvyupārajarjam*) too proclaim difference between God and soul which are two ontological principles

Thus, while in the *advaita-vedānta* the liberated soul is lost in *Brahman*, in the philosophy of Rāmānuja, it simply becomes similar to God in some qualities. The soul possesses the undesirable susceptibility to come under the influence of *avidyā* but this defect is totally absent in God. In fact, God is wholly devoid of all bad qualities and is always the repository of values of the highest order. The soul is simply the worshipper of God who is its ruler and controller, and as such the soul can never be totally identified with God :—

*Dasabhūtaḥ svataḥ sarve hyutmanāḥ paramātmanah
nānyathā lakṣaṇam teṣū bandhe mokṣe ca vidyate,"*

(*Īśvara-Saṁhitā*)

Objections

Defending the *advaita* position, Śrī Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śaṣṭrī has stated that Rāmānuja is not justified in refuting *jīvanmukti*, since it is recognized in other systems also. In fact, in the state of *jīvanmukti* an individual becomes free only from the veiling power of *avidyā*. The projecting power of *avidyā* still remains operative as *prarabḍha karma** has not been fully exhausted. Since the veiling power of *avidyā* comes to an end as soon as true knowledge dawns, the individual cannot be held to be in bondage. As he is personally free from body feeling, he is bodiless from his own point of view, but from the point of view of other persons, he is embodied¹. In this stage, there

* Past actions which have started bearing fruits

1 *Āvastatattva Śuddhiḥ*—by Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śaṣṭrī—chap. on *Śabda pramāṇa*—p. 95

Sadrśtyā bhimānābhavādasarīrah

paradrśtyā tu sasarīra iti hi tadarthah

is no feeling of identity between the body and the spirit. Their unified use is only for practical convenience.

Secondly, it is not a defect to hold that in the *jīvanmukti* stage, the individual soul is liberated only from the influences of *sancita karma* and *kriyamāṇa karma* whereas the influences of the *prārabdha karma* still act on him. In *Śrībhāṣya* too, Rāmānuja has admitted that *amṛtatva* means freedom from the past and the future *aghas* (sins) and not from the present ones. Hence, in Rāmānuja's philosophy too, the sense of *mukti* is thus contracted and narrowed to a certain extent. Both *advaita* and *viśiṣṭādvaita* therefore stand on a par so far as the use of the word *mukti* in a narrow sense is concerned.¹

Lastly, it has been pointed out by some critics that the description of *Vaikunṭha* where free souls serve God by assuming the forms of various things like umbrella, sleepers, steps etc. seems to be Olympian assurances without any firm footing in reality. No scientific mind can be satisfied by such a description of the abode of God which is saturated with immortal bliss and nectar-like happiness.

Objections Met

Shri Shastri's arguments used in *Śaṅkara's* defence are not very convincing. If in the *mukti*-state, *avidyā* is still present with its power of projection, then how can we say that *Bādha-kajñāna** is capable of destroying fully *avidyā* or ignorance? And if *avidyā* is not totally uprooted, there cannot be salvation in the true sense of the term. Liberation really means total destruction of all worldly experiences. Further, if true knowledge of Brahman is incapable of destroying the influences of *prārabdha-karma* and if worldly-feeling, due to operative forces of such actions, still persists, then the assertion that liberation is attained as soon as one acquires '*Bādha-kajñāna*' cannot be held as true.

1. *Śrībhāṣyamate'pyamṛtatavam sāmānyataḥ prastutamullata pūrvāghacīleṣa-tayā—Katham Saṁkucyate ?*
(*Advaitatatva Śuddhiḥ*—by Ananta Krishna Shastri—chap. on

Śabdapramāṇa, pp. 95-96).

* *Bādha-kajñāna*—Knowledge that is capable of annulling.

In fact, according to Rāmānuja, *vākyārthajñāna* really arouses in the heart of an individual a living faith and hope for liberation, but liberation in the true sense can be attained only after death. Then only the soul is in a position to enjoy eternal bliss in communion with God. It is *sājujya* or divine communion which is the proper form of salvation. Hence, it is only when the individual soul enters into the abode of God and becomes saturated through and through with the infinite and immeasurable bliss of Divine Life, that he can be regarded as emancipated from the evils of the mundane existence. This stage is, however, reached gradually and the stage of *sthītaprajña* (stable in mind) is the highest stage that a soul can reach in this world.

Further, it is not proper to say that according to Rāmānuja, *amṛtatva* (immortality) can be attained in this life on the destruction of the past and the future *aghas* (sins). He has simply stated that a wise man by virtue of his true knowledge becomes free from the influences of past and future *aghas*.¹ But freedom from past and future *aghas* does not lead to *amṛtatva* or total destruction of bondage. True immortality, a wise man can taste only when his body is dissolved. The *Śruti* text like '*atha martyomṛto bhavatyatra brahma samuśnute*'² simply implies that a wise man while living in his body, can have a taste of the nectar-like bliss of immortality or can have a communion with God only at the time of *upāsana* (worship). It does not suggest attainment of *amṛtatva* and destruction of bondage.

Hence, according to Rāmānuja, destruction of past and future *aghas* should be supposed to occur only in the stage of *sthītaprajña* which has not been described by him as a form of salvation. This stage is only a door to immortality; and it is because this stage is a door and not the real state of

1. *Vidyāpreptau puruṣasya vidyāmāhātmyāduttarapūroḥghayoraśleṣavināśāvur-
padyate*—(*Śrībhāṣya*—4-1-13, Conclusion).

2. *Atha martyomṛto bhavatyatra brahma samuśnute iti vacanam na bandho-
pamardenāmṛtatoam vadati* (*Śrībhāṣya*—4-2-10).

salvation that *aghas* (sins) cannot be totally destroyed here. Had this stage been wholly free from all influences of actions, then there would not have been any distinction between this stage and the stage of salvation. So, *viśiṣṭādvaita* has not narrowed the sense of liberation which can be attained only after the soul has been freed from the yoke of the body. The influences of the present *aghas* persist only in the *sthita-prajña* stage and not in the stage of salvation. But *advaita-vedānta*, by admitting this door-stage as a form of liberation (*jīvanmukti*) has used the term *mokṣa* in a narrow sense and so this is a defect.

Regarding the description of *vaikunṭha* and the presence therein of eternal and free souls as servants of God, it can be stated that these are the effects of *vaiṣṇava tantras* on the one hand and also of the mystic religion of *Ālvārs* on the other. The hymns of *Ālvārs* were simply the outpourings of lovers' hearts saturated with an intense and enveloping attachment for God. They did not care for rational arguments or intellectual deliberations. Their philosophy was a philosophy of heart with an exclusive stress on devotion. Since they were mad with love for God, they wished to assume the forms at even inanimate things like steps,¹ sleepers, etc. so as to be of daily service to their only beloved Person. In their opinion, realisation of the proximity of God was much more covetable than the attainment of emancipation. *Mokṣa*, therefore, meant for them the attainment of the position of God's servant. The *Ālvārs* flourished in South India up to 8th or 9th century A. D. and the influence of the *Ālvār* movement crept into the religio-philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja-through Nāthamuni and Yamunācāryya; but it was Rāmānuja who first of all brought into a unity the two streams of *advaita* and *bhakti* which formed a wonderful blend in the philosophico-religion of *viśiṣṭādvaita*.

Further, if we believe in the powers of a liberated soul, we have got to believe that if they desire, they can assume the forms of inanimate things used in

1. *Sopānibhūtvā tava prabālādharāṃ paśyāmi*—Sathkopa Arvar.

Divine Service. The liberated soul is a lover of God whom it looks upon as its only refuge and so it is natural for a liberated soul to have a desire to assume the forms of things so as to be of the greatest service to God. Since the desires of the emancipated soul are fulfilled as a matter of course, logically there is no absurdity in believing that the liberated souls can transform their bodies made of *śūdrhasattva* into inanimate things like umbrella, steps, etc.¹

To conclude, we can say that the *Bodhāyana vṛtti* of *Brahma Sūtra* which contained criticisms against absolute *advaita-vāda* was on the line of *bhakti*. Rāmānuja was specially inspired by *Bodhāyana vṛtti* to formulate an interpretation of *Brahma Sūtra* on the line of *bhakti*. *Bodhāyana vṛtti* was briefly and non-elaborately reproduced by *acāryas* like *Draṁiḍa*, *Tamka*, etc.² Rāmānuja, by means of his purity of heart and head produced an elaborate philosophy on *Bodhāyana's* devotional line. *Śaṁkarācāryya* paid special attention to *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* and neglected wholly *Pañcarātra* and *Purāṇas*. All these literatures were paid due respect by Rāmānuja and all of them found their respective places and positions in the *bhaktidarśana* of the *vīṣiṣṭadvaita* school.

1. The Vaiṣṇava philosophers attach great value to divine service. It is their belief that with a view to serving God, a liberated soul does not hesitate to assume the form of a stair case. The fact that the liberated soul can assume any form with a view to serving God is supported by *Jaiśandra maṭadīpikā*, (*Muktānām Śarīraparigrahasu Vasantotsava veṣaparigrahaḍivat Svāmīnaḥ kaim-laryameva.....Muktatya śarīraṁ nāstīti vacanam* [tu *śkarmakṛta-śarīrābhāvoparam*). Rāmānuja himself has said that a liberated soul has the choice to remain either embodied or other wise. *Ataeva śaṁkalpādubhayavidhaṁ saśarīramāśarīraṁ eva muktāṁ Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇo manyate. Evaṁ cobhavo śrutirupapadyate.* (*Śrībhāṣyam*). 4.4.12
2. *Bhagavadbodhāyana kṛtām vīstīrṇām brahmhasūtra vṛttiṁ pūrvācāryaiḥ saṁeikṣīpuḥ. Tanmatīnusāreṇa Sūtraksarāṇi vyākhyayate.*—*Śrībhāṣya* (chap. 1, p. 5.)—edited and published by T. Srinivasacari, Bombay, 1916.

Section B

Meaning of Bhakti in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja

Bhakti as described in the Śrībhāṣya and the Vedārthasaṁgraha

According to *Vedārtha Saṁgraha*, *bhakti* has been described as a knowledge which consists in excessive adoration and attachment to the ultimate reality as a result of which the devotee becomes absolutely disinterested in all other objects of the world.¹ It is further said that God is the highest being and as such He naturally becomes the dearest treasure of a human heart. Meditation on God or a full knowledge of the nature of God generates love and transforms *dhyāna* itself into a form of love and affection.² *Bhakti*, according to Rāmānuja, is not merely an emotion of love and respect devoid of knowledge : it is a special form of knowledge that fills the heart of an individual with a deep feeling of attachment for the Supreme Divinity. He has thus equalled *bhakti* with *dhyāna* and *upāśanā*, emphasising thereby the importance of the rational aspect in it. *Bhakti* always presupposes a thorough knowledge of the ultimate reality as taught in the Upaniṣads : but it is not mere knowledge devoid of feeling. It has been stated in the *Śrībhāṣya* that *bhakti* is a form of loving meditation on the nature of God.³ Here too, Rāmānuja has stated that *dhyāna* which is identical with *bhakti* is also synonymous with *upāśanā* and *vedana*.⁴ *Upāśanā* means concentration of mind wholly on God,⁵ as described by the Upaniṣads and no other thought should disturb the mind during *Upāśanā* or *dhyāna*.⁶

1. *Vedārtha Saṁgraha* : Second Edition : published by Dr. J. Prasad, Benares 1624. p. 152.

2. Ibid. Commentary by Sudarśana Surī.

3. *Śrī Bhāṣya* : *Śrūta prakāśikā tīkā on Śūtra 1-1-1* :
Snehapūroakamanudhyānaibhaktiḥ

4. *Śrībhāṣya* Vol. II 4-1-1.

5. Ibid. 4-1-1.

6. *Bhagavad Gītā* (Rāmānujabhāṣyam) Chap. 4 introduction.

God being the most beloved object, His thoughts also are very dear and pleasing to the devotee and naturally, therefore, these pleasant thoughts keep his mind continuously occupied. This is *bhakti*.

Relation between Bhakti, Jñāna and Karma

From what is stated above, it is clear that Rāmānuja has recognized a very close connection between *bhakti* and *jñāna* or devotion and knowledge. In fact, it appears to us that in the opinion of Rāmānuja, knowledge may be regarded as the cause of *bhakti*. Knowledge is the very foundation of *bhakti* and it is *jñāna* that produces *bhakti* and also nourishes and enriches it. In the process of attaining liberation, an individual should first of all try to acquire a true knowledge of his self thereby distinguishing the soul from all its necessary accompaniments and also from all other inanimate objects of the world. When he will acquire a true knowledge of his pure *aham* and will also understand that this pure *aham* is only a mode of the Supreme Personality on which it fully depends, he will succeed in realising his true being in relation to the ultimate Source of the world. Naturally, therefore, he will feel intense love and affection and reverence for God in whom he lives, moves and has his being. This is *bhakti* and this *bhakti* can remain fixed in the mind only through constant meditation, thinking and reflection on the nature of the Supreme Being.¹ *Bhakti*, therefore, consists of knowledge, intense affection and respect. The essence of *bhakti* lies in complete self-surrender to the Highest Being who is the Lord and Protector of the whole universe and such a surrender takes place only when the individual self realizes his own nature, the nature of God and also the nature of his relation to the Supreme Reality. Love cannot spring forth in the heart of a man unless he knows the nature of the object he is going to love. So, knowledge is necessary for

1. *Śrībhāṣya*—edited and published by T. Srinivasacari, Bombay, 1916.—1-1-1.

the emergence of *bhakti* (devotion) in the heart of an worshipper.

Not only *Jñāna-yoga*, but also *Karma-yoga* is necessary for the awakening of *bhakti* (devotion) in the heart of man. It is the disinterested performance of *nitya-naimittika karmas* (daily duties and duties obligatory on occasions) that purifies the mind of an individual¹ and makes him fit for grasping the Ultimate Truth. *Karma*, according to Rāmānuja, is such a thing that should not be abandoned at any stage of life. The importance of disinterested action or *karma-yoga* for the purpose of self-knowledge and self-realisation has been emphasized by Rāmānuja in his commentary on the Gīta, chapter 3, sloka 1, "*jñānaniṣṭhāeva ātmāvalokana sādhanam, karmaniṣṭhā tu tasyaḥ nispādikā*". In his opinion knowledge is indeed an important part of disinterested action² and as such both are mutually inclusive.

The most important requirement for the performance of disinterested action is the complete dissociation of the soul from the ego-consciousness or *ahamkāra* which is a product of *Prakṛti*. It is because of the identification of an individual's self with the ego consciousness that he thinks of himself as the doer of actions and enjoyer of all sorts of worldly experiences. One is able to practise *karmayoga* by dissociating his self wholly from the egocentric desires, and this happens to him only when the light of self-knowledge, illuminates and purifies his heart (i. e. when he feels and realizes that the soul is essentially different from the bodymind system). The disinterested action has, therefore, been described as action illumined by the light of self-knowledge :

Evamantargatajñānam yat karmatatte prabakṣyāmi yat jñātvā
Anuṣṭhāya aśubhāt samsārabandhāt mokṣyase.....
Gītābhāṣya 4-16.

1. *Yatindrā mahadīpika*—chap. 7, p. 62.

*Ayam tu jīvagatakalmeṣaṣṭhanayanadvārā Jñānayogam utpādya Taddvārā
 sākṣadvā Bhaktyutpādato Bhavati.*

2. *Bhagavadgītā*—chap. 4 (Rāmānuja-bhāṣyam) Introduction.
Karmayoga jñānamsāya eva pradhāna...

In commenting upon the verse 18 of the fourth chapter of the Bhagavadgītā, Rāmānuja has interpreted the word 'Akarma' in the sense of *ātma-jñāna* and has stated that action illumined by self-knowledge assumes the form of knowledge and knowledge purified by disinterested performance of action assumes the form of action.¹

Knowledge, therefore, is not alien to *bhakti* and *karma*; on the other hand, it is an important ingredient of both devotion and disinterested action. In the first stage, knowledge is needed to purify all actions of the devotee. In this stage, the devotee realises that his soul is different from the body and the sense-organs which are the vehicles of action and that his sole purpose of life is to please God. He understands that *Prakṛti* is not his substratum and that the bodily self associated with all the organs is an object to be shunned. This true knowledge of the soul helps him to give up the sense of agency of all worldly activities and also to make his mind completely free from the desire to enjoy the fruits of such actions. In the second stage, the true knowledge of self and also the knowledge of its non-relation to *Prakṛti* as the substratum ripens into a firm faith in God as the individual's sole source and support: his mind is now illumined with the light of the knowledge of this true relation to God. Here, all philosophical interpretations of the relation such as "*Śarīra-Śarīri Bhāva*" (body-soul feeling), "*Prakūra-Prakūri Bhāva*" (mode substance feeling), "*Sesa-Sesi Bhāva*" (Principal-accessory feeling), etc. are directly experienced by him and naturally, therefore, this knowledge of *Amita-Amiti* generates in his mind a deep devotion and love for God as He is now looked upon as the individual's only refuge. In this stage, knowledge becomes the cause of *bhakti*. In the last stage when knowledge deepens into highest form

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2. *Kriyamāṇam eva 'karma ātmayāthātmyānusandhānena jñānakāram yaḥ paśyēt tat ca jñānam karmānantargatatayā karmākāram yaḥ paśyediti uktam bhavati kriyārahī karmāṇi kartrībhūtātmayāthātmyānusandhānena tadubhayaṁ sampannam bhavati...Gītābhāṣya—4-18*
(Rāmānuja).

of *bhakti*, it assumes the form of constant meditation, thinking and reflection on the *svarūpa* of God. Thus, when a man attains a full knowledge of his absolute dependence on God he at once shifts his attention from worldly objects to God, gives up his egoism totally, performs action with complete *vairagya* (detachment) and meditates constantly on the nature of God. A question may be asked here, what form of God is constantly contemplated upon by the devotee in this stage of *Paramābhakti*?

Regarding this point, it is really very difficult to make any clear and definite suggestion : still by following the philosophical trend of Rāmānuja, we may say that the devotee visualises God first of all, as One possessing infinite auspicious qualities, devoid of all faults, blissful and merciful and by repeated meditation on God, the devotee gradually loses all sense of difference. There remain neither the feeling of '*Grahita*' nor the feeling of '*Grahaṇa*'. The devotee becomes fully immersed in the *Grāhya-rūpa*. Different qualities of God get merged into His One Form; and though qualities are present, yet there is no feeling of any distinction between the substance and its attributes. All differences are totally lost in this state. This is the last and the final state of *bhaktiyoga* when the worshipper feels no difference between himself and God, acquires all the fundamental characteristics of his Ideal and finally realises Him as his own self. The non-dualistic consciousness of the liberated soul is expressed in the feeling "I am Brahman without any division"¹ This non-duality however does not mean *svatūpa aikya* but *viśiṣṭa aikya* in which the self is realised as an inseparable mode of God who is its only support and substratum. By the acquisition of equality of attributes with God the individual soul also becomes as pure as Brahman (*Brahmasamāna suddhi*). This stage of *mukti* reminds us of the stage of "*Samāpatti*" described in the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali :

1. *Śrībhāṣya*—4/4/4—*paramānandabrahmaṇaḥ* *Śrīrāmānujācārya* *at-*
bhāvātī *Muktaḥ*.....

Atībhāṣya *Aham* *Brahmaṇi* *iti* *eva* *anubhūyati*.

"*Cetesograhītri grahaṇagrāhyeṣu...Yattatsthaladanjanatū teṣusthitasya tadākūrūpattih sa samāpattiritiucyate*".

Here, also, the devotee places himself wholly in God and thereby gets merged in God and there is no other object for him except God. Psychologically considered, this stage is a stage of *advaita*. *Bhakti* (devotion) in this stage is *upeya bhakti* and there exists an experienced unity between the devotee and God. Difference exists only ontologically as the self is naturally different from God.

Seven-fold Limbs of Bhakti

The seven-fold *sādhana*s leading to *Bhakti* are enumerated by Rāmānuja as follows :

(1) *Viveka*—*viveka* means purification of body by taking only such food which has not been spoilt by *Jāti* and *Āśraya*. In other words, in order to keep one's body pure and spotless, one should take only *sāttvika* food.

(2) *Vimoka*—means freedom from passion and anger as these two are two great obstacles in the path of *bhakti*.

(3) *Abhyāsa*—Continuous remembrance of the presence of God as the indwelling principle with a pure body and a purified mind.

(4) *Kriyā*—The *mumukṣu* has got to perform five-fold duties according to his ability.

(5) *Kalyāṇa*—refers to virtue or innerside of duty. It consists of *satya* or truth, *ārjaba* or purity of thought, word and action, *dayā* or kindness, *dāna* or benevolence and *ahimsā* or non-violence.

(6) *Anavasāda*—means freedom from all sorts of despair, dejection, etc.

(7) *Anudharsa*—is the absence of too much excitement on account of pleasure and too much depression on account of pain.

The seven-fold *sādhana*s of *bhakti* lead to that state of *anubhava* (experience) which is just prior to the final realisation of *Brahman* and which possesses, fulness, vividness and

liveliness of perception.¹ When such a vivid experience of God takes place, naturally the heart of devotee becomes full to the brim with intense love, respect and yearning for that supremely beloved object. This is *Parābhakti* (Primary love of God) which blossoms into *paramābhakti* when the devotee succeeds in winning the grace of God. When the object of his love fully responds to his call, he forgets everything, gives up all *dharma*s and seeks refuge in the loving heart of his beloved God.

Different Forms of Bhakti

From the above description, it would seem that bhakti can be classified into *Sādhana bhakti* or *Upāya bhakti* (devotion as means) *parābhakti* and *paramābhakti*.

Sādhana bhakti is more of the nature of knowledge than of love and longing. This is the stage, when the *mumukṣu* seeks to clean his mind by practising *Samādhi* etc. with a view to attaining a true knowledge, regarding his own self, regarding God and also regarding the nature of his relation to God. This is the stage of *ātmaśloka* which necessarily results in a true realisation of the nature of God. In this stage, *bhakti* is a firm faith in the existence of God as the repository of eternal values and this faith is generated in the mind of the *mumukṣu* after seeing the transitoriness of all things including the effects of the vedic sacrifices. *Sādhana bhakti*, though primarily of the form of knowledge is still termed *bhakti* and not *jñāna* as the *mumukṣu* here does not seek God as a means to the realisation of the true nature of self as the ultimate reality as is done by a *jñāna-yogi*. To the followers of *bhaktiyoga*, God, in all stages, is believed to be the supreme reality and self-knowledge is supposed to be related to God-knowledge, as its necessary means. As God is worshipped here as *Bhagavān*, his worship, whether in the form of disinterested action or in the form of a search for Divine Knowledge

1. *Yatindramatadīpikā*—second edition—Anandarama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934, p. 63.

Evam sādhanasaptakānugrhitā bhaktirdarśanasamānakāraṇīnāṣṭatya-zvadhikā na bhavati.

is always termed *bhakti*, as the word '*bhakti*' is derived from the root "*Bhaj*" meaning worship of God.¹ If search for God knowledge or self-knowledge is viewed as a means to the attainment of the Supreme Being, then this is also nothing but *bhakti*. When, as a result of continued practice of *Samādāna* etc. the mind of the devotee is purified and with a pure mind, he remains wholly absorbed in the continuous meditation on God, then a very vivid and lively mental visualisation of God takes place. The devotee gets a glimpse of divinity which acquires the clearness and liveliness of perception and this results in the realisation of the Divine as his own inner self. This is the stage in which his faith in God is strengthened and brightened by the glow of love, respect and admiration. Devotion, in this stage, is called *parābhakti* and this, in due course, through the stage of *Parajñāna* or union deepens into *Paramābhakti*, when the devotee, being united with God, becomes mad with love and longing for Him, and does not care for anything else except the grace of his beloved master and is always anxious to maintain his intimacy with Him. In the *Gītā*, Śrīkrishṇa has advised Arjuna by saying :

' *Cetasā Sarvakarmāṇi Mayi Samnasya Matparāḥ
Buddhīyogamupāsritya Maccittāḥ Satatāmbhaya.*'

In the stage of *Paramābhakti*, the devotee places his heart in the heart of God and dedicates all his actions to God. *Paramābhakti* is the finest flower of devotion and in essence seems to be identical with *Prapatti*—a path prescribed for those persons who are incapable of going through the different stages of *bhakti-yoga*. In the state of *Paramābhakti*, God is looked upon as the only centre and source of the life of the devotee. *Bhagavad-Rūpa* (love for God) then becomes the sole music of his life, as he is then completely immersed in the enjoyment of the bliss of *Paramātman*.

Meaning of Prapatti

Prapatti literally means seeking the protection of God after

1. Sanskrit English Dictionary. By Apte (Published under the Auspices of Government of India) Page—398.

realising that He is the only Saviour of this sorrow-stricken world. In the third *adhyāya* of the *Śrībhāṣya*, Rāmānuja has stated that different forms of *vidyās* are the alternative means to God-realisation.¹ *Prapattī* or *Nyāsa-vidyā*, being one of the forms of *vidyā*, is therefore a means to *mokṣa* or liberation. In the *Yatindramatadīpikā*, it has been stated that *Prapattī* which is synonymous with *Nyāsa-vidyā* consists of the following five limbs :—

(1) *Ānukūlyasya Saṁkalpaḥ* (i.e. will of the *jīva* should be attuned in such a manner that it will always be in harmony with the Divine Will).

(2) *Pratikūlasya varjīanam* (i.e. renunciation of everything that will incur disfavour of God).

(3) *Rakṣīṣyatīti viśvāsa* (i.e. firm faith in God as the Saviour of all).

(4) *Goptritvavarānamtathā* (i.e. acceptance of God as the only hope for liberation).

(5) (a) *Kūrpānyam* (feeling of humility and utter inability to follow the difficult path of *bhakti-yoga*.)

(b) *Ātmanikṣepa* (complete self-surrender to God and dedication of everything to Him).

In the opinion of *Yatindramatadīpikā*, *Nyāsa*, *Śaraṇāgati*, etc. are synonymous and these terms also stand for a particular form of knowledge.²

In the '*Gāḍya-traya*', Rāmānuja has said that this *prapattī* state also involves a consciousness of one's sins and shortcomings and is therefore associated with the feeling that the devotee is a worthless and helpless servant of God and is extremely

1. *Sarvāśca vidyāḥ Brahmānubhavaśredhyanadikarmāvidyānirāsana Mukhena Brahmafratīphalā ityaviśiṣṭaphalatoṣṣareṣām vikalparūpa-*
Śrībhāṣya-3. 3. 57.

2. *Yatindramatadīpikā*—second edition—Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934—chap. 7. p. 64
*Etaddehāvasūne Mokṣapradā sakṛitkṛtāryā Nyāsaḥ Śaraṇāgatiṇīdī-
śatdavedya jñānaviśeṣarūpa.*

eager to attain salvation through his grace alone. The devotee here feels like a dry leaf at the mercy of the wind. He has no purpose or will of his own; he is simply carrying out God's purpose in this world. This is the attitude of the *Bhagavad-saraṇūgata* and such a devotee is delivered from all sins and sorrows by God Himself (*Sarvasya Laukikasya vaidikasya ca Karmaṇah Kartṛtvam, Bhoktrtvam, Ārādhyam ca Yathā Mayi Sarvam Samarpitam Bhavati, Tathā Kuru. ...* (Rāmānuja's commentary on sloka 27, chap. 9, *Bhagavadgītā*).

God is the 'Śeṣi' and *Jiva* is the 'Śeṣa' (Subservient) and true *śesatva* consists in the realisation of the fact that the individual soul has nothing, does nothing and desires nothing but Divine-service and Divine-bliss. The feelings of I, my and mine are totally lost and the individual soul subsists wholly in God and exists for His satisfaction only. It is this attitude that enables the devotee to act always in harmony with the Divine will and to give up everything that displeases God. A complete surrender of individuality and egoistic impulses is what is called *Prapatti*, and this, when effected, eliminates all sense of difference. The worshipper becomes wholly immersed in the luxuriant manifestations of his Divine Lord; he takes delight in placing himself entirely in the hands of God just as a child clings wholeheartedly to his mother for safety and proper nourishment.

Thus, when *Prapatti* sanctifies the heart of a devotee, he at once surrenders his whole nature to God and consequently freedom from selfish desires, equal-mindedness and love for all arise in his mind as logical consequences. Devotion is perfect in this stage and forces of attraction and repulsion, friendship and enmity, pleasure and pain cease to have any influence on him. The closing śloka of the *Bhāgavadgītā* (chapter 12) says :

*Ye tu dharmāmritamīdam yathoktam paryupāsate
Śraddadhānā matparamā bhaktaste atīva me priyaḥ.*

Those devotees are very dear to me, who clinging firmly to me follow this immortal Wisdom with faith and respect.

Prapatti and Paramabhakti

From the above considerations it is clear that so far as essential ingredients are concerned, there is no difference between prapatti and paramābhakti which is the highest culmination of the path of *bhaktiyoga*. The difference lies in this that while *bhaktiyoga* is a synthetic process that combines with itself both *jñānayoga* and *karmayoga*, *Prapatti* or *Śaraṇāgati* is a simple and direct approach to God through self-surrender, love and humility. The absolute self-surrendering attitude, dedication of everything to God, complete elimination of ego-sense and supreme love for God are present in both the forms; but while as a method, *bhaktiyoga* is a long and laborious process, *Prapatti* method is simple in the sense that here the devotee is not in need of any external "*sādhana*" to purify his outer organs. A single moment of serious and sincere offering of oneself to God is considered enough; and as it is immediate and non-laborious, it is regarded as superior to *bhaktiyoga*. In his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, Rāmānuja has stated explicitly that *Prapatti* is actually the final culmination of the method of *bhaktiyoga* and *bhaktiyoga* will not be complete unless it results in pious resignation.¹ In the *Yatindramatadipikā*, *prapatti* has been described as a form of knowledge and thus, it is not in essence different from *Paramābhakti* which the devotee attains by following '*bhakti-mārga*'. This *prapatti* or *paramābhakti* is "immortal bliss" (*amritasvarūpa*) which the devotee acquires by the grace of God and by sacrificing his ego. Both *Prapatti* and *Paramābhakti* result in the emergence of an attitude which makes one feel and act as if his personality does not exist.

Conclusion

From what has been stated above regarding *bhaktiyoga* and *prapattiyoga*, it follows that both of them are regarded by Rāmānuja as commendable methods for the attainment of

1. *Bhagavadgītā*—chap. 18-66. Rāmānuja's commentary. (Published by the Gita Press, Gorakhpur).

Mukti; and that both of them are identical so far as essential ingredients are concerned. Mention of *Bhaktiyoga* and *Prapatti* as two, in spite of their very close affinity, unfolds before our eyes a picture of the social conditions of our country at that age. Vaiṣṇavism grew on the soil of India to fight Buddhism on the ground of *bhakti*. The liberal spirit of Buddhism and its non-observation of caste-distinctions and sex distinctions in the sphere of religion were the two pillars on which the wide popularity of Buddhism rested at that time. In the eleventh century, therefore, Rāmānuja, the great *Vaiṣṇava* philosopher, in his fight against Lord Buddha's creed, became anxious to open the gate of salvation even to the lowest classes and also to remain faithful to the spirit of Brāhmanical religion. Only the three higher castes were allowed to study the vedas and practise *vaidika* rites. With a view to keeping harmony with the traditional religion of the age, Rāmānuja opened the path of *bhaktiyoga* to the three higher castes. The lower castes, who were debarred from *vaidika jñāna* and *vaidika karma*, could not adopt the path of *bhaktiyoga*. So the path of *Prapatti* was introduced for all low caste people so as to enable them to adopt *vaisnava* customs and manners without in any way violating the principles of the Brāhmanic religion. The goal is the same, the essential ingredients are identical; but while *bhaktiyoga* is an approach through philosophical knowledge, action, love and respect, *Prapatti* is an approach to God through faith and selfless love accompanied by an attitude of self-surrender and resignation.

Further, if philosophy is to be a science of liberation, then it must be able to give full satisfaction to the religious instinct of man. In other words, True Philosophy should aim at bringing about a happy and effective reconciliation between knowledge and devotion.

Buddhism, in spite of its broad outlook and catholic spirit, could not serve as a perennial source of inspiration to the suffering humanity due to the fact that the '*Sādhana marga*' of the Buddhists was a path of cold, strenuous self-culture and

not a process of blissful union or identification with the Supreme Reality. The concept of God was totally banished from the early Buddhistic philosophy; and in the absence of a loving God, *bhakti* cannot ripen into its finest form. In "The Buddhistic Way of Virtue", K. J. Sanders has remarked that when we go through Dhammapada, we find ourselves "in a moonlit world, beautiful yet cold,.....our hearts are not stirred by any assurance of the reality of the "Unseen". In this respect, the position of *Śaṅkara* also is not better than that of Lord Buddha. In *Śaṅkara's* philosophical scheme, religious worship and devotion to God have found a position inferior to the meditation on *Nirguṇa-Brahman*. Truly speaking *Śaṅkara* has deprived God of His Godliness by reducing Him to a mere phenomenal category. God, caught in the snare of *Māyā*, is no God at all. Such a '*māyika* *Īśvara*' cannot arouse that deep love and respect in the heart of a devotee which in due course can shape into *paramābhakti*. *Nirguṇa-Brahman*, on the other hand, is devoid of mental modifications; as such, like an unconscious object, it cannot know itself. This *Brahman* also cannot warm up the heart of a devotee and devotion cannot spring forth in a torrential flow in the presence of such a characterless absolute. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, has admitted *Saguṇa-Brahman* as the highest category of both religion and philosophy and as such in his hands, the gulf between philosophy and religion has been completely bridged over.

Moreover, Rāmānuja has also made provision for liberation of those persons who have committed great sins and have thereby forfeited their right to *vaidika* actions. Such persons can have recourse to *Prapatti* method. If a man succeeds in offering himself sincerely to God, the sins of his past criminal and immoral actions will be wiped out at once. *Vairāgya* (non-attached attitude) and sincere faith in God are the two things that bring man very close to Him. The soul of man is essentially pure, and is linked with God; it is because of this fact that even a hard criminal, in the midst of his various crimes, suddenly catches the glow of God and realises the utter viciousness of all his deeds by performing which he has sinned

against his true self and also against God. He suddenly gets up from his sinful slumber and falls sincerely at the feet of God who is rich in mercy and whose very essence is 'dayā' (kindness) and love. Instances of such sinners turning great devotees of God are not rare in the history of Indian philosophy and religion. 'Sincerity' is the best offering that one can make unto God, and God also draws erring men to Himself only if they approach Him with sincerity and faith. Rāmānuja allowed salvation to all persons as he had permitted everybody to enter into the fold of Vaiṣṇava religion. His was the work of a reformer and not of a revolutionary. He was eager to keep his theory in tune with the *Vaidika* religion and at the same time he tried to open the door of religion to all persons without exception. It was because of the non-recognition of any kind of distinction or restriction in the sphere of religion that we could find even Mohamedans and outcastes among the followers of the *Vaiṣṇava* cult. This liberal spirit of Vaiṣṇavism enhanced the prestige of this religion to a very great extent and it continued to be a powerful and popular religion of India till the middle of the eighteenth century.

CHAPTER V

THEOLOGY

God in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja

According to Śaṅkara, the world, the individual soul and God are all phenomenal creations of *Brahman* who alone is real in its pure and differenceless form. The Highest Reality is not a creator God but an unchangeable, static and pure consciousness which surpasses all sorts of intellectual apprehension.

Rāmānuja holds that it is absurd to believe in the reality of a differenceless contentless pure consciousness shining in a transempirical sphere of transcendental glory. His philosophy therefore asserts the Ultimate Reality of *Bhagavān Viṣṇu* or *Śrīmān Nārāyaṇa* who is the support, substratum, controller and preserver of the whole universe. In fact, the philosophy of Rāmānuja is a philosophy of realistic theism assigning the highest place to a suprapersonal God.

Nature of God as viewed by Rāmānuja

Rāmānuja holds that God is the inner self of the whole universe of being and non-being. Individual selves and inanimate *acit* are regarded as the body of God existing solely for His purpose and deriving sustenance only from Him. God exists in His threefold forms as *acit*, *cit* and *antaryāmi* : matter and soul, being the body of God, are wholly dependent on Him.

In the *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, God has been described as the Lord of all, *śeṣi* or the Principal of all, the support of all *karmas*, the giver of all fruits of actions, the substratum of everything, the agency that produces all effects, and possessor of all (excepting His *svarūpajñāna*) as His body.

He is infinite, eternal and the indwelling principle and is beyond all sorts of impurities of the world. Infinity of God means that He is not limited by space, time or any other object

of the same status. As He is all pervading, He is not limited by space; as He is eternal, He is above all temporal changes. Again, as there is no other object of the same type (all things besides God are attributes of Him.) He is not limited by any object either. As He is the inner principle of all, all become meaningful only through Him. Although He is the indwelling principle of the whole universe of souls and matter, He is not in any way affected by worldly impurities. Just as the soul of a man is not affected by the changing states of His body, in the same manner, God (being the innermost soul of all beings) is not affected by sins and sorrows of life.

As of Supreme Value, God is endowed with infinite auspicious qualities of which truthfulness, knowledge, bliss and purity determine His *svarūpa*, whereas all knowingness, all-powerfulness, etc. are the qualities that adorn Him as the creator of the world. Since He is the refuge of all *jīvas*, He possesses *vātsalya* (tenderness), *saṁśīlya* (gentleness) *saṁlābhya* (easiness of acquisition) etc. *Kāruṇya* (compassion) is the quality due to which God is regarded as the preserver of the whole world. He is ever ready to help everyone to reach Him. His compassionate and gracious nature inspires Him to overlook all the defects of an erring soul whenever the latter approaches Him in a spirit of self-surrender and absolute submission. In other words, God is viewed here as the sole and the supreme redeemer of the whole world.

The immutable and mutable aspects of God.

If God is to be regarded as the eternal principle, free from all sorts of impurities, caused by change and impermanence, then He ought to be admitted as the static and immutable support standing as the permanent background of a changing and variegated universe. Again, if the world is supposed to have been sprung forth from God who is the primary cause, then some sort of dynamic activity has got to be ascribed to Him. All systems of philosophy face this difficult problem of effecting a reconciliation between these two apparently contradictory features that are to be attributed to the Prime Cause. Śaṅkara has endowed *māyā* with dynamism so

that his Brahman or the ultimate reality has remained unaffected by change and mutation. Further as *māyā* has been called *mithyā* or *anirvācyā*, his non-dualism has remained totally unaffected by *dvaitavāda*. But the world in his philosophy has ceased to be metaphysically real. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, agrees with the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* in admitting the metaphysical reality of the world. In his opinion, the qualified *Brahman* is static in its essential nature but dynamic in its attributive aspects. God does not undergo any form of change or transformation so far as its *svarūpa* is concerned. Constant mutations or modifications of various forms take place only in the *acit* aspect of God which constitutes His body. So, there are modal changes only and no modification in the essential nature of God. The auspicious qualities of *Īśvara* never get tarnished by the incessant moral upheavals of the phenomenal world. He is the Supremely Divine Person whose wishes are all eternally satisfied and who is the sole cause of the whole universe.

God as the Upādāna Kāraṇa and Nimitta Kāraṇa.

According to *Nyāya*-system, God is only the efficient cause of the world whereas the material cause of the world consists of eternal and indestructible atoms. Since God gives motion to the atoms by dint of which the atoms form different combinations, God is regarded as the creator of the universe. Atoms also become disintegrated through Divine agency and so God is also a destroyer of the world. *Adiṣṭa* (desert) is apriori and unconscious and so it can be operative only through the intervention of a Supreme Spirit. The whole of creation is therefore sustained by the will of God. Hence God is the efficient cause of creation and dissolution as it is only through His guidance and under His supervision that all *padārthas* of the world integrate and disintegrate according to the *karmas* of the individual souls.

The *Nyāya* theory of God (as outlined above) really takes away much of the charm and fascination of a theistic doctrine. If God is not the material cause of the world, if for material, He has to depend upon something other than Himself, then He

will be a limited and finite God holding a position, not better than that of an ordinary potter who is also the efficient cause of his creation.

Theism of the *yoga* system too, is no better than that of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* philosophy. Generally, the conception of God carries with it the sense that He is also the material cause of the world, as otherwise, it ceases to be the essential condition for the existence of the world. *Upādāna kārāṇatva* is the most important characteristic of a creator God without which God will be called a creator by courtesy only. If *upādāna-kārāṇatva* is taken away from God, He loses all strength and significance; this is the case with Him in the *yoga*-system. According to this system also, the creation of the world is due to the contact of *Prakṛti* with *Puruṣa* and therefore, from the point of view of *yoga*-physics too, God does not seem to occupy a very important place. Here too, He exists simply as the efficient Cause as He is supposed to bring about the association and dissociation of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* for creation and dissolution of the universe. He also removes the obstacles in the path of His devotee by placing him under conditions most suitable for attainment of God.¹

Rāmānuja, however, offers us a form of theism which is more satisfactory than the theism of the *Nyāya*-system and also of the system of *yoga*. In his opinion, God is not only the efficient cause but He is also the material cause and the assisting cause of this universe.

Cause, according to Rāmānuja, is of three kinds : *upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause) *nimitta-kāraṇa* (efficient cause) and *sahakāri-kāraṇa* (assisting cause). The substance that undergoes changes of states in the form of effect is called the *upādāna*, that which causes the *upādāna* to undergo changes is the efficient cause and that which acts as the assisting factor is called *sahakāri kāraṇa*.² God, in association with *cit* (soul)

1. Most suitable for gaining the grace (*anugraha*) of God with the help of which knowledge of the distinction between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* can be acquired.
2. *Tatīndramatadīpikā* – Second edition—Anandasrama Mudranalaya, Poona, 1934—*Navama'vataṛah*—p. 18.

and *acit* (matter) in subtle forms, is the *upādāna-kāraṇa* of the world, God with the resolution of "I shall be many" is the efficient cause, God endowed with the qualities of knowledge, power, etc., is the assisting cause. Hence it is no exaggeration to hold that God is the sole and sufficient cause of the world.

While ascribing *upādānatva* or material causality to *Īśvara*, Rāmānuja has admitted a distinction between the *viśeṣyānīśa* (nounpart) and *viśeṣaṇūnīśa* (adjective part) of God. The *viśeṣyānīśa* or *svarūpūnīśa* of God does not suffer any kind of change; changes take place only within the modes or *viśeṣaṇūnīśa* of God and that change is only a change of states. Both *cit* and *acit* change from a subtle form to a gross form. Change in spirit and matter, however, does not take place in the same manner. While unconscious matter undergoes a change of its essential nature, there is no such modification of *svarūpa* in the case of souls. It is the '*dharmabhūtajñāna*' of the individual souls that undergoes modification and passes from a state of absolute contraction to a state of expansion, the extent of which is determined by the law of *karma*. The modes of God are supposed to form the body of God. It is therefore the body that undergoes change of states. God who is the indwelling self of both *cit* and *acit* remains unaffected by such modifications. In this world of ours, we do find that a change in the body does not necessarily create a change in the self which is its central core. The body passes through infancy, childhood, boyhood, etc. but the soul remains the same. This will help us to understand how God remains pure and immutable although *cit* and *acit* suffer changes and modifications, imperfections and impurities. In other words, we can say that the *Prakṛti* aspect of God is affected by transformations whereas the *puruṣa* aspect of God is affected by moral imperfections of the world. *Īśvara*—the Supreme Reality—always remains unaffected and immutable in essence under all conditions. At the time of creation God impels *Prakṛti* to evolve and change in accordance with the merits and demerits of the *Jivas*. At the time of dissolution again, the evolutionary movement of *Prakṛti* is fully stopped and its various transformations are suspended through the will of God.

In like manner, souls also undergo a change from the unmanifest state of subtlety to a manifest state of grossness and vice versa during creation and dissolution through the expansion and contraction of the *dharmabhūta-jñāna*. Thus, by recognizing God as '*cidacitviśiṣṭaḥ*' and also by admitting that changes take place in His modes only and not in His essence, Rāmānuja has made his God both immutable and mutable. Such a God can become both the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. God cannot be an immanent principle of the world unless He is the material cause. Such a world which is not wholly permeated by the Divine Presence fails to satisfy the religious cravings of a devoted soul, Śamkara too has felt this necessity and has made provision for a creator God in his philosophy; but as he has declared God as phenomenal, he has taken away by one hand what he has given to religion by the other.

In the philosophy of Rāmānuja, no distinction has been made between *Nirguṇa Brahman* and *Saguṇa Brahman*. To him *Viṣṇu* or *Nārāyaṇa* is the Highest Reality and is *Saguṇa* by nature. It is from Him, that the world has emerged.¹ At the time of creation, *Śrīmān Viṣṇu* projects the whole world in a colourful manner and at the time of dissolution He again withdraws everything in His own tamo-aspect thereby suspending creative activities of *Prakṛti* for a period of time. To prove that the ultimate reality is Lord *Viṣṇu*, Rāmānuja has quoted a number of passages from different *śāstras* such as the *upaniṣads*, the *Gītā*, the *Bhāgavata*, the *Mahābhārata*, *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, etc. :

Eko ha vai Nārāyaṇaḥ āsīd, na brahma neśāno.

(*Mahopantṣad*-1/1).

*Tasya Prithivī śariraṃ, Tasyātmā śariraṃ,
Tasyāvyaktaṃ śariraṃ, Tasyākṣaraṃ śariraṃ
eṣa sarvāntarātmā divya devo eko Nārāyaṇaḥ.*

(*Subāla upaniṣad*-7).

1. *Viṣṇupurāṇa*-1. 1. 31.

Viṣṇosakāśad uddhūtaṃ jagat.

Bhagavadgītā-14-3.

*Mama yonirmahadbrahma tasmin'grahmaṃ dadāmyaham
Sambhavaḥ sarvabhūtāṇāṃ tato Bhavati bhārata.*

Sarveveda yat Padamāmananti

So'dhvanah Paramāpnoti tadviṣṇo paramaṁpadam

(*Kaṭha*-1/3/9).

Tattvam Jijñāsamānam hetubhiḥ sarvatomukhaiḥ

Tattvameko mahāyogi Hariḥ Nārāyaṇaḥ Paraḥ.

(*Mahābhārata*-347/83).

Aham kṛtsnasya jagataḥ prabhavaḥ pralayastathā.

(*Gītā*-7/6).

Mattaḥparātaram nānyat kincidasti Dhananjaya.

(*Gītā*-7/7).

All these scriptural utterances have been admitted by Rāma-
nuja as proofs for the admissibility of *Nārāyaṇa* as the Ultimate
Reality possessing the characteristics of *asthūlatva*, (Non-gross-
ness) *ānandamayatva* (blissfulness) etc. He is therefore the
only goal to be attained by the pursuit of all forms of 'vidyā'.

Super-personality of God and His a-prākṛta Form

Since *viśiṣṭādvaita* is a monotheistic philosophy, it does not
believe in the existence of a formless impersonal reality as the
Supreme Category. God is, here, supposed to possess Super-
personality coupled with a supernatural form. The different
śruti texts too lend support to this theory. 'na tasya prākṛta
mūrtiḥ' ; 'vedāhametaṁ puruṣaṁ mahāntaṁ adityavarṇaṁ tamasaḥ
parastāt' ; etc.

The supernatural form and beauty of God cannot be seen
through our external sense-organs which are fit only to catch
the glimpses of the worldly sights and sounds. It is only the
mind in its pure state that can have a direct visualization of
this exquisite beauty (*manomayaḥ bhārūpaḥ na cakṣusā grihyate,*
naiva vācū.....mandasā tu viśuddhena etc.). It was only due to
this fact that Arjuna was given a pair of supernatural eyes to
see the cosmic form of Lord *Nārāyaṇa*. The apparently con-
tradictory statements of the *upaniṣads* describing the Highest
Reality in one breath as "adriśya", etc. and in another as 'draṣ-
ṭavya, mantavya', etc. can be reconciled from the *viśiṣṭādvaita*
point of view. The texts describing *Brahman* as *adriśya*, *agrāhya*

etc. lay stress on the fact that the divine form cannot be perceived in the ordinary manner by the use of the natural powers of the eyes, etc. while the texts describing *Brahman* as *draṣṭavya mantavya*, etc. simply lay bare the fact that a pure mind and the eyes of wisdom alone are capable of comprehending this Supreme Reality. *Nityamukta jīvas* residing in *vaikunṭha* are in a position to perceive constantly this supernatural and extremely charming beauty of *Śrīmān Nārāyaṇa* (*Tadviṣṇo paramaṁ padam sadā paśyanti śūrayaḥ, Praśna upaniṣad, vaikunṭhe tu pare loka nityatvena vyavasthita pasyanti ca sadā devaṁ netrairjñānena cāmarāḥ, visvakasena-saṁhitā*).

Vyūhas of God

This Divine Personality assumes different forms or manifests Himself in different ways to carry on successfully the creation, sustenance and dissolution of this empirical world. These different manifestations or emanations of God which are divine in nature are known as *vyūhas* and these are four in number—*Vāsudeva*, *Śaṅkarṣaṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*. *Śrīvāsudeva* is endowed with all the six qualities. He is the Supreme God in a state of emanation, *Śaṅkarṣaṇa* possesses only knowledge and power whereas *Pradyumna* is endowed with *aiśvarya* and *virya*. *Śakti* and *teja* are the two qualities that belong to *Aniruddha*.

But the manifestation of God in the form of a *Vyūha* should not be understood to mean production of an effect deity from a Causal God. *Śaṅkarṣaṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha* are the three forms which God assumes according to His own sweet will so as to rule over soul, mind and ego. Just as an actor in a drama assumes the role of a king to govern the characters of the drama without entering into a relation of causality with the kingship, in the same manner, there is no cause-effect relationship between God and his *vyūhas* or between one *vyūha* and another. The one Supreme Being presents Himself in the *vyūha* forms simply out of His eagerness to control and direct the process of creation and dissolution in a very effective manner; in Himself God is always one and never many. So, *Śaṅkara's* criticism that according to *Pañcarātra*, *Śaṅkarṣaṇa* is born of

Vāsudeva, *Pradyumna* of *Śaṅkarṣaṇa* and *Aniruddha* of *Pradyumna* is unjust and baseless. Like the *upaniṣads*, *Pañcarātra* literatures also do not believe in the non-eternality of the individual souls. There is no object in this world which is devoid of the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti* and the three forms of *Vāsudeva* already mentioned as *Śaṅkarṣaṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha* rule over these three *guṇas* and are consequently associated with the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe respectively.

Avatāras

The word *avatāra* has been derived from the *Sanskrit* word *avataraṇam* meaning descent. An *avatāra* of God therefore refers to that particular form of God which He assumes in order to come down to this empirical world which is full of strifes and struggles, miseries and frustrations. The creation of the world and also its destruction are sports of God, and individual souls together with unconscious *Prakṛti* and Time are the active participants of this unique play.

The form that God assumes in all His descents is *aprakṛta* (*Mahābhārata* *pyavatāra-rūpas yāpyaprakṛitatvamucyate, nabhūtasamghasamsthāno dehasya paramātmanah-Śrībhāṣya 1-1-21* *Asyadevādī-rupeṇāvatāreṣu api na prakṛti dehaḥ* (*Vedārtha-Samgraha*)—

Janma Karma ca me divyameva yo veti tattvataḥ—

Gītā 4/8.)

His birth in the world is also non-natural in the sense that it is not an effect of past *karmas*. God is above all *karmic* influences. Even when He comes down to this world, His divine nature remains unimpaired.¹ God comes here of His own accord,² because there is no other force (more powerful than God) to compel Him to manifest Himself in a finite form. It is because God preserves His Divinity even in the stage of incarnation that Kṛṣṇa was able to show His cosmic form to

1.prakṛtiḥ svabhāvāḥ, svam eva svabhāvaṁ adhiṣṭhāya sreṇa eva rūpeṇa so'cehayā sambhvaṁmi.

2. Tadā aham eva svasaṅkalpeṇa uktaprakāreṇa ūtrīṇaṁ srijāmi (Gītā 4/7 — *Rama* *vja bhāṣyam*)

Arjuna who was given divine eyes for that purpose. People with natural eyes are incapable of having any vision of God's supernatural form. So in His *avatāra*-form God, generally remains enveloped in His own *yogamāyā* with a view to appearing to ordinary human beings as human and mortal.

The primary purpose of God's incarnation is to come within easy access of His worshipper who has been suffering from an intense pang of separation from his beloved God.

(*Sādhava uktalakṣaṇa dharmasīlā vaiṣṇavagresara matsamāśrayana pravṛtta mannāmakarmasvarūpāṇām avāṁmanasago cara tayā maddarśanād ṛte svātmadhāraṇādīsukham alabhamāna anumātrakālamapi kalpa sahasram manvanah praśithilasavagūtrā bhavye yuḥ iti matsvarūpaceṣṭitāvalokanūlāpādi dānena tesām paritrāṇāya.....etc.* Gītā 4/8)

This is the prime motive behind God's descent to this world from His Eternal Abode of *Vaikuṇṭha*.

The secondary purpose is to punish the wicked with a view to saving *vedic* dharma and social stability which depend mainly on the preservation of the traditional creeds and laws of different *varṇas* and *āśramas*.¹ Thus we find that although God as the Supreme Reality is birthless, deathless and the Lord of all beings and things of the world, still in order to wipe out sin, disorder, and ugliness from the face of the earth, He comes down to this world in various forms out of His own sweet will. Any one who can acquire a thorough knowledge of God's descent, is in a position to attain liberation and also to enjoy communion with Him.²

Arcāvatāras

These are the forms in which God manifests Himself with a view to satisfying the desires and inclinations of His different

1. *Tadā yadā hi dharmasya glāṇirbhavati bhārata abhyutthānamadarmasya tadātmanāṁ sṛjāmyaham...* (*Gītā 4/7*)

2. *Madāyadivyojanmaceṣṭitayāzithātmya vijñānena viddhastamasastamatsamāśrayaṇavareṇādīpāṇīm asmin eva janmani Yathoditāṣṭakāreṇa mām aśṛitya madelapriyo madelacitto mām eva prāpnoti...* (*Gītā 4/9 Rāmānuja bhagya*).

devotees. Different devotees conceive of God in different ways and make idols of *Śrīviṣṇu* accordingly. These *vigrahas* are placed in different temples and *mathas* and are worshipped daily by the *upāsakas*. God in the forms of *arcāvatāras* is wholly dependent on His devotees for His maintenance and protection. Omnipotent God, here, becomes helpless like a child in order to satisfy the intense desires of His devotees to serve Him in all possible ways.

Proofs for the existence of God

According to *Nyāya* philosophy, the existence of God can be proved both by inference and scriptural testimony : because in its opinion valid knowledge is the knowledge of a thing as it really is and not the knowledge that has not been acquired by any other source. In the opinion of *Śaṅkara* too, God can be known by direct realisation, by inference and also by verbal testimony, because according to him a "*siddha vastu*" (accomplished thing) can be known through more than one source. *Rāmānuja*, however, holds that the existence of God can be proved by the *āgamas* only and not by any other source. In his commentary on the third *sūtra* of the *Śrībhāṣya* he has made this point clear and has shown that other proofs which seem to establish the existence of God, finally fail to do so.

First of all God cannot be known through Perception. Perception is either externally carried by the five senseorgans or internally carried by the mind. External senseorgans can convey to us knowledge of those objects only which are present before us whereas God who is the maker of all the objects is never present before the external sense-organs. Mind too is incapable of giving us knowledge of God as mind can make known to us directly only our feelings of pleasures and pains etc. External objects can be revealed to us by the mind only with the assistance of the outer sense-organs. *Yogic Pratyakṣa* too, cannot prove the existence of God because this is only of the nature of memory.

God cannot be known through inference either; this is because inference is based on *vyāptijñāna* and no *vyāpti* is possible

in respect of supersensuous objects. Of course, it is held by many thinkers that here from the presence of the world as an effect we can legitimately infer the presence of God as the cause: but this does not stand critical considerations. It is held that like a human body, the world too is a composite object consisting of parts. The human body is ruled and controlled by the conscious soul. The world too should therefore be ruled and controlled by God. This is an example of a bad analogy as the two cases differ in a very important respect. The soul is not the sole maker of a human body but God is the maker of the whole world. The production of the human body of a person is the combined effect of his own past actions as well as of the past actions of all those persons who are related to him. The creation of the world, on the other hand, is wholly due to the sportive motive of God.

Moreover, if we rely on inference, we can very well prove by this method that individual souls are the makers of the world. In our ordinary life, we find that the potters or the cloth makers possess a general knowledge of the materials which they need for their purpose and have also direct acquaintance with them. It is not necessary that a potter should have direct knowledge of all the powers existing in the materials he is going to use to produce earthen jars. If this be the case then we can very well infer that the world too has been produced by one or more individual souls having a general and direct acquaintance with the materials of the world. Thus, instead of proving the existence of God by inference we can very well prove the existence of one or more individual souls as the Cause of the world.

Indeed there are some who would still insist on proving the existence of God by the cosmological argument on the ground that a vast thing like the universe can be produced by a being of unlimited powers only and not by the finite and limited souls.

Against this argument Rāmānuja has held that nobody can make any categorical and definite assertion about the simultaneous origination of all parts of the world from a single person. We find that many earthen jars of various shapes and sizes

exist in this world; they are however not made at one time and by one person. It is, therefore, quite legitimate for us to suppose that various parts of the world have been gradually created by different persons. So instead of having one creator, we shall have to admit the existence of many creators through whose activities, the world has been gradually brought into being.

Thus, from the above discussion, it is evident that inferential truths arrived at by one person may be refuted by another person.¹ Since God can never be proved by perception and inference, His existence has to be established on the evidence of the scriptural texts alone.

Objections Considered

Dr. C. D. Sharma has raised certain objections against Rāmānuja's theory of God.²

Firstly, in his opinion, "If God is the immanent soul of the universe, how can He at the same time be a transcendent person living in *Vaikuṇṭha* with His consort *Lakṣmī* and attended upon by the *nitya* and the *mukta* souls?"

Secondly, if the body of God is made up of *Prakṛti* and souls, what is the necessity of assuming *śuddhasattva* as the stuff which constitutes the body of God?

Lastly, Dr. C. D. Sharma has remarked that "Rāmānuja's Absolute is Śamkara's *Brahman* bound to this world, while Śamkara's Absolute is Rāmānuja's *Īśvara* liberated from this world.

Objections Met

If we ponder over these objections raised by Dr. Sharma against the philosophy of Rāmānuja, we feel that these are not really insoluble inherent riddles of *viśiṣṭādvaita*.

As a reply to the first objection we, can say that the sky,

1. *Puruṣabuddhimūlatarkakāvalamvanasya tathaiṣa deśāntara kālāntareṣu tadadhiḥkatamatarkakuśalaḥ uruṣotprekṣitatarkaduṣyātvasambhāvanayā tar-*
kāpratīṣṭhānadoṣādanirmokṣo durnivārah...Śrībhāṣyam.
2. "Indian Philosophy"—Dr. C. D. Sharma, po, 531-32.

which is all pervasive, is both immanent and transcendent in relation to the objects which are associated with it. Some portion of space will be limited by buildings, trees etc. and a vast portion will still lie outside of them. In *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy too, God is not immanent (*antaryāmi*) in things and beings of the world in the sense of being identical with them. Though God pervades both *cit* and *acit*, He is not wholly exhausted by them (*ekāmśena sthitaḥ jagat*). Even that part of God which is the substratum of *cit* and *acit* is not identical with them. He can never be overpowered by spirit and matter; on the other hand both spirit and matter derive sustenance from Him. Hence, there is no contradiction in supposing God both immanent and transcendent in relation to spirit and matter. Since God is not identical with *cit* and *acit* though immanent in them, He can have a form of His own and can be supposed to dwell as a transcendent person in *Vaikuṇṭha*.

The second charge too can be met by saying that God has not one body only formed of *cit* (spirit) and *Prakṛti*. Besides the body of *cit* and *Prakṛti*, God also appears in other bodies in the form of *vyūhas*, *avatāras*, etc. so as to perform the activities of creation, preservation, destruction, etc. of the world. These bodies are formed of *śuddhasattva*.

Regarding the last point, we can say that according to Rāmānuja, there can be no *Brahman* that is absolutely unqualified. To him a conscious entity is that which knows itself. If there is anything which, though a principle of illumination, is yet unable to know itself then it is no better than an inert substance. For that reason, the Supreme Reality must not only be a conscious being, it must also be a knower. Though, we can detect certain similarity between the lower *Brahman* of Śaṅkara and God of Rāmānuja, the higher *Brahman* of Śaṅkara is only a figment of imagination according to Rāmānuja. Even in the case of Śaṅkara's '*Saguṇa Brahman*', we find that it is a combination of *māyā* and *cit*. This *cit* is devoid of '*jñātritva-śakti*' (power of knowing). Power of Knowing is a *ṛtti* of *māyā* which is falsely ascribed to Pure Knowledge as a result of its being limited by *upādhi* (adjunct). God of Rāmānuja however is a knower by nature. *Cit* devoid of the

power of knowing is inert and *māyā* too is inert. A combination of these two inert principles gives us a phenomenal category in the form of Śamkara's *Īśvara*. Thus Rāmānuja's *Īśvara* differs fundamentally from Śamkara's *Īśvara* and also from Śamkara's Absolute as He always exists as the Knower and never as Pure Knowledge. Hence it is not proper to say that if Rāmānuja's *Īśvara* is liberated from the world. He will become the Absolute of Śamkara.

Truly speaking, the *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy of Rāmānuja is a compromise between philosophy and religion resulting in a harmonious blending of warm yearnings of the heart with the cold criticisms of reason. Man possesses reason together with sentiments and emotions. Just as reason inspires a man to test and verify all that he assumes to be true on the touchstone of reason, in the same way his emotional nature goads him to accept that principle as true and real which will give satisfaction to his loving heart. Theology of *viśiṣṭādvaita* is a synthesis of head and heart, knowledge and emotion. A differenceless, qualitiess Absolute may be a glorious achievement of human intellect, but it fails to give satisfaction to the emotional nature of man. It is only through self-surrender to an all-knowing, all-good and exquisitely beautiful God that a man can find solace for his heart coupled with peace and tranquillity for his suffering.

The fact that devotion to a qualified and creator God is necessary for man on the path of his spiritual march has been recognised by Śamkara also. For that reason he has introduced a qualified *Brahman* to serve the purpose of religion and this qualified *Brahman* has been endowed with all-knowingness, omnipotence etc. as its attributes. Even then, this qualified *Brahman* has failed to arouse human respect and adoration, as it has been described as illusory and phenomenal. An illusory object can satisfy a man's heart only so long as he remains under the spell of illusion. As soon as the illusory spell is broken, the illusory object ceases to exist for him with the result that his loving heart loses its support and sustenance for ever.

The soul of man cannot rest in peace, if heart is kept in starva-

tion. Śaṅkara's *advaitavāda* is, no doubt, a remarkable intellectual achievement but nowhere do we find any outpouring of the heart or overflowing of love in his philosophical system.

The history of Indian philosophy is really a history of rivalry between these twofold tendencies of human mind. These have brought about various changes and innovations in the sphere of philosophical thought. In the *upaniṣads*, a qualified *Īśvara* has been glorified along with a qualitless absolute whereas in the *Hīnayāna* Buddhism there was no sanction for the acceptance of soul or God. The cold and rigid moral practices of this form of early Buddhism therefore failed to satisfy the heart of man and as a natural course, it caused the emergence of the *Mahāyāna* Buddhism with its broad outlook and deep sympathy for the suffering beings. Thus Mahāyāna Buddhism which was brought about by the demands of human heart succeeded in giving a humanitarian tone to Buddhistic philosophy. As Mahāyānism made provision for rituals and imageworship and accepted the hierarchy of deities whom devotees could love and respect, this form of Buddhism became popular not only in India but also in other parts of the world. In Jainism too, we find that though there is no place for God, yet *tirthamkaras* are worshipped like Gods and loved and respected by the Jain devotees.

To sum up, it can be said that the motive of philosophy is to produce calmness and tranquility of mind ; in that case it must assume as ultimate such a principle which will not only satisfy a man's reason, but will also bring for him fulness of heart and richness of spirit resulting in peace, gentleness and serenity of human soul. *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda* is a philosophy of this kind and its special merit lies in the fact that it is a unique reconciliation of *bhakti* with the traditional *Vedānta* philosophy of his age.

CONCLUSION

We have already made a detailed and critical survey of the philosophy of Rāmānuja in the previous chapters. In view of what we have discovered so far in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy of Rāmānuja, we may suggest logically that the qualified monism of Rāmānuja is not an entirely new innovation to us; on the contrary it is a grand fusion of the *upanisāds*, the *Bhagavaagītā*, the *Purāṇas*, the *Itihāsas* and the other systems of Indian philosophy.

The concept of Qualified *Brahman* as expounded in the philosophy of Rāmānuja is the best philosophic concept to synthesise the different trends of dualism, monism and monotheism of the devotional schools and also to bring about a harmony between Philosophy and Religion.

The Dualism of *Sāṃkhya* presents *Puruṣa* or the conscious principle and *Prakṛti* or the unconscious principle of change and mutations as two mutually exclusive entities, both eternally self-existent. Although both of them maintain separate existence, still *Prakṛti* is supposed to act not blindly by freaks and pranks but in an orderly way—ultimately to satisfy the *puruṣa*. This naturally brings in the question of teleology without making the world a play of some Supreme Conscious Being. The critics of *Sāṃkhya*, however, pointed out the difficulty of this dualistic position by asserting that no motive can be ascribed logically to *Prakṛti* which is absolutely unconscious and blind. Agency too, cannot be ascribed to *Puruṣa* as that will mean a deviation from the fundamental position of the *Sāṃkhya* itself.

Now, the Qualified *Brahman* of Rāmānuja, conceived on the pattern of the *Puruṣottama* of the *Bhagavatgītā*, offers a very satisfactory solution in this respect. The idea of *Puruṣottama* as developed in the *Gītā* represents an all-absorbing wholeness comprising within it both mutability and immutability. *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are not independent principles existing by themselves. On the other hand, both of them are parts or aspects

of an all-inclusive God. *Prakṛti* is the lower nature, since it is the mutable material stuff of the whole universe. Higher than *Prakṛti* is God's superior nature which consists of the living souls. This superior nature is the principle by which this insentient *Prakṛti* is sustained and animated. These two natures of God (*aparū* and *parū*) constitute the cause of the creation and dissolution of the universe. Since *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* represent different phases of God's nature, He is the real support of the universe, like the string of gems on a necklace. *Prakṛti*, no doubt, creates the universe; but it is only an instrument of God, having no independent existence of its own. Hence, the *Gītā* says that the *puruṣottama* is the ultimate cause of the whole world of beings and things. The three *guṇas* and all their products are also grounded in Him. The Lord exists in all beings as their essential quality. But this Lord is not wholly immanent in this world. His true nature is transcendent and beyond the range of human comprehension. Only a portion of Him (i. e. His *aparū* and *parū prakṛti*) is revealed in the universe. The lower nature of God entangles the spirit in this world and being entangled, the spirit resides in all beings as their sustaining principle.

The principles of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* which are self-existent and independent according to dualistic *Sāṃkhya* have been described in the *Gītā* as *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* and both of them have been viewed as aspects of one Divine Personality. *Kṣetrajña* is the conscious principle that works through the medium of the blind forces of Nature and since these two are nothing but the two aspects in which the divine energy works, they are not incapable of getting related together for the purpose of creation. Hence, in the light of this interpretation of the *Bhagavadgītā*, there arises no difficulty in explaining the teleology even in the working of an unconscious *Prakṛti* and also in explaining why *Prakṛti* should work for the benefit of the *puruṣa*.

Now, the *Brahman* of Rāmānuja is non-dual no doubt, but It is qualified inasmuch as It has both *cit* and *acit* as Its inseparable attributes. *Acit* has not been called the nature of God as is done in the *Bhagavadgītā*, since in that case, there will be

difficulty in conceiving God as purely spiritual and fully conscious. *Acit* is radically different from God as it is both material and unconscious. Hence, Rāmānuja has described both *cit* and *acit* as inseparable attributes of God or as constituting the body of God. As adjectives, they are different from God although they always remain related to Him. Since the universe constituted of both *cit* and *acit*, is only adjectively related to God, His non-dual and purely spiritual nature remains unaffected by changes of the world. The world as an attribute of God exists not for itself but for Him who is its main support and the ultimate goal. It is because God is the Soul of the world that every object of the world bears a reference to Him. Thus, although with *Bhagavadgita*, Rāmānuja holds that God pervades both Soul and Nature yet he emphatically declares that spirit and matter do not constitute the *svatūpa* of God.¹ God is quite different from both of them. They form His body in the sense that, though animated, sustained and controlled by Him for His own ends, their change and imperfections do not in any way affect His own essential nature². Immanence for Rāmānuja does not mean perfect identity. So, although God appears to be identical with individual souls, He is not so in reality.

Thus the conception of *Brahman* as qualified by *cit* and *acit* in subtle forms is an improvement upon the *Gītā* conception of *Puruṣottama* possessing a higher and a lower nature. The antagonism between action (*karma*) and knowledge (*jñāna*), dualism (*dvaita*) and monism (*advaita*) which is sought to be reconciled with reference to the ideal of *Puruṣottama* of the *Bhagavadgītā*, is also best solved in the conception of a Qualified *Brahman* as expounded in the philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja.

The cosmic form of the Lord which was seen by Arjuna has

1. In the *Gītā*, matter has been described as 'aparā Prakṛti' (lower nature) of God. So, one may think wrongly that matter constitutes the *svatūpa* of God. There is no scope for such confusion in the philosophy of Rāmānuja.

2. B. Kumarappa—"Hindu Conception of the Deity", p. 327.

been introduced in the *Gītā* in order to lay bare the fact that even the gross forms of the worldly objects are nothing but the diverse manifestations of the One Supreme Divinity. The whole universe with its manifold divisions is gathered together in one body which is the body of the Supreme Lord.

(*ihaikastham jagatkṛṣṇam paśyādya sacarūcaram,
mamadehe guḍākeṣa yaccānyaddraṣṭumicchasi.*

Gītā chap, XI, no. 7)

In the body of God, Arjuna beholds all beings and things of the earth and heaven but still he cannot visualise the beginning, the middle or the end of the Lord who is both immanent and transcendent :

*Paśyāmi devāṁstava devadehe
sarvamstathā bhūtaviśeṣa samghān
Brahmāṇamiṣaṁ kamalāsanasthamṣiṣca
sarvā nuragāmśca diptān,
aneka vāhūdara vaktra netraṁ
paśyāmi tvaṁ sarvato 'nantarupam
nāntaṁ na madhyaṁ na punastavādini
paśyāmi viśveśvara viśvarūpa.*

(The *Gītā*, chap. XII, no. 15 and 16)

That the world is a body of God has thus been suggested in the *Bhagavadgītā* : but it has not been clearly worked out. In the philosophy of Rāmānuja, we get a full and clear account of this body-soul relation between God and the universe. *Cit* and *act* in the gross forms are clearly declared as constituting the body of God who is the indwelling soul of both of them. Since in practice, body and soul are not differentiated, the spirit of *advaita* remains intact. It has also been clearly shown that the whole universe, both moving and unmoving, are unified in the body of God. Nothing can exist without Him who is the sole support of the entire universe. Not only spirit and matter in subtle forms constitute the body of God, but in the gross forms also, both of them form the Divine Body which was revealed to Arjuna by God Himself (*Divyaṁ dadāmi te cakṣuḥ paśya me yogamaiśvaram*).

The conception of this Qualified *Brahman* has helped Rāmānuja to harmonize different forms of *upāsana* (worship) as well. Since the body of God is constituted of both Spirit and Matter and since in ordinary life, we find that the soul enjoys happiness when the body is nursed, even *Prakṛti-upāsana* (worship of Nature) can be regarded as the worship of God. By worshipping *Prakṛti*, one is able to please the Lord who resides in Nature as its indwelling soul. Thus all forms of *upāsana*¹ made unto God, parents, preceptors, etc. can be legitimately regarded as worship of the One Supreme Divinity in the light of the Qualified *Brahman* of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy.

The fact that both spirit and matter actively cooperate to create the universe which has been hinted at in the *Gītā* has found a clear expression in the philosophy of Rāmānuja as a result of which the teleology inherent in the process of the evolutionary flow has been explained in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy in a logically justifiable manner. In the *Gītā*, it has been stated that *Puruṣottama* or the Supreme Person is the possessor of both spiritual and non-spiritual energy which works in two different ways in order to create this multicoloured universe. The world of physical things is as much an expression of Divine energy as the world of animated beings (*Mayādhyakṣena Prakṛti syūyate ca carācaram* etc.). Both *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* may be taken to be independent in relation to each other—the one excluding the other in its nature, but both of them represent two aspects of the Supreme Being in whom both have their ultimate support and by whom both of them are controlled and regulated for the purposes of creation and dissolution of the universe. This teaching of the *Gītā* has found a more elaborate and a more justifiable expression in Rāmānuja's writings when he recognizes a natural distinction between God and *cidacit* (attributes or modes) which, according to him, are His *viśeṣaṇas* or *prakāras*. At the same time, he admits also that both spirit and matter are controlled and regulated by God who is the soul of both of them.

1. Relative merit of all these forms of worship will however, be determined according to scriptures.

In the opinion of Rāmānuja, the evolution of the world from *Prakṛti* takes place through the instrumentality of thought and will-power of God. So, this world is not a chance-creation, nor is it a mere superfluous manifestation of Divine Energy. It is meaningful as this world is the place where bound souls can attain liberation which is their due. Under all circumstances, souls and matter constitute the body of God. The world as the body of God or as the adjective of God is inseparably associated with Him. It is because as the innermost soul of the entire world of spirit and matter, God pervades, supports and regulates all things and beings that He is called *Īśvara*. Due to inseparable relationship, both conscious soul and unconscious physical world are regarded as parts or body or modes of God. Soul, matter and God are naturally distinct and different, but as they always remain together, the triune unity is regarded as one. *Prakṛti* is controlled and made to yield different products by God. The universe is rooted in God and pulsates with His life. Changes and diversities of Nature are so created as to adopt themselves to the spiritual progress of the *jivas*. Perfection of individual souls as the *śeṣa* (accessory) of God is the real purpose of the process of evolution. The will of God is the primary cause that produces changes in Nature and progress in human souls. Causality, therefore, is the Divine urge that creates a universe, the goal and foundation of which are *Brahman* itself. Thus, the teleology which is artificial in the dualistic *Sāṃkhya* and loosely knitted in the *Gītā* has been firmly and logically expounded in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy of Rāmānuja. Teleology developed in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* is real in the sense that it refers to God as the final cause of all things and beings of the world.

In the seventh chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā* it has been stated that one who acquires true knowledge, visualises the whole world as a form of God. He sees God in all things and all things in God (*Vāsudeva Sarvamiti*). This teaching of the *Gītā* can be logically explained only in the light of the philosophy of Rāmānuja because according to him, *Vāsudeva* is identical with the Qualified *Brahman*. Both matter and spirit

being the body of God, all physical and psychical phenomena naturally refer to *Vāsudeva* who is their indwelling Lord. He is the cause of the psychophysical universe as well as its final goal. *Prakṛti* of the Yoga system is the material cause of the world but it is not identical with God. So "all" (*sarvam*) which refers to the products of *Prakṛti* cannot be viewed as *Vāsudeva*. According to *advaita-vedānta*, whatever is visible is false and that which is real is imperceptible.¹ So, the universe which is visible and false cannot be viewed as one with the Ultimate Reality. In the philosophy of Rāmānuja, the universe is the body of *Vāsudeva* and as body is regarded as non-different from the soul in actual practice, the universe can very well be called "*Vāsudeva*".

Again, the opposition between action and knowledge can be fully removed if we look at them from the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* point of view. This solution too has been attempted at in the *Bhagavadgītā* but it has found its final and logical expression in the philosophy of Rāmānuja. Action and knowledge are ordinarily taken as representing two different paths. The path of action is called *Pravṛttimarga* and the path of knowledge is called *Nivṛttimarga*. Both of them are generally taken as antagonistic to each other. *Prāvṛtti* leads to a process of change and as such it is the mutable aspect of Reality whereas *Nivṛtti* represents the unchangeable aspect of Reality. Since these two are the positive and negative aspects of one and the same Reality according to the *Gītā*, they are not contradictory to each other. In the truth of the Supreme Reality, the contradictories appear as complementaries. Knowledge of the Highest Reality breaks open the shell of egoism and purifies action while the knowledge of the highest truth finds its best expression in the service of the whole of creation. The dignity of an active life has, thus been recognised by Rāmānuja.

This fact that both action and knowledge are necessary as means to the realisation of the Divine bliss has been very logi-

1. The empirical world which is visible is false. *Nirupādhiḥ Brahman* is not *vyttiḥ viśayaka* or *phalavyapitṛiṣayaka*.

cally discussed in the philosophy of Rāmānuja. For Rāmānuja action does not refer to physical actions only (*kāyika karma*). *Upāsana* or meditation on God is also a form of action and this particular form of action is an indispensable condition for the attainment of *tattvajñāna*. As such, this type of action ought to be performed by the devotee in all stages of devotion. In the *advaita-vedānta*, performance of *nitya-naimittika* actions is necessary in the stage of mental purification only and *karma-sannyāsa* (giving up of all actions) has been suggested for those who have acquired true knowledge. So, in the philosophy of *advaita-vedānta*, one and the same *mumukṣu* cannot practise simultaneously *karma* and *karma-sannyāsa* towards the attainment of one and the same goal. This has, however, been solved in the philosophy of Rāmānuja. According to him, a *mumukṣu* should give up all actions except action in the form of *upāsana* which he should do till the end of his life with a view to attaining Divine Communion and Divine Bliss. Both *jñāna-yoga* and *Karma-yoga* are regarded as doors to *bhakti* by Rāmānuja and as such these two have been reconciled with each other. Disinterested and continuous performance of *nitya naimittika karmas* removes all impurities from the heart of an individual and thereby prepares the way for the emergence of such knowledge as is needed for the ripening of devotion. The importance of disinterested performance of actions or *karma-yoga* for the purpose of self-knowledge and self-realisation has been repeatedly emphasized by Rāmānuja in his philosophical writings. In his opinion, knowledge is indeed an important part of disinterested action and both are mutually inclusive (*Karma-yoge jñānāmsasya eva prādhanyam uncyate*, Rāmānuja's Commentary on the *Gita*, chap 4) This is because one is able to practise *karma-yoga* by dissociating his self wholly from the ego-centric desires only when the glow of self knowledge illuminates and purifies his heart. The disinterested action has, therefore, been described as action illumined by the light of self knowledge. Knowledge is not antagonistic to action, on the other hand, it is an important ingredient of disinterested action. Knowledge is needed to purify all actions of the devotee. The devotee must realise that his soul is different from the body-

mind system and that *Prakṛti* is not his real support. It is this form of true knowledge that helps an individual to give up the sense of agency of all worldly activities and also to make his mind completely free from the desire to enjoy the merits of his own actions.

The synthesis of *jñāna* and *bhakti* too has been made in a more perfect manner in the philosophy of Rāmānuja than in the *Bhagavadgītā*. In the *Bhagavadgītā*, teachings like "*bhajate mām*" etc. lay stress on the importance of devotion. If devotion is not regarded as means to the realisation of the ultimate goal, then the *Gītā* will have to face the criticism that it has attached too much importance to *bhakti* which is not really the means to the highest end of life. Again, if *bhakti* in the *Gītā* is regarded as the sole means to liberation then the *Gītā* will be in a difficult position to reconcile its teaching with the *Śruti* text "*Rṣe jñānāt na muktiḥ*"- Rāmānuja, however, has admitted different forms of *bhakti* and by describing *bhakti* as knowledge which elicits excessive adoration and attachment to ultimate reality, he has completely bridged the disquieting chasm between knowledge and devotion. Devotion is not simply an emotion of love and sentiment devoid of knowledge. It is a special kind of knowledge that fills the heart of the *mumukṣu* with a deep longing for Divine Communion and Divine Grace. *Bhakti*, *dhyāna*, *upāsana* are synonymous terms and each one of them refers to a loving meditation on the nature of God. Knowledge is the very foundation of *bhakti* and it is knowledge again that feeds and nourishes *bhakti*. Devotion can remain fixed in the mind of a devotee only through constant meditation, thinking and reflection on the nature of the Supreme Being. The essence of *bhakti* lies in full self-surrender to God. Such a surrender takes place only when the individual self realises his own nature, the nature of God and also the nature of His relationship to the Supreme Reality. The heart of a man cannot be flooded over with love and affection unless he knows the nature of the object he is going to love. So, knowledge is necessary for the emergence of devotion in the heart of the worshipper.

Moreover, Rāmānuja has classified *bhakti* into *sādhana-bhakti* *parā-bhakti* and *paramā-bhakti* and by elucidating the nature of each one of these three forms, he has sought to establish a harmony between devotion and knowledge.

Sādhana-bhakti, for example, represents the stage when the devotee purifies his mind by practising *śama*, *dama*, etc. restraint of mind, restraint of sense organs etc.) with a view to attaining a true knowledge regarding his own self, regarding God and regarding the nature of his relation to God. This is the stage of *ātmaśvalokana* (beholding the self) which necessarily results in a true knowledge of God. Thus, *sādhana-bhakti* is more of the nature of knowledge than of love and longing. It is of the nature of a firm faith in the existence of God as the abode of all eternal values and this faith is aroused in the mind of the devotee after seeing the transitoriness of all things including the effect of the *Vedic* sacrifices. In fact, *sādhana-bhakti* is called *bhakti* and not knowledge due to the fact that up to this stage Knowledge of God is only mediate and not immediate.¹ Higher than the stage of *sādhana-bhakti* is the stage of *parā-jñāna* and in this stage, the devotee gets a glimpse of divinity which acquires the clearness and liveliness of perception and this results in the realisation of God as his own inner self. This *parā-bhakti*, then ripens into *paramā-bhakti* when the devotee becomes mad with love and longing for God.

Regarding the origin of the world, the philosophy of Rāmānuja may be regarded as a better synthesis between *kṣāṇikavāda*² of the Buddhist philosophy and *sthīravāda*³ of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* school than the philosophy of the *Sāṃkhya* school. According to *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* school, atoms are the permanent elements of the world. All objects of the world are newly created and destroyed by the integration and disintegration of these atoms. The atoms in themselves are static. There is no inner dynamism in these ultimate constituents of the world.

1. *Sādhana-bhakti* is not knowledge because it is not nearest to immediate and full realisation (*Sākṣātkāra-rūpa*) of self.
2. The doctrine of Momentariness.
3. The doctrine of permanence.

According to the older school, *adriṣṭa*, (*dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit)) was supposed to provide these otherwise static atoms with motion as a result of which different atoms could come together and form different combinations thereby bringing into being different types of worldly objects. But the latter school holds that God's will generates motion in atoms with the help of *adriṣṭa* as an assisting cause as a result of which the atoms come together and produce different objects. When God wishes to dissolve the world, the work of *adriṣṭa* is stopped and the whole world is then automatically dissolved. Thus, on the one hand, there exists the eternal stuff in the form of static atoms and on the other hand, there is God with the weapon of *adriṣṭa* in His hand with the help of which He creates and dissolves the world according to His own will.

Buddhism, on the other hand, does not believe in the existence of any eternal and static stuff of the world. According to it, nothing is permanent, nothing endures even for two moments together. There are only diverse series of changes; things do not exist with any static and permanent essence in them. They exist only as causal relatives. There being certain phenomena, there happen to be some others. Creation of all things and beings of the world takes place in a continuous causal series in the past, present and future. There is a ceaseless flow of elements and incessant becomings. The whole world is a flux and everything is being continually renewed. Nothing stands, nothing abides. There is no substance, either spiritual or material, that is not a particle of the ever-changing and ever-flowing stream. One moment bursts forth, vanishes and is immediately replaced by the next one which also disappears and makes room for the emergence of the subsequent one. In other words, there is only a series of moments and no permanent or eternal stuff of the world. There is only the way of becoming and there is no being that becomes.

Indeed the dynamism of the world is so real and forceful that it cannot be denied by any sane man. The world, we live in, is not a static world. It is out and out dynamic. Perpetual changes, vibrating currents of life and constant movements are the keynotes of this phenomenal universe. But if we believe in

changes only and do not admit the existence of any being that changes. then the changes will have to be supposed to hang in the air without any support or substratum. On the other hand if we do not believe that changes are happening in the world due to an inner push and inner mobility of the ultimate stuff, then also we land in an unhappy and artificial situation. We cannot also hold that *adriṣṭa* (past actions) provides the static atoms with mobility and dynamism, since *adriṣṭa* is *Jada* (inert) and as such it is incapable of injecting dynamism either from itself or from some other source into the atoms. Introduction of God as the Prime Mover of the essentially static atoms does not improve the situation. Movement then becomes wholly artificial and there ceases to be the growth of a world through successive stages in a continuous evolution of the ultimate stuff. These defects, the dualistic *Sāṃkhya* has sought to remove by making the matrix of the world an essentially dynamic principle. *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṃkhya* school is *Parīṇāmi-nitya*. (changeable eternal). The *guṇas* which are the ultimate constituents of *Prakṛti* undergo constant changes ceaselessly and as such they constitute the ever-changing dynamic energy of the world.

The way in which Nature has been equipped with all forces and laws necessary for creation by a rigidly dualistic *sāṃkhya* logically suggests only a materialistic and mechanistic interpretation of the world. To improve the situation, it has been held by some followers of the *Sāṃkhya* that it is not a wholly unconscious *Prakṛti* but a *Cetanaviṣṭa prakṛti* (Nature, permeated by consciousness) that creates the world for the benefit of the selves. Even then this *āveśa* (Penetration) of consciousness cannot be clearly and distinctly comprehended by us. Moreover in that case, the teleological movement of *Prakṛti* will cease to be its own inherent movement. It will then be the result of the function of consciousness in it.

The inseparable relation between conscious principle and matter and the consequent emergence of a teleological flow from *Prakṛti* has been satisfactorily explained by Rāmānuja by means of body-soul relation. Every school of Indian philosophy excepting the Cārvākas, admits that the movements of the body

are-generated by the principle of consciousness that dwells in the body as its inner soul. According to Rāmānuja, Nature is controlled and made to yield different products by God who is the inner self of all living beings and things which constitute His body. The universe is grounded in God and pulsates with His life. He causes *Prakṛti* to change in a manner which is beneficial to the individual souls in their spiritual progress. Perfection of individual souls as *Viśeṣaṇas* or *Prakāras* (attributes or modes) of God is the real purpose of evolution.

A definite hint about the body-soul relation between God and the ultimate stuff of the universe can be discovered in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Sri Udayanāchāryya (984 A. D.).¹ He has stated that activities in atoms take place in a manner similar to that according to which activities in a body take place through functioning of its indwelling principle of consciousness. This has been interpreted by his opponent as suggesting a body-soul relation between God and the atoms. In replying to this criticism of his opponent, Udayanāchāryya has emphatically stated that if by body one is to understand that in which activities are generated through the efforts of the conscious principle which resides in it, then there is no harm in admitting the atoms as the body of God. In fact, unless such a relation is admitted to exist between God and the atoms, divine inspiration cannot be supposed to arouse activities in the material stuff which is distinct and different from Him. This suggestion of the body-soul relation between God and *cidacit* (spirit and matter) has been fully developed in the philosophy of Rāmānuja.

Rāmānuja's theory of creation is also a reconciliation between the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* atomism and the illusionism of the *advaita-vedānta*.

According to *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* philosophy, the world is real and is the product of the eternally real and self-existent atoms which are qualitatively distinct from one another. The atoms of one particular type can give rise to the products of that type

1. Udayana—“*Nyāyakusumāñjali*”. *Pañcaratna Kṛit*—2.

only. The human body, for example, is the result principally of the earth atoms, although atoms of other elements like water may be found in its structure. The process of creation as described by Prasastapada in his commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* is as follows :

When the creative desire of the Supreme Lord in the shape of an active potency moves towards creation, the *Karmic* tendencies of the bound souls gain back their active nature and bring about different combinations of atoms. In the first place, as a result of the conjunction of air atoms with souls, brought about by *jivadrīṣṭas* (Past actions merit and desmerits etc. of the soul) vibrations in the air atoms are generated. In the emergence of the activity in the air atoms, the air atoms are the material causes ; the contact (*samyoga*) of the atoms with the souls whose *adrīṣṭas* have become operative is the immaterial cause and the *Karmic* tendency is the instrumental cause. All these causal forces produce mutual conjunction of the air atoms till the gross air that vibrates in the sky is produced. Then by the same process, the gross water is produced in the air after which the solid earth is produced out of the earth atoms through the processes of diad. triad, etc.

When the four *mahābhūtas* are thus produced, the atoms of fire get mixed up with the atoms of earth and the Great Egg is produced. In that Egg, the Supreme Lord produces the god *Brahma* who is then directed to do the rest of the work of creation. *Īśvara* does not create the world with a view to realising some selfish end. This creation is entirely for the good of all living beings. Sorrows and pains exist in this world as necessary forces to turn *jīvas* from worldly attachment which causes spiritual degradation and loss of real values of life. Further, God makes arrangement for enjoyment of pleasures and pains in this world in accordance with merits and demerits of the actions of individual souls. The will of God not only brings about creation and dissolution of the universe but it also acts in the world as the *sadhāraṇa kāraṇa* (common cause) of all forms of actions. Thus, for the

Naiyāyikas and the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the material causes of the world in the forms of ever-existing atoms are as eternal as God and God is only the efficient cause of the world, whereas the *upaniṣads* have clearly described God as both the material and the efficient cause of the world. So, the atomistic theory of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* does not seem to be in harmony with what is taught in the *upaniṣads*.

This atomism of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* school has been severely criticised by *Śaṅkara* in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*. Since atoms in themselves are static and motionless, how could the first vibration (without which contact of one atom with another could not have been possible) start ? Action is the effect of some cause and as the cause of the first action in the atoms, we have got to assume the existence of a Cause. In the absence of the physical body, the quality of *prayatna* (effort) could not be generated in the soul. Again, *Adriṣṭa* (desert) cannot be supposed to be the cause of the first activity of the atoms, as in the absence of creation, *adriṣṭa* is logically inadmissible. Moreover, *adriṣṭa* is unconscious and since knowledge could not be generated in the soul prior to creation, *adriṣṭa* could not be guided by the individual soul. *Adriṣṭa* (desert) exists in the *ātman* (soul) and not anywhere else. So, there is no natural connection between *adriṣṭa* and the atoms. Hence, there is no factor which can be logically supposed to act as the guiding principle of the static atoms at the time of first creation. Just as creation, on this view, is impossible, in the same manner, dissolution too cannot be explained on the basis of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* atomism. *Dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) are capable of producing pleasures and pains in the state of creation; they are potent enough to bring about the dissolution of this world.

As opposed to this theory we get the *Vedānta* theory of illusion according to which the world is an illusory manifestation of one Ultimate Reality called *Brahman* or *Ātman*. The philosophy of *Śaṅkara* may be summed up in the oft-quoted saying "*Brahma Satyam Jagat Mithyā*". *Brahman*, according to him, is that which exists in itself and is conceived through itself. It

only. The human body, for example, is the result principally of the earth atoms, although atoms of other elements like water may be found in its structure. The process of creation as described by Prasastapada in his commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* is as follows :

When the creative desire of the Supreme Lord in the shape of an active potency moves towards creation, the *Karmic* tendencies of the bound souls gain back their active nature and bring about different combinations of atoms. In the first place, as a result of the conjunction of air atoms with souls, brought about by *jīvadriṣṭas* (Past actions merit and desmerits etc. of the soul) vibrations in the air atoms are generated. In the emergence of the activity in the air atoms, the air atoms are the material causes ; the contact (*samyoga*) of the atoms with the souls whose *adriṣṭas* have become operative is the immaterial cause and the *Karmic* tendency is the instrumental cause. All these causal forces produce mutual conjunction of the air atoms till the gross air that vibrates in the sky is produced. Then by the same process, the gross water is produced in the air after which the solid earth is produced out of the earth atoms through the processes of diad. triad, etc.

When the four *mahābhūtas* are thus produced, the atoms of fire get mixed up with the atoms of earth and the Great Egg is produced. In that Egg, the Supreme Lord produces the god *Brahma* who is then directed to do the rest of the work of creation. *Īśvara* does not create the world with a view to realising some selfish end. This creation is entirely for the good of all living beings. Sorrows and pains exist in this world as necessary forces to turn *jīvas* from worldly attachment which causes spiritual degradation and loss of real values of life. Further, God makes arrangement for enjoyment of pleasures and pains in this world in accordance with merits and demerits of the actions of individual souls. The will of God not only brings about creation and dissolution of the universe but it also acts in the world as the *sadhāraṇa kārana* (common cause) of all forms of actions. Thus, for the

is that *Brahman* is not merely the transcendental but also the immanent cause and lies concealed in the central core of all things and beings as their innermost soul. This *Brahman* for Rāmānuja is however a triune unity of *Īśvara*, *cit* and *acit* which are distinguishable but not separable from one another. The world is a modification of *acit* which is a *viśeṣaṇa* (adjective) of God and it is therefore, real. God possesses *acintyassakti* which finds its expression in the evolution of the world. The world being a real modification of a real cause cannot be described as illusory. It is called non-eternal because of its essentially mutable nature. What exists cannot be unreal or false. Things enter into different states successively. The prior state of a substance disappears and a subsequent state emerges without bringing into existence an entirely new substance. Nature is not merely what it is but what becomes and this becoming of *Prakṛti* in diverse directions gives rise to different worldly objects. Matter is eternally unstable. It is because of these instability and constant changes of Nature and also of the world that both of them are often described in the *Śruti* as *nāsti*. *Nāsti* does not prove the illusory nature of the world and *Prakṛti*. It simply refers to their mutable character. With *Nyāya-vaśeṣikā*, Rāmānuja agrees to hold the reality of a pluralistic world and with Śaṅkara he agrees in accepting *Brahman* as the Ultimate Cause.

Further in the *upaniṣads*, *Brahman* has been described both as *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa*. Śaṅkara relies on the *Nirguṇa Śruti* and holds that these are of primary importance whereas *Saguṇa Śruti* are applicable only to a lower *Brahman* or *Īśvara*. The ultimate reality is according to Śaṅkara one without a second and it is *nirviśeṣa* that transcends the limits of intellectual comprehension. In the intellectual sphere, one thing is related to another thing and is also limited by it. All determinations whether qualitative or quantitative deny logically the absolute unity of Reality. Every determination is negation and the moment *Brahman* thinks "I shall be many", negation enters into it and *Brahman* becomes finite-infinite. Limitation means imperfection and contradiction and the Absolute of the *upaniṣads* is above all limitations and subject-object distinctions. *Saguṇa*

is indefinable, though it can be experienced by supra-intellectual intuition. It is a vast ocean of pure existence, objectless consciousness and immeasurable bliss without any distinction of names and forms. Whatever is known intellectually is false and *Brahman* is the *bhūmā* (the Great) that can never be measured by logical thinking and is devoid of all qualities. *Brahman* is eternal and immutable and as such it does not get modified into the effect (i. e. the world) though the world has no substratum without *Brahman*. The effect, according to Śaṅkara, is a *vivarta* or appearance of an unchangeable ground and this appearance is due to a cosmic illusion (*Māyā*) which conceals *Brahman* like a piece of cloud covering the sun and creates many out of the one. *Māyā* is thus the basis of this baseless world. This *Māyā* is *bhāvāhhāvavilakṣana* and is not metaphysically real. It is existent because it is destroyed by *Brahmajnana*. It is neither real, nor unreal, nor is it both. It is *mithyā* or *anirvacaniya*. Though it has no beginning, it vanishes in the state of emancipation.

The illusory nature of the world in Śaṅkara-*vedānta*, thus, follows from the illusory nature of *Māyā*—its material cause. According to Śaṅkara, the evolution of the world is metaphysically based on *vivarta-vāda* which holds that creation is the projection of name and form on *Brahman*. The world is not real like the *Sāṃkhya-Prakṛti*, nor unreal as the *mādhyanikas* hold; it has relative or conditional reality which disappears in the state of liberation.

This cosmology of Śaṅkar which ends in illusionism is incomprehensible to most of us, as we cannot whole-heartedly believe that we are living in a world of magic and illusion. The pluralism of the *Nyaya-vaśeṣika* has, no doubt, admitted the existence of a real world founded on real causes; but as this theory fails to give a satisfactory explanation of the first atomic vibration, it cannot be accepted as logically sound. Further, it has not admitted God as the material cause of the world and its cosmology is not in harmony with the *upaniṣadic* texts. Ramanuja, therefore, holds that the pluralistic world is not an illusion but the pluralistic theory of N-V. is false and contrary to *Śruti*-texts. The central teaching of the *upaniṣads*

His importance has not been minimised in the *Nyāya*-philosophy. The individual souls are incapable of attaining true knowledge except through the grace of God. God possesses infinite knowledge and is all merciful. Like a loving father, He is always engaged in doing good to all living beings. It is through the will of God that the world is created and preserved. But when ever God feels that there is an excess of vice over virtue, He at once dissolves that sinful world with a view to creating a better one. In and through this process of creation, an ethical and spiritual purpose of God is being continuously realised. God is the sole giver of the fruits of actions in accordance with the law of *Karma*. No man is wholly free as he performs his action under Divine guidance and protection. In the performance of an action, man is only the *nimittakāraṇa* (instrumental cause) while the *prayajaka-karta* or the true inspirer is God Himself. Thus, God is the moral ruler of human action, the giver of rewards and punishments and also the controller of human sorrows and pleasures. It is only by remaining under His protection that an individual is capable of realising the supreme goal of his own life. Thus according to *Nyāya*, the qualified and the Personal God is the highest category of both Metaphysics and Religion.

Rāmānuja attaches equal importance and value to both *Saguṇa Śruti* and *Nirguṇa Śruti* and seeks to reconcile them in a harmonious manner in his conception of the Qualified *Brahman*. Like the *Nyāya* system, he admits the existence of a qualified God as the highest category of both Religion and Philosophy. *Saguṇa Brahman* is not a glorified Spirit caught up in the contradiction of the finite-infinite, having reality in the empirical sphere only. God limits Himself by love and intense affection and such a limitation is never an imperfection. On the other hand this sort of limitation brings out the bliss of infinite love and eternal life. Rāmānuja, however, does not agree with the *Nyāya* in admitting God merely as the efficient Cause. This is because the idea of God as efficient Causality only makes Him extra-cosmic. He, thus, ceases to have an intimate and immanent presence in the world. The *Saguṇa* texts of the *upaniṣads* suggest that God possesses infinite auspicious quali-

Brahman is subject-object and is less than the Absolute. It is a product of illusion and is not the highest reality. Śaṅkara, however, recognizes the needs of religious consciousness on the empirical level and concedes the empirical reality of *Saguṇa Brahman* or personal God. Though *Brahman* in reality, is *Nirguṇa*, it assumes a shape formed of *māyā* to satisfy the devotee. The infinite *Brahman*, beyond space and time, is thus localised and limited as the object of ignorance and the devotee loves and meditates upon the personal God and thereby secures his *puruṣārtha*. *Brahman* in reality is illimitable and unlocalisable but due to ignorance, it is supposed to reside in the heart of man. The Absolute of the *upaniṣads*, in reality, is free from the limiting conditions of the subject-object relation and is the one without a second; but under the spell of ignorance, the Absolute appears as *Īśvara* or *Saguṇa Brahman* who is the highest in the realm of the finite existence only. In the phenomenal sphere, He is the general controller of everything including the action of the *jīvas*. He is the God of Religious Consciousness and worship. So far as we are in the empirical region or the region of the *dvaita*, the highest category is this determinate *Īśvara* who is the creator and controller of this world of *nāma-rūpa*;¹ (name and form) but above and beyond this sphere of *dvaita*, (duality) shines forth the indeterminate nature of *Brahman*, devoid of change and mutation, creation and destruction. Since the indeterminate *Brahman*, when reflected in *māyā*, appears as determinate and personal, *Īśvara* of Śaṅkara is not false; His *Īśvaratva* (i. e. determinateness, personality, etc.) only is false. This is how Śaṅkara has sought to reconcile the *Saguṇa* texts with the *Nirguṇa*-texts of the *upaniṣads*. *Saguṇa*-texts are true only in the empirical sphere and not in the sphere of the Indeterminate Absolute.

The *Nyāya*-system, on the other hand, believes in the existence of a *Saguṇa Īśvara* or Personal God as the efficient Cause of the world. Though God is not the material Cause still

1. Śaṅkara's Commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra* 3. 2. 38.

*Tasyaiva brahmaṇo vyavahārikātmīrīṣitaṁ avibhāgāvasthāyamaṁ anyoḥ
svabhāvo varjate.*

of the world. The threads issue forth from the body of the spider and production of the threads from the body is controlled by the soul of the spider. From the body of a dead spider, no thread can be extracted. Thus material causality is ascribed to the soul of the spider due to its inseparable relation with the body from which the threads emerge.

Regarding the nature of knowledge also, we find that Rāmānuja's theory lies midway between the *Nyāya* theory of knowledge and the theory of knowledge of the *Sāṃkhya* and the *advait-vedānta*. Knowledge has been viewed by Gautam as a product. It is produced when the sense-organs are in operative contact with the real objects of an external universe. Thus, Gautam believes in the productive theory in regard to knowledge which has been described as the quality of the soul. The *Sāṃkhya* and the *Vedānta* on the other hand, believes in the eternality of pure consciousness and by following the *Upaniṣadic* tradition, they have described the soul as *jñān-svarūpa* (of the nature of consciousness). Pure consciousness is static, unproductive and substantive and it can never be viewed as a quality of the soul. The knowledge which is produced as a quality of the *antaḥkāraṇa* is non-eternal and phenomenal. It is this non-eternal and changeable knowledge which is capable of directly manifesting diverse objects on different occasions. Pure and static consciousness simply forms the stable background of these unstable and flickering cognitions. It is because the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* philosophers have not frankly admitted the existence of this pure consciousness as the essence of the soul that they hold the view that one consciousness is always discovered by another consciousness. *Sāṃkhya* and *advaita-vedānta*, on the other hand, recognise the existence of pure consciousness which incorporate all changing mental states which are enjoyed by the self and this enjoyment of the mental states by the self is what is called self-revealing character of the *ātman*. The changing mental states, on the other hand, are the effects of *antaḥkāraṇa* and are therefore non-eternal qualities not of the self but of the *antaḥkāraṇa*. The pure consciousness and the consciousness reflected through mental states which directly discovers the object are numerically one. Just as the watery

ties and the *Nirguna* texts imply that He is devoid of all bad and undesirable qualities. Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara when he declares that *Brahman* is both the material and the efficient cause of the world but he does not admit any distinction between the Higher *Brahman* and the Lower *Brahman*. According to him, the Supreme Reality is one and it is both *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*. All auspicious qualities constitute the essence of God and the conception of God as endowed with qualities is essential to all forms of meditation. Just as we cannot think of fire without heat and light, in the same manner, we cannot think of God without His essential qualities. The *Śruti* definition of *Brahman* as the ruler of the world in the three aspects of creation, preservation and destruction is not to affirm it first as *saguṇa* and then deny it as a figment of imagination in favour of an indeterminate *Brahman*. The illusion theory that ignores the reality of religious consciousness is itself false and absurd.

Truly speaking, Rāmānuja, by admitting the material Cause of the world as the body of God and also by holding that there is identity between body and soul from the practical point of view is in a better position than Śaṅkara in declaring *Brahman* both as the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. The *Nyāya*, however, has admitted that the atoms may be regarded as constituting the body of God but as the *Naiyāyikas* have not declared an *aprithaksiddhi* relation (inseparable relation) between atoms and God, material Causality of God has not been established (In fact, *Nyāya* has not admitted God as the material cause of the world). In the opinion of Śaṅkara *māyā* is the material stuff of the world but as *māyā* has not been described as the body of God, here also, the material Causality of God is not logically comprehensible. Moreover the *upaniṣadic* text “*yathā urnanābhi* etc.”¹ can be consistently explained in the light of Rāmānuja’s conception of the body-soul relation between God and the stuff of the world. Just as the spider is the material and efficient cause of the web, in the same manner God is also the efficient and the material Cause

1. *Mundaka upa.* 1-1-7.

Yathā urnanābhi syjate gṛhacaste

There is another important point in respect of which the *Nyāya* theory of knowledge differs from that of Rāmānuja. This refers to the relation between knowledge and its object. According to Rāmānuja, both knowledge and its object are substances. So, the relation that exists between them may be described as a form of *saṁyoga*. According to *Nyāya*, it is a form of *svarūpa-sambandha* known as *viśaya-viśayī* relation in which knowledge is looked upon as a connecting link between itself and the object. The object is related to knowledge by knowledge. No other relation is necessary to act as a connecting bond between the two. Knowledge is a quality (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the object is a noun (*viśeṣya*). No third thing exists between them in the form of a relation.

According to *Sāṁkhya* and *advaita*, the relation between knowledge and its object is of the nature of *vimba-prativimba*. Here the image and not the object that is directly manifested in knowledge. When sense-organs come in contact with an object in perception, intellect at once assumes the form of the object and this image is then cast on the reflected consciousness of the spirit (*upahitacaitanya*) as a result of which *vyākhyāna* (Phenomenal Knowledge) is generated. What is directly connected with knowledge is not the object as such but an image of the object.

Both Rāmānuja and Gautama have declined to regard phenomenal knowledge as a modification of the unconscious intellect as is done by the *Sāṁkhya* and the *advaita-vedānta*. But while the *Nyāya* believes in the non-eternality of knowledge which exists for three moments only, Rāmānuja has upheld the eternal view of knowledge. In the opinion of Rāmānuja, knowledge itself is eternal but the relation between knowledge and its object is non-eternal. Knowledge becomes expanded or contracted due to the *adriṣṭas* (desert) of the *jīvas*; as a result of such expansion and contraction of knowledge, there is more or less of the glow of knowledge and this glow is subject to change. Knowledge of the form of *buddhivṛtti* has been recognized neither by the followers of the *Nyāya*, nor by Rāmānuja. Changeable knowledge as a quality of the *dharmabhūtajñāna*

waves caused by an external factor like air are not different from the water of the sea which makes itself perceptible and enjoyable in and through the waves, in the same manner, mobile bits of phenomenal consciousness are not different from the sea of consciousness which constitutes the ultimate basis

Rāmānuja's theory of knowledge lies midway between the theory of knowledge of the *Nyāya-aiśesika* and that of the *Sāṃkhya* and *advaitavedānta*. Like the *Nyāya*, the epistemological enquiry of Rāmānuja proceeds on the assumption that experience in all its levels is real. *Pramāṇas* (Sources of valid Knowledge) are not false or illusory. They are real and what they reveal is also real. The world is not rooted in illusion and contradiction. It is a permanent and interconnected system of experience and there is no inner inherent contradiction in it. In Rāmānuja's epistemology, even dreams and illusions are perceptive reality and their subjectivity is due to the predominance of one element over others. Both Rāmānuja and Gṛātaṃ believe that knowledge is a quality of the soul, but Rāmānuja proceeds further and describes knowledge as the essence of the self. For him, knowledge is both a substance and a quality. Since it constitutes the essence of selves and God, it is a substance, it is also a quality as it exists as an attribute of God and *atman*. This attributive knowledge existing in God and soul is called *dharmabhūtājñāna*. It is this *dharmabhūtājñāna* that manifests an object to the subject to which it belongs, *Dharmabhūtājñāna* too is substantive as it becomes the substratum of expansion and contraction in knowledge. When *Dharmabhūtājñāna* functions, it not only reveals an object to the subject but also shows itself in and through its act of object revelation. Here, therefore, Rāmānuja agrees with *Sāṃkhya* and *advaita-vedānta* in holding that knowledge is self-revealing and differs from *Nyāya*, according to which knowledge is not self-revealing but is known only through another knowledge. Even in that case the *Nyāya* holds that the object is known before the subject and knowledge are manifested. Both subject and knowledge are known together when there is reflection upon experience (*anubhavasaya*). There is no simultaneous revelation of the subject, object and knowledge according to *Nyāya*.

of smell is made up of earth and apprehends smell which is the characteristic quality of the earth element. The organ of taste is made up of water and is the receiver of taste which is its peculiar quality. The visual organ is made up of light and perceives colour which is its characteristic quality. The organ of hearing is nothing but *ākāśa* and it perceives sound which is the special quality of the earth-element. Each sense-organ is, thus, capable of receiving the distinctive quality of that substance of which it is constituted.

According to Rāmānuja, the sense-organs are primarily *āhamkārika* in nature. They are *bhautika* only in a secondary sense, i. e. in the sense that their powers are nursed and fed by the *bhautika* objects.

Lastly, in the philosophy of Rāmānuja, we find a very logical synthesis between the *karmakāṇḍa* and the *jñānakāṇḍa* of the *Vedas*. According to *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, the main purpose of the scriptures is to make a person conversant with ritualistic actions. The concept of ritual performance rests wholly on the assumption of gods to whom sacrifices are offered and permanent souls who reap the fruits of the sacrifices performed. The individual soul is the doer of the *vedic* sacrifices and *devās* (gods) are the objects of worship. Hence a thorough knowledge of the relation between the *jīva* and its *upāsya*, as described in the *upaniṣads* has become a necessary limb of the whole body of the sacrificial religion. So, *karmakāṇḍa* is the most important part of the *vedas* and the *upaniṣads* simply form an auxiliary part. The *Mīmāṃsā* does not admit the existence of any God as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. It also does not believe in the creation and dissolution of the world. The world is permanently present in the usualom-JJ and order without any new creation or *pralaya*.

In the opinion of the *advaita-vedānta* the results of ritualistic performances can never be treated as eternal since they are produced. A thing that has a beginning is sure to have an end as well. The effects of all types of actions which come into being as a result of their performances are non-eternal ; there is no logic in making a distinction between the effects of *nityāna*

resulting from the relation of the object with knowledge has taken the place of *viṭtiñāna* in the philosophy of Rāmānuja.

The fact that Rāmānuja has not remained satisfied merely by recognizing knowledge as a quality of soul, but has gone further to admit knowledge as an eternal substance also reveals to us the essentially synthetic character of Rāmānuja's approach. The *upaniṣads* have always described the soul as *jñāna-svarūpa* and this has been kept unimpaired in his philosophy. But with the *Nyāya*-system he has felt the need for recognizing an attributive knowledge as well capable of manifesting diverse objects on different occasions. It is due to the elastic nature of this attributive knowledge that the different things of the world become the objects of our changeable phenomenal consciousness. Our inner perceptions always take the forms of "I know", "I am sorry", etc. and in all of them, the soul is always revealed as the substratum of knowledge and is never identified with any form of experience. The self as knower is always the substance that is characterised by different bits of knowledge. Hence the fact that knowledge is also a quality of the soul-substance, cannot be denied.

Again, regarding the nature of the sense-organs which form the basis of the psychology of perception, we find that Rāmānuja's view is a happy reconciliation between the *Sāṃkhya*-view and the view of the *Naiyāyikas*.

According to the *Sāṃkhya*, *Prakṛti* is the ultimate ground of all physical and psychical existence. *Buddhi* evolves out of *Prakṛti* when the equilibrium of the three *guṇas* are disturbed by a transcendental influence of the self for the sake of which all evolution takes place. *Buddhi* is the cosmic matter of experience. From *buddhi* arises *ahaṃkāra* which gives rise to the eleven sense-organs and the five *tanmātras* under the influence of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The preponderance of *sattva* in *ahaṃkāra* gives rise to the five sense-organs and the preponderance of *tamas* in *ahaṃkāra* gives rise to the five subtle elements. According to *Sāṃkhya*, therefore, the five sense-organs are *ahaṃkārika* in nature.

The *Naiyāyikas*, on the other hand, hold that the five sense-organs have their origin in five material elements. The orga

There is an ethical and religious progression in the apprehension and attainment of *Brahman*. Action by itself cannot be the means to the highest goal as is supposed by the *Mīmāṃsakas*. Nor is it right to hold with the *advaitins* that knowledge and action are opposed to each other like light and darkness and that all actions can be traced to *avidyā*. The real *sādhana* consists of *jñāna-yoga*, *karmayoga* and *bhaktiyoga* and a harmonious integration of these three constitute the real method of *Vedāntic* culture. The self has its being in *Brahman* and belongs to *Brahman*; but due to *avidyā-karma* the self forgets its real being, identifies itself with the body and subjects itself to the hardships of worldly-life. In the process of freeing oneself from the influences of *avidyā-karma*, the performance of the *vedic* rites forms the preliminary step. It is through the performance of the *vedic* rites that an individual soul is able to realise the distinction between the immortal soul and the perishable body. The perishable body does not enjoy the fruits of *vedic* actions, as it is being continuously renewed. The enduring soul alone reaps the results of the sacrifices performed according to *vedic vidhis* (injunctions). The highest form of action is *niṣkāma karma* which frees the mind of all subjective inclinations and objective ideas of utility. The practice of *niṣkāma karma* together with a full knowledge of the true nature of the eternally free self leads the *mumukṣu* to *bhaktiyoga* or *Brahmopāsana* that finally results in God-consciousness or God-realisation. The *upaniṣads*, therefore, are not independent of the *karmakāṇḍa* of the *vedas*; on the other hand, they constitute the final stage of the spiritual quest that started initially in the hymns of the *R̥gvedas*.

The philosophy of Rāmānuja establishes a harmony between these two views. He agrees with the school of *Pūrvaśrīmīmāṃsā* in holding that *karmakāṇḍa* of the *vedas* is mainly ritualistic and that all other *vedarūkyas* are the necessary parts of the *vedic vidhis* (injunctions) discussed in the *karmakāṇḍa*. He, however, differs from the school of *Pūrvaśrīmīmāṃsā* by emphatically asserting that *upāsana* (worship or Divine service) too is a form of action and that the *upaniṣads* are solely concerned with the

imittika karmas and *kāmyakarmas* so far as non-eternality of their effects is concerned. *Mokṣa*, being a permanent state, can never be the effect of even *nīttyanaimittika karmas*,¹ which are not done from selfish motives. The results of work, however good, fall within the range of perishable existence and work even if combined with meditation, can never lead to liberation. In fact, liberation is not a result produced from some thing. It always exists as a permanent stage though not known and felt by the bound souls living under the spell of *avidyā*. *Tattvajñāna* or *Brahmajñāna* destroys the illusory distinction between the self and *Brahman* and *mokṣa*-state or the state of *advaita* immediately shines forth in all its glory. The attainment of liberation is, therefore, compared by the *advaita-vedānta* to the discovery of the necklace on the neck of a 'person who forgot its existence on the neck and looked for it here and there. Hence, in the opinion of *Śaṅkara*, *mokṣa* can never be the effect of *karma* and therefore the *upaniṣads* form an independent part of the *vedas*, being concerned mainly with *Brahma-jñāna* which alone can help one to reach the highest goal of life, i. e. liberation.

Rāmānuja however is of opinion that the *vedas* are divided into two sections—one is called *karmakāṇḍa* or *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* which deals with the sacrificial rites and the other is called *jñānakāṇḍa* or *uttaramīmāṃsā* which deals with the nature of *Brahman*. In the *karmakāṇḍa*, the sacrificial rites and their non-eternal results are first of all discussed and then in the *jñānakāṇḍa*, *upāsana-vidhi* which is the highest form of action and its result in the form of *Brahma*-realization are fully treated. When the *mumukṣu* realises fully the non-eternal and unsteady effects of the sacrifices he becomes eager to practise that kind of action which will lead him to reach *Brahman*—the highest goal of life. Hence, the *upaniṣads* constitute the second division of the *vedas*. The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* are integrally connected and they are complementary to each other.

1. Naimittikeṣu karmasu na mokṣaphalam kalpyate. Tathā nityā. nāmapi na mokṣaphalam.—Bṛhad upaniṣad Śaṅkara's commentary : Introduction 3-3.

that it loses its' existence totally in *Brahman*. The world of plurality, therefore, is an illusion; the only thing real is *advaita Brahman*. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, admits the reality of the pluralistic world and postulates as the cause of the world the three real entities of God, soul and matter which are distinguishable but not separable and God is the ruling self with an infinity of perfections. Matter with its evolutionary changes and individual souls limited by *avidyā-karma* are the *prakāras* of God. From Him as their immanent source, they derive their being and function. As both spirit and matter which are the constitutive principles of the world are real, the world of multiplicity and change is also real. In the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* philosophy God, being external to the material cause of the world ceases to be its immanent ruler. He also ceases to have the characteristic of all-ness which is His legitimate due. In fact, the conception of God generally carries with it the sense that He is also the material cause of the world, as otherwise He ceases to be the essential condition for the existence of the world and loses all charm and significance. The *Sāṃkhya* dualism also that admits the existence of two independent principles only, fails to give us any satisfactory explanation regarding the contact between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in the absence of God and hence, although this system professes to give us a teleological theory of the world, it cannot really do so. Rāmānuja agrees with the pluralistic *Nyāya vaiśeṣika* and the dualistic *Sāṃkhya* in admitting the pluralistic world as real but he differs from them vitally, as he does not accept a theory of creation of which God is not the material cause. He agrees with the monism of Śaṅkara in holding that *Brahman* is the material and efficient cause of the world but he differs from an *advaitavādin* when he refuses to admit that this world is a figment of imagination.

Materialism, subjective idealism and absolute idealism too have been beautifully harmonised in the philosophy of Rāmānuja. The materialist identifies reality with matter only and gives us a naturalistic and atheistic philosophy which is one-sided and abstract in the sense that the importance of cons-

upāsānā vidhis and not with the *vidhis* (injunctions) of purely *kāyikakarmas*. In *upāsānā* which is a form of mental action, the object of worship is *Brahman* or *Īśvara* who is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the whole universe. Śaṅkara is right in holding that the *upaniṣads* are wholly and solely concerned with *Brahma-jñāna* but he is not right in saying that *Brahman* is never the *upāsya* of any kind of action. It is also not true to hold that the result of an action is always non-eternal. In the opinion of Rāmānuja, eternality and non-eternality depend on the nature of the result which one obtains by following a particular line of action. *Upāsānā* is such an action that it brings about total destruction of all egocentric actions. It also helps the worshipper to win the grace of God. Now, the destruction of actions cannot be destroyed and as such it is eternal. Further, God, being merciful, all-good and perfect, will always remain well disposed towards His devotee. Love of an ordinary self-centred person vanishes as soon as something contrary to what he desires happens. Divine love, however, is never withdrawn on selfish ground.

Truly speaking, Rāmānuja's system is neither strictly monistic, nor strictly pluralistic; nor can we call it strictly dualistic in character. It is, in fact, a sanctified confluence of all the three types of philosophical thought. Monism is admitted by the idea that there is only one *cidacidviśiṣṭa Brahman* and that both *cit* and *acit* constitute the body of this *Brahman* which exists in them as their indwelling spirit. According to strict monism of Śaṅkara, *Brahman* is the Absolute devoid of all differences and distinctions and the world of matter and mind is a false appearance of *Brahman*, caused by Ignorance or *Māyā*. *Brahman*, joined with *Māyā*, projects the appearance of the world which is only a creation of imagination. So long as an individual remains under the influence of *avidyā*, he views himself as different from *Brahman* and also perceives a world standing as an other and offering him both cooperation and resistance under different conditions. When the knowledge of an absolute identity between *jīva* (soul) and *Īśvara* (God) is attained, *māyā* is destroyed and the soul is released in the sense

Indeed this synthetic character of Qualified Monism has been maintained throughout by Rāmānuja and it can be safely asserted that the philosophy of Rāmānuja is a grand attempt at synthesising the current religious and philosophical systems of India in an ideal unity which does justice to *jagat*, *jiva* and *Īśvara*.

ciousness as a constitutive principle of the 'world has been totally denied in it. Subjective idealism, on the other hand, regards spirit or mind alone as reality and thus lands itself in solipsism in the absence of a universal spiritual principle of unity. The absolute idealism of Śaṅkara totally denies the values of matter and spirit and postulates *Nirguṇa Brahman* as the only reality. God and the individual soul are 'nothing but 'solidified masses of *Māyā*' which differ from each other only in degrees of reality (God being more real than the individual soul). Both of them vanish ultimately in the presence of *aparokṣajñāna*. The *advaita* theory of Śaṅkara, thus, becomes a mere abstract absolutistic theory. For Rāmānuja, however, matter, spirit and God are equally real. They form an inseparable unity and can only be distinguished and not divided. None of them is an isolated system external to the other. They are all vitally connected as a result of which our experiences of all levels of life are eternally {real, concrete and living. Rāmānuja's Principles of *satkhyāti*, *aprithaksiddhi*, *sāmānadhikaranya*, *śarīra-sārīri-bhāva* etc. act as cementing forces and reconcile realism, Pluralism, absolutism etc. in the philosophy of *viśiṣṭādvaita*.

In the closing chapter of *Śrībhāṣya*, Rāmānuja himself has said that his endeavour is to effect a synthesis among the different *upaniṣadic* texts which seem to advocate different theories such as *advaitavāda* and *dvaitavāda*, *bhedavāda* and *abhedaavada*, *nirguṇavāda* and *saguṇavāda*, etc. In the opinion of Rāmānuja, all the apparently inconsistent *upaniṣadic* texts can be harmonised, if the philosophical position of *viśiṣṭādvaita* is accepted. The *upaniṣadic* statements which seem to deny qualities of God, deny only bad qualities of Him. The statements which speak of *abheda* simply state that soul and matter cannot exist without being unified with God. The *Śruti* texts, which advocate *bheda* simply suggest that soul and matter are not unreal and false; they are as eternal as God, although they do not exist outside of Him. Thus, in his opinion a rational synthesis of the scattered teachings of the *upaniṣads* is sure to give us only the philosophy of Qualified Monism.

into existence will be useless. If the jar is already existent in its cause, then why should there be the operation of the efficient cause to bring the jar into existence? It is not proper also to say that the jar has been produced by the operation of the wheel and the stick. The *Sāṃkhya*, of course, seeks to defend its position by asserting that the causal operation is necessary to manifest the effect which was potentially existing in the cause. But this also is unacceptable due to some important reasons.

In the first place, manifestation and production are two different words having different meanings. Production means production of a single effect by the whole of a *Kāraka* (active cause) whereas in the case of manifestation, the manifesting agent can reveal many things existing in the same place and perceivable by the same sense with the help of other assisting factors (*kārakam samagramapyekam utpādayati; vyanjakam tu sahakārisampannam samānendriyagrāhyāni samānadesasthānāni sarvāni api vyanakti*). A lamp, for example, can manifest many other things besides a jar. If the *Sāṃkhya* says that the manifestation of a specific object can be effected only by a special manifesting agent with regard to a particular sense-organ and at a particular place where the manifesting agent exists, then this also is not tenable; because the *Sāṃkhya* has to prove, first, that only the potential energy is manifested in the form of the effect and that no new thing is thereby produced. Only then, it can be allowed to amend its statement in the manner stated above. When manifestation itself is not an established fact, any attempt to explain either the specific nature or conditions of manifestation is simply futile and uncalled for.

It may be urged in favour of *Sāṃkhya* that the instances available in our daily-life invariably prove that causation means manifestation of what is latent in the cause. The clod of clay can manifest a jar simply because the jar is an implicit state in its causal stuff. There is no instance in which a non-existent thing comes in to being as a result of the causal operation. But Venkatanāth says that this contention of the *Sāṃkhya*-school is true only in respect of that which is

APPENDIX-A

Venkatanāth's Refutation of the Sāṃkhya Theory of Satkāryavāda

Venkatanāth is not willing to accept the Sāṃkhya view that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in an unmanifested state. Causation, in his opinion, is production and not the manifestation of what is already existent in a latent manner. In his book entitled *Tattvamuktākalāpa* Venkatanāth has made a thorough examination of the Sāṃkhya theory of Causation with a view to making explicit the inconsistencies involved in the Sāṃkhya arguments.

According to Sāṃkhya, what is non-existent can never be made existent. It is only the sat which can be brought into being by causal means. The sky-flower which is non-existent, is not related to any cause. If the non-existent can be brought in to existence, then *Pramāṇa* also can be changed into *apramāṇa*. So, the effect must be assumed to exist in the cause prior to the causal operation. The cause is potent to produce the effect. A particular cause can produce that effect only the potency of which is already existent in it. If a non-existent and *aprāpta* effect can emerge from a cause, then why should there be emergence of oil from oil seeds alone and not from the dust or the sand? *Tailagarbhatva* (being filled with oil) exists in oil seeds only and not in anything else. The non-difference between the cause and the effect exists from the very beginning. Had the effect been a substance different from the cause, then there would have been the relation of contact between them. There is however no such contact and there is no separation as well since the effect is never outside the cause.

Venkatanāth has criticised this Sāṃkhya-interpretation of *Satkāryavāda* mainly on the ground that the effect can never be supposed to pre-exist in the cause. If it is so supposed, then the causal operation necessary for bringing the effect

covered by the *Sāṃkhya*-definition mentioned above. Hence the definition under consideration cannot claim universal applicability. Further, *nityaprāpti* cannot be a reason for establishing the relation of *upādāna* and *upādeya*. There is *nityaprāpti* between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, but there is no *upādāna-upādeya* relation between them. The *Sāṃkhya*ist may say that it is not *nitya-prāpti* (Constant complicity) alone that proves causation; this *nitya-prāpti* ought to be a case of *ubhaya-prāpti* as well. This too will not save the position of the *Sāṃkhya* because in the philosophy of *Sāṃkhya*, the union of *puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* has been compared with that of a blind man and a lame man which is a case of *ubhaya-prāpti*.

Again, in the opinion of the *Sāṃkhya* school, the cause is the potential effect. But this description is applicable only to the material cause and not to the efficient cause and other assisting factors although they too contribute a good deal towards the production of the effect. If the *Sāṃkhya* holds that the efficient cause too possesses the potency of producing the effect, then the *Sāṃkhya* will have to admit that the world exists in a potential state in the *Puruṣa* as well and that *Puruṣa*, therefore, is a part of *Prakṛti* (*Anyathā Prakṛterivā-tmano 'pi prapañcagarbhatvena Prakṛtitya prasamgāt-Sarvārtha Siddhiḥ*, p. 296). This is because the *Sāṃkhya* holds that *puruṣa* becomes the efficient cause by means of *Sannidhi*. Moreover, if the effect exists in a potential state in the efficient cause as well, then there can remain no difference between the material cause and the efficient cause (*Tathā satī nimittopādānavaisamyabīlayāt ca-Sarvārtha Siddhiḥ*, p. 296 Oriental Research Institute Mysore.)

The *Sāṃkhya* is not in a position to assert that the *upādeya* (Product) is always non-different from *upādāna* (material-cause) because it has not been able to state clearly what should be the real function of the material cause. *Upādeyatva* (material causality) of the *upādāna* (Cause) *kāraṇa* (material cause) cannot mean *tajjanyatva* (i. e. due to the functioning of the material cause). So, the effect will be non-different from the

absolutely non-existent. It is only a sky-flwer or a hare's horn that can never be prought into being by the operation of any causal agent. The so-called effect, however, is not non-existent in this absolute sense. It is in relation to time only that an effect becomes existent or non-existent. None can dispute the fact that the prior existence of the effect in the cause takes away from the causal operation all its importance and necessity for existence. Moreover, if a thing is *Prāksat* (existent before production) it cannot at the same time be *kriyamūṇa*¹ (*Api ca asadakaraṇūdi tatra kāryasya Prākasatve kriyamūṇatvādi-tyeva hetussyūttathā ca pratijnāhetuvirodhaḥ Sarvarthasiddhiḥ*)

—The assertion of the *Sāṃkhya* in respect of the prior existence of the prior effect in the cause contradicts our perceptual experience as well. Had the effect been already existent in the cause, we could have perceived it. But the effect is never perceived unless it is produced. If this opposition to perceptual experience is not accepted as an evidence for the denial of the prior existence of the effect in the cause, then even the existence of the sky flower can be proved by means of some arguments of a like nature (*Bhāvatvena tu prākṣattvam sādhayāma iti cet; tadā 'pi pratyakṣa virodhaḥ anyathā; nityāsato 'pi kutascinnityasattvasādhane nivārakabhāvāt*). In fact, if on the ground that a non-existent thing cannot be produced, we make the hypothesis that whatever is produced is already in existence, then we involve ourselves in to contradictions. The cause is really the unconditional and invariable antecedent of the effect and this definition is quite competent to explain the production of an effect which was non-existent previously in the cause.

Again, according to *Sāṃkhya*, there is always the relation of constant compresence (*nityaprāpti*) between the *upādāna* and the *upādeya* and so the causal rule runs as follows : that which always remains in a non-separable relation with the effect is to be regarded as the material cause. This relation of non-separableness is true only with regard to the material cause. The efficient cause is also a cause and this has not been

1. That which is being produced.

With regard to manifestation, again, it may be asked whether this is eternal or itself an effect. If manifestation is eternal, then objects are eternally manifested and no causal operation is necessary to bring anything into existence. If manifestation is itself a product, then in order to bring it into being, another manifestation will be necessary and that being a product will need a third manifestation and thus there will be the fallacy of infinite regress. Moreover, if manifestation is regarded as a non-eternal effect that was non-existent prior to its production, then the original *satkāryavāda* of the *Sāṃkhya* school will have to be given up.

It may be urged on behalf of the *Sāṃkhya* that the production of an effect is not of the nature of the effect itself for one always speaks of an effect as being produced. (*kāryam kriyate* or *ghataḥ kriyate*). Had production and effect been identical, then there would not have been the simultaneous use of two words (*ghata* and *kriyate*). Production, therefore, is different from the effect. If this difference is admitted then regarding production also, it may be asked whether the production is produced or eternally manifested. If production is supposed to be produced, then there will be the fallacy of infinite regress; and if production is eternally manifested, then the causal operation will be un-necessary. When manifestation and production present difficulties of the same type, there is no harm in accepting the view that the effect may be manifested.

To refute this, Venkatanāth has pointed out that production is the same as operation of the causal conditions; and this operation is caused by the operation of its own causal conditions. There is no doubt an infinite regress but this infinite Regress (*Vijñānāvat*) is admitted by all.

The opponent may pose a question; *kṛti* means productive effort or *yatna* and that is a quality of the soul. How can such a *kṛti* (Productive effort) be supposed to exist in the effect? This is possible by *upacāra* or *lakṣanā* (secondary sense). The *kṛti* of the potter is for the jar and it is because this productive effort is directed towards the jar that it is attributed to the jar in a

efficient cause as well. Again, the effect cannot be regarded as a mere modification of the material cause (*tadvikārūta*) because in that case, there will be perfect identity between the cause and the effect as the *Sāṃkhya* has not admitted any distinction between a quality and the possessor of the quality. Some amount of difference ought to exist between the cause and the effect from the *Sāṃkhya* point of view since the effect is said to exist in the cause. In the case of perfect identity, there cannot be any distinction between *vṛtti* (mode) and *vṛttimān* (that which possesses the mode) *ādhāra* (Support) and *ādheya*. (Supported). *Upādeyatva* cannot be *tatsambandhitva* either; because if there is perfect identity between the cause and the effect, then there can be no question of relation as relation always relates two relata together. Moreover, the relation of *Samavāya* (inherence) which is generally supposed to exist between the quality and the possessor of the quality is not admitted in the philosophy of *Sāṃkhya*.

The *Sāṃkhya* view that the relation of identity is to be inferred in all cases where the relation of contact is non-existent is also inadmissible. The relation of contact exists in those cases where both terms denote substances. If one of the objects related is not a substance, then there cannot be any *saṃyoga*. The denial of *saṃyoga*, however, does not establish the existence of the relation of non-difference. It is, of course, true that the effect is not a substance different from the cause. It is only a state of the causal substance but there is distinction between the state and the possessor of the state which are related together by the relation of *aprithaksiddhi* (Relation of inseparableness) There is no *saṃyoga* and there is no identity either.

The *Sāṃkhya* view that production and manifestation are synonymous terms is also not correct. Although in *dhātupātha*, the root 'jan' is used to mean *prādurbhāva*, still the meaning of *Prādurbhāva* is not manifestation. This word, on the other hand, is largely used to mean production. *Upādeya* (Product) is that thing which originates; and before origination, it was non-existent.

sadātmaka in respect of that characteristic which exists in a specific time and *asadātmaka* in respect of its past and future states. If we go beyond the age of *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and take into consideration the description of the cause given by Viśṇāna-bhikṣu in his *Viśṇūnāmṛta-bhāṣya*, we find that Bhikṣu too has admitted the *sadasadātmaka* nature of the cause in the practical sphere. When a particular state is existent in the cause, the latter is *sadātmaka* in respect of that state; but in respect of the past state which is no more and the future state which is yet to be, the substance is *asadātmaka* (*Sada-sadrūpavamevaca vyavahārika sattvaṃ..... nanu viruddham sadasattvaṃ kathamektro' papadyateṭi cenna, ekadharmena sattvadasūyūmparināmivastunūmatitanagata dharmenūśattvāt (Viśṇūnāmṛta Bhāṣya-1-1-4)*). Of course, the transcendental reality according to Bhikṣu is not *sadasadātmaka*.

Secondly, Venkatanāth seems to differ from the *Sāṃkhya*-view due to the fact that while the *Sāṃkhya* has concentrated its whole attention on the explication of the conception of the material cause, Venkata has given equal importance to both the material cause and the efficient cause and has considered them together under the conception of causation. He has described causation in such a manner as to include the efficient cause as well. But even if we coin a definition by stating invariability, unconditionality, etc. as the marks of causation, still the distinction between the efficient cause and the material cause cannot be overlooked. In fact, in all the systems of philosophy, the efficient cause has been defined separately by different characteristics. The efficient cause can become the cause by remaining present up to the moment just prior to the production of the effect but the material cause must be present even at the moment of production. Since the efficient cause does not enter into the effect, it can be destroyed without doing any harm to the effect; but the effect will not exist if its material cause is destroyed. The efficient cause is the power that helps the material cause to produce the effect whereas the material cause is the substance out of which the effect is produced. It is because the purpose of the *Sāṃkhya*

secondary sense as a result of which we say that the jar has been produced. At the very first moment, when there is a specific movement of the clay involving the jar-state of the clay, we say that a jar is produced. This production has no further production. It is because the jar-state was non-existent prior to its production, that the word 'Production' is used to imply the appearance of a new state in the substance.

If we compare the view of Venkatanāth with the *Sāṃkhya*-view of causation very minutely and critically, we feel that there is no such gulf of difference between the two views which cannot be satisfactorily overcome.

An important distinction between the the two views can be detected in respect of the use of the word '*sat*' in two different senses. According to Venkatanāth, '*sat*' is that which exists at any time. It is non-existent with reference to the present time, it may be existent in future. If it is existent in regard to the present moment, it may become non-existent in future. According to *Sāṃkhya*, however, a *sat* object must be eternally existent. It can only swing between potentiality and actuality, manifestation and non-manifestation. It can never be totally destroyed.¹ Causation is a repetitive movement and is not a process of the emergence of an entirely new principle. Since the effect is *sat* (real) it is always existent. For venkatanāth, the effect is a state of the causal substance. When this state is produced, it is existent in the cause and when it is destroyed or is not produced, it is non-existent. *Sāṃkhya* has used *sat* to mean eternal existence involving no time reference whereas venkata seems to have used the word *sat* in the sense of existence in time only and not in the sense of eternity which is not punctuated by time. Hence in his opinion, a causal substance can be described as *śaśvatsādātma*. It is

1. Here '*sat*' refers to *Prakṛti* that swings between potentiality to actuality. (*Parināmāsat*) In addition to this, *sāṃkhya* has admitted the existence of unchangeable eternal principle in the form of *Puruṣa* (*Kūṭasthāsat*). In *advaita vedānta* the changeable matrix of the world is not real. It is not *sat* but *anirvacanīya*.

sadātma in respect of that characteristic which exists in a specific time and *asadātma* in respect of its past and future states. If we go beyond the age of *Sāṃkhya-karikā* and take into consideration the description of the cause given by Viṣṇuānabhikṣu in his *Viṣṇūnāmṛta-bhāṣya*, we find that Bhikṣu too has admitted the *sadasadātma* nature of the cause in the practical sphere. When a particular state is existent in the cause, the latter is *sadātma* in respect of that state, but in respect of the past state which is no more and the future state which is yet to be, the substance is *asadātma* (*Sada-sadrūpatamevaca vāyahūrika sattvam nanu viruddham sadasattvam kathamekthro' papadyate cenna, ekadharmena sattvasasūyūmparināmi vastunāmātatanagata dharmenāsattvāt* (*Viṣṇūnāmṛta Bhāṣya*-1-1-4) Of course, the transcendental reality according to Bhikṣu is not *sadasadātma*

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is to prove that there is no production of an entirely new thing out of *Prakṛti* but just the manifestation of what is already potentially existing in Nature that this school has given arguments like *asadakaraṇāt*, *upādānagrahaṇāt*, etc.¹ with a view to making clear to us the fact of the potential existence of an effect in its material substratum even prior to manifestation. Since the effect is not produced out of the potency of the efficient cause which works on the material-stuff from outside only, the *Sāṃkhya* has not taken the trouble of including it into its definition of the material cause. All the arguments of the *Kārikā* no. 9 have been directed to prove simply the truth that the material cause always possesses the potency of bringing into existence certain specific effects which are its own states. Had Venkatanāth himself made an attempt to separate the efficient cause from the material cause by explaining their distinctive characteristics, he, too, would have come very close to the *Sāṃkhya* in respect of his definition of the material cause. In fact, he has agreed to join hands with the *Sāṃkhyists* if they accept the view that the aspect in which an effect differs from the cause is not existent in the causal state prior to its manifestation or that the effect is a new state of the causal substance which remains identical in and through all changes of states taking place at different moments of time. Since the *Sāṃkhya* believes that an effect in its fullfledged effect-form possesses grossness which is a characteristic of its manifested state only, it may be said that this grossness is something which was non-existent in the undeveloped form of the effect, thereby eliminating the apparent difference between the *Sāṃkhya* view and the view of Venkatanāth. The real difficulty with Venkatanāth seems to have arisen due to the fact that unless we believe in the production of a new state, the operation of the causal agents becomes a meaningless supposition. In order to keep the effectiveness of the operation of the causal agents unimpaired, he has asserted repeatedly that the effect-state is a newly produced state and that it was non-existent in the substance prior to production. [For Venkata-

1. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* no. 9

nāth, the effect state is the state in which the *avayavas* are combined together, (i. e. the state of *avayava-saṁyoga*). The cloth is nothing but the threads joined together. The conjunction of threads is not the *asamavayī kāraṇa* (non-inherent cause) of the cloth as is supposed by the *Nyāya*. On the other hand, it is the cloth-state of the threads which is regarded by us as cloth. So, the cloth as an effect is not an independent substance besides the threads and there is no contact (*saṁyoga*) between the two. Since the cloth is nothing but the conjunction of threads (*tantu-saṁyoga*), it is a quality of the material cause. Although there is difference between the quality and the possessor of the quality, still by the *aprithaksiddhi* relation, they are unified as one. According to *Nyāya*, three stages can be detected in the process of the production of a piece of cloth from the threads : (1) the threads, (2) the conjunction of the threads and (3) the cloth. According to Venkatanāth, the third stage is non-existent. The conjunction of the threads is what is described in the practical life as cloth. The *Sāṁkhya*, however, will admit the existence of the threads only. The cloth is only a developed state of the threads and as such it is called the effect and the threads are the undeveloped state of the cloth and so it is called the cause. In fact, according to the *Sāṁkhya*, both the cause and the effect are the potential and actual forms of the same matter and energy constituting the substantiality of the world. This identity between the cause and the effect admitted in the *Sāṁkhya* school is what Venkatanāth has refused to accept. So, he has introduced a new-state like *avayava-saṁyoga* to distinguish it from the causal state in which conjunction is absent and has described this state as the effect thereby making a distinction between the cause and the effect. He has also asserted that since the *saṁyoga* of the *avayavas* (which is the effect) is brought about only (non-existent before production) by the causal operation, it is *Prāgasat*. Hence the *Sāṁkhya* is wrong in supposing that the effect pre-exists in the cause.

Now, when the *Sāṁkhya* says that the effect is a gross state of the cause, it surely means by grossness some such form which was non-existent prior to the emergence of the effect.

That is why the *Sāṃkhya* has described the effect as "*Prakṛti svarūpam, virūpam ca*". It is because *Sāṃkhya* has not recognised any distinction between *avasthā*-(state) and *avasthāvana* (possessor of the state) that it has not admitted any difference between the material cause and the effect-state which as its state does not exist outside of it. Threads as the substance and the conjunction of the threads as the quality are not different according to *Sāṃkhya* and hence in its opinion there is no harm in establishing an identity between the material cause and the effect although the effect-state has something (at least in the form of its grossness) which was not present in its causal condition. When the *Sāṃkhya* says "*asad akaraṇāt*", it does not mean to suggest that the effect exists in its gross state in the material cause prior to its production. Venkatanāth, too, has said that an absolutely non-existent thing (*atyantāsat*) like "sky-flower" cannot be brought into existence. If the effect is not absolutely non-existent in the cause, then it must be supposed to be existent in the material cause at least in some form otherwise he will have to admit that anything can come out of anything. In the *Śrībhāṣya* too, Rāmānuja has accepted the non-difference of the effect from the cause and has also described the emergence of the gross world bearing name and form, from a subtle causal state devoid of any characteristic.

"*Ataḥ kāryabhāve ca tadevedāmiti upalādhērbuddhis abdāntarūdayo vāsthūbheda mātranibandhanā ityavagamyate. Tasmātkāraṇādananyatkāryam*"...(2. 1. 16)

"*Idamś abdānirdiṣṭasya jagatassattvadharmo nāma rupe ; asattvadharmastu tadvirodhini sukṣmāvasthā. Ato jagato nāmā rūpāyuktasya tadvirodhisukṣmadāśapattirasattvam*". (2. 1. 18)

The passages quoted above clearly prove that, according to Rāmānuja, the *asat upadeśa* of the *upaniṣads* refers to the subtle non-manifested state of the world and not its absolute non-existence. Even if we admit that the states or forms which were non-existent in the past are coming into being in the present, still as these states are developing gradually from the same causal substance, and are deriving their being from it, they are to be regarded as somehow existent in the substance

even before their actual development in the somewhat new forms. Their appearance in the effect-forms or more fully developed forms cannot, therefore, invalidate the doctrine that the effects are already existent in the cause. In fact, the theory of causation as expounded by Rāmānuja comes very close to the *Sāṃkhya* theory of causation. It is Venkatanāth who has introduced such differentiating concepts like conjunction of threads as the effect, the difference between the cause and the effect, etc, most probably with a view to distinguishing very clearly the theory of causation of his own religious sect from that of the *Sāṃkhya* school.

In the *Śrībhāṣya* 2. 1. 16 Rāmānuja has also stated "*ato bāla yubūdivat karaṇa bhūtameva dravyam avasthāntarāpannam kāryamiti giyate : ekameva hemajatiyam dravyam kāryakaraṇobhayavastham dṛśyate.....tasmātkāraṇūdananyat kāryam.*"

It is because boyhood, adulthood etc. exist as possibilities in the physiological make-up of Devadatta, that we find the gradual emergence of these states in his body. The existence of these possibilities in the *upādāna* has been described by the *Sāṃkhya* as the prior existence of the effect in its subtle state. The two schools really differ in the use of words only as Venkatanāth too has not admitted the effect as *atyantāsat*.

Further, just as in the opinion of Venkatanāth, the efficient cause must be related to the material cause and there must be the causal operation in the *upādāna* in order to bring the effect into being, in the same way, the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy too feels the need for the relation of the efficient cause to the material cause so as to bring about the manifestation of the subtle seed in a gross and perceptible form. That Venkatanāth differs from *Sāṃkhya* in the matter of accepting an identity between the *avasthā* and the *avasthāyān* is perhaps due to the fact that the main position of the former is different from that *Sāṃkhya* school. According to *Sāṃkhya*, the root cause of the world is an unconscious *Prakṛti* which is independent and self-existent. Since *Prakṛti* carries on the work of creation by its own power and energy, it has to be identical with its own power. But the *viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy has admitted the existence of a cons-

APPENDIX-B

Inferential Proof for the Existence of Prakṛti Venkatanāth's Criticism of the Sāṃkhya View

The philosophy of *Sāṃkhya* has sought to prove the existence of *Prakṛti* on the basis of inference. The reasons given in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* for proving the existence of *Prakṛti* by inference are as follows :—

*Bhedūnām Parimāṇāt,
Samanvayāt, Śaktiśaḥ Pravṛttestca
Kāraṇa kūr्या-bhūbhūgād
avibhūgād-vaiśvarūpasya.*

In the opinion of Venkatanāth, however, the existence of a unique principle like *Prakṛti* can never be established by means of inference. He has, therefore, taken much pain to show that all the arguments advanced by *Sāṃkhya* to prove the existence of *Prakṛti* are based on a false logic and a fictitious foundation.

The first argument "*vedānām parimāṇāt*" seeks to prove the existence of *Prakṛti* on the ground that since all things including *mahat* are finite and limited, none of them can be accepted as the uncaused cause of the universe. This uncaused cause of the universe must therefore be an *avyakta prakṛti* as otherwise the evolution of the world from a single cause cannot be explained. Spirit, being static in nature, cannot be the cause of the world. But in the opinion of Venkatanāth, the limited nature of *mahat* etc. can serve as a middle term to prove the existence of an unlimited cause only; it cannot be the reason for inferring the existence of an *avyakta prakṛti*.¹ Further, in the *Śruti*, *avyakta* has been described as '*parichhinnā*'.² The *Sāṃkhya* supposition that the cause must be larger in quantity

1. *Tatra parichhinnatvāt sakāraṇatamīyeco'nmurānaṃ na tu avyaktakāraṇakamiti*
(*Anandadayinīṭkā*).

2. *Tamasah parastanmṛtyum bhīnati* (*Sarvārthasiddhiḥ*).

than the effect is also not sound. A big cloth is found to be made out of a comparatively small bundle of threads. In the case of a tree also we find that huge effect is produced from a cause that is very insignificant in quantity.

The second argument "*samanvayāt*" is equally invalid. The *Sāṃkhya* holds that the *guṇas* which are inherent in all pleasurable, painful and indifferent things must be the cause of the whole world. In the opinion of Venkatanāth, "*Na hi yat yesu anugatam tatteṣūm karaṇamiti niyamah*" (*Sarvārthasiddhiḥ*). The qualities of whiteness, cowness, etc. inhere in a large number of objects but they are never regarded as the causes of those things and beings (*sauklyāgotvāderanekanugatasya tatkāraṇa-bhāvāt*). In the case of earthen jars, plates, etc. the quality of earthiness which is transmitted to jars, plates, etc. is not the cause; but it is what, in fact, inheres in the effect. The causal substance is never inherent in the effect (*Ghatādiṣu anugatasya mṛttasya tatkāraṇatvasiddhiḥ. Mṛtdravyasya tu ghatadyātmana vibhaktasyā vibhaktasya vā teṣu anugatatvadṛṣṭeḥ,.....Sarvārthasiddhiḥ*). Nor can it be said that the cause and the effect are of the same *upādāna* (material cause) as they have the same form; because in that case, there will be no distinction between the cause and the effect.¹ Further, if the three *guṇas* are regarded as the cause of the world due to the fact that these three are present in all worldly-objects, then the *Sāṃkhya* will not be able to establish the existence of a single cause in the form of *avyakta prakṛti*.² Even in the equilibrated state, the three *guṇas* cannot be looked and thought of as one because they will still be having their different contributions in producing their different types of effects (*Sāmyāvasthānam sattvaraja-stamāsam samghātaḥ prakṛtiḥ, ataḥ kāraṇaikatvamasyūt Tenna; citrapatārambhaka śuklakṛṣṇa rakta tāntu-samghātānyūyena sūkṣmadṛṣṭau kṛyūṇām yathūsvamkāraṇabhedasyaivaṅgikārāt,.....sarvarthsiddhiḥ*). (P. 133)

1. *Tadaṣṭi-rāpāramatanirdhūtam sārūpyahetau tatoabhedabhanga prasongāi... Sarvārthasiddhiḥ. Page 126*

2. *Guṇatroyātmakam ca kāraṇamiehhetauste visvasyaikopādānātvaṁ durvatanam... Sarvārthasiddhiḥ. Page 132*

The argument "*śaktiḥ pravṛtteśca*", too, cannot prove inferentially the existence of an *avyakta prakṛti* as the root cause of the world. The word '*śakti*' implies the subtle condition or the energy-form of the effect. The subtle or the energy-form of the oil is the oil-seed. In the example of oil and oil-seed, the oilseed is the substratum of the oil. If *avyakta* implies energy, then like oil-energy, it too must have a substratum as otherwise, the example of oil and oilseed will be an unsuitable one. Now, if a substratum of *avyakta* is admitted, then there will be more principles than what has actually been accepted by *Sāṃkhya* (*Yadi tailāśrayatīlavadavyaktavasthāśrayasvi kūrah, tadā pūrvavatśvestatavasaṃkhyā virodhah. Atha na; viṣamastiladṛṣṭāntaḥ*).

Lastly, the argument "*kāraṇa-kāryavibhāgātavibhāgāditi*" is also faulty and unacceptable. The argument of *Sāṃkhya* runs as follows: The jar and the golden ornament produced from the clod of clay and the lump of gold get merged in their causes and become indistinguishable from them. When the effects emerge out of the causes at the time of evolution they become distinguished from the causes; but during dissolution, the product merges into its source and thus disappears. The gross elements emerge out of the subtle elements and become distinguished from them. The subtle elements are produced from *ahamkāra* and as manifest products, they are separated from their cause. *Ahamkāra*, emerging from the *mahat*, becomes distinguished from it and *mahat*, emerging from the Great Unmanifest is separated from the latter. At the time of dissolution again, the gross elements merge into the subtle elements, the subtle elements into *ahamkāra*, *ahamkāra* into *mahat* and *mahat* into *prakṛti*—the Great Unmanifest. From these processes of evolution and dissolution, it follows that the effect is only a form of the cause which becomes manifest and unmanifest under appropriate conditions. As the Great Unmanifest cannot get merged into any other cause, it is to be accepted as the root material cause of the whole universe (*Prakṛtestu na kṛcinnivesa iti sa sarvakārya nūmayaktameva*). According to Venkatanath, this "*vibhāga-vibhāga*" reason of the *Sāṃkhya* establishes both the material and the efficient cause of the world although the latter has not

been covered by the *Sāṃkhya* definition of causation. (*Yatra kāryāṇām vibhāgāvibhāgaḍṣṭiḥ natatrasarvatropādānatvam, nimittēpikkacittadṛṣṭeh na hi kāṣṭhe pūrthivamso vanherūpādānam, na ca vanhyāmśo dhūmasya*).¹ The *Sāṃkhya* definition of cause is therefore incomplete since it leaves out the efficient cause.

Again, according to the *Sāṃkhya*, the qualities of the cause are ordinarily found to exist in the effect. Hence *avyūpti* can very well be made to this effect that in all cases, the effect has the same qualities as the cause.²

If we analyse fully the nature of the worldly objects, we find that each one of them is pleasurable to some, painful to others, and dull to a third group of persons. The whole world, being an effect, it must have such a cause possessed of these three qualities of pleasure, pain and indifference.

Now, since the *Sāṃkhya* view is that the qualities of the effect are the same as the cause, we are to find out the nature of relation between the effect and the causal qualities. In the first place, the effect as a substance is not identical with the causal qualities (*Na khalu tantvādiguṇaiḥ śuktādibhiḥ patasya-tādātmyamḍṣṭam. Sarvārthasiddhiḥ*). There can be no oneness between two distinct categories like substance and quality. (*Na dravyasya guṇatādātmyam*). The *Sāṃkhya* supposition that the simultaneous experience of the quality and the effect-substance favours the acceptance of the two as identical is false; because in that case the simultaneous experience of the form of a thing with its taste will lead us to believe that the form of a thing is identical with its taste *Dvayoḥ pīthagjanmānanubhavasva abhedasūdhakatve rūparasūderaikya prasaṅgaḥ sphuṭatibhāvāt, ... Bhāvaprakāśaḥ*). The effect cannot be identical with all causal qualities, because in that case there will be no difference between the cause and the effect.

Further, the followers of *Sāṃkhya* hold that the effect is

1. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Page 145

2. (*Kāryatoesati yeddharmavattvam ya'tra tatra kāraṇagatātaddharmātmake-taranti tyūptiḥ suyate. Kāraṇagumsivabhāvāt kuryasya ihaloke yadātmakeam* / *īraṇam tadātmakeva kuryamapi bhava'iti; Bhāvaprakāśaḥ*).

opradhāna and cannot exist apart from the cause. So, they are regarded as one. An effect has no other essence than its cause. It is entirely dependent on the material cause from the being of which it derives its own being. The cause and the effect are identical only as *upādāna* (material cause) and *upādeya* (product). It is because the effect as *upādeya* exists in its material cause as the *upādāna* that the quality of the material cause colours the effect as well.

In the opinion of Venkatanāth, this view of the *Sāṃkhya* is also inconsistent with its theory of manifestation. The relation that can exist between the *upādāna* and the *upādeya* is the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and this relation has not been accepted by the *Sāṃkhya* school.

The *Sāṃkhya* may defend itself by saying that by all these means it has tried to prove simply that the effect exists in a cause and since the world is an effect, it must exist in a cause which is potent enough to produce it. That cause is *prakṛti*.

Even this assertion will be of no help as it will be capable of proving simply that there is a cause of the universe. But it will not help *Sāṃkhya* to assert that the cause of the universe is of the nature of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (*Kāryavasthānām kāraṇa-dravyavṛttitvamūtra sādhanapatteh. Tathā ca na kāraṇavasthasya sukhādī ātmakatasiddhiḥ*).

If the *Sāṃkhya* further holds that only the essential qualities of the cause are transmitted to the effect and that the effect therefore is related to the cause only in respect of the essential qualities, then this also is not correct; because in that case, we shall not be able to explain the emergence of the living flies from cowdung,

The *Śruti* has described *Puruṣa* as *asaṃga*. So, *Puruṣa* can not have an inherent inclination towards the enjoyment of worldly objects. Had *Puruṣa* been supposed to be naturally inclined towards the enjoyment of worldly objects, then it could never have succeeded to become *asaṃga* after the description of the *Śruti*. Though *asaṃga* by nature, *Puruṣa* gets associated with pleasures and pains of life. How is this effected? In

order to explain the natural *asaṅgatv* of *Purūṣa* and also its association with worldly experiences which constitute its bondage, we have got to suppose some other category possessing the power of producing pleasures and pains and getting connected with *Puruṣa* due to ignorance. This category cannot be any one of the senses because in dreams, the senses remain inoperative and still one is capable of feeling pleasure and pain. *Ahaṁkāra* also can never be the cause of the experience because in deep sleep, *ahaṁkāra* is suspended and still there is the functioning of breathing. This may lead us to assume that *manas* is the category which serves as the intermediate link between the self and the worldly-life ; but this assumption too is to be given up since this has a limited function. Limited things are always products and as such they always imply the presence of a cause other than themselves. *Sāṁkhya*, therefore, infers that there is some unlimited and uncaused subtle principle of the nature of these characteristics which we find manifested in the world as its effect and with which the self enters into a false contact through beginningless ignorance. According to Venkatanāth, the association of self with the worldly objects is brought about by *karma*. The world has, indeed, evolved from *Prakṛti* which is only a mode of God; but the existence of *Prakṛti* as a mode of God is to be established on the basis of the scriptural authority only and not through inference or perception.

APPENDIX-C

Meaning of "That thou art"

One of the most important *upaniṣadic* statements which the non-dualists regard as the very foundation of the *advaita*-theory is the proposition "That Thou Art" (*Tattvamasi*) which occurs in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. The followers of the *advaita* school attach great importance to this *upaniṣadic* text because in their opinion this is the text that clearly and emphatically suggests the Oneness of the Ultimate Reality.

Brahman alone exists as the Highest Reality from all points of view. To teach this central truth (the identity of the soul and *Brahman*) is the aim of all *upaniṣads*. The text "That Thou art" expresses in a nutshell the whole teachings of the *upaniṣads*. In and through this statement the sages of the *upaniṣads* affirm that each one of us is *Brahman* and that there is no other truth besides *Brahman*. The *advaitic* interpretation of this important *upaniṣadic* text has, however, aroused opposition from the non-*advaita* quarters and both qualified monists and dualists have tried to interpret this text differently from their different points of view. Here I will try to make a comparative appraisal of the interpretation of "That Thou Art" given by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

Meaning of *Tattvamasi* according to Śaṅkara

In the opinion of Śaṅkara, this statement of the *Chāndogya upaniṣad* asserts the absolute identity between *Brahman* and the individual self. The individual soul, in Śaṅkara's opinion, is nothing but the pure consciousness of *Brahman* which appears not by itself but in association with the psychical apparatus known as *antaḥkaraṇa* and encased in a particular physical body. This association of pure consciousness with the mind-body system is due to ignorance (*avidyā*). In "That Thou Art" if 'That' refers to Pure Consciousness or *Brahman* and 'Thou' refers to Pure Consciousness in association with psycho-physical organism, then both of them cannot be absolutely identical.

Śaṅkara, therefore, says that 'Thou' refers to Pure Consciousness only apart from the mind-body system of which pure consciousness is the substratum. By 'That' also is not meant here the Pure Consciousness which is remote (*Parokṣa*) and which appears as omniscient, omnipotent etc. 'That' in the sentence really refers to Pure Consciousness only which is direct, immediate and devoid of all qualities, natural or supernatural. So, Śaṅkara says that the sentence under consideration expresses apposition (*sāmānādhikaraṇa*) between the two, *Brahman* and the individual soul as both of them are pure consciousness. Pure Consciousness is the reality underlying a particular mind-body system. Mind and body are products of Nescience (*avidyā*) and as such they are all false. The self, viewed apart from the psycho-physical system is identical with *Brahman* devoid of qualities like remoteness, omniscience, omnipotence, etc.

- When we remain under the influence of ignorance, the self appears as identical with the body, limited like the body and so on. The text like '*Tattvamasi*' reminds us of the great truth that what we illusorily accept as different are really one.

The notion of ego, according to Śaṅkara, consists of pure consciousness on the one hand, and body, internal organs, impressions etc. on the other. Of these, pure consciousness is the only reality whereas other associates are only false imposition on that real foundational principle. This blend of the unreal with the real, the false with the true constitutes our notion of the ego. The internal organs or the false elements only are affected by sorrows and sufferings, materiality and changefulness whereas the real element in the form of pure consciousness is unchangeable. This unchangeable part of the ego, if viewed apart from the unreal internal organs, is absolutely identical with *Brahman*.

'That Thou Art' is not a Tautologus proposition

According to *Advaita-vedānta*, the text under consideration (i. e. 'That Thou Art') does not involve tautology. It stands on a par with such a sentence as "This is that *Devadātta*".

When I perceive *Devadatta* for the second time and at once recognize him as the person whom I saw on some other occasion, I report this matter to another person by using such a sentence as "This is that *Devadatta*." Of course I do not mean to suggest that two places and two periods of time are identical. Indeed, two *Devadattas* seen under different conditions are different in certain respects. When I saw *Devadatta* for the first time, he was in Delhi and at that time he was healthy and happy. When I perceive him now, he is in Calcutta and he has become very lean and thin. He is also looking very depressed. So, when I say "This is that *Devadatta*" I do not mean to say that there is identity between the past healthy and happy condition of *Devadatta* and his present lean and depressed condition. Identity that is asserted here is the identity of the personality of *Devadatta* devoid of all such accidental characteristics as health and happiness or depression and thinness. Similarly, *Śaṅkara* says that when the individual self is declared to be identical with *Brahman*, the individual self characterised by egoism, agency etc. is not declared to be identical with *Brahman*. It is the self or pure consciousness, viewed apart from all false conditions, that is identical with *Brahman*. Thus in the case of both "That" and "Thou" part of the usual meaning is left out and part is retained. This is called *bhūgatyūgalakṣaṇū* (partial retention of the meaning of a word).

(In the case of "That" remoteness, omniscience etc. are left out and in the case of "Thou" egoism characterised by agency and enjoyment of worldly experience etc. are left out).

This *upanīṣadic* statement like recognition does not reveal to us any new knowledge. Its immeasurable value, however, lies in the fact that it removes the false notion of difference between the individual self and *Brahman*. Sometimes it may happen to me that due to weakness of the retentive power of my mind I fail to cognize that the person who is standing in front of me is identical with the person whom I saw two years back. It seems to me as if I am perceiving two different persons. Such a case of failure of memory is caused by some defect in our intellect. If in such a case, a third person comes forward

and says to me that the person under consideration is not a stranger, I saw him on some other occasion at a certain place two years back, then this statement will help me to get rid of my mistaken view. I shall reflect on what the third person has told me and through continuous efforts, I shall be able to realise the identity of the two apparently different persons. Similarly due to ignorance, we are ordinarily incapable of understanding the identity of the individual self and *Brahman* and we take them as different. This *upaniṣadic* text removes this false notion of difference and helps an individual to realise that he is the Truth and there is nothing besides the Ultimate Truth or *Brahman*. Thus this sentence is neither tautologous nor is it superfluous in any sense.

Rāmānuja on Tattvamasi

Rāmānuja, however, does not believe that this statement asserts absolute identity between the individual soul and *Brahman*. In his opinion there is no such absolute identity between soul and God. It is unthinkable that an individual soul which lives in God and which derives sustenance from God can be identical with God in every respect. Had there been absolute identity between soul and God then the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* would not have made this assertion "That Thou art". This is because it is meaningless to assert identity between two exactly alike terms. Judgment or proposition is always a unity of different. An identity judgment like "This is that *Devadatta*" simply implies that *Devadatta* qualified by one set of conditions is identical with *Devadatta* qualified by a different set of conditions. In "That Thou art", the two parts 'That' and 'Thou' are not unified in the form of a proposition to express simply the absolute oneness of one differenceless substance. No differenceless substance can ever become the object of any form of knowledge. All sources of knowledge establish the existence of some qualified substance and for that reason, experience, in all its levels, has a qualified substance for its object. The identity proposition "This is that *Devadatta*" actually refers to one and the same person perceived twice at two different

periods of time. Such propositions do not imply the identity of one substance leaving out the attributes. The *upaniṣadic* sentence "That Thou art" actually implies 'qualified identity' which means that God, as the cause of the universe is identical with God as the inner self of the individual soul (*Jīva*). 'That' signifies God as the cause of the universe and 'Thou' signifies God as the inner controller of the individual soul and both refer to the same substance. The identity, here, is asserted between two forms of the same substance (i.e. God). God is self-dependent and individual soul is God-dependent. So, to predicate their absolute identity is nothing but a perversion of thought. The individual soul is a mode (*Prākāra*) of God and as such it is neither a distinct reality external to Him, nor is it a vanishing being produced by the Principle of Illusion (*Māyā*). As a spiritual mode of God, the individual soul derives its being and function from God with whom it stands in body-soul relation. So, the judgment 'That Thou art' implies the personal identity of God under different conditions. *Brahman* as the Cause of the world and as the possessor of infinite auspicious qualities is identical with *Brahman* that resides in the individual soul in inseparable association with the material body (*acitviśiṣṭa-jīva*) as such a soul constitutes the body of God in which He resides as the inner controller.¹ The central core of the *viśiṣṭādvaita* system is a form of organic unity brought about by body-soul relation (*Śarīra-Śarīri-Sambandha*) in which the soul as the body of *Brahman* remains inseparably related to it and every movement of the soul is directed by God to the fulfilment of the Divine purpose.

Meaning of apposition (*Sāmanadbhikaraṇa*) according to Ramanuja:

In the opinion of Rāmānuja, apposition really signifies that different attributive words are predicated of one and the same

1. *Vedārtha-Samgraha* published by Dr. Jagannath Prasad, second edn. 1924, p. 35.

*Tatpodaṁ jagatkāraṇabhūtaṁ sakala-kalyāṇaguṇaganālarāṁ
rīraśāḍyam rīrīkārāṁśāṣṭe śvarūpīṇa tadeva brahṁa
jīvīnīryāmīrtipēṇa śarīrajīvīśārīrāśīṣṭārāśāṣṭe... ..*

substance.¹ In the case of blue-lotus, for example, the attributes of blueness and lotusness are applied to one and the same substance. Apposition never means identity of essence only apart from all differences. According to rules of grammar, when attributive words formed by *Prakṛti*, *pratyaya* etc. and having different senses are predicated of one and the same substance which is their common substratum, it is known as apposition or *sāmānādhikaraṇa*. Here also in the statement 'That Thou art' different attributes in the forms of Causal state and effect state are predicated of one and the same substance that is God or *Brahman*. The individual soul which as a category is inferior to God or the Highest Category can never be absolutely identical with Him. There is natural and essential difference between God and the individual soul. It is because the individual soul is the body of God that there is identity between the two from the practical point of view. In practical life, a word connoting the body connotes also the self of which it is the body. (*Śarīravāci śabdānām śarītraparyantatā-Śrutaprakāśikā Tīkā*, Śrībhāṣya, Vol. I, Sūtra 1-1-1, *Grantha* edition). When we say "This fair person is a learned man, by using the word 'fair' we refer to his body whereas it is the soul that is really the scholar; but here the soul and body have been treated as identical. Rāmānuja, therefore, asserts that all terms like tree, river, man, God etc. must refer ultimately to *Brahman* of which they are the body. In fact, the relation between the body and the soul resembles the relation that exists between the substance and the attribute. Just as an attribute refers to the substance of which it is an attribute, in the same manner the term that connotes the body also connotes the self. The body of *Śvetaketu* refers to his self and the self of *Śvetaketu* refers to God of whom it is the body. The proposition "That Thou art" shows identity between the Cosmic Self and the inner

1. Ibid. pp. 44-45. *Bhīṣma pravṛttinimittānām śabdānām ekasminnartho-
vṛtti-sāmānādhikaraṇyamiti*.

self of the Self having a body bearing the name of *Śvetaketu* (*Śvetaketu Śarirakū*), the soul of *Śvetaketu* is the body of the Cosmic Self). Apposition here does not signify bare unity established by the abandonment of attributes as has been supposed by Śaṅkara. On the other hand, it shows that adjectives having different senses possess the power of referring to one and the same substance. The word 'That' refers to God as the cause of the world and the word 'Thou' refers to the same God in a different aspect as the inner ruler of *Śvetaketu*'s self associated with a body.

Ramānuja and the Bhedabhed (identity and difference) Theory of Bhāskara and Yadavaprakas'a

From what has been stated above regarding Rāmānuja's interpretation of the judgment 'That Thou art', it is clear that in his opinion, the difference between God and the individual soul is natural and real. The individual soul is the body or a mode of God and as such, it can never be absolutely identical with God. There is identity only from the practical point of view. Ontologically speaking, God and the individual soul are different although they always stand in a relation of inseparable union.

Bhāskara, however, holds that identity is final whereas the difference between God and the soul is caused by limiting adjuncts like intellect, ego, mind etc. produced by Ignorance. In the state of emancipation, the finite transcends itself and gets wholly merged in *Brahman*. Hence the state of liberation is a state of oneness (*Ekibhāva*). Bhāskara seems to have followed the tradition of Audulomi who has expounded the theory of identity and difference between God and the individual soul. In the opinion of Audulomi, *Brahman*, when soiled by the body, sense-organs, mind, intellect, etc. appears as an individual. The individual again when purified by knowledge, meditation, etc. becomes dissociated from the body, senses, etc. and regains its own pure form as *Brahman*.

Absence of *Jiva-bhāva* (form of individuality) is the presence of *Brahmbhāva* (form of pure consciousness). (*Vedānta-Sūtra*, Śaṅkara's Commentary on 1.4.21). Bhāskara too has asserted that there is both identity and difference between God and the individual soul. Identity, however, is ontological while difference exists in the empirical life only. In the empirical life (i.e. the condition of bondage) the individual soul is different from *Brahman* because the purity of the soul gets lost in this state due to its association with ignorance, desires and actions. When through meditation and knowledge the soul regains its natural purity on the elimination of all the limiting adjuncts, it becomes one with the absolute *Brahman*. Although Bhāskara has upheld the view of final *advaita* (oneness) between the individual soul and *Brahman*, he has rejected the non-dualistic ideas of *Māyā* (Illusion), *Māyā*-bound God and illusory nature of the individual soul. The individual soul is finite, but it is not an illusory appearance of the unconditioned *Brahman*. The Infinite *Brahman* actually limits and finitizes itself in the form of many. The effect is a real transformation of the Cause and not its *Vivarta* or illusory manifestation. *Brahman* possesses infinite power of creation and transformation (*Parīṇāma-śakti*) as a result of which it becomes the manifold of living beings and non-living things according to moral needs of the world. This process of differentiation, however, does not spoil the pure and taintless nature of *Brahman*. It is a kind of sport with *Brahman* and this ceaseless creative operation simply proves the fulness and richness of the Highest Reality. Thus, in the opinion of Bhāskara, there is natural identity between the individual soul and *Brahman*. The differences caused by ignorance, desires, actions etc. in the empirical sphere, are practically real but non-eternal. In other words, we can say that, according to Bhāskara, there is identity at the root and difference only in the manifested world. Both are, however, real.

Yādaṇa Prakāśa too has declared the relation between *Brahman* and the individual soul as one of *bhedā-bheda* (existence of both identity and difference between *Brahman* and

the individual soul); but while Bhāskara has not declared the existence of both identity and difference in the final state Yādava Prakāśa has done that and has described *Brahman* both as different from and identical with the individual soul, by nature. Identity between the individual soul and *Brahman* exists only in respect of the relation of *upādeya* to its *upādāna* whereas there is *vyaktibheda* by nature. Hence, according to Yādava Prakāśa, even in the state of liberation, the individual soul will stand to *Brahman* in the relation of both identity and difference. It will never get merged in *Brahman*.

Rāmānuja's own theory, however, differs from the theories of both Bhāskara and Yādava Prakāśa who were regarded in that period as the staunch supporters of the *bhedābheda* theory (the theory that posits the existence of both identity and difference between *Brahman* and the individual soul). For Rāmānuja identity simply refers to the inseparable relation between *Brahman* and the individual soul. The being of a finite self cannot dissolve wholly in the Absolute in any state of its existence. In the opinion of Bhāskara, difference is inherently *abheda-dharmi*. The waves are different from the sea, but are also identical with it. Identity, {for Bhāskara, means absolute identity or total oneness. In the opinion of Rāmānuja, on the other hand, identity does not mean oneness; it simply refers to inseparableness. The self can never be dissolved into God. One substance cannot be totally merged in another substance. An individual may rise very high in purity and knowledge, but still there will always be a God superior to him. The individual is only a *vīśeṣaṇa* (adjective) of God and as such, he can never become one with God. An adjective can never get merged in the noun it qualifies.

The *Bhedābheda* theory (the theory that posits existence of both identity and difference) of Bhāskara, on the other hand, has a tendency to suggest that identity means essential identity which has been emphatically denied by Rāmānuja. Thus, while for Bhāskara, identity is essential and difference is practical, for Rāmānuja, difference is essential and identity is practical.

Rāmānuja has not accepted the theory of Yādava-Prakāśa either as he has refused to admit that both identity and difference are natural and essential. It is because of such difference existing between the theory [of Rāmānuja and the theory of *bhedābheda* (identity and difference) of Bhaskara or of Yādava-Prakāśa in respect of the relation between the individual soul and *Brahman*, that Rāmānuja has not given the name of *bhedābheda* (both identity and difference) to his own theory lest it might get confused with the theories of his predecessors.

The *Vedic* judgment "That Thou art" does not convey essential oneness (*svārūpaikya*) of *Brahman* and the individual soul. It simply implies oneness of a substance having two different attributes. The non-dualistic claim that this proposition establishes bare identity between the individual soul and *Brahman* by eliminating the attributes is false. There is eternal distinction between spirit, matter and God. Matter is the object of experience, spirit is the subject of experience and God is the ultimate sustaining principle of both spirit and matter. Hence God can never be totally identified with spirit or matter. Thus while for Śaṅkara, the difference between the soul and *Brahman* is false, for Rāmānuja it is true and real. Again Bhāskara says that the difference is non-eternal but Yādava Prakāśa holds that there is no contradiction in supposing that both identity and difference exist between *Brahman* and the individual soul at the root and also in the final state.

Conclusion

A careful reflection on the two interpretations of "That Thou art" given by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja will reveal to us that these interpretations are not in reality so wide apart as not to allow any compromise between them. No doubt, there are important differences but there is some subtle affinity as well.

The difference that strikes one at a first glance is that while Śaṅkara has negated individuality totally in the state of liberation by completely identifying 'Thou' with 'That', Rāmānuja has retained it till the last. According to Rāmānuja the soul

is one with God in a manner in which the body of a man is treated as one with his soul in worldly-dealings and worldly-affairs. It is this identity from the practical point of view that has been referred to by the *upaniṣadic* judgment "That Thou art". Otherwise there is natural and essential distinction between the soul and *Brahman*. In fact, the non-dual interpretation of this *upaniṣadic* judgment is not possible in the well-known express sense (*vāchyārtha*) of the words 'Thou' and 'That'. A non-dual interpretation is possible only when these two words are taken in their implied sense (*lakṣyārtha*). From the point of view of Qualified Monism, however, both the words (That and Thou) can be understood in their usual well-known meaning. The word 'Thou' stands in the usual manner for the Highest Reality residing in the soul of *Śvetaketu*, since in the opinion of Rāmānuja, every word refers to God and everything denoted by a word belongs to God as His adjective. Hence, it is not necessary to take the word "Thou" in an implied sense. The true *Vāchyārtha* (express sense) of every word is God. As adjectives are necessarily related to their respective nouns, so also all things and beings comprising the world remain inseparably related to God—their only substratum; and because of this inseparable relation, the substance (God) and the attributes (soul and matter) are treated as one. Otherwise even in the state of liberation, the duality between God and the soul is not annihilated. For Śaṅkara, however, individuality is a product of illusion and so when illusion is destroyed, the individuality of the individual soul is also destroyed. Thus according to Śaṅkara, there is singleness in emancipation and not the oneness of a whole whereas for Rāmānuja, emancipation is not a state of singleness but a state of oneness of an organic whole.

In spite of such metaphysical differences we shall be able to find affinity between these two conceptions of liberation from the psychological point of view. The Qualified Monism of Rāmānuja advocates a total identity between the soul and God from the psychological point of view. The liberated soul, through intense devotion, feels that it has become one with God or that its existence is lost in the existence of God just as a

lover experiences ■ feeling of oneness with his beloved in true love. Felt experience is one although experiences are two. Experience is non-dual according to Rāmānuja as well. For Śaṅkara, *Brahman* is nothing but pure experience or knowledge and for that reason he has stopped by describing this highest state of experience as a state of non-dual experience. He does not believe in the reality of any knower or experiencer besides knowledge. Rāmānuja has advocated the existence of God and individual souls as knowers and has for that reason asserted the existence of duality even in that state of non-dual experience. That the state of liberation is a state of non-duality from the point of view of experience has been accepted both by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

Further, in the opinion of Rāmānuja, the individual soul has no substratum other than God. It remains inseparably united with God who is its sole refuge. Hence though in the state of liberation, the individual soul retains its individuality, still this individuality remains inseparably united with Divinity. Now, the soul in the opinion of Rāmānuja is atomic in nature while God is all-pervading. Both God and the soul are principles of illumination (consciousness). If a principle of illumination which is atomic in nature remains in close proximity of a principle of illumination which is all-pervading, then the separate existence of the atomic light cannot be distinguished at all. The separate existence of ■ light of ten candle-power cannot be differentiated if it is used in a room in which a light of one hundred candle-power is in operation. So, the individuality of an individual soul is completely overshadowed by the all-embracing personality of the Supreme Lord. It is because of this fact that Rāmānuja has stated that the state of liberation is a state of highest affinity (*paramasūmya*) between God and the individual soul in respect of consciousness. If it is so, then it actually becomes an impossible task to distinguish atomic consciousness from all-pervading consciousness. It is because of this fact that Śaṅkara has perceived oneness in emancipation whereas Rāmānuja has maintained psychological oneness but metaphysical duality which is in tune with his own philosophical position. Truly speaking, the motive of Śaṅkara is to

preach the identity of *Brahman* and the individual soul while the aim of Rāmānuja is to advocate the existence of an all-embracing God with whom the individual remains inseparably related as His body. It is the duty of every soul to discover this Divinity in his own soul and for that reason, in the *Chānd Upaniṣad*, Śvetaketu has been advised to look within his own soul to find out the Soul of all souls.

APPENDIX-D

S'amkara and Rāmānuja on the Self-validity of knowledge

Knowledge, the function of which is to reveal reality may do its job either in a true manner or in a manner that is false. When knowledge is true, it is called *Pramā*, and *Apramā* when it is false. In the sphere of epistemology, therefore, two important questions demand solutions before we can make an approach to Reality through knowledge: these are—(1) how is the validity of knowledge constituted and (2) how is the validity of knowledge known to us ?

These two questions have been answered in different ways by the different schools of ancient Indian Philosophy. Here, however, we shall consider only the views of Śamkara and Rāmānuja, the two great *vedantic* thinkers of ancient India.

The View of S'amkara

Śamkara believes in the intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity of knowledge. In his opinion, knowledge is intrinsically valid and it is also known to be valid by its own intrinsic conditions. Just as the cognition of a cognition is self-revealed in the same manner the truth of a cognition is also self-revealed. All knowledge is self-luminous and intrinsically true. A cognition reveals not only its existence but also its truth. The same set of conditions from which knowledge arises constitutes its validity and also manifests its Validity. Hence cognition of a cognition as well as its validity are revealed simultaneously. In actual life, we do find that as soon as there is knowledge it is accepted as valid and we proceed to act immediately on the basis of that knowledge. It is, therefore, quite reasonable for us to believe that the truth of a Knowledge as well as the Knowledge of the truth of knowledge are revealed to us by the same set of conditions which are intrinsic to knowledge itself. The *Naiyāyikas* are wrong in holding that knowledge

in itself is neither valid nor invalid. Validity as a quality arises in knowledge by such external conditions as *bhuyōsamyoḡa satlingaparamarsa* (valid subsumptive reflection) etc. Truly speaking, there is no knowledge devoid of the qualities of validity and invalidity which are caused extrinsically. If knowledge is not accepted as intrinsically valid, then it can never be made valid by any external condition; because in that case, the validating conditions must be made true by other conditions and these by a third set of conditions and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus there will be the fallacy of infinite regress. Hence, if we do not believe in the self-validity of knowledge, our knowledge can never be made true by external conditions. The conditions which cause a cognition are the conditions of its validity as well as of the knowledge of its validity. The expression *svataḥ Prāmāṇya* implies that just as *Jñānatvā* is natural to knowledge, in the same way *Prāmāṇya* too is natural to knowledge. Cognition is, by its nature, true. It is vitiated simply by conditions external to itself. Of course, it is true that knowledge is validly generated only when there is a total absence of vitiating factors in knowledge, but these conditions do not play any part in making a particular cognition valid. The absence of these defects simply prevent the origination of invalidity in cognition. Such *doṣābhāva* should not, however, be treated as an external condition necessary for the origination of truth in knowledge. This is because *doṣābhāva* is negative and as such cannot contribute anything from outside towards the validity of knowledge. Had it been a positive condition, then the self-validity of knowledge would have been damaged. (*Doṣābhāvasyāpi hetuāṅgikūrāt. Na caivam paratastvam; āgantukabhāvakūraṇū pekṣyāmevā paratastvat. Jñāyate ca prāmāṇyam svataḥ.*) (*Ādāntaparibhāṣā* edited by A. K. Sastri—published by the University of Calcutta, p. 299.¹ Whenever a cognition arises, it is accepted

1. English translation :

"For the absence of defects is also admitted to be a cause. Nor does Valid knowledge become thereby dependent on other things, for dependence comes only when adventitious positive entities act as causes. The validity of knowledge is also spontaneously apprehended—"

By Swami Mādhavāṇand

as valid. It is admitted as invalid only when it is contradicted by another cognition. The cognition of a snake is invalidated only when it is contradicted by the subsequent cognition of the rope.

According to *Nyaya*, Truth is externally caused. In perception, contact of the sense-organs with a larger number of parts is the generating condition of truth. In the case of inferential knowledge (*sallingaparamarea*) is the required condition whereas in '*sabda*', (Verbal testimony) the character of the *apta* (Trustworthy person) serves as condition for making knowledge valid. Thus, in the opinion of the *Nyaya* school, there is no *dharma* which is present in all forms of knowledge for causing validity. Moreover, the resulting knowledge may be true even if '*lingaparamarsa*' is false. The *advaitavedanta* on the other hand holds that the constituting and revealing conditions of a cognition are identical with the conditions that make it true and also reveal it as such. So, if anybody raises the question, how does truth arise in knowledge? The simple answer is : it is due to those very conditions which constitute knowledge. In the same manner the question, how truth is to be known?, may be answered by saying that truth is known by the same conditions by the help of which knowledge is known.

Self-validity of knowledge does not however imply that knowledge can never be known as false. The invalidity of knowledge becomes known to us when it fails to satisfy our practical needs. Valid knowledge is not merely "*tadvatitaprakarakam jñānam*", but it is also "*saṁvādipravṛtṭyanukūlam tadvatitaprakarakam jñānam*."¹ Intrinsic validity of knowledge is known directly through perception but the invalidity which is extrinsic to knowledge is known through inference. When proceeding to act on a particular cognition, we find that it does not satisfy our practical need, we infer that it is false. On perceiving mirage from a distance, we take it for water.

1. "Valid knowledge is that knowledge regarding something possessing a particular attribute which has that attribute as its feature (*Prakāra*) which is conducive to successful effort....." Swami Mādhavānand.

But when we come near and find that this cannot satisfy our thirst, we infer that our knowledge of it as water is false.

While truth which is '*tadvatitatprakaraka*' is directly received by the *vyṛtti* of *buddhi*, falsity which is of the nature of '*tadabha-varati*' cannot be so received since *buddhivyṛtti* is capable of catching directly the image of that thing only which has a form. Hence, falsity of knowledge is to be known by us on the basis of inference with the help of the following *vyūpti*: "*yatra yatra nisphalajanakatvam tatra apramāṇyam*" (Wherever Knowledge is not conducive to successful effort it is invalid)

In the opinion of the *advaitavedānta*, therefore, all knowledge is intrinsically valid. No external condition is needed to make our cognition valid. Even the experience of non-contradiction cannot be supposed to serve as the standard for determining the validity of knowledge. This is because non-contradiction can be viewed in two ways: (1) non-contradiction for a certain period of time, (2) non-contradiction for all time to come. A cognition may not be contradicted now but will be contradicted in future. In that case, we shall have to say that this particular cognition is valid for the present only. In future, the same cognition will be contradicted and will therefore turn out to be false. In that case validity will cease to be objective and will become wholly relative to the knowledge level of the subject. Regarding the second sense, we can say that it will never be possible for human beings to declare that a certain cognition will never be contradicted unless they become omniscient. Hence, validity of knowledge must be self-evident.

It is because truth is inherent in knowledge and is also revealed by knowledge itself, that there can never be a case where knowledge is wholly false. In other words, according to *advaitavedānta*, knowledge becomes false only partially. Owing to the presence of some vitiating conditions (*doṣas*) the whole truth is not revealed. An erroneous cognition too contains a core of truth which becomes the substratum on which vitiating conditions project false characteristics. Knowledge of *īdam* is true and on it rests the false knowledge of silver produced by some vitiating conditions. Whenever knowledge

reveals itself it also reveals reality either in a manner which is wholly true or in a manner which is true only partially as the generating conditions of knowledge are not accompanied by the absence of *doṣa* (*doṣābhāva*). It is because *doṣābhāva* is not present in the case of empirical knowledge that empirical knowledge is not a true revealer of Reality. *Māyā* or *avidyā* which is the greatest of all the vitiating conditions is always present in the knowing subject at the empirical level and for that reason all worldly knowledge involving a sense of duality is metaphysically false. Only the substratum of empirical knowledge which is *Brahman* itself is true from the ultimate point of view. In fact, the *advaita* distinction between different degrees of Reality becoming the objects at different levels of knowledge, rests logically on the *advaita* theory of the intrinsic validity of knowledge. Gradual spiritual training necessary for liberation refers to the gradual removal of the external *doṣas* which prevent the inherent truth of knowledge from being fully manifested. These vitiating conditions or *doṣas* may be such that occur within the sphere of experience or they may be *apriori* lying at the root of knowledge. When the vitiating conditions are factors of the empirical world, the error can be detected as soon as an effort for doing something on the basis of that knowledge becomes unsuccessful. This is what happens with us in our day-to-day dealings and such errors are called illusions. Here also, illusory knowledge is not wholly false. The knowledge of the substratum which is wrongly characterised due to defects is true. The *apriori* defect however is involved in the very conception of a *pramātā* or knower and as a result of that it vitiates the whole of our worldly experience. This defect can be detected only from the standpoint of *Brahma-jñāna*. Hence in the opinion of the *advaita vedāntā* the world-knowledge is false metaphysically and has no validity, because there is the *avidyā-doṣa* while in the ordinary sphere, the *prātibhāsika* knowledge is false due to vitiating factors of the empirical world. Here we should be careful to note that the question of truth and error etc. arises, according to *advaita* when we look at the world from the practical point of view; from the metaphysical point of view,

validity, invalidity etc. are false since the knower or *pramatā* itself is false.

A common objection against the *advaita* theory of the self-validity of knowledge is that it fails to give a satisfactory explanation of doubtful cognition. If cognition occurs simultaneously with its validity and if the operating conditions in both the cases are identical, then no scope is left for doubtful cognition in which case truth has not been ascertained. In the case of doubt, knowledge of a particular *dharmi* is present but regarding its characteristics, the mind wavers between two sets of qualities which belong to two objects which are simultaneously revived in memory due to similarity. What is certain in doubt is the knowledge of the *dharmi* and this certain knowledge of the *dharmi* is absolutely necessary for the occurrence of a doubt. What is uncertain is the knowledge of the distinctive features of the particular *dharmi*. When we perceive a tall object from a distance but do not perceive the peculiar features of the object correctly, we have a doubtful perception such as "Is it a lightpost or a man?" Here we are definite about the tall object but whether the tallness of the object is associated with the peculiar characteristics of the post or of a human being is not known to us. Only the tallness of the object is truly revealed and so there is doubt. Now, if we believe in the self-validity of knowledge, then the conditions which produce the cognition of the tall object will also produce the validity of that cognition. Hence there can never be a phenomenon like doubtful cognition. Again, if it is admitted that in the case of a doubtful cognition, there is no definite cognition of the *dharmi*, then this also cannot be upheld; because for a doubtful cognition a definite knowledge of *dharmi* is absolutely necessary. On the other hand there is no difficulty for a person to explain doubtful cognition if he believes in *Paratā-prāmānyavāda*. This is because in that case, *dharmi* is definitely known but its validity is to be determined by some external conditions. The conditions which produce cognition of an object are different from the conditions which make that cognition valid.

This objection against the *advaita* theory of self-validity of knowledge can be solved in the following manner. According to the theory of self-validity, the generating conditions of knowledge *unaccompanied by the vitiating factors* are alone capable of making the knowledge true. In the case of doubtful cognition, the generating conditions of the cognition remain associated with vitiating factors. Therefore there is doubt—and so there is no knowledge of the validity. Thus although there is the certain and true knowledge of *dharmi*, there is no true knowledge of its distinctive features. Perception, inference, etc. when accompanied by vitiating conditions of a particular type give rise to doubtful cognition.

We can conclude by saying that in the *Paratahprāmānyavāda* (theory of Extrinsic validity) of the *Nyāya*-system the cause of validity is a positive condition in the form of quality whereas according to *advaita-vedānta*, a negative condition in the form of *doṣābhāva* (absence of defects) is necessary for generating truth in knowledge. In fact, *doṣābhāva* is necessary for creating every kind of effect from its cause. If there is a vitiating condition in a cause, then it will act as a *pratibandhaka* (obstacle) and the effect will not be produced. Therefore, *doṣābhāva* is not something that has been introduced only in the *advaitavedānta*. It is needed in every case of causation. The quality¹ that has been admitted in the *Nyāya*-system is however, a new innovation.

The View of Rāmānuja

Rāmānuja too has advocated the theory of the self-validity of knowledge. In his opinion all knowledge is self-evident and determinate. Even the so-called illusion is not invalid in his opinion. Illusory perception is also true (*bhramādi pratyakṣa jñānam yathārthameva*). Knowledge according to him performs two functions : (1) it reveals reality and (2) it also serves the practical purposes of life. The function of revelality is perfor-


1. Validity as a quality arises in knowledge due to *bhūyo samyoga*. Sat lingaparāmārśa, character of the trustworthy person etc. According to N.-V. both quality and absence of defects are the causes of validity whereas *advaita vedānta* admits only the absence of defect.

med by all forms of knowledge including the so-called illusions. From this point of view all knowledge has cognitive value and as such is valid. It is only in respect of the second function that we find a difference between the so-called true knowledge and the so-called illusion. While the former serves the practical purposes of life in the usual manner, the latter does not. Nevertheless, the latter form of knowledge remains associated with a general conviction of validity at the time of its origination and it is because of this general conviction of validity that a man proceeds to act on a particular knowledge as soon as he cognizes it. When he finds that his cognition is not satisfying his needs in the usual manner, he infers that his knowledge is wrong. Validity is not a product. It is natural to knowledge just as revelation is natural to all cognition. Both *Jñānatva* and *pramāṇatva* are self-revealing and as such whenever we have cognition we also accept it as valid. When we perceive fire, the validity of fire as a burning object is grasped with the very knowledge of fire and does not depend on any other cognition for its confirmation. Like Śaṅkara Rāmānuja also seems to believe that if knowledge is not self-evident, then it can never be known as valid by any amount of human efforts. Since in the opinion of Rāmānuja, knowledge always means qualified cognition, validity of knowledge too is grasped at the very first moment along with all other qualities and relations. If all qualities and relations involved in knowledge are not grasped even in the stage of indeterminate cognition, then they can never be grasped in any other subsequent cognition.

In the case of illusion, however, Rāmānuja does not suggest that the aspect of the object revealed in cognition is false in the sense that it does not belong to the 'given' (i. e. it is not objective). It is false only because the cognition here reveals the subdued elements of the object due to some physiological or psychological causes; and as such cognition here is not useful in the usual manner. Thus, according to Rāmānuja, the question of validity or invalidity does not arise in respect of cognition so far as its function of reality-revelation is concerned. The question of truth and falsity arises in respect

of its pragmatic aspect. According to Śaṅkara, however, the question of truth and falsity arises in respect of knowledge as well since a true cognition reveals objective characteristics whereas a false cognition reveals the superimposed characteristics which do not really belong to the substance. Śaṅkara has admitted truth and falsity in the pragmatic aspect of knowledge in a manner which is similar to that of Rāmānuja. A true knowledge serves a practical need satisfactorily whereas a false knowledge is useless. In the opinion of Śaṅkara, the object of false knowledge is "*anirvacaniya*". It is neither real, nor unreal, nor both real and unreal. Now it is the reality or unreality of the object of knowledge that makes knowledge true or false. If the object revealed is real and is of the same nature as has been revealed in knowledge, then the knowledge is admitted as true. But if the object revealed is not objective in all its details then the knowledge of it is also false. The object of false knowledge is called '*anirvacaniya*' in the *advaitavedānta* because of its belief in the self validity of knowledge. Since all knowledge when revealed is accepted as true, a false knowledge too at the very first moment of its object-revelation is accepted as true. At that moment, the object is felt by the perceiver as a real object, the object is regarded as *sat* during the state of illusion. When on the basis of this really false but seemingly true knowledge, one proceeds to act, he becomes unsuccessful and admits that the previous cognition was false in the sense that the object revealed in that knowledge was not real. Hence, the one and the same object, being an object of experience is real and being negated by pragmatic uselessness is unreal : and as such it has been described as *anirvacaniya* in the *advaitavedānta*. But Rāmānuja is a true realist and hence he is bold enough to declare that the object revealed in illusion is neither illusory nor indescribable. It is real, true and objective. In his opinion it is not possible for us to explain satisfactorily how an *anirvacaniya* silver can originate as an object of illusory cognition. We cannot say that the *anirvacaniya-ragata* will originate from the knowledge of "*Idam rajatam*". This is because there cannot be any cognition of silver prior to the production of silver. Hence there will be the fallacy of Mutual

Dependence (*anyonyūśraya*). It is also not intelligible to Rāmānuja how true "*rajata-buddhi*" can change into *anirvacaniya* "*rajata-buddhi*". Even in illusion, *rajata-buddhi*, according to Rāmānuja, is real in the sense that it reveals the silver-portion of the conch-shell. But this silver portion of the conch-shell is of a very small quantity and hence the cognition fails to serve the purpose of silver in the usual manner. Thus for Śaṅkara illusory perception is real only in so far as the substratum revealed in it is real. The characteristics imposed on the substratum are only apparent and not objective from the empirical point of view. For Rāmānuja however both the substratum and the characteristics revealed in illusion are true and objective. The only shortcoming of the illusory experience lies in the fact that the characteristics revealed here are the characteristics of those elements of the object which exist in it only in a small quantity. So, the object of illusion is not of the kind as will be useful in practical life. Śaṅkara has to assume a number of things such as the emergence of the apparent silver, the factors necessary for such emergence and also the destruction (which is contrary to ordinary experience) of the newly created '*prātibhāsika*' silver with a view to giving a justifiable explanation of Illusion from the point of view of "*advaitavedānta*". Since Rāmānuja has admitted the objective existence of the illusory silver, he has no need to make any of these assumptions. If the object of illusion fails to be of service to human beings its failure can very well be understood as being due to the fact that it is not of the quantity required for rendering services in practical life. Knowledge is revelation of objects and as such it is always valid. To have a firm faith in the object-revealing capacity of knowledge is the primary duty of every person who is not willing to accept the world as fictitious and blind.



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INDEX

A

- Abhāva 31, 32, 50
 Abheda 96, 200
 Abheda Dharmī 229
 Abhedavāda 200
 Abhimāna 28
 Abhivyakti 214
 Absolute 9
 Acintya 107
 Acintyassakti 187
 Acit 78, 91, 92-94, 96, 110, 116,
 187
 Acitviśiṣṭa Jiva 225
 Ādhāra 14, 206
 Adharma (Demerit) 181, 185
 Ādheya 206
 Ādbeyatva 103, 104
 Adhikaraṇa (locus) 32
 Adhishṭhāna 99
 Adhishṭheya 99
 Adhyāsa 146
 Ādhyāśikaśāstrīmya 131
 Adhyavastya 28, 87

- Advaitavāda 170, 200
 Advaitavādin 199
 Advaitavedānta 27, 58, 75, 120,
 126, 129, 136, 139, 177,
 178, 183, 192, 193, 195,
 222, 236-238, 240, 242
 Advaitins 120
 Āgamas 165
 Aghas 138
 Agniloka 134
 Agrāhya 161
 Aham 87, 101, 102, 111-113
 Ahamkāra 28, 86, 87, 88, 89, 112,
 143, 194, 217, 220,
 Āhamkārika 29, 194, 195
 Āhamkārika aham 112
 Ahimsa 146
 Alīvarya 162
 Ajada (non-Inert) 25, 79, 80, 91,
 107
 Ajada-dravya 25, 26
 Ajada-nature 80
 Ajada-tva 79, 80

Anaikāntika 56, 57
 Ānandamayātva 161
 Anantakriṣṇa Śāstri (Mahamahopadhyaya) 122, 135
 Anavasāda 146
 Anavasthā 118
 Andāl 21
 Aniruddha 162, 163,
 Anirvacanīya 42, 118, 186, 242, 243
 Anirvacanīyakhyāti 42
 Anirvacanīyanupapattih 118
 Anirvacanīya-ragata 242
 Anirvacanīyatva 119
 Anirvācyā 116
 Anītya 84
 Antahkaraṇa 101, 102, 124, 125, 191, 221
 Antaryāmi 10, 155, 168
 Anubhāva 52, 53, 58, 146
 Anudharsa 146
 Anugīta 13
 Ānukūlyasya Saṁkalpaḥ 149
 Anumāna 28
 Anumiti 54
 Anumiti-Jñāna 55
 Aṇutva 103
 Anuvṛtta-dharma 37
 Anuvṛttijñāna 35, 36, 37, 38
 Anuvyavasāya 192
 Anvayavyatireki 55
 Anyathākhyāti 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 51
 Anyonyāśraya 243
 Aparokṣajñāna 200
 Āpastamba 3
 Apauruṣeyatva 59
 Apradhāna 219
 Aprākṛta 161
 Apramā 234
 Apramāṇa 202

Aprāpta 202
 Aprasiddha 56
 Aprāthaksiddhi 78 fn., 92, 97, 98, 108, 131, 190, 200, 206, 211
 Āpta 59, 236
 Āptapuruṣa 59
 Arcāvatāras 164, 165
 Ārjaba 146
 Arjuna 148, 151, 164, 173, 174
 Arthāpatti 58, 59
 Asadātmaka 209
 Asādharaṇa-kāraṇa 106
 Asamavāyi kāraṇa 211
 Asaṁga 219
 Asaṁgatva 220
 Asata 56, 84
 Asatakhyaṭi 42
 Asatkāraṇavāda 63
 Asceticism 5
 Asiddha 56, 57
 Āśramas 131
 Āśraya 108
 Āśrayānupapattih 117
 Āśrayāsiddha 57
 Āśrayatva 110
 Āśrita 78 fn.
 Āśritaiva 76
 Asthūlatva 161
 Asti 84
 Āśurikeśvāchāryya 3
 Ātmā 103, 114
 Ātmajñāna 144
 Ātmakhyāti 42
 Ātman (soul) 25, 29, 100, 102, 107, 108, 115, 185, 191, 192
 Ātmanikṣepa 149
 Ātmanivedana 8
 Ātmatva 102
 Ātmāvalokana 147, 180
 Ātyantīśat 212, 213

Audulomi 227
 Avasthā 212, 213
 Avasthā-pariṇāma 93, 94
 Avasthāna 212, 213
 Avatāra 16, 163, 164, 168
 Avataraṇam 163
 Avayavas-211
 Avayava-saṁyoga 211
 Āveśa 182
 Avibhaktatamaḥ 82
 Avidyā 40, 79, 82, 112, 115-122,
 125, 126, 130-132, 196, 221,
 222, 238
 Avidyā-doṣa 238
 Avidyā-karma 133, 197
 Aviveka 126
 Aviveki-prakṛti 126
 Avyakta 83, 85, 107, 217
 Avyakta prakṛti 215, 216, 217
 Avyāpavṛtta 48
 Avyapti 218
 Āyu 80

B

Bādhakajñāna 132, 137
 Benares 107 fn.
 Bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā 223
 Bhagavad-ārādhana-karma 24
 Bhagavadgītā 6, 14, 16, 87, 141,
 150, 151, 171-174, 176, 177,
 179
 Bhagavad-Rāga 148
 Bhagavad-Śaraṇāgata 150
 Bhagavāna 147, 155
 Bhāgavata 160
 Bhāgavatapurāṇa 22, 87
 Bhāgavatism 7
 Bhaj 148
 Bhakti 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18,
 23, 80, 130, 131, 139-148,
 152, 170, 178, 179

Bhaktidarśana 140
 Bhgktimārga 151
 Bhaktiyoga 147, 148, 151, 152,
 197
 Bhārucci 23
 Bhāskara 221, 228, 229, 230
 Bhautika 29, 195
 Bhāva-bhāva-lakṣaṇa 186
 Bhāvarūpa 116
 Bheda 200
 Bheda-bheda 70, 227, 228, 229,
 230
 Bhedavāda 200
 Bhoktā 108
 Bhoktṛtva 108-110, 112, 130
 Bhṛgu 19
 Bhūmā 186
 Bhūti 86, 88, 89
 Bhūtas 49, 89, 91
 Biography 3
 Bodhāyana 23, 140
 Bodhāyanavṛtti 5
 Brahma 59, 60, 61
 Brahmabhāva 228
 Brahmajñāna 119, 186, 196, 198,
 238
 Brahmaloaka 134
 Brahman 4, 11, 12, 23, 24, 68-70,
 72-77, 83, 90-94, 96, 97-99,
 117, 118, 120, 121, 124, 129,
 133, 134, 136, 145, 146, 155,
 157, 160-162, 167, 168, 171-
 173, 176, 185-188, 196-199,
 221-232, 238
 Brahman-Jñāna 124
 Brahman-Realization 196
 Brahmaprakāra 131
 Brahmaprāpti 61
 Brahma-Randhra 12
 Brahmasamānaśuddhi 145
 Brahma Sūtra 5, 7, 14, 18, 23, 24,
 136, 140, 185

Brāhmin 3, 48
 Brahmoṣaṇā 197
 Bṛihadāraṇyaka upanīśad 9, 10, 12,
 Buddha 152, 153
 Buddha 28, 42, 86-88, 109, 111,
 194, 237
 Buddhism 6, 7, 91, 102, 152, 170,
 181
 Buddhistic-Philosophy 153, 170
 Buddhistic Way of Virtue 153
 Buddha-tattva 87
 Buddhivṛtti 193, 237
 C
 Caitanya 108, 111, 114
 Cakṣusmān 102
 Calcutta 223
 Cārvāka 98, 182
 Causal 226
 Causal God 162
 Causal Relation 62
 Causation 62, 203, 208
 Cause 158, 166, 225, 228,
 Cause-Brahman 76
 Cetana 26, 111, 113, 114
 Cetanatva 102
 Cetanāviśiṣṭa Prakṛti 95, 182
 Chalukyas 7
 Chāndogya Upanīśad 11, 84, 85
 in, 93, 132, 133, 221, 224,
 233
 Chingleput 3
 Chola 6, 8
 Cidacīdvaiṣṭa Brahman 198
 Cidacit 175, 183
 Cidacitviśiṣṭaḥ 160
 Cintā 28
 Cit 92, 93, 96, 159, 187
 Citta 28, 86
 Codanā 46
 Codanā-tīkya 46
 Cosmic order 9

Cosmic self 226, 227

Criticism 215

D

Dāna 146
 Daṇḍa 39
 Daṇḍin 39
 Daṇḍi Puruṣaḥ 98
 Dāsarathī 5
 Das Gupta S. N. (Prof.) 22, 106
 Dayā 146
 Delhi 223
 Devadatta 54, 59, 213, 222, 223,
 224
 Devas 195
 Devotee 142, 146
 Devotion 143, 150
 Devotional Cult 5
 Dhammapada 153
 Dharma 78, 147, 181, 185, 236
 Dharma-Bhūtajñāna 25, 26, 79,
 103, 108, 110, 113-115, 121-
 123, 125, 130, 150, 159, 192,
 193
 Dharmasāstra 48
 Dharmī 78, 239, 240
 Dhātupātha 206
 Dhyāna 128, 141, 179
 Dhyāna-niyoga 133
 Dichotomus 26
 Divine 148, 157, 160
 Divine-bliss 150, 178
 Divine Body 174
 Divine Communion 178, 179
 Divine Grace 179
 Divine Knowledge 147
 Divine Lord 150
 Divine Person 157
 Divine Personality 162, 172
 Divine Purpose 225
 Divine Service 140, 150
 Divine Urge 176

Divine Will 84, 149, 150
 Divinity 163, 233
 Divya-Sūkti 22
 Doṣa 43, 237, 238
 Doṣabhāva 235, 238, 240
 Drāmiḍa 23, 140
 Draṣṭa 108
 Draṣṭavya 161
 Draṣṭritva 108
 Drāviḍa-Veda 22
 Dualism 171
 Dvaita 173, 188
 Dvaitavāda 75, 200
 Dvāpar-Yuga 19
 Dvītyādiplīṇḍa-Grahaṇam 36

E

Ekāyanaveda 19
 Ekibhāva 227
 English 21
 Epistemology 25

F

Fallacies 56

G

Gadya-Traya 6, 24, 149
 Gandhatanmātra² 88, 98
 Gandhavattā 55
 Ganges 4
 Garuda 110
 Gaudīya Vaiṣṇavas 22
 Gautam 191, 192, 193
 Gavaya 58
 Ghata 207
 Ghee 80
 Gītā 14, 15, 16, 85 fn., 133, 143,
 148, 160, 163, 171, 172, 173,
 174
 Gītābhāṣya 143, 144 fn.

God 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9-20, 25-33,
 34-78, 82, 84, 85, 92, 93,
 96-98, 102-106, 108, 110,
 126, 128, 131, 133, 135-142,
 144-151, 154-162, 166-170,
 172-175, 181-185, 187, 192,
 195, 213, 220, 224-230

God-consciousness 197

God-realisation 149, 197

Gopi 21

Goptritvavarānamtathā 149

Covinda 4

Govindadāsa 5

Grahaṇa 145

Grahita 145

Grantha 226

Great Egg 184

Great Unmanifest 217

Guhadeva 23

Guṇa 15, 36, 80, 83, 95, 109,
 194, 216

Guṇa-Sattva 80, 81

H

Hārītagotra² 3

Hetu 55, 56

Hicun-Tsang 6

Highest Being 13

Highest Category 226

Highest Reality 14, 18, 155, 160,
 221, 228

Hīnayāna 170

History of Indian Philosophy 18,
 22 fn., 106 fn.

Hita 23, 24

Hooper J. S. M. 20, 21

Hostisāla 5

I

Ibid 107 fn., 141

Idam 42, 237

Idam rajatam 48, 242

Illusion 225, 228

Immanent 168

India 7

Indian Philosophy 97 fn., 111 fn.,
234

Indraloka 134

Indriya-Vṛtti 110

Inference 54, 55, 56

Īvara 92, 106, 108, 126, 157,
159, 167, 169, 170, 176, 187,
188, 198, 201

Īvara-Samhitā 136

Itihāsas 7, 171

J

Jaḍa (inert) 25, 26, 79, 91, 182,
Jagat 168, 201

Jaimini 19

Jaina 170

Jainism 6, 7, 170

Jāti 32, 36, 66, 97, 146

Jāti-Guṇa 35, 37, 38

Jātivīśiṣṭaguṇa 32

Jātivīśiṣṭakriyā 32

Jīva 14, 78 fn., 100, 101, 103-
106, 109-112, 117, 121, 149,
150, 156, 159, 176, 188, 193,
195, 199, 201, 225

Jīva-Bhāva 228

Jīvadīṣṭas 184

Jīvanmukti 131, 132, 133, 136,
137, 139

Jīvātman 11

Jīvātman 45

Jñāna 15, 108, 115, 116, 120, 142,
147, 152, 173, 179

Jñānakāṇḍa 61, 195, 196

Jñāna-Sāpekṣa 120

Jñāna-Svarūpa 115, 191, 194

Jñāna-Svarūpa Ātman 124

Jñānatva 235, 241

Jñāna-Yoga 143, 151, 178, 197

Jñāna-Yogi 147

Jñāta 113

Jñātriva 110

Jñātriva-Śakti 168

Jñeyatva 98

Jyotiṣṭoma 125

K

Kainkarya 131

Kāla 16, 17, 50, 91

Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa 56, 57

Kali-yuga 19

Kalpa 59

Kalyāṇa 146

Kāmyakārmās 196

Kāncī 3, 4, 5

Kāncipūrṇa 4, 5

Kāntimatī 3

Kāpyasam Pūṇḍarikam 5

Kāzaka 203

Kāraṇa 101, 157, 205

Kāraṇa Brahman 93

Kārikā 23, 210

Karm 25, 40, 60, 105, 110, 112,
122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 130,
132, 133, 142-144, 155, 157,
159, 163, 173, 178, 189, 196,
220

Karmakāṇḍa 61, 195, 196, 197

Karma Sannyāsa 178

Karma-yoga 143, 151, 178, 197

Karmic 184

Kārpānyam 149

Kartā 103

Kartṛiva 102, 108, 109, 112, 130

Kāruṇya 156

Kārya 97

Kārya Brahman

Kashmir 5

Kāṭha Upaniṣad 11

Kāyika Karma 178, 198
 Kevalānvayi 55
 Kevalavyatireka Sahacāra 55
 Kevalavyatireki 55
 Khyātivāda 45, 46
 Knower 169
 Knowledge 191, 192, 234
 Kriyā 146
 Kriyamāṇa 204
 Kriyamāṇa-karma 105, 125, 133, 137

Kṛṣṇa 20, 21, 22, 163
 Kṛti 207
 Kṣaṇikavāda 180
 Kṣara 14
 Kṣetra 18, 172
 Kṣetrajña 18, 172
 Kulasekhara 21, 22
 Kulottunga 6, 8
 Kumudasarovara 3
 Kuṇḍala 92
 Kuṇḍali 92
 Kuresh 5, 6, 8
 Kūṭasthāsana 208 fn.

L

Lakṣaṇa 207
 Lakṣmi 167
 Lakṣyārtha 231
 Lanka 22
 Liberation 127, 128
 Lingaparāmārśa 54, 55, 236
 Lokāchārya 78, 85
 Lord 142, 155, 172, 173

M

Mādhavānanda (Swami) 236 fn.
 Mādhyama-bhāva 22
 Mādhyamika 186
 Madras 3
 Mahābhārata 13, 160

Mahābhūta 88, 184
 Mahānasa 56
 Mahāpūrṇa 5, 11
 Mahat 85, 86, 215, 217
 Mahāvākyas 134
 Mahāyāna 170
 Mahāyānism 170
 Mama 101
 Manana 107
 Manas 86, 87, 220
 Mānasa-Jñāna 107
 Maṇiprabhā 26
 Mantavya 161
 Mathas 165
 Matsya-purāṇa 16
 Māyā 64, 75, 82, 83, 116, 126, 153, 156, 157, 168, 169, 186, 188, 198, 200, 225, 228, 238
 Māyā-bound 228
 Māyika Antahkaraṇa 112
 Māyika Isvara 153
 Memory 51, 52, 53
 Memory-image 51
 Memory-Knowledge 52, 53
 Metaphysics 62, 189
 Mīmāṃsā 58, 106
 Mīmāṃsakas 197
 Mīśrasattva 78, 81, 82
 Mithyā 99, 157, 186
 Modified monism 214
 Mohamedans 154
 Mokṣa 139, 196
 Mokṣa-state 106
 Monism 109, 118
 Muktavasthā 102
 Mukta 167
 Mukti 137, 145, 182
 Mumukṣu 146, 147, 178, 196, 197
 Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 11, 17, 18
 Mysore 203

N

Naiyāyikas 30, 31, 35, 36, 38, 39,
 74, 194, 234
 Nāmadheyatvamātram 116
 Nāma-rūpa 188
 Namm Ālvārs 20
 Nārāyaṇa 5, 7, 13, 18, 68, 80,
 155, 160, 161
 Nārāyaṇīya 13
 Nāsti 77, 85
 Nāthamuni 23, 139
 Nature 86, 95, 112, 172, 173,
 175, 176, 182
 Navidyā 116
 Navya-Nyāya 75
 Nāyanmārs 6, 7
 Neo-realist 51
 Nescience 222
 Nididhyāsana 107
 Nigamana 56
 Nīlakaṇṭha Śāstrī (Prof.) 7
 Nimitta 167
 Nimittakāraṇa 189
 Nirguṇa 187
 Nirguṇa Brahman 153, 160, 200
 Nirguṇasruti 189
 Nirguṇa-texts 188
 Nirguṇavāda 200
 Nirupādhika 55
 Nirupādhika-jñāna 79
 Nirvikalpaka 35, 36, 37, 38
 Nirviṣayacaitanya 124
 Niṣkāma 197
 Nitya 84, 167
 Nityamukta Jīva 162
 Nityanaimittika 196
 Nitya-naimittika karmas 125, 130,
 143, 178
 Nityaprāpti 204, 205
 Nitya-vibhūti 82, 90

Nivartaka-jñāna 119
 Nivartakānupapattiḥ 119
 Nivṛtti 60, 177
 Nivṛttimārga 177
 Nivṛtṭyanupapattiḥ 119
 Niyāmaka 104
 Niyāmya 104
 Niyantā 14
 Niyata 55
 North 7
 Nyāsavidyā 149
 Nyāya 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 97, 111,
 165, 191-193, 211, 236
 Nyāya-darśana 115
 Nyāyakusumānjali 183
 Nyāya school 35, 39, 47
 Nyāya system 31, 38, 55, 111,
 157, 188, 194, 240
 Nyāyavaiśeṣika 63, 157, 158, 180,
 183, 184, 186, 191, 192, 199
 Nyāya-vaiśeṣikasystem 90

O

Omnipotence 169
 Oriental Research Institute 205

P

Padārthas 157
 Pakṣa 55
 Pakṣadharmatā 54
 Pallava 7
 Panchadashi 81
 Pāñcarātra 18, 19, 140, 162, 163
 Parābhakti 15, 147, 148, 180
 Parādhīnakartṛtva 103, 104
 Prājñāna 148, 180
 Paramābhakti 15, 145, 147, 148,
 151, 153, 180
 Paramasāmya 232
 Pārama-sāmbhita 18, 19
 Paramātmā 11
 Paramātmān 92, 148

- Parārtha 56
 Parārthānumāna 56
 Parāśara 5
 Parataḥ-Prāmāṇyavāda 239, 240
 Paratantra 96
 Paratantra-bheda 96, 97
 Paratantratva 103, 104
 Parichhinna 216
 Pariṇāma-śakti 228
 Pariṇāminitya 182
 Pariṇāmisat 208 fn.
 Parokṣa 222
 Pārtha-Sārathi 3
 Patañjali 145
 Pauskara-Saṁhitā 18
 Perception 51, 52, 53, 54
 Personal Being 11
 Personal God 4, 14, 23, 188, 189
 Phenomenal knowledge 193
 Philosophy 115, 155, 160, 169, 171
 Pitriloka 129
 Pluralism 111
 Poona 103 fn.
 Position 171
 Potter 158
 Prabhākara 28
 Prādurbhāva 206
 Pradyumna 162, 163
 Prāgabdhāva 121
 Prāgasat 211
 Prajāpatiloka 134
 Prakāra 94, 225
 Prakaraṇasama 56, 57
 Prakāra-Prakāri Bhāva 144
 Prakāśatva 53
 Prakṛti 29
 Prakṛti 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 64, 70, 80, 81-85, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 116, 126, 130, 143, 144, 158, 159, 160, 167, 168, 171, 172, 175-177, 179, 182, 183, 187, 188, 194, 199, 205, 208 fn, 210, 213-217, 219, 220, 226
 Prakritikabuddhi 112
 Prakṛti-Śakti 122
 Prakṛtisvarūpam 212
 Prakṛti-Upāsana 175
 Prakṣat 204
 Pralaya 195
 Pramā 234
 Pramāṇjñāna 52
 Pramāṇa 52, 53, 114, 118, 119, 124, 192, 202
 Pramāṇānupapattiḥ 118
 Prāmāṇya 7, 235
 Pramāta 238, 239
 Pramāitva 241
 Prāṇagā Prakṛti 85, 86
 Prapatti 148-153
 Prapattiyoga 151
 Prāpya-Prakāśakāri 29
 Prārabdha-Karma 105, 106, 133, 136
 Prāśastapāda 184
 Prathama Grahaṇam 34
 Prathamapiṇḍa 34
 Prātibhāsika 238, 243
 Pratijñā 56
 Prativandhaka 240
 Pratyabhiñā 54, 58
 Pratyakṣa 28
 Pratyaktva 102
 Pratyaya 226
 Pravṛtti 60, 177
 Prayag 4
 Prayajaka-Karta 189
 Prayatna 185
 Presence 160

Preservation 168
 Preserver 156
 Prime cause 156
 Prime Mover 182
 Pṛthvītarabheda 55, 56
 Pṛthvī 55
 Proctor 142
 Purāṇas 7, 16, 22, 82, 84, 140, 171
 Pure aham 113, 115
 Pure-consciousness 117, 221, 222
 Pure knowledge 168, 169
 Pūrṇāchāryya 5
 Puruṣa 14, 17, 18, 39, 94, 109, 158, 159, 171, 172, 175, 199, 205, 219, 220
 Puruṣārtha 23, 24, 188
 Puruṣottama 171, 172, 173, 175
 Pūrvāchāryyas 22
 Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 52, 55, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 195-197
 Pūrvasaṁskāra 38
 Putikā 46, 47

Q

Qualified Brahman 175, 176
 Qualified Monism 200, 201, 231

R

Rajaraja 5
 Rajas 80, 81, 86, 90, 194, 219
 Rajata-Buddhi 243
 Rajatajñāna 47
 Rajatam 51
 Rajoguṇa 90 fn.
 Rakṣisyatiti viśvāsa 149
 Rāma 22
 Rāmānuja 3-8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22-28, 30, 72-75, 81, 83-85, 87, 88, 91-93, 96, 102, 105, 106,

108, 110, 111-113, 121-132, 138, 140-142, 146-153, 154, 155, 157-161, 166-169, 171-180, 183, 186-189, 191-196, 200, 201, 212, 213, 221, 224-227, 229-234, 240-243

Rāmānuja Bhāṣya 133 fn., 163

Rāmānujāchāryya 3, 24

Rāmānujadarśana 59, 116, 123, 124

Rāmānuja-School 88

Rāmāyaṇa 22

Rasatanmātra 88, 89

Rāvaṇa 22

Realists 51

Religion 171, 189

Religio-Philosophy 139

Revelation 114

R̥gveda 8, 9, 197

Rūpatanmātra 88, 89

S

Śabda 28, 58, 59, 236

Sabdanam 226

Śabdatanmātra 88, 89

Sadasadātmak 208, 209

Sadasadvilakṣaṇa 118

Sadātmaka 209

Sādhana 146, 151, 197

Sādhanabhakti 147, 180

Sādhanamārga 152

Sadhāraṇa Karma 184

Sādhyā 55

Sage 19

Saguṇa 160, 187

Saguṇa Brahma 11, 153, 160, 168, 188, 189

Saguṇa Īvara 16, 188

Saguṇaśruti 187, 189

Sagunavāda 200

Sahacāra 55

Sahakāri Kāraṇa 65, 158

Śaiva 7

Saivism 7, 8

Śaivite 5

Sakhya-Bhāva 22

Śakti 162, 217

Sallingaparāmarśa 236

Salvation 128

Saṁkalpa 87

Śamadama 147, 148

Sāmānādhikaraṇa 222, 225, 226

Sāmānādhikaraṇya 92, 200

Sāmānya-Jñāna 123

Sāmasthāna 65

Samavāya 30, 31, 74, 97, 206, 219

Samavāya Sannikarṣa 32

Samaveta 31

Samaveta Samavāya 30, 31, 32

Sambandha 36

Sambhitās 7

Saṁkara 25, 60, 64, 75, 83, 84,

94, 116, 119, 121, 124, 125,

137, 153, 155, 156, 160, 162,

165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 185,

186, 198, 200, 221-223, 227,

228, 230-232, 234, 241-243

Saṁkaracaitanyabhāraṇi 45, 47, 48

Saṁkarācchāryya 45, 63, 75, 116,

140

Saṁkarāṇa 19, 162, 163

Saṁkara-Vedānta 116, 117, 123,

186

Śāṁkhya 27, 51, 63, 64, 86, 87,

90, 94, 98, 108, 109, 111,

112, 115, 157, 171, 172, 176,

180, 182, 191-194, 199, 202-

210, 211-220

Saṁkhya-Kārikā 62, 209, 210,

215

Saṁkhya-Prakṛti 186

Saṁkhya-view 194, 215

Saṁkhya-Yoga 87

Saṁkhya-Yoga philosophy 90

Sāṁkhyists 210

Sampatti 145

Saṁskāra 36, 53

Samvedanā 114

Saṁyoga 27, 30-33, 184, 193,
206

Saṁyoga Sannikarṣa 32

Saṁyukta 31

Saṁyukta-Samavāya 30, 31

Saṁyukta-Samavāya-Sannikarṣa 31

Saṁyukta Samaveta Samavāya 30,
31, 32

Saṁyukta-Sannikarṣa 31

Saṁyuktāśraya 30, 31, 33

Saṁyuktāśraya Sannikarṣa 32

Sancita-Karmas 106, 125, 133, 137

Saṇḍagau 48, 49

Sanders K. J. 163

Sāṇḍilya 19

Sannidhi 205

Sannikarṣa 31, 32

Sanskrit 3, 7, 163

Śaraṇāgati 14, 151

Śarīra-Śarīri 92

Śarīra-Śarīri Bhāva 144, 200

Śarīra-śarīri-sambandha 225

Sariravaci 226

Śarīri-Śarīra Sambandha 70

Sarvajnatva 134, 135

Sarvārtha-Siddhiḥ 216

Sasanga 112

Śāstra 81, 109, 160

Sāstri A. K. 235

Sat 242

Satabhūṣaṇi 96, 97, 122, 123

Satakhyaṭi 40, 47, 48, 50, 200

Sathkopa 5

Sathkopa Ālvar 20

- Saikāryavāda 63, 64, 67, 202, 207
 Sattva 81, 86, 90, 91, 194, 219
 Sattvaguna 86
 Sattva-Sūnya 78, 90, 91
 Sattvata-Sambhā 18
 Sātvika 146
 Sātvika Abhāṁkāra 86, 87
 Satya 146
 Satya-Kāmatva 11
 Satyaloka 129
 Satya-Samkalpatva 11, 134, 135
 Saulabhya 156
 Sausliya 156
 Savikalpaka 35, 38
 Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa 34, 36
 Saviour 149
 Sīyujya 138
 Self-Revelation 114
 Self-Surrender 130, 131
 Śeṣa 96, 104, 110, 150, 176
 Śeṣa-Śeṣi Bhāva 144
 Śeṣatva 103, 150
 Śeṣi 14, 150, 155
 Sharma C. D. (Dr.) 97 fn., 111, 113
 Siddhāvastu 50, 155
 Siddhāntaraya 23
 Smṛti 53, 54
 Smṛti-Jñāna 52
 Soul 156, 173
 Soul of all souls 233
 Soma 47
 Soma-Creeper 46
 Sources 192
 South 7
 South India 6, 7
 Spāśātanmātra 88, 89
 Śravaṇa 107
 Śrībhaktiya 6, 14, 16, 23, 24, 46, 71 fn., 72 fn., 77 fn., 84 fn., 85 fn., 87 fn., 89 fn., 91 fn., 94 fn., 105 fn., 114 fn., 131 fn., 132 fn., 141, 142 fn., 145 fn., 149, 165, 200, 212, 213, 226
 Śrīkrishṇa 148
 Śrīmahābhūtapurī 3
 Śrīnivasacari 140 fn.
 Śrīperumbudus 3
 Śrīrangam 4, 5, 6, 8
 Śrīśailapūrṇa 3
 Śrīvaiṣṇava School 80
 Śrīvaiṣṇu 165
 Śrīṣṭi 59
 Śruti 5, 46, 47, 83, 85, 103, 104, 215, 219
 Śruti-Texts 22, 128, 138, 186
 Sthitaprajña 133, 138, 139
 Sthiravāda 180
 Subservient 150
 Substratum 158
 Sudarśana Suri 118 fn.
 Suddhasattva 78, 79, 80-82, 91, 140, 157, 168
 Sumantu 19
 Supreme Being 142, 148, 162, 175
 Supreme Category 161
 Supreme Conscious Being 171
 Supreme Divinity 12, 174, 175
 Supreme Lord 174, 184, 232
 Supreme Person 175
 Supreme Personality 80, 142
 Supreme Reality 23, 142, 153, 159, 162, 164, 168
 Supreme Spirit 157
 Supreme Truth 10, 17
 Supreme Value 156
 Surātmaka 46, 48
 Suśūpti 107, 114, 125
 Sutra 105, 165

Upādhi 84, 90, 168
 Upahitacaitanya 193
 Upakaraṇas 135
 Upalakṣaṇa 76
 Upamāna 58
 Upanaya 56
 Upaniṣad 9, 12, 14, 115, 141,
 160-163, 170, 171, 185-188,
 194-198, 212, 221, 224
 Upaniṣadic 186, 191, 221, 223,
 224, 225
 Upaniṣadic Texts 200
 Upāsakas 165
 Upāsana 60, 61, 128, 130, 138,
 141, 175, 197, 198
 Upāsanaṅkṛyā 60
 Upāsana-Vidhi 196, 198
 Upāśya 195, 198
 Upāya Bhakti 147
 Upāyabudhi 131
 Utkramaṇa 103
 Utpatti 68
 Utpattivādin 214
 Uttaramīmāṃsā 61, 196
 V
 Vacaspatimīśra 62, 64
 Vāchyārtha 231
 Vaidika 153
 Vaidika-Karma 125, 152
 Vaidika Religion 154
 Vaidika Rites 152
 Vaidika 86
 Vaikunṭha 29, 110, 134, 137, 139,
 162, 164, 167, 168
 Valrāgya (detachment) 145, 153
 Vaiśeṣikas 185
 Vaiṣṇava 4, 6, 7, 8, 19, 82
 Vaiṣṇava cult 154

Vaiṣṇava Tantras 139
 Vaiṣṇavism 5, 7, 152, 154
 Vaiṣṇavite 6
 Vākyaṛthajñāna 132, 138
 Validity 234, 235
 Van Buitenen J. A. B. 86 fn.
 Varavaramuni 82
 Varnas 131, 164
 Varnāśrama-Karmas 121
 Varuṇaloka 134
 Vāsana 43
 Vasiṣṭha 8
 Vāsudeva 16, 17, 18, 162, 163,
 176, 177
 Vātsalya 156
 Vātsalyabhāva 22
 Vāyuloka 134
 Vedana 128, 141
 Vedānta 111, 191
 Vedāntadīpa 6, 24, 30
 Vedānta Philosophy 170
 Vedāntasāra 6, 24
 Vedānta-Sūtra 228
 Vedāntic 197
 Vedārthasaṃgraha 6, 16, 24, 80,-
 103 fn., 118 fn., 121 fn., 141,
 163
 Vedas 7, 8, 9, 59, 61, 140, 195
 Vedavākya 197
 Vedic Judgment 230
 Vedic Karma 127
 Vedic Rites 130
 Vedic Rituals 127
 Vedic Vidhi 197
 Venkatanath 202, 208, 209-211,-
 212, 213, 215, 216, 217-219,-
 220
 Vibhaktatamaḥ 82, 83

- Vibhavas 18
 Videhamukti 131, 132
 Vidheyatva 103, 104 fn.
 Vidyā 131, 161
 Vidyāraṇya Muni 47, 48
 Vighrahas 165
 Vijāṁkuravat 207
 Vijānabhāṣya 209
 Vijānabhikṣu 209
 Vikrama Chola 6, 8
 Vimba-Pratīvimba 27, 193
 Vimoka 146
 Viruddha 56, 57
 Virūpam 212
 Virya 162
 Viśaya-Viśaya 193
 Viśeṣaṇa 36, 75, 78 fn., 175, 187,
 193, 229
 Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva 30, 31
 Viśeṣaṇa Viśeṣya-Sanaikarṣa 32
 Viśeṣya 193
 Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa sambandha 68
 Viśiṣṭa alkya 145
 Viśiṣṭadvaita 5, 14, 22, 23, 32, 35,
 52, 56, 58-61, 77, 79, 80, 82,
 88, 90, 91, 99, 100, 102, 122,
 137, 139, 140, 161, 167, 198,
 169-171, 175, 176, 200, 213,
 225
 Viśiṣṭadvaita darśana 23
 Viśiṣṭadvaita school 32
 Viśiṣṭadvaitavāda 13, 19
 Viṣṇu 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17,
 18, 20, 80, 155, 160
 Viṣṇu-Purāṇa 16, 17, 22, 160
 Viṣṇusahasranāma 13
 Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha 47
 Vivarta 186, 228
 Vivartavāda 63, 68, 186
 Vindīraṇya 3
 Vṛtti 28, 29, 124, 168, 206, 237,
 Vṛtticaitanya 123
 Vṛttijñāna 193, 194
 Vṛttikāra 23
 Vṛttimān 206
 Vyabhicāra 56
 Vyakti 97
 Vyaktibheda 229
 Vyāpti 54, 55, 165, 237
 Vyāptijñāna 165
 Vyāpyatvāśiddha 57
 Vyatīrekīśādhya 55
 Vyūha doctrine 13
 Vyūhas 18, 162, 168
 W
 West 51
 Wisdom 150
 Y
 Yādava Prakāśa 3, 4, 5, 227-230
 Yajurveda 3
 Yamunā 4
 Yamunāchāryya 3, 4, 5, 23, 139
 Yathāvaśhita 49
 Yatiṇḍramatadīpikā 53, 59, 79-82,
 86 fn., 87 fn., 103 fn., 107,
 131 fn., 149, 155
 Yoga 158
 Yogamāyā 164
 Yoga-physics 158
 Yogasūtra 145
 Yoga-system 158, 177
 Yoga-wisdom 19
 Yogic Pratyakṣa 165
 Yogis 33

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